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
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
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FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

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JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
FOR
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

PREFACE

1. Purpose. This publication sets forth the principles governing the joint conduct of US foreign internal defense (FID) operations. It provides a basis for understanding US national policy and general strategic objectives relating to FID and explains important DOD and US Government (USG) agency command and control (C2) relationships. In addition, it outlines basic US military capabilities in FID and provides commanders guidance on how to organize, plan, and train for the employment of US forces in interagency and multinational FID operations.

2. Application

a. Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, and joint task forces (JTFs), and the subordinate components of these commands. The JTTP also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service, or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service, under criteria set forth in Joint Pub 0-2. Because of the interagency approach required in a FID effort, this publication will also provide valuable information to other Government departments and agencies on how the military views and operates in this environment.

b. The US military will conduct military operations in support of FID programs. These military operations may be a major part of the total US effort, but they will be conducted with advice and direction from other USG agencies.

c. FID is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. This publication defines general C2 relationships and offers organizational examples for potential FID operations. This publication is authoritative but not directive, and commanders should use judgment in applying the guidance to direct FID planning and execution. The JTTP should be followed, except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If

conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.

d. The military portion of FID incorporates both conventional and special operations capabilities, is joint in nature, and supports interagency activities. Special operations forces (SOF), psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, and civil affairs (CA) forces are often particularly well suited to conduct or support FID operations because of their unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively a SOF mission, FID is a legislatively directed activity for SOF. SOF may (1) conduct FID unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, (2) support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or (3) support the employment of conventional military forces.

e. In applying the tactics, techniques, and procedures set forth in this publication, care must be taken to distinguish between distinct but related responsibilities in the two channels of authority to forces assigned to combatant commands. The Military Departments and Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. Commanders of the combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) over these assigned forces. Service component commanders are responsible both to joint force commanders (JFCs) in the operational chain of command and to the Military Departments and Services in the chain of command for matters that the JFC has not been assigned authority.

3. Scope. This publication covers a broad category of US operations involving the application of all elements of national power in supporting host nation (HN) efforts to combat lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. As a result, this JTTP is broader in scope than other publications. This publication is not intended to be a single source FID document. Service and other Government agency publications provide specific procedures for implementing the guidance provided in this publication in the areas of planning, organizing, and employing forces for FID operations.

4. Basis. This publication supports the overarching concept of and responsibilities for FID as provided in Joint Pub 0-2. In addition, this publication supports the doctrinal precepts and generally falls under the umbrella of operations described in Joint Pub 3-07. Joint Pub 3-07 provides the broad concepts for operations other than war while this publication focuses on specific ways and means for supporting nations facing lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. This publication draws from a wide variety of documents to outline the US position on this complex area. Appendix H, References, provides a comprehensive list of these documents; the references listed below establish the foundation for this publication.

a. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces."

b. Joint Pub 1-01, 30 July 1992, "Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program."

c. Joint Pub 1-02, 1 December 1989, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."

d. Joint Pub 3-0, 1 January 1990, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."

e. Joint Pub 3-05, 17 October 1990, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations."

f. Joint Pub 3-07, (in development) "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War."

g. Joint Pub 3-53, February 1987, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations."

h. Joint Test Pub 3-57, 25 October 1991, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. General. The United States seeks to promote the growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and fair and open international trade. We also support the security, stability, and well-being of our allies and other nations friendly to our interests. Although these interests appear to be obvious, recognizing how best to obtain goals and objectives supporting these interests is a complex and difficult task. The United States will generally employ a mix of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power in support of these objectives. As part of this effort, friendly nations facing threats to their internal security may receive assistance from the United States through a variety of diplomatic, materiel, and instructional means. This important element of US foreign policy is called FID.

a. Commensurate with US policy goals, the focus of all US FID efforts is to support the HN's program of internal defense and development (IDAD). These national programs are designed to free and protect a nation from lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency by emphasizing the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of society. The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely to be economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, these needs should prescribe the principal focus of US efforts. Nevertheless, military assistance is often necessary to provide the secure environment for these efforts to become effective. These needs of society remain relevant to threats posed through illegal drug trafficking, terrorism, and civil unrest that affect all aspects of a nation's defense and development.

b. FID is the participation by the civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (Joint Pub 1-02). From the US perspective, FID has assumed many forms as support to foreign nations has evolved. In all cases, however, FID refers to the US activities that support an HN's IDAD strategy designed to protect against these threats.

c. This chapter lays the general foundation for US FID operations. These basic principles will be examined in more detail later in the publication.

2. Background

a. The United States has a long history of assisting the governments of friendly nations facing internal threats. In the chaos after World War II, the United States followed its massive wartime Lend Lease Program with postwar assistance by providing up to 90 percent of the support to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in support of war stricken Europe and the Far East. New balances of power and the devastation of Europe had permanently changed the strategic role and interests of the United States. This new role was vividly demonstrated by the economic, equipment, training, and advisory support provided to Greece and Turkey to stabilize their governments. This postwar US policy was reflected in the staunchly anti-Communist Truman Doctrine that established US policy as that of ". . . supporting free peoples who are attempting to resist subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

b. Both the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were US designed and implemented programs concentrating on repelling the external threat of Communist aggression as well as thwarting internal threats to supported nations. Although this concept of support differs significantly from today's FID concept, these programs set the precedent for US support and assistance to friendly nations facing threats to their national security. Early postwar arms transfers were carried out as grant aid (giveaway) under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Later, as the economies of recipient nations regenerated, arms transfers, economic aid, and collective security began to merge under a program that was to be known under the Nixon administration as security assistance.

c. The US policy of assisting friendly nations to develop stable governments and prevent the spread of communism, fueled by the fear of the domino effect, continued through the US experience with Cuba beginning in 1959. This policy reached a new level during the 1960s with the Alliance for Progress, which involved Central and South America. This era of assistance culminated with the war in Vietnam, a major turning point for US policy that shaped the concept of FID as the United States now conducts it. In 1969, with US public and congressional opinion moving strongly against the war in Vietnam and against US intervention in general, President Richard M. Nixon announced a new US approach to

supporting friendly nations. The Nixon or Guam Doctrine expressed this policy with emphasis on the point that the United States would assist friendly nations but would require them to provide the manpower and be ultimately responsible for their own national defense. This fundamental concept of nations developing their own IDAD programs supported through US training and materiel assistance has become the basis for today's FID concept.

d. In recent times, the United States has provided the same type of assistance in Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait. Although not of the same magnitude as the post-WWII efforts, the United States contributed to restoring stability in the various regions after crisis situations.

3. Relationships. It is important to frame the US FID effort in perspective with the overall span of US doctrine that it supports and to understand how it fits into the HN's IDAD program.

a. FID is a primary program used in supporting friendly nations operating in or threatened with potential hostilities. Joint Pub 3-07 describes military operations other than war in terms of five operational categories. Those categories are: insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping, counterdrug (CD), and contingency operations. All of these categories may, to some degree, include FID operations as an integral component in supporting the fight against lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency.

b. US military support to FID should focus on assisting an HN in anticipating, precluding, and countering these threats or other potential threats. Emphasis on internal developmental programs as well as internal defense programs when organizing, planning, and executing military support to a FID program is an essential aspect. This assists the HN to address the root causes of instability in a proactive manner rather than reacting to threats.

c. US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused toward counterinsurgency. Although much of the FID effort remains focused on this important area, US FID programs may aim at other threats to an HN's internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface,

and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. Focus on the internal development portion of IDAD enables the FID program to address other areas than just counterinsurgency.

d. US military operations to support a FID program provide training, materiel, advice, or assistance to support local forces in executing an IDAD program rather than US forces conducting the IDAD mission for the HN.

e. US FID efforts are always directed at supporting internal HN action programs aimed at bolstering IDAD. The fundamental principle of all FID efforts is that they foster internal solutions and assist IDAD programs for which the supported nation has ultimate responsibility and control.

f. US military efforts designed to defend nations against external aggression are extended through mutual defense treaties and are not the topic of this publication.

4. The FID Operational Framework. As shown in Figure I-1, FID is a program involving all elements of national power used together to support an HN's IDAD program. Although this publication centers on the military element's contribution, it is important to also understand the overlying national strategy that directs FID activities and how all elements of national power support the concept.




Figure I-1. FID

Figure I-1. FID

a. Diplomatic Element. FID is primarily focused on the diplomatic element of national power. A dysfunctional political system in a nation results in internal instability. Often the first element exercised by the United States, diplomatic efforts usually dominate early methods of assistance. Indirect and direct military support provided through training, logistics, or other support all make significant diplomatic statements by demonstrating US commitment and resolve.

b. Economic Element. Economics influence every aspect of FID support. Often, the internal strife a supported nation faces is brought on by unfavorable economic conditions within that nation. These conditions weaken national infrastructures and result in an inability to meet the basic needs of the people. These conditions establish an environment ripe for increasing lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. The economic tool is used in a variety of ways, ranging from direct financial assistance through the International Monetary Fund and favorable trade arrangements, to the provision of equipment and training under security assistance (SA).

c. Informational Element. Effective use of public diplomacy, public affairs (PA), and PSYOP are essential to a FID program. FID programs offer a great opportunity for public misunderstanding and for exploitation by elements hostile to the United States and its allies. US foreign assistance has often been met with skepticism by our public and has typically been the target for enemy PSYOP campaigns. FID offers a tremendous opportunity to portray US support in a positive light, but not at the expense of the supported nation that may be sensitive to accepting aid. Accurate portrayal of US FID efforts through positive information programs can influence worldwide perceptions of the US FID programs and the HN's desire to embrace changes and improvements necessary to correct its problems.

d. Military Element. The military plays an important supporting role in the total FID program. Military support, however, has a far-reaching impact on all elements of national power and cannot be conducted in isolation from other aspects of US policy in the HN. In some cases, the role of the US military may become more important because military officials have greater access to and credibility with HN regimes that are heavily influenced or dominated by their own military. The ability of the US military to influence the professionalism of the HN military and thus their

democratic process is considerable. In such cases, success may depend on US representatives being able to persuade host military authorities to lead or support reform efforts aimed at eliminating or reducing corruption and human rights abuse. The FID effort is a multinational interagency effort requiring synchronization of all elements of national power and interagency efforts. US military support also requires joint planning and execution to ensure that the efforts of all Service or functional components are mutually supportive and focused. Military FID programs can generally be categorized into indirect support, direct support (not including combat operations), and combat operations. These categories represent significantly different levels of US diplomatic and military commitment and risk. It should be noted, however, that various programs and operations within these categories can occur simultaneously. As an example, certain forms of indirect support and direct support (not including combat operations) may continue even when US forces are committed to a combat role. (See Figure I-2.)




Figure I-2. FID: An Integrated Program

Figure I-2. FID: An Integrated Program

5. DOD FID Tools. The specific tools used in executing the DOD portion of the FID program, under the categories mentioned above, are discussed in the following paragraphs.

a. Indirect Support. These operations emphasize the principle of an HN's self-sufficiency. Indirect support focuses on building strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency. The US military contribution to this type of support is provided primarily through SA and nation assistance supplemented by joint and combined exercises and exchange programs.

(1) Security Assistance. SA is a principal instrument in the US FID effort. Like FID itself, SA is a broad, encompassing topic and includes efforts of civilian agencies as well as those of the military. By definition, SA is the provision of defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of US national policies and objectives. SA, while integral to our FID program, is also much broader than FID alone. The




Figure I-3. The Relationship of SA to FID

Figure I-3. The Relationship of SA to FID

preponderance of SA (80 to 90 percent), is aimed at enhancing regional stability of areas of the world facing external rather than internal threats. SA directed at external threats is outside the purview of this publication. This relationship of SA to FID is depicted in Figure I-3. Note that only a portion of the overall SA effort fits into the FID area, but that it is a large part of the overall FID effort. Also, it is important to note that the direct support (not involving combat operations) category makes up the preponderance of the remaining military operations. The SA program is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended, and is under the supervision and general direction of the Department of State (DOS). The military component of SA, implemented by the Department of Defense in accordance with policies established by DOS, has as its principal components the foreign military financing program (FMFP), International Military Education and Training (IMET), foreign military sales (FMS), and peacekeeping operations (PKO). These components, combined with the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and commercial sales licensed under the AECA provide the SA tools that the United States can use to further its national interests and support the overall FID effort. The specific procedures for requesting and approving HN SA requests and integrating the SA tool into the combatant commanders' military plans to support a FID program are complex. This area will be examined in more detail later in this publication. Figure I-4 offers a general overview of the SA management process and lists the key military programs.

(a) Foreign Military Sales. This is a nonappropriated program through which governments can purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States. Eligible nations can use this program to help build national security infrastructures. A limitation of this program is that the nations that require assistance are often unable to finance their needs.

(b) Foreign Military Financing Program. The program provides funding to purchase defense articles and services, design and construction services, and training through FMS or commercial




Figure I-4. US Security Assistance

Figure I-4. US Security Assistance

channels. The FMFP can be an extremely effective FID tool by providing assistance to nations with weak economies that would otherwise be unable to afford US assistance. In FY 1990, FMFP absorbed the funding authorized under the grant program, MAP--MAP was dissolved. This reorganization resulted in a greater percentage of grants available under FMFP, and FMFP became the sole source of US financing for the acquisition of defense articles, and services, including training, by foreign governments.

(c) International Military Education and Training Program. IMET offers perhaps the greatest positive impact by providing training to selected foreign military and related civilian personnel on a low-cost, grant aid basis. This program has long-term positive effects on the relations of US and supported nations and on the development of strong and stable military infrastructures within regions of the world vital to US interests. Because foreign nations will logically continue to send personnel for training who show potential for promotion to senior government positions, IMET allows the United States to develop lines of communications (LOCs) with foreign military and civilian personnel worldwide that may become increasingly important with the passage of time.

(d) Peacekeeping Operations. This program funds US PKO such as the multinational force and observers (MFO) in the Sinai and the US contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyprus. These operations are limited in scope and funding levels and, although related to FID operations, are generally considered separate activities with very focused goals and objectives.

(e) Antiterrorism Assistance. Antiterrorism assistance, under the overall coordination of the Secretary of State, is designed to enhance the ability of foreign law enforcement personnel to deter terrorist acts such as bombing, kidnaping, assassination, hostage taking, and hijacking. Such assistance may include training services and the provision of equipment and other commodities related to bomb detection and disposal, management of hostage situations,

physical security, and other counterterrorism matters.
(Note: DOD training of law enforcement personnel is significantly restricted by Section 660 of the FAA.)

(f) ESF and Commercial Sales Licensed Under the AECA. These are the two primary non-DOD SA programs. The ESF provides grants or loans to enhance the economic stability of selected nations and is managed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) under the policy direction of the Secretary of State in cooperation with the Director of the Internal Development Cooperation Agency. The commercial sales program is a mechanism to monitor and control direct sales from US industry to foreign governments. This is accomplished by licensing through the Office of Defense Trade Control, DOS.

(2) Joint and Combined Exercises. These programs strengthen US-HN relations and interoperability of forces. They are joint and Service-funded and complement SA and civil and military operations (CMO) by validating HN needs and capabilities and by providing a vehicle for the conduct of humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) programs. There are very strict legal restrictions on the type of support that can be provided and on the monetary limits of such support. More detail is provided on applicable legal considerations in Chapter IV and Appendix A of this publication.

(3) Exchange Programs. Military exchange programs also support the overall FID program by fostering mutual understanding between forces, familiarizing each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other, and enhancing cultural awareness. Exchange programs, coupled with the IMET SA program, are extremely valuable in improving HN and US relations and may also have long-term implications for strengthening democratic ideals and respect for human rights among supported governments. It is important, however, that such exchange programs (funded with title 10 monies) do not themselves become vehicles for SA training or other services to the HN, in contravention of the FAA and AECA.

b. Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations). These operations involve the use of US forces providing

direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military. They differ from SA in that they are joint- or Service-funded, do not usually involve the transfer of arms and equipment, and do not usually include training local military forces. Direct support operations are normally conducted when the HN has not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle. Assistance will normally focus on CMO (primarily, the provision of services to the local populace), communications and intelligence sharing, and logistic support.

(1) Civil Military Operations. CMO are a variety of activities supporting military operations that embrace the relationship between military forces, civilian authorities, and the population. CMO also focus on the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. CMO are often linked not only to support a counterinsurgency program, but effect all FID programs. CMO may be used in a preventive manner to address root causes of instability, in a reconstructive manner after conflict; or may be used to support disaster relief, civil defense, CD, and antiterrorist activities. CMO involve PSYOP, and CA, humanitarian assistance (HA), military civic action (MCA), and HCA.

(a) Civil Affairs. CA serves as a critical link between US forces providing support in an HN and the HN's government, military force, and civilian population. In FID, CA facilitates the integration of US military support into the overall IDAD programs of the supported nation. (See Joint Pub 3-57.)

(b) Psychological Operations. PSYOP activities ensure clear communication of US intentions and goals and take the offensive against deception initiated by adversaries. PSYOP programs ensure that adversaries do not misrepresent US efforts and that, through lack of information, US forces themselves do not cause the local populace to misinterpret their actions. (See Joint Pub 3-53.)

(c) Humanitarian Assistance. HA operations are conducted by US military forces to alleviate the urgent nonmilitary needs of the HN populace

until the appropriate civilian agencies are able to accept this responsibility. HA programs are often an integral part of an overall FID program.

(d) Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. HCA activities are designed to provide assistance to the HN populace in conjunction with US military operations. HCA are integrated into the overall FID program to enhance the stability of the combatant commander's AOR as well as to improve the readiness of US forces deployed in the theater.

(e) Military Civic Action. MCA is the use of predominately indigenous military personnel to conduct construction projects, support missions, and services useful to the local population. These activities may involve US supervision and advice but will normally be conducted by the local military. MCA is an essential part of military support to a FID program to assist the local government develop capabilities to provide for the security and well being of its own population.

(2) Intelligence and Communications Sharing. US intelligence sharing ranges from strategic analysis to current intelligence summaries and situation reporting for tactical operations. An adequate intelligence collection and dissemination capability is often one of the weakest links in an HN's military capability. US military communications hardware and operators may also be supplied in cases where HN infrastructure cannot support intelligence operations.

(3) Logistics. US military capabilities may be used to provide transportation or maintenance support to the HN nation military in operations that do not expose US personnel to hostile fire. The FAA does not generally authorize the transfer of equipment or supplies. Logistics support must be provided with consideration to the long-term effect on the capability of the local forces to become self-sufficient.

c. US Combat Operations. The introduction of US combat forces into FID operations is a National Command Authorities (NCA) decision and serves only as a temporary solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and provide security for the populace. In all

cases, US combat operations support the HN's IDAD program and remain strategically defensive in nature. Other joint and Service doctrines provide specific tactical missions and procedures, but there are certain general principles that should guide employment of US forces in a tactical role in support of a FID program. These procedures, and the unique C2 and employment considerations for joint and combined tactical operations in FID, serve as the focus for discussions of tactical operations in this publication.

(1) The primary role for US military forces in tactical operations is to support, advise, and assist HN forces through logistics, intelligence or other combat support, and service support means. This allows the HN force to concentrate on taking the offensive against hostile elements.

(2) If the level of lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency reaches a level that HN forces cannot control, US forces may be required to engage the hostile elements. In this case, the objective of US operations is to protect or stabilize the HN's political, economic, and social institutions until the host military can assume these responsibilities.

(3) In all cases, the strategic initiative and responsibility lie with the HN. To preserve its legitimacy and ensure a lasting solution to the problem, the host government must bear this responsibility. A decision for US forces to take the strategic initiative amounts to a transition to war.

(4) Given the combined and interagency impact of conducting combat operations supporting FID, JFCs can expect complex C2 relationships. More information on C2 relationships and issues is provided in Chapter II.

(5) The nature of US tactical participation in host country internal conflicts requires judicious and prudent rules of engagement (ROE) and guidelines for the application of force. Inappropriate destruction and violence attributed to US forces may easily reduce the legitimacy and sovereignty of the supported government. In addition, these incidents may be used by adversaries to fuel anti-American sentiments and assist the cause of the opposition.

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1. General

a. Integrated Effort

(1) As discussed in Chapter I, when it is in the interests of US national security, the United States may employ all elements of national power to assist a friendly nation in conducting IDAD programs.

(2) For FID to be successful in meeting an HN's needs, the USG must integrate efforts of multiple government agencies. This is the best way to ensure the efforts complement each other and that available resources are used effectively and efficiently. Effective integration is difficult and consists of much more than mere coordination; it is not enough for national FID programs simply to be resolved. Ideally the FID program will incorporate all elements in a synergistic manner that supports HN requirements and US national policy and interests in the most advantageous way.

(3) Such integration and coordination are essentially vertical between levels of command and organization, and horizontal between USG agencies and HN military and civilian agencies. In addition, integration and coordination requirements may extend to allied nations participating with the United States in multinational FID efforts. As is evident in Figure II-1, the lines of organization and C2 in a FID situation are interwoven and often unclear. This factor, combined with the breadth of potential FID operations, makes complete integration and coordination of all national FID efforts a daunting challenge.

b. The Need for Specialized FID Management

(1) Management of the FID effort begins at the national level with the selection of those nations the United States will support through FID programs. This decision is made by the President, with advice from the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and other members of the National Security Council (NSC). Funding for these programs is appropriated by Congress.

(2) The United States will normally consider FID support only if the following three conditions exist:

(a) The existing or threatened internal disorder is such that action by the United States supports US national strategic goals.

(b) The threatened nation is capable of effectively using US assistance.

(c) The threatened nation requests US assistance.




Figure II-1. FID Coordination

Figure II-1. FID Coordination

(3) If the President makes the decision to provide military support to a FID program, the level and type of assistance required must be determined. The level of commitment will dictate the type of management required. No two FID programs are exactly alike. Just as national and regional FID managers tailor programs to meet the needs of the supported nation, they also tailor the management of these programs to match the magnitude and type of assistance provided.


(4) Ordinarily, when the decision limits FID support to minor levels of SA or CMO, there is no requirement for a special management program. In these cases, standard interagency coordination should be adequate. The major FID programs (i.e., those in support of nations critical to US national interests) demand levels of management and coordination beyond what is normally found at the interagency, combatant command, and Country Team levels.

2. National-Level Organizations. FID involves operations ranging from development of civilian infrastructure to combat operations. To operate effectively in this complicated environment, the military commander must understand the basic functions of all levels of decisionmaking in FID and realize how to coordinate those levels with which he interacts in the execution of military operations in support of FID. The discussion of important activities that impact on FID is not designed to be comprehensive; it is included only to provide a general understanding of the major FID players from the national level down to the combatant command level.

a. National Security Council. The first step in translating national-level decisions and guidance into operation plans and specific guidance to Government agencies and departments begins at the NSC. The NSC serves as an advisory organization to the President in establishing national policy and as the senior Government interagency coordination activity. The NSC consists of three components: the statutory members (President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense), the statutory advisers (Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and, the participants the President may direct to complement the body (Figure II-2).

(1) The organizational framework for the NSC consists of a four-level structure for national policymaking. The council itself makes up the first level and subordinate to the council are three levels

National Security Council



Principals Committee

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chair)
 Secretary of State Director of Central Intelligence
 Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 US Rep to UN Assist to the Pres for Economic Policy
 and others, as appropriate

Deputies Committee

Deputy Assistant to the Pres for National Security Affairs (Chair)
 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Deputy DCI
 Under Secretary of State for Pol Affairs Vice CJCS
 Assist to the Vice Pres for National Security Affairs

Interagency Working Groups (NSC/IWGs)

Chaired by Assistant Secretary level representatives




Figure II-2. NSC Structure

Figure II-2. NSC Structure

of committees. These are the Principals Committee (NSC/PC), the Deputies Committee (NSC/DC), and the Interagency Working Groups (IWGs).

(2) The Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the 1987 National Defense Authorization Act mandated the centralized management of LIC issues and corresponding FID requirements at the NSC level, and directed the establishment of the Board for Low-Intensity Conflict to do so. The NSC/DC, in addition to its other responsibilities, serves as the Board for Low-Intensity Conflict. This board considers national LIC and related FID policy matters and coordinates interagency efforts with the goal of creating a unified FID effort.

(3) In its role as the Board for Low-Intensity Conflict, the NSC/DC is supported by IWGs, which advise on LIC matters as they relate to their areas. These IWGs are further supported by functional working groups that meet to address issues as required to help shape national policy and enhance interagency coordination.

b. Department of State. DOS is generally the lead Government agency in executing US FID programs. The following narrative presents the major responsibilities of the DOS related to the planning and execution of FID.

(1) The Secretary of State has responsibility for advising the President in forming foreign policy and has other major specific responsibilities key to the overall planning and execution of the national FID effort.

(2) DOS assists the NSC in building national FID policies and priorities and is the lead Government agency to carry out these policies in this interagency arena. DOS involvement extends from policy formulation, at the highest level, to mission execution at the HN and Country Team levels.

(3) The Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs is the principal adviser and focal point for SA matters within the DOS. Control and coordination of SA extends from this office to the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs. These lines of supervision and administration interface with Department of Defense at the individual Country Teams and security

assistance organizations (SAOs) in the HNs (see Figure I-4). DOS manages the overall US SA program; the DOD role is limited to implementing the military portion of SA.

(4) At the national level, the DOS Bureau of Political Military Affairs is the principal channel of liaison between the DOS and Department of Defense. In addition, this bureau has primary responsibility for assisting the Secretary of State in executing his responsibilities of managing the military portion of SA.

(5) The Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, DOS, is especially important in FID programs as a coordinating link in US support of HN CD programs.

c. DOS Agencies. Also within the DOS organization are two agencies that operate with some autonomy in areas that have significant impact on military activities in support of FID programs.

(1) US Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID carries out nonmilitary assistance programs designed to assist certain less developed nations increase their productive capacities and improve their quality of life. It also promotes economic and political stability in friendly nations. USAID administers two kinds of foreign economic assistance: developmental assistance and the ESF. The mission of USAID and the parallel DOD developmental activities supporting FID underscore the importance of employing an integrated interagency effort.

(2) US Information Agency (USIA). USIA supports US foreign policy objectives by informing the public in other nations about US programs and policies and administering overseas cultural and exchange programs. These activities enhance US military operations in support of HN IDAD programs through public diplomacy to the supported government and its populace. DOD and USIA informational efforts must be mutually supportive. Close coordination between USIA (US Information Services (USIS) overseas), military PA offices, and PSYOP elements is essential, although often problematic.

d. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA supports the FID mission in both a national-level advisory

capacity and at the regional and country levels through direct support of FID activities. DCI advises the NSC in matters concerning the coordination and implementation of intelligence activities in support of national-level FID programs. On the regional level, CIA provides intelligence in support of FID threat analysis and needs assessments and supports the Ambassador with intelligence at the Country Team level. This intelligence support is extremely important in determining the level and degree of required resources and in determining the effectiveness of these committed resources. Military intelligence activities must be linked with CIA activities, either directly or through the Country Team, to ensure the exchange of information necessary to support the FID program.

e. Department of Defense. The DOD national-level organizations involved in FID management include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff.

(1) Office of the Secretary of Defense. In most FID matters, OSD acts as a policy making organization. Because of the tight legislative control on military activities to support FID programs, OSD closely supervises the military portion of SA. Numerous activities at the OSD level affect FID programs. The four activities listed below are directly involved in the areas of SA and in the general areas of LIC- and FID-related issues.

(a) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) exercises overall direction, authority, and control concerning SA for OSD through the various Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

(b) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) supervises special operations of the Department of Defense and has far-reaching policy responsibilities that can impact on virtually all areas of FID policy and programs.

(c) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Security Affairs (ASD(RSA)) establishes SA policy and supervises SA programs through the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA).

(d) DSAA administers and supervises SA planning and formulates and executes SA efforts in coordination with other Government programs. The DSAA also conducts international logistics and sales negotiations with representatives of foreign nations and serves as the DOD focal point for liaison with US industry regarding SA. Finally, the DSAA develops and promulgates SA procedures, maintains the data base for the programs, and makes determinations with respect to the allocation of FMS administrative funds. All these activities support FID programs.

(e) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ATSD(PA)) supervises and establishes policy for PA programs with the Department of Defense. Public affairs is an integral part of military support to FID programs.

(2) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plays an important role in providing strategic guidance to the combatant commanders for the conduct of military operations to support FID programs. This guidance is provided primarily through the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Joint Planning Document (JPD), and the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), key components of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). This guidance is provided after, and often modified as a result of, the interagency coordination and policy development process described earlier in this chapter. General guidance by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding FID responsibilities is provided to Services, combatant commanders, and commanders of unified commands in Joint Pub 0-2. Because of their familiarity with the needs of the friendly nations in their regions, the combatant commanders are given great latitude in managing and coordinating their military activities in support of FID programs.

(a) Because of the wide variety of potential military activities to support FID, no one Joint Staff directorate monitors all military activities to support FID. Three staff directorates provide the majority of the input to planning guidance and provide most of the oversight for FID operations.

(b) Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5), contributes to the strategic FID guidance provided to combatant commanders through the JSCP. Primary functions include coordinating SA with US military plans and programs, and advising the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on SA programs.

(c) Operations Directorate (J-3), monitors major current military operations in support of FID.

(d) Intelligence Directorate (J-2), assists with the coordination of national-level intelligence support requirements and provides oversight guidance on intelligence operations and HN training requests in support of FID.

3. Combatant Command Organization. Combatant commands with geographic areas of operations (AORs) are responsible for planning and executing military operations in support of FID in their regions. Other unified commands play a supporting role to those combatant commanders by providing resources to conduct operations as directed by the NCA.

a. General. The combatant commander has the responsibility of coordinating and monitoring all the military activities in his AOR in support of FID programs. The priority and importance of the FID mission will depend on the individual theater; however, in certain areas FID may represent the combatant commander's most important peacetime mission. Organizing for military operations in FID will vary, but there are fundamental principles that apply when planning or executing FID operations. For example:

(1) Military activities in support of FID are an integral part of the long-range strategic plans and objectives for the command's AOR. These plans must reflect national security priorities and guidance.

(2) Although planning and executing military operations in FID require a coordinated staff and interagency effort, responsibility and accountability remain with the designated planning and operations section.

b. Staff Organization. The general purpose and functions of the combatant commander's joint staff are provided in Joint Pub 0-2. The purpose of this

discussion is to outline general organizational requirements for FID oversight and management at the combatant command level.


(1) Plans, Policy, and Strategy Directorate (J5). The J5, as the staff planner, must incorporate military support to FID programs into theater strategy and plans. The J5 has three ways to accomplish this: (1) the Plans Division prepares the combatant commander's vision and strategy, a 5-10 year document that is key to long- and mid-term objectives for military support to FID programs, (2) the Political Military Affairs Division links the combatant command to the SAOs, and (3) the SA Section provides oversight of military SA efforts and coordinates regional SA activities critical to avoiding stovepiped SA activities. The SA Section may be delegated to the J3, J4, or J7, depending on the desires of the combatant commander.

(2) The Operations Directorate (J3). The J3 monitors the execution of military operations in support of a FID program using the Current Operations Section and the Joint Exercises and Training Section. Additionally, J3 uses CA and the PSYOP Section, which orchestrates specifically designed PSYOP programs to maximize the positive effects of military activities in support of FID, and the special operations staff element (SOSE), which assists in the unique planning and employment considerations for SOF in support of FID programs to accomplish FID-related responsibilities. Combatant commanders may elect to assign all these functions to the theater subunified special operations command (SOC).

(3) Intelligence Directorate (J2). The combatant command intelligence directorate supplements estimates produced by the national intelligence agencies. Important information is economic, political, and social conditions, as well as military threats. Critical to military operations in support of FID is the accurate detection and assessment of internal instability. Early warning in this realm may preclude the use of force. Cooperative intelligence liaisons between the United States and the host country are vital.

(4) Political Advisor. The POLAD serves as a link between the DOS and the combatant commander's staff.

An effective use of the POLAD's skill in FID-intensive theaters may be for the combatant commander to establish a FID advisory committee (Figure II-3) consisting of interagency representatives and military staff from Country Teams and the combatant commander's staff. This committee acts as a focal point for the coordination and integration of military and nonmilitary support to FID programs.



The FID Advisory Committee may consist of representatives of all the activities shown, plus SOF, medical, engineer, and others as the CINC sees fit.

Figure II-3. FID Advisory Committee

Figure II-3. FID Advisory Committee

(5) Legal Adviser. The legal adviser should evaluate all military operations in support of a FID program because of the current legal restrictions and complex funding sources. See Appendix A for more information about the legal considerations when supporting a FID program.

(6) PA Element. Integral to successful military operations in support of FID programs is public awareness and support. A coordinated public information program to support a FID program is essential. The special staff PA officer must be an active participant in military planning to support FID.

(7) Other Staff Elements. All staff elements contribute to the overall support of the FID program. Some, such as J4 and J6, may be given primary responsibility for specific military technical support missions. These staff elements will usually focus on the direct support (not involving combat operations) category of military support to FID.

4. Subordinate Unified Commands. Combatant commanders may form area and functional subordinate unified commands.

a. An example of a regional subordinate unified command is US Forces, Korea, under USPACOM. The responsibilities for FID support in these area commands closely parallel those discussed for the combatant commands. Specific authority for planning and conducting FID depends on the level of authority delegated by the combatant commander. However, basic principles and staff organization remain consistent.

b. Functional subordinate unified commands such as USSOCSOUTH, which is the theater SOC for USSOUTHCOM, control a specific functional capability. These functional commands contribute to FID planning and execution through management of FID areas related to their functional areas of expertise.

c. Theater subordinate unified SOCs are of particular importance because of the significant role of SOF in FID programs. The theater subordinate unified SOC normally has operational control (OPCON) of all SOF in the theater and has primary responsibility to plan and execute SOF operations in support of FID. Coordination between the theater subordinate unified SOC and the geographic


combatant commander is essential for effective management of military operations in support of FID, including joint and combined exercises, mobile training teams (MTTs), integration of conventional forces with SOF and other operations.

5. Joint Task Forces. Combatant commanders may form JTFs to execute a variety of priority missions. The JTF formed under USACOM to control CD operations (JTF-4) is an example of this concept. Another example, JTF-BRAVO, which is subordinate to USSOUTHCOM, was formed by the combatant commander for the primary mission of coordinating and supporting US military training exercises in Honduras during a time when a US forward presence in Central America was deemed necessary. The large number of training exercises and related HCA projects conducted were a primary factor in the decision to form the JTF. Other JTFs are organized to accomplish specific functional missions such as road construction and support for transportation and communications efforts. A theater with significant military activities in support of FID may consider organizing two JTFs--one for support and one for functional missions--to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations.

6. The US Diplomatic Mission and Country Team. The US diplomatic mission to an HN includes representatives of all US departments and agencies physically present in the country. The President gives the chief of the diplomatic mission, normally an Ambassador, direction and control over all US in-country government personnel. However, this authority does not extend to personnel in other missions or those assigned to either an international agency or to a combatant commander. Although the diplomatic mission is beyond the realm of the combatant commander's responsibility, close coordination with each mission in the commander's AOR is essential in order to build an effective overlying regional FID program. The effective use of the FID advisory committee in conjunction with a theater strategy that incorporates FID, will help ensure that the required coordination is accomplished.

a. Organization. The Country Team Concept (Figure II-4) denotes the process of in-country, interdepartmental coordination among key members of the US diplomatic mission. The DOS developed this concept of embassy management in the early 1950s, although it wasn't until 1974 that the term Country Team received its first official mention in Public Law 93-475. The composition of a Country Team varies widely, depending on the desires of the chief of mission, the in-country situation, and

the number and levels of US departments and agencies present. The principal military members of the Country Team are the Defense Attache and the chief of the SAO. Although the US area military commander (the combatant commander or a subordinate) is not a member of the diplomatic mission, he may participate or be represented in meetings and coordination conducted by the Country Team. The following discussion provides an outline of typical Country Team representatives and explains the military elements important to the FID mission. DOS and related activities from the national level were discussed earlier in this chapter; therefore, they will be mentioned only briefly here.



* Becomes Charge d'Affairs when Ambassador is out of the country or when an Ambassador has not yet been appointed.

Figure II-4. The Country Team Concept

Figure II-4. The Country Team Concept

(1) The Ambassador is the personal representative of the President of the United States. Ambassadorial authority extends to all elements of the mission and all official USG activities and establishments within the host country. Appendix B is the text of the presidential letter often used to outline the authority granted to the Ambassador to execute his or

her duties. Mentioned in this letter, the only exceptions to the Ambassador's authority over USG activities are the control of military elements under the separate command of a combatant commander or the control of elements of another US Mission or personnel assigned to an international agency. Within this authority, the Ambassador coordinates much of the FID effort in the assigned country. The Ambassador accomplishes this task either through the assigned SAO or through his Country Team. There is a close coordinating relationship between the Ambassador, the represented USG agencies, and the combatant commander.

(2) The US DOS is generally represented on the Country Team by the following:

(a) The Deputy Chief of Mission is the second in command, serves as executive officer and chief of staff, and directs the mission in the Ambassador's absence (then called the Charge D'Affairs).

(b) The Political Counselor directs the political section and is often third in command of the mission. The political section may also contain a political/military officer to assist in the coordination of military activities supporting FID programs.

(c) The Commercial Attache is trained by the Department of Commerce and promotes US commercial interests.

(3) USIA (USIS overseas) is represented by the following positions:

(a) The PA Officer is the ranking USIA officer in country responsible for implementing the US information program throughout the HN.

(b) The Information Officer is responsible for relations with the press and media.

(4) The Agency for International Development is represented by the in-country director of USAID. The director directs the nonmilitary US developmental efforts in the HN.

(5) Other USG departments, agencies, and interests may be represented by the following:

- (a) Treasury Attache.
- (b) Agricultural Attache.
- (c) Labor Attache.
- (d) Civil Air Attache.
- (e) Science Attache.
- (f) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Representative.
- (g) Director of the Peace Corps.

(6) The DOD organization and representation within the diplomatic mission and Country Team can range from as little as an envoy, to a full complement of Service attaches, or a major SAO. In nations with active FID programs, there is likely to be a larger military presence with most of these resources centered in the SAO.

(a) The US Defense Representative (USDR) is the representative for the Secretary of Defense and the Ambassador's liaison for all matters relating to administrative and security coordination for all DOD personnel and organizations in the HN that are not assigned to, attached to, nor under the command of a combatant commander. The USDR is designated by the USDP with the concurrences of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the appropriate combatant commander with area responsibility for the country to which the USDR is assigned. The position is advisory only, thus the USDR does not have either command or tasking authority. The USDR will normally be the senior military officer assigned to permanent duty and responsibility in the country. The appointment of the Defense Attache (DATT) or the SA officer as the USDR does not change either the scope of their primary responsibilities or their accountability to established rating officials.

(b) DATT is normally the senior Service attache assigned to the embassy. The DATT and other

Service attaches comprise the Defense Attache Office (USDAO) and serve as valuable liaisons to their HN counterparts. USDAOs are operated by DIA. The attaches also serve the Ambassador and coordinate with, and represent, their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attaches assist the FID program by exchanging information with the combatant commander's staff on HN military, social, economic, and political conditions. In many countries, the functions of an SAO are carried out within the USDAO under the direction of the DATT.

(c) The SAO is the most important FID-related military activity under the supervision of the Ambassador. The term US military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) at one time identified all Armed Forces organizations with SA responsibilities permanently assigned to US diplomatic missions. However, this and other similar terms may be replaced by the generic term "security assistance organization" or "SAO." The specific title of the SAO may vary depending on the HN where it is located. However, these differences reflect nothing more than the political climate within the host country. The organization of a typical SAO is indicated in Figure II-5.




Figure II-5. SAO Organization

Figure II-5. SAO Organization

1. The SAO reports to the US Ambassador and assists HN security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the SA program. SA offices also help US Country Teams communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the USG. This work is accomplished by means of the annual integrated assessment of security assistance (AIASA). The AIASA provides the basis for formulating the annual US SA budget request and has two parts--defense articles and services and military training. Each SAO will coordinate equipment requests contained in the AIASA with the geographic combatant commander.

2. The SAO is essentially a management organization that helps assess the HN needs and articulate them through the instruments described above. In addition, the SAO provides oversight of training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to assist the HN. The SAO is limited by law from giving direct training assistance that is normally provided through special teams and organizations assigned to perform limited tasks for specific periods. These include technical assistance field teams (TAFTs), MTTs, technical assistance teams (TATs), language training detachments, weapon system logistics offices, quality assurance teams (QATs), as well as site survey and defense requirement survey teams.

3. The foreign internal defense augmentation force (FIDAF) is a composite organization that may be established to augment the SAO when needed. When constituted, the FIDAF operates under a US combatant command or a subordinate JTF. FIDAF's FID mission is to assist SAOs with training and operational advice and to provide assistance to HN forces. The FIDAF may be activated in intensive FID theaters during surge operations to assist the relatively small SAO in managing the assistance teams described above. Employment of a FIDAF does not change the fact that all training teams deployed in

the HN are under the supervision of the Chief of the US Diplomatic Mission (Ambassador). Ideally, the FIDAF should be specially trained, area-oriented, and language-qualified, such as SOF. Although assisting the SAO, the FIDAF is funded under nonsecurity assistance funds.

(7) Extensive and effective lines of coordination in an organization such as the Country Team are critical to its effective functioning. Effective coordination from the national level down to the smallest independent agencies operating within the host country are essential. This arrangement and lines of coordination are illustrated in Figure II-6.




Figure II-6. Embassy and SAO Working Relationships

Figure II-6. Embassy and SAO Working Relationships

7. The Supported Host Nation. The HN IDAD program is always the centerpiece of any FID program. The entire FID effort is tailored to the needs of the individual nation and to effectively interface with the HN IDAD organization. Appendix C provides a more extensive explanation and also details a generic IDAD organizational structure. Appendix C can be useful to understand how the HN may organize and provides a basis from which to provide guidance to HNs on how to improve their IDAD organization.

a. IDAD Principles. Although IDAD organizations will vary depending on the environment, resources available, and other factors, certain basic principles guide a successful IDAD program. These principles include unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and a responsive government. These may seem overly simplistic and obvious; however, if they are not applied properly, the result may be a disjointed effort that damages the legitimacy and stability of the HN government. Appendix C provides further discussion of these principles.

b. HN Organization for IDAD. Just as the United States organizes to support a FID program, so must an HN organize to facilitate the extensive coordination required in a complex IDAD program. Appendix C provides a detailed view of an organizational method that facilitates this control and coordination. The concept generally requires an organization that is geographically organized into national and regional levels, where each level has its own functional structure. This concept facilitates management at both the macro and micro levels of those areas critical to accomplishing balanced development with the concomitant security, neutralization, and mobilization functions.

8. Multinational FID Force. The rapidly shifting global balance of power, along with emerging regional actors, may result in an increase in multinational FID efforts. This multinational approach to FID is a relatively new concept that will require innovative C2 and coordination procedures for FID planning and execution. Multinational programs will increase cultural and language barriers as well as further complicate interoperability of equipment and tactics. The FID planner must consider and address all these challenges when evaluating the usefulness of multinational FID operations. There is little doubt, however, that as the United States encourages other friendly nations to shoulder more of the FID burden, the frequency and scope of multinational FID operations will increase.

CHAPTER III

PLANNING FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1. General

a. FID is designed to bolster the internal stability and security of the supported nation. Only a comprehensive planning process at both the national and regional level can provide the means to reach this goal.

b. The national FID effort should involve the integration of all elements of national power. This effort must entail the complete integration of military operations in support of the FID program to complement the overall national program. However, this chapter will concentrate only on the military aspects of planning FID support.

c. NSC directives promulgate US FID policy. JSPS documents reflect the military responsibilities for carrying out this broad guidance.

d. The entire focus of US assistance under FID is to assist an HN, if possible, in anticipating, precluding, and, as a last resort, countering an internal threat. The type of planning necessary is obviously dictated by the type or types of support being provided. Support in anticipating and precluding threats is preventive in nature and is likely to require a mix of indirect and direct support not involving tactical operations. An existing threat is likely to require responses that span all categories of FID support, to include US combat operations. A detailed discussion of employment considerations is included in Chapter IV.

2. Planning Imperatives. FID has certain aspects that make planning for it unique. Planners must consider some basic imperatives when integrating FID into strategies and plans.

a. Planners must consider long-term or strategic effects of all US assistance efforts before FID programs are implemented. This long-term consideration is especially important in building HN development and defense self-sufficiency, both of which may require large investments of time and materiel.

b. Planners must tailor military support of FID programs to the environment and the specific needs of the supported HN. They must consider the threat as well as

local religious, social, economic, and political factors when developing the military plans to support FID. Overcoming the tendency to use a US frame of reference is important because this potentially damaging tendency can result in equipment, training, and infrastructure not at all suitable for the nation receiving US assistance.

c. Planners must understand that a basic premise of the FID program is that the ultimate responsibility for IDAD rests with the HN. US planners must measure all FID plans against this precept.

3. DOD Guidance. Much of the military planning for FID is decentralized to the combatant command level. The combatant commander bases strategy and military planning to support FID on the broad guidance and missions provided in the JSPS. This section will briefly discuss the major JSPS guidance documents and their relation to the combatant commander's FID planning process. Only those documents most relevant to the FID planning process will be discussed. Refer to Joint Pub 5-0 and CJCS MOP 7 for more information on JSPS and operational planning procedures.

a. The NMS provides the advice of the Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense concerning the recommended national military strategy and fiscally constrained force structure required to support attainment of national security objectives. The NMS allows the combatant commanders to provide feedback about priorities and force structure requirements, which may be significant in highlighting those FID areas of importance that the JSCP (discussed below) has not resourced or recognized as specified or implied missions.

b. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JSCP is the principal vehicle by which the CINCs are tasked to develop OPLANS, CONPLANS, and concept summaries for global and regional contingencies. Through the guidance and resources provided in the JSCP, the combatant commanders develop their OPLANS, CONPLANS, and concept summaries to support FID programs. Generally, the JSCP provides guidance important to FID in the following areas.

(1) JSCP provides general taskings to the combatant commanders that may mandate military support to a FID program or provide the strategic guidance and

direction from which combatant commanders may deduce military missions to support FID programs.

(2) JSCP provides a list of major combat forces expected to be available during the planning period and apportions those forces for planning.

(3) JSCP has 16 annexes that are published separately. Most of these annexes impact on military planning and execution to support FID programs; however, four are directly tied to FID as described below:

(a) The PSYOP annex establishes PSYOP objectives and provides planning guidance. It also identifies the PSYOP forces for each Service and assigns planning tasks to combatant commands and selected Defense agencies. The PSYOP program will be a major integrated part of the overall FID effort. This annex may designate some specific FID-related PSYOP taskings and will outline general PSYOP themes for the combatant commander to consider in the development of the theater FID program.

(b) The SOF annex identifies the SOF objectives and resources to meet these objectives. This annex covers all aspects of SOF missions. The inclusion of such a broad range of potential missions requires planners to closely examine this annex for its affect on FID programs.

(c) The CA annex is very important to the planning of military support to FID programs. This annex will provide specific planning tasks to the Services and combatant commands for CA. The CA missions of surveying, assisting, advising, and coordinating are essential to effectively implement US military support to FID efforts.

(d) The forward presence operations annex is also important to planning of theater military support to FID. This annex may contain guidance concerning support to CD, nation assistance, SA, and other forward presence operations.

c. At the theater level, the combatant commander, using a CINC-integrated priority list, also identifies

requirements to support FID programs and requests authorization and resourcing.

4. General Theater Planning Requirements. Combatant commanders with geographic AORs may develop theater strategies and/or campaign plans that support taskings by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the JSCP. Combatant commanders vary the planning instruments they use to direct activities in their areas of operations (AOs). Regardless of how commanders may tailor the planning process, military activities in support of FID requirements are integrated into concepts and plans from the strategic level down to and including the tactical level.

a. Theater strategy translates national and alliance strategic tasks and direction into long-term, regionally focused concepts to accomplish specific missions and objectives. The NMS and JSCP guide the development of this strategy that incorporates peacetime and war objectives and reflects national and DOD policy and guidance. Peacetime goals will normally focus on deterring hostilities and enhancing stability in the theater. FID is an integral part of this strategy. The determination of the desired end state for the theater is an important element in the strategy process. This determination establishes the theater's strategic direction on which planners base campaign plans as well as other plans. There is no specific format for developing or documenting the theater strategy. In general, the theater strategy will normally include an analysis of US national policy and interests, a strategic assessment of the area of operations, a threat analysis, the combatant commander's vision, and a statement of theater missions and objectives.

b. Theater campaign plans are operational extensions of the theater strategy. They provide the commander's vision and intent through broad operational concepts and provide the framework for supporting operation plans. Joint Pub 3-0 discusses campaign plans in more detail and provides a sample format for a theater campaign plan.

c. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the approved system for conventional operation planning and execution. The JOPES deliberate planning process interrelates with other national military strategy and planning documents to develop operation plans. The deliberate planning process is particularly applicable to FID planning since most military activities

in support of FID programs are planned well in advance as part of a larger strategy or campaign.

5. FID Planning Procedures and Considerations. The JOPES deliberate planning process consists of five phases as shown in Figure III-1. This section will discuss major FID planning considerations in each of these five phases and show how they fit into the overall combatant commander's strategy and plans.

a. Initiation. There are three ways the combatant commander identifies requirements for military activities to support FID. Plans for these specific military operations in support of FID become part of the overall theater effort and incorporated into all levels of planning.

(1) Top down through the JSPS, in accordance with the provisions of Joint Pub 0-2 or other directives.

(2) Bottom up from an HN or Country Team in the combatant commander's AOR. The combatant commander may forward these requests to the NCA for authorization. The combatant commander may authorize these support missions whenever they are in accordance with US law and directed through the JSPS or Joint Pub 0-2.




Figure III-1. JOPES Deliberate Planning Process Phases

Figure III-1. JOPES Deliberate Planning Process Phases

(3) Combatant commander initiated. Military support to FID programs that is not directed under an existing specified or implied mission may be

identified. The combatant commander endorses these requirements and obtains authorization from the NCA.

b. Concept Development. The specific steps followed in this phase of the JSPS are detailed in Joint Pub 5-0. Figure III-2 provides an overview of the major concept development stages. This section addresses important FID considerations.




Figure III-2. Concept Development

(1) Before beginning FID planning, the commander's staff will conduct a thorough mission analysis of the operational environment and threat. This mission analysis establishes the operational framework for FID concept development and planning. The following are important areas examined during this process that must be considered when developing the concept.

(a) Threats to HN IDAD. Threats may be specific such as illicit drugs or terrorism or they may be more general as in social unrest and instability. Identification of the root cause is key so that military activities in the FID plans may target long-term causes rather than short-term symptoms. Appendix D provides detailed guidance for conducting intelligence preparation of the AO necessary for effective FID planning.

(b) The HN Social, Economic, and Political Environment. FID programs are intended to support IDAD programs in a manner that is acceptable to the HN's cultural and political realities. The capability of the HN government

and leadership as well as existing treaties and social infrastructure are all factors that planners must consider. This step may result in the conclusion that the best solution from the US perspective may not be the best solution for the supported HN. This proposed solution may now be outside the realm of FID and may be better accomplished through other means. This situation must be resolved in diplomatic channels between the United States and the HN. For example, a treaty may meet US goals and objectives independent of the HN IDAD program and interests.

(c) Mission Analysis. Mission analysis for military operations in support of FID will normally be conducted in conjunction with normal operational planning. In peacetime, military activities in support of FID may be the majority of missions analyzed. During this phase, the planners must analyze the assigned tasks, develop a mission statement, formulate subordinate tasks, and prepare guidance for the commander's approval. The first two of these are discussed below.

1. Analyze Assigned Tasks. Tasks to support FID will be specified and implied and may range from supporting SA efforts to providing forces to conduct HA efforts.

2. Develop a Mission Statement. The mission statement guides much of the remaining planning process. The mission statement will provide the who, what, when, where, why, and possibly how. The theater mission established by the combatant commander will be very general but may identify specific FID-related tasks. An example mission for USSOUTHCOM is shown below.

USSOUTHCOM promotes US policy and contributes to the defense of North America by combatting drug trafficking and insurgencies, guaranteeing the secure and open operation of the Panama Canal, and encouraging economic and political modernization to achieve a free, stable, and prosperous community of American nations in the southern theater.

The mission statement will orient on the priority threats to the region. In this example, the illicit drug trafficking, insurgent, and social and economic threats are highlighted. In the case of subordinate unified commands or JTFs, this process would be similar but it would result in a more specific mission statement.

(2) During the planning guidance phase the commander outlines tentative courses of action (COAs), additional assumptions, and a planning directive to his staff and subordinate commanders. Several important FID guidelines must be considered to ensure future planning results in the most efficient employment of the commander's resources to support FID.

(a) Legal Authorizations and Restrictions. The legal restrictions governing military activities in support of FID are complex and subject to changing US legislation. The staff legal adviser has an active role in the FID planning process. The basic funding authorizations for military activities in support of FID come through either the FAA, AECA, or through DOD operation and maintenance (O&M) funding sources. While combatant commanders may use O&M funding for specified and limited FID activities such as HCA, they may not use O&M funds for SA nor exceed strict dollar limits on military construction (MILCON) projects. Appendix A provides a detailed look at the legal aspects of FID and rulings on several FID programs that may assist commanders in establishing a legal yardstick for FID plans.

(b) Third Country Interests. US FID efforts may impact on countries throughout the region. In some theaters, traditional rivalries and hostility toward the United States will be a factor. For example, US assistance to a nation with longstanding enemies in the area may be perceived by these enemies as upsetting the regional balance of power. Also, these same nations may see US intervention in the area simply as US imperialism. These factors will not dictate US policy, but will require careful evaluation and consideration. Commanders may

consider active information programs to accurately depict US efforts and to defeat the PSYOP efforts of the opposition. In general, US commanders must consider friendly, neutral, and hostile nations in the supported HN's region and envision how they will perceive US support.

(c) Restrictive Use of Force. US combat operations in FID will generally require a very judicious selection and employment of forces. The purpose of such selection and employment is to ensure that the HN military rapidly accepts the responsibility for the security of the nation and to ensure minimization of HN civilian casualties. Specific ROE are likely to be more restrictive in FID than in other operations. However, the existence of such restrictive ROE does not preclude the United States from employing that level of force when the NCA determine it is necessary to stabilize a friendly HN government or to protect the lives of deployed US personnel.

(3) The staff analyzes and refines tentative COAs during the staff estimate process of concept development. These detailed options serve as the foundation for the commander's decision to select a COA. Military options to support FID under consideration can involve any of the categories of indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), or combat operations. Because military support to FID has unique characteristics, staff planners must carefully develop the following three estimates to facilitate an effective FID plan.

(a) The intelligence estimate is essential to accurately identify the threat upon which to base FID efforts. The intelligence estimate supporting FID operations will have an orientation quite different from that of a conventional estimate. A comprehensive and intimate knowledge of the environment is essential in building this estimate. The conventional J2 intelligence estimate concentrates on: enemy situation, enemy capabilities, an analysis of those capabilities, and, finally, conclusions drawn from that analysis. In FID, however, planners must expand this concept beyond conventional enemy analysis to focus more on the local population and its

probable reactions to potential US or opposition actions. This emphasis requires knowledge of the ethnic, racial, economic, scientific, technical, religious, and linguistic groups in the HN, as well as their locations and an understanding of how they may perceive future operations. Understanding the operating environment and the HN's social, economic, and political order are essential to build effective FID programs to support the local IDAD program. It is evident that the manner in which the FID intelligence planner views the battlefield is different from that of the conventional planner. Appendix D discusses in detail the FID-unique aspects of intelligence preparation that planners must consider to successfully plan and execute a long-range FID program.

(b) The CA estimate examines each military COA for required CA assistance and reviews potential operations for any civil administration implications. CA will also complete area studies where operations are likely. For military operations to support FID, these assessments focus on social, economic, and political factors that relate to existing or potential lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. These assessments may include overlays that show local demographics, civil supply support, public utilities, and population displacement. CA support, like PSYOP, should be incorporated into all FID operations. A limiting factor in accomplishing this is the shortage of qualified personnel to support peacetime operations in support of FID. Ninety-six percent of the CA forces are in the Reserve component (RC). This situation forces commanders to maximize the use of limited active CA resources and to integrate RC CA forces fully into operational missions. Appendix E provides a sample format for the CA estimate and offers special considerations for incorporating CA into the overall plan.

(c) The PSYOP staff estimate process examines the potential impact of proposed US military operations in support of FID programs. Each operation has a PSYOP impact, therefore the importance of the HN populace's perceptions of US actions in the area cannot be overemphasized.

In addition to evaluating the psychological impact of planned operations, planners must develop specific PSYOP actions and incorporate them logically into the commander's plans to influence the target audience or to combat the adversary's PSYOP programs. More specific guidance on the actual conduct of PSYOP will be included in the PSYOP annex to the appropriate plan. At the combatant command level, PSYOP planners must coordinate concepts and plans, through military PA, Country Teams and with the USIS representative. This coordination is very important because USIS, as USIA's overseas operating agency, has primary responsibility for the dissemination of information about the United States to foreign countries. This coordination is discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. An example of a PSYOP estimate and special considerations for incorporating PSYOP into the overall plan is provided in Annex F of this publication.

(d) In addition to the considerations discussed above, there are seven important FID guidelines that the staff must consider as it develops possible COAs and analyzes them before the commander makes a selection. These guidelines are discussed below.

1. HN Sovereignty and Legitimacy. If US military efforts in support of FID do anything to undermine the sovereignty or legitimacy of the HN government, then they have effectively sabotaged the FID program. The FID program is only as successful as the HN's IDAD program.

2. Plan for the Long Term. Planners must evaluate short-range operations in support of FID with respect to the long-term effect. An erratic FID program can cause ill will among the local populace for years to come. This ill will may manifest itself as resentment toward US presence, but more importantly, it may result in a weakening of the legitimacy of the HN government.

3. Maximize Intelligence Capability. FID planners must be able to identify political, economic, scientific, technical,

and social threats, in addition to the conventional hostile military factions. This identification is a complex task, especially when working in an unfamiliar culture in which US personnel may have little or no experience, and in which high-technology collection and processing equipment may be of little use. Despite this challenge, planners must integrate all available assets and use culturally trained specialists to define these threats and to appropriately tailor the COAs.

4. Unity of Effort. FID is a national-level program that involves numerous USG agencies. Planning must coordinate an integrated theater effort that is joint, interagency, and combined to reduce inefficiencies and duplication in support of FID programs.

5. Tailor FID Operations to the Needs and Environment of the HN. FID programs must consist of appropriate support provided at the right time and in the correct manner. This precept means that what worked for the United States or another nation may not necessarily work for a third nation. In addition, what worked yesterday may not be appropriate tomorrow. Changing political, economic, and social conditions must be as familiar to the FID planner as changes in enemy equipment and force structure are to the conventional planner. The ability of planners to adapt FID programs and methods of US operations to specific HN needs is an absolute imperative to success in FID.

6. ROE and Economy of Force Measures. Carefully establish ROE and economy of force measures. ROE are determined by threat, political considerations, and the type of military operations supporting a FID program. Planners must evaluate operations closely to determine the increased risks of large deployments of US personnel in the area. In a high-threat condition, it may be prudent to delay the FID mission and commit a smaller element

than to commit a larger force that is more difficult to protect.

7. Measures of Success. Clearly define and focus on measures of success. The success of US FID programs can only be measured in terms of the success of the HN's IDAD program. The measures of success should focus on long-term, obtainable objectives rather than short-term, limited objectives. In addition, transition points must be established that define when the supported HN will incrementally assume responsibility for the total IDAD effort.

(4) The commander's selection of the COA completes the staff estimate process and serves as the foundation for the CINC's strategic concept. This concept is reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and when approved the plan development phase begins. FID guidelines and concepts discussed above remain important.

c. Plan Development. The plan development phase begins after the CINC's strategic concept is fully developed. This phase matches mission requirements against available resources. This action is particularly important because a large portion of the force needed to conduct FID is in the RC and, in most cases, is unavailable (short of national mobilization) for long-term operations. In major military operations in support of a FID program, the commander must consider this shortage of Active component (AC) CA and PSYOP capability when beginning to develop the plan. Imaginative use of RC forces may alleviate shortfalls and assist organizing and tailoring resources to carry out the military support to FID as efficiently as possible. HN, third-party nations, and USG interagency coordination (Country Team) remains paramount during plan development. This is an extension of the coordination that began during the plan initiation phase.

d. Plan Review. This essential step is a comprehensive review of the plan for adequacy, acceptability, joint doctrine integration, and feasibility, and is part of the general review process that continues at intermediate stages throughout the planning process. The review for adequacy determines the sufficiency of scope and content of operations to accomplish the assigned task, the validity of assumptions, and the degree of compliance

with higher headquarter's task assignment and guidance. The review for feasibility measures the ability to accomplish assigned tasks using available resources. It considers both the appropriateness and the planned use of available resources. Planners should consider that many FID objectives will involve a long-term effort and that measures of success may be difficult to evaluate in the short term.

e. Supporting Plans. Supporting plans are simply subordinate plans that facilitate the conduct of the overall plan. Subordinate commanders receive their task assignments from which to construct supporting plans in paragraph 3 of the supported plan. Supporting FID plans may come from a variety of units such as Service or functional component commanders, JTF commanders, supporting combatant commanders or subordinate CA, PSYOP, engineer, medical, transportation, or combat units. Supporting plans cover mobilization, deployment, and employment, and are the "how to" of the plan.

6. Summary. Planners must realize that planning for joint FID operations is an integrated process. It is totally integrated into theater planning and is reflected in planning documents extending from the JSCP and the combatant commander's strategy down to joint force and Service component supporting plans. During the concept development of FID planning, planners must employ a broad approach to intelligence preparation of the AO. In addition, they must ensure that PSYOP and CA estimates are included in formulating adequate and feasible COAs from the FID standpoint. Planners must also remember several important FID planning considerations as they move through the planning process. These considerations focus on the major differences between conventional and FID planning and the means for accommodating these differences. Finally, the staff must review FID plans for adequacy, and they must ensure creation of appropriate supporting plans to support theater-level operations.

CHAPTER IV

EMPLOYMENT FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

SECTION A--EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

1. General

a. Thus far, the discussion of FID has generally centered on the strategic and operational levels. This chapter transitions to a more focused examination of the employment principles, tools, and techniques used in conducting FID operations.

b. US forces will usually be employed under the command of a combatant commander as part of the overall theater strategy. This strategy will incorporate FID programs with other major peacetime training and maintenance functions.

c. FID programs are part of the unified operations of the combatant command and are joint and combined in nature. Even small tactical operations will usually be combined in terms of efforts with the supported HN. Although some operations such as road building efforts may be executed by a single Service component, these smaller efforts fit into the overall theater strategy and plans.

2. Employment Factors. As in planning, several areas deserve special attention when discussing employment of forces in FID operations.

a. Psychological Impact. The psychological effort is relevant to the entire FID operation. The impact may occur incidentally, as a result of an operation, or may be specifically executed primarily for its PSYOP effects. Regardless of whether the operation is supported by or in support of the PSYOP operation, all FID efforts will be executed with the PSYOP objectives and effects in mind.

b. Intelligence Support. A thorough intelligence analysis must focus on the political, social, scientific, technical, and economic aspects of the area as well as on an analysis of hostile elements. Active intelligence support must continue through to the end of the employment of military forces in support of a FID program. This continuous intelligence effort will gauge the reaction of the local populace and determine the

effects on the infrastructure of US efforts, as well as evaluate strengths, weaknesses, and disposition of opposition groups in the area.

(1) Appendix D provides intelligence considerations and a format for intelligence preparation of the FID AO. Although the considerations must be modified for the specific FID program, generally the AO must be surveyed for an operational area evaluation; a geographic, population, and climatology analysis; and a threat evaluation. These factors will dictate the employment techniques and FID tools to use.

(2) Human resources intelligence (HUMINT) support is likely to be the most important type of intelligence support of FID. The analysis, as described in Appendix D, requires a large HUMINT effort. A more decentralized intelligence gathering approach is required. Small units and teams deployed in the AO are in a good position to evaluate the social, economic, and military situation in the host country. In a FID environment, the best US intelligence may come from units and teams that work closely with the local population and HN military forces. These units and teams must be prebriefed and debriefed for essential elements of information (EEI) and this information should contribute to the data used in conducting the intelligence preparation of the AO. This concept is different from the top-down, technology-dependent system the United States has traditionally relied on for most conventional intelligence gathering efforts.

(3) Information sharing across USG and national boundaries is an important concept in FID. There are likely to be several Government agencies operating in an HN and all are exposed daily to information valuable to the FID program. This situation requires a strong focus on lateral coordination and the development of an effective program of interagency information exchange. In addition, the very nature of FID denotes the sharing of information between the supported HN and the US joint force headquarters controlling the FID effort. This information exchange may be further complicated by a friendly third nation participating in the FID program.

(4) The nature of FID missions and the high degree of dependence on HUMINT sources necessitate an active counterintelligence and operational security

program. At a minimum, US FID mission forces must be able to:

- (a) Accomplish liaison with HN counterintelligence and security forces.
- (b) Provide a conduit to Country Team counterintelligence and security elements.
- (c) Conduct analysis of opposing force intelligence collection, security, counterintelligence, and deception capabilities.
- (d) Conduct counterintelligence investigations and double agent operations.
- (e) Conduct counterintelligence vulnerability assessments of US forces.
- (f) Provide counterintelligence input to US FID plans.

US force deployments for FID missions must be structured to provide adequate counterintelligence resources to accomplish these missions. Guidance for interaction with HN intelligence and security services is covered in Joint Pub 2-01.2

c. Special Operations Forces. SOF are an integral part of FID. The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is, in fact, the only combatant command with a legislatively mandated FID mission. In fulfilling its mission, the command provides PSYOP, CA, and SOF in support of combatant commanders with geographical AORs. Commanders should use these regionally focused and culturally oriented personnel to assist in the FID mission. SOF contribute to the FID effort under OPCON of the theater SOC, which has primary responsibility to plan and supervise the execution of SOF operations in support of FID. Planning support may also be provided by the SOSE, described in Chapter II. This effort includes coordination conducted by CA elements, as well as SOF support of mission execution, through PSYOP teams, specialized HN training teams, and direct action forces conducting highly specialized missions. Despite this very important role, commanders and their staffs must understand that SOF is only part of the FID program. The primary SOF mission is to train, advise, and support HN military and paramilitary forces. SOF operations in support of FID may be unilateral, but more likely, these

activities will support other ongoing US military assistance efforts. When planning for use of SOF, C3 requirements among the combatant command, the Country Team, and SOF must be assessed. Communications requirements for C2, administration, logistics, and emergencies must be clarified.

d. Public Information Programs. Public information is an important ongoing effort during the employment phase of any FID mission. While it is important to correctly portray the FID effort to HN personnel through PSYOP, it is also important to employ an effective PA program to inform the US public of current FID actions, goals, and objectives. History has shown that without the support of the US public, it may be impossible to develop an effective FID program. At the US national level, public diplomacy programs will accurately depict US efforts. This national program is supported through the combatant commander's, or other JFC's, information programs designed to disclose the maximum amount of information possible within applicable security restrictions and the guidelines established by the NCA. Coordination is essential between the PA staff and the media, the Country Team, and other information agencies within the HN and region.

e. Logistic Support. Logistic operations in support of a FID program are both supporting missions to US forces and primary operational missions when supporting HN civilians or military forces with medical, construction, maintenance, supply, or transportation capabilities. Logistics offers commanders a limited but potentially effective tool to use to support the overall FID effort. The following points offer general guidelines for logistics issues in support of US forces conducting FID operations.

(1) Except during combat operations, there may be a ceiling imposed on the number of US military personnel authorized to be in the affected country to support FID programs. This necessitates close scrutiny of all support requirements. Maximum use should be made of host nation support (HNS) capabilities, but where reliance on the HN is not feasible, logistic support requirements must be minimized. Maximum use of throughput of supplies, airlift resupply, and inter-Service support agreements should also be considered.

(2) Logistic support of US combat operations in support of a FID program will normally require a large US presence within the supported nation. Commanders must carefully balance the advantages of using HNS with the danger of establishing dependence on potentially unreliable sources.

(3) Logistic operations in support of FID are task-organized according to the type of mission. Service logistic support elements will be integrated into the overall joint force. Logistic support for the deployed forces, however, will remain a Service responsibility.

f. CD Operations in FID. US military support of the national CD effort has increased tremendously in recent years. A significant portion of this involvement comes under the rubric of FID.

(1) DOD resources may be used in connection with CD activities in nations receiving military assistance in support of a FID program. This military assistance is usually centered on source operations, but can be involved with in transit CD operations.

(a) DOD is the lead agency of the USG for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. Congress has urged the earliest possible detection of illegal drugs and overseas activities are authorized. This detection and monitoring mission is performed with O&M funds notwithstanding the possibility of incidental benefit to the HN. Such activities may include nonconfrontational intercepts for intelligence or communication purposes, gathering and processing of tactical intelligence from a variety of sources, including fixed and mobile surveillance assets and certain intelligence sharing.

(b) In a CD support role, subject to NCA policy and legislative guidance, DOD may offer certain direct support to HN CD personnel, and certain enhanced support to US civilian law enforcement agencies which may be operating in the HN, and to the DOS, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters.

(2) Absent direction from the NCA, US forces engaged in CD activities are prohibited from engaging in direct law enforcement activity. They may not directly participate in an arrest, search, seizure, or other similar activity. DOD personnel are not authorized to accompany HN forces on actual CD field operations or participate in any activities where hostilities are imminent.

(3) As directed by the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders will be given the authority to plan and execute HN programs using a combination of SA, training and advisory assistance (non-SA-funded), intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support, and humanitarian assistance (HA). These efforts are designed to bolster the HN's capability to operate against the infrastructure of the drug-producing criminal enterprises. Often, illicit drug traffickers are closely connected with local insurgent or terrorist groups. For this reason, CD-focused FID programs must be integrated into the theater strategy as a coordinated effort to support the HN's IDAD strategy.

(4) Combatant commands and subordinate JTFs must closely coordinate, as required, with the Country Team DEA and DOS INM representatives. Liaison with the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is also vital. ONDCP is legislatively charged with the responsibility of establishing the national drug control strategy, and with coordinating and overseeing the implementation of the consolidated National Drug Control Program budget. This coordination is crucial to an efficient national CD program to combat illicit drug trafficking in source regions.

g. Operations Security (OPSEC). A major problem in all FID activities is denial of critical information about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities to hostile elements. This is due to the fact that groups engaged in lawlessness and insurgency operations may be corrupted members of penetrated foreign governments. US and foreign personnel involved in FID and IDAD programs should be provided extensive OPSEC training to ensure effectiveness of their operations. Refer to Joint Pub 3-54 for more details on OPSEC.

h. Lessons Learned. As FID programs are implemented, it is critical to document lessons learned to allow the commander to modify the FID program to fit the special circumstances and environment. Comprehensive after-action reviews and reports focusing on the specifics of the FID operations should be conducted to gather this information as soon as possible after mission execution. (See Joint Pub 1-03.30, "Joint After-Action Reporting System," for specific procedures.)

3. DOD FID Tools. Chapter I discussed the general categories of FID operations (indirect support, direct support (not involving combat operations), and combat operations) and the specific operations within each of these. Sections B, C, and D of this chapter will address each of the subcategories in detail. However, because FID, by definition, encompasses a broad range of military activities, only the most common types of military support to FID will be discussed.

SECTION B--INDIRECT SUPPORT

4. Security Assistance. Types of SA and USG organizations that implement the program were covered in Chapters I and II. This section will discuss specific military SA operations and how the combatant commander may use this tool to further support FID programs. The military will primarily provide equipment, training, and services to the supported HN forces. In the SA arena, combatant commanders and JTF commanders do not have authority over the SA program, but have responsibility for planning and executing military activities to support FID within the SA process. Combatant commanders are active in the SA process by advising Ambassadors through the SAO and by coordinating and monitoring ongoing SA efforts in their AORs. In addition, through coordination with HN military forces and supporting SAOs, the combatant commander can assist in building credible military assistance packages that best support long-term goals and objectives of regional FID programs. The following paragraphs describe the SA support areas of equipment, services, and training as well as the employment considerations for each.

a. Equipment. The combatant commander and subordinate JFC can have the greatest impact in this area during the planning and resource identification phase of developing the theater strategy. Regional threats, identified through an intelligence preparation of the AO




Figure IV-1. Indirect Support in FID

Figure IV-1. Indirect Support in FID

(Appendix D), will determine the general equipment needs of the supported HNs in the theater. Each SAO will coordinate resultant military equipment requests contained in the AIASA with the combatant commander's staff and Country Team. Finally, the combatant commander endorses the AIASA and provides recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on appropriate equipment or distribution. Throughout this process, HN needs must be evaluated in terms of the threat and existing social, political, and economic conditions. Care must be taken to guard against an American solution or to support unnecessary requests as explained below.

(1) The FID planning imperative to tailor support to HN needs is extremely important in providing equipment support. Environmental factors, level of HN training, ability to maintain equipment, and a myriad of other factors will determine equipment appropriate to HN needs. If equipment in the US inventory is not appropriate for use by the HN, the commander may recommend a nonstandard item to fill the requirement. Sustainability of nonstandard equipment as well as interoperability with existing equipment must be considered.

(2) HNs may request expensive equipment as a status symbol of regional military power. This is often done in spite of the fact that the overall strength of the military would be best enhanced by improved training and professionalism among the existing force. This is a delicate political situation, but

one that the Ambassador and the combatant commander may be able to influence.

b. Services. Services include any service, test, inspection, repair, training, publication, technical or other assistance, or defense information used for the purpose of furnishing military assistance, but does not include military education and training activities. Services support is usually integrated with equipment support. The combatant commander has oversight to ensure that the equipment is suitable for the HN's needs and that the HN is capable of maintaining it. These types of services will almost always be required to ensure an effective logistics plan for the acquired equipment. There are two common types of service teams: QATs and TATs. QATs are used to ensure equipment is in usable condition and are short term. TATs are used when the HN experiences difficulty with US supplied equipment. For detailed information on teams available for initial and follow-on equipment support, see the Security Assistance Management Manual (DOD 5105.38-M).

c. Training. The training portion of SA can make a very significant impact on the HN IDAD program. The combatant commander is actively involved in coordinating, planning, and approving training support with the SAO and HN.

(1) The following are the general objectives of training programs under SA.

(a) O&M Skills. To create skills needed for effective O&M of equipment acquired from the United States.

(b) Effective Management. To assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management of its Defense establishment.

(c) Development of Training Self-Sufficiency. To foster development by the HN of its own training capability.

(d) Rapport and Understanding. To promote military-to-military understanding leading to increased rationalization, standardization, and interoperability.

(e) Increased Awareness. To provide an opportunity to demonstrate the US commitment to

the basic principles of internationally recognized human rights.

(2) The following force structure, training plan, and training activities considerations should be understood before implementing a FID training program.

(a) Training Force Structure. SOF are very important in training HN forces because of their language training and regional cultural focus. Training in SA is not limited to SOF. Conventional forces may also be integrated into the training effort, particularly in areas where the technical aspects of the required training limit the use of SOF. In technical areas such as communications, intelligence and equipment maintenance, conventional forces may conduct the training augmented by SOF to provide language and cultural training that conventional forces may lack.

(b) Training Plan. The training portion of SA is identified and coordinated by the SAO with the HN military. Combatant commanders and JTF commanders will incorporate the SA training, planning, and requirements into the overall military planning to support FID programs.

1. The SAO will develop a 2-year plan that consolidates HN needs from a joint perspective, taking into consideration all sources of training and funding. These plans will be approved by the appropriate combatant command.

2. Each year the combatant commanders with geographic responsibility (USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USPACOM) will host a Joint Service Program Management Review. During this workshop the staff will refine and coordinate the 2-year plans previously approved by the combatant commanders, finalize the budget year training program, and announce and discuss changes in the command's training policy or procedures.

3. The SAO must ensure that the HN looks beyond its current needs toward the

future. A tool to accomplish this is the 2-year plan.

4. Planners must also ensure US forces involved in training HN personnel are fully aware of restrictions on their involvement in HN combat operations, and that they employ vigilant force protection measures. US training teams should consider themselves likely targets of attack if supported forces are facing an active armed threat.

(c) Training Activities. The combatant commander has a number of training activities that should be considered when reviewing individual country training plans. These programs may be carried out by attending military schools in the United States or by deploying teams of SOF or conventional forces or a combination of both. Consideration should be given to language qualification, cultural orientation, theater objectives, and the supported HN's IDAD program when selecting forces. The following are the primary types of training that may be employed as part of military support to the FID program.

1. Mobile Training Teams. MTTs are used when an HN element requires on-site training and to conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements. An MTT may be single Service or joint, SOF or conventional forces, but is tailored for the training the HN requires. An MTT is employed TDY for a period not to exceed 179 days, including travel. If HN forces require training for a longer period, then training in CONUS should be considered as an alternative.

2. Extended Training Service Specialists (ETSSs). ETSS teams are employed on a permanent change of station (PCS) basis (usually for 1 year) to assist the HN in attaining readiness on weapons or other equipment. These teams train the HN's initial instructor cadre so that they can assume the responsibility for training their own personnel.

3. Technical Assistance Field Teams. TAFTs are also deployed on a PCS basis and train HN personnel in equipment specific military skills.

4. IMET Program. IMET provides HN personnel training opportunities in CONUS. This type of training not only meets the immediate HN requirement of increased training, but also has a longer term impact of improving US-HN relations. Because FID requires a long-term approach to planning, commanders should include this type of training in their overall FID program.

5. Joint and Combined Exercises. These exercises can enhance a FID program. They offer the advantage of training US forces while simultaneously increasing interoperability with HN forces and offering limited HN training opportunities. The participation of US forces in these exercises, designed primarily to enhance the training and readiness of US forces, is funded by the O&M funds of the providing Service. Airlift and sealift may be provided by the combatant command from its airlift and sealift budget. Expenses of HN forces participation may be funded by the Developing Country Combined Exercise Program as arranged by the conducting combatant command. These expenses differ from SA funding because SA is designed to train HN forces, whereas joint and combined exercises are designed to train US forces with HN forces. In addition, forces involved in these exercises come under the combatant command (command authority) of the combatant commander and OPCON of the designated subordinate JFC responsible for the region, while SA forces are under the control of the chief of the diplomatic mission. Legal restrictions on what FID programs can be conducted in conjunction with these exercises are complex. Appendix A provides general guidelines on these restrictions. Prior legal guidance is important to the concept of the exercise and related FID operations. Exercises should be planned as part of the overall training program for the theater, and other FID activities should be integrated into the framework of these exercises. Examples of this integration are the conduct of HCA missions. The implementation of HCA programs into exercises will be examined in detail later in this chapter. Joint and combined exercises can yield important benefits for US interests and the overall theater FID program. The most significant of these benefits:

- a. Enhance relationships and interoperability with HN forces.
- b. Demonstrate resolve and commitment to the HN.
- c. Familiarize US forces and commanders with potential combat areas.

6. Exchange Programs. These programs allow the commander to use O&M money for the exchange of units or individuals and may be used to expand the efforts of the SA programs funded under IMET that allow HN personnel to train in CONUS. These exchange programs foster greater mutual understanding and familiarize each force with the operations of the other. Exchange programs are another building block that can help a commander round out his FID plan. These are not standalone programs; however, when commanders combine them with other FID tools described in this chapter, the result can be a comprehensive program that fully supports the HN IDAD program. The general types of exchange programs that commanders should consider are described below. (See Appendix A for a more detailed explanation of the legal aspects of these types of training.)

- a. Reciprocal Unit Exchange Program. This program is for squad to battalion-size elements. Each nation's forces trains the other in tactics, techniques, and procedures. This program is a good vehicle for US commanders to use to sensitize their forces to the cultural and social aspects of the HN while simultaneously increasing the training readiness of HN forces. The proficiency of the units must be comparable to preclude exchanging fully trained US forces for untrained HN forces. To do so would be an extension of the SA training program.
- b. Personnel Exchange Program (PEP). The PEP is a 1- to 3-year program in which one person from the HN is exchanged with a US member. This program, like reciprocal unit exchanges, requires the exchanged personnel be of comparable proficiency in their area of expertise.
- c. Individual Exchange Program. This program is similar to the PEP. It is different, however, because it is a TDY assignment in-theater. This program gives the commander flexibility since he will not lose personnel for extended periods and he is able to expose a larger portion of his force to the program.

d. Combination Programs. Commanders should consider combining SA efforts with joint or combined exercises to obtain maximum benefit for all concerned. For example, exchange of key personnel during exercises will gain more in terms of interoperability than exchanges during normal operational periods. Also, the exchange of units with similar equipment, especially if the HN is unfamiliar with the equipment, may be very beneficial.

SECTION C--DIRECT SUPPORT NOT INVOLVING COMBAT OPERATIONS

7. Direct Support Not Involving Combat Operations. As mentioned in Chapter I, this category of support involves US forces actually conducting operations in support of the HN. This is different from providing equipment or training support to enhance the HN's ability to conduct their own operations. Direct support operations provide immediate assistance and are usually combined in a total FID program with indirect operations. Two types of direct operations critical to supporting FID across all categories are CA and PSYOP. Because these operations involve US forces in a direct operational role they are discussed under direct support operations not involving combat. These concepts and relationships will be discussed in more detail in the remainder of this section.

8. Civil Military Operations. As explained in Chapter I, CMO span a very broad area in FID and include activities in peace, conflict, and war. Using CMO to support military activities in a FID program can enhance preventive measures, reconstructive efforts, and combat operations in support of an HN's IDAD program. This discussion is limited to those portions of CMO that most directly contribute to a commander's support of a FID program.

a. Civil Affairs. CA units are vital to support theater FID programs in areas from planning to execution. CA personnel are a valuable resource in planning and facilitating the conduct of various indirect, direct support (not involving combat), and combat operations in support of the overall FID effort. CA personnel also assist the HN civilian government by providing civil administration assistance in the executive, legislative, or judicial areas. Refer to Joint Pub 3-57 for more detailed information of CA capabilities.




Figure IV-2. Direct Support in FID

Figure IV-2. Direct Support in FID

(1) Force Structure. Since 96 percent of the CA force structure is in the RC, JFCs need to consider carefully how to employ limited CA assets to their optimum advantage. Each combatant command is apportioned AC and RC forces based on approved war plans. This equates to one AC CA company and from 3 to 16 RC units of varying sizes. Although RC forces are apportioned to a combatant command, they are not available unless mobilized or called to active duty in accordance with the law. The challenge, therefore, for JFCs requiring dedicated CA support is careful preplanning to ensure that dedicated support is available for FID programs and as early as possible for contingency operations in FID. Selective Reserve personnel and units are available for annual training up to 19 days per year, excluding travel time. Individual RC personnel are also available for up to 179 days for voluntary or special active duty in support of projects supporting RC programs or for temporary tours of active duty in support of operational active Army requirements. RC forces are also available for up to 90 days with an additional 90 days possible through the Presidential Selective Reserve callup. The key for combatant commanders is to ensure early and continuous coordination with the Service component gaining command of all matters concerning apportioned forces, especially RC.

(a) CA Support Augmentation Teams. One of these teams is assigned to each combatant command to augment the CA staff planning element. These teams are instrumental in planning military operations to support FID and incorporating FID programs into the overall theater strategy.

(b) CA Commands, Brigades, and Battalions. CA commands and brigades are designed to plan, manage, and conduct CA operations in support of the entire theater or designated AOR. CA battalions are organized along four different models ranging from a FID-unconventional warfare focus, to organizations designed to support more conventional tactical operations.

(2) CA Capabilities. CA units are regionally focused, possess varying levels of language capability, and generally have the following areas of expertise: labor; legal; public administration; public education; public finance; public health; civilian supply; economics and commerce; food and agriculture; communications; public transportation; public works; civil defense; public safety; public welfare; property control; dislocated civilians; and arts, monuments, and archives. Commanders should consider using their CA assets in the following roles to support the overall FID program.

(a) Planning, supporting, and controlling other military operations in FID such as training assistance, HA, MCA, HCA, and logistic support.

(b) Provide liaison to civilian authorities.

(c) Facilitate the identification and procurement of civilian resources to support the mission.

(d) Support and conduct civil administration.

(3) CA Employment Considerations in FID. The following are areas that commanders must consider when employing CA assets in planning and executing FID programs.

(a) CA expertise must be incorporated in the planning as well as into the execution of military activities in support of FID programs.

(b) The ultimate success of FID operations will hinge on HN public support. Integrated CA, PSYOP, and HA activities can enhance that support.

(c) The sovereignty of the HN must be maintained at all times. The perception that the United States is running a puppet government is counter to the basic principles of FID. This is important to remember when providing civil administration assistance.

(d) HN self-sufficiency must be a goal of all CA assistance.

b. Psychological Operations. PSYOP impacts all military operations in support of FID. CA, PSYOP, and HA must be fully integrated if the combatant commander and other JFCs are to effectively support a FID program. Commanders must evaluate each proposed FID program in terms of how it fits into the overall theater or regional PSYOP. This includes PSYOP that are actions done solely for their psychological impact, as well as military operations, which may have only an incidental psychological impact. Generally, PSYOP missions in support of FID can be summarized by one or more of the following four goals: (1) building favorable attitudes toward the United States among the HN populace; (2) building favorable attitudes toward, and acceptance of, the HN government; (3) countering anti-US and anti-HN propaganda; and (4) discrediting the insurrection leadership and ideology by reducing support for both within the local populace, as well as the insurrection's armed force. See Joint Pub 3-53 for a more detailed discussion of PSYOP.

(1) PSYOP Force Structure. Similar to the CA force structure, over 85 percent of PSYOP assets are in the RC force. The Army has the preponderance of PSYOP assets and the only AC PSYOP capability. The US Air Force does have an RC aerial PSYOP dissemination capability in its special operations group (SOG). SOG consists of specially equipped aircraft capable of a variety of delivery and media capabilities that can be used to support the overall PSYOP plan. PSYOP resources, like CA assets, are assigned to the Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). Requests for PSYOP support are made

through combatant command channels to USSOCOM for approval.

(a) PSYOP Group (POG). The POG is a theater asset that provides C2 to two to five PSYOP battalions (POBs) and provides liaison to subordinate unified commands, Services, HN, and allies as authorized.

(b) PSYOP Battalion. The POB provides C2 to various PSYOP companies such as Research and Analysis, Strategic Dissemination, Operational Support, and Tactical Support.

(2) PSYOP Capabilities. Psychological operators prepare an in-depth analysis of the target nation's social, political, religious, cultural, and economic environment as background for the development of the supporting PSYOP plan. (See Appendix F for more detail on this process.) The PSYOP planner will recommend a PSYOP theme (subject, topic, or line of persuasion used to achieve a psychological objective) to the combatant commander. The PSYOP planner may recommend certain symbols as a means of conveying the theme. Once the commander chooses a theme and symbols, the tone and general parameters for much of the PSYOP to support the FID program have been established, and all military operations should be evaluated against these parameters. In addition to establishing the psychological theme and symbols, the PSYOP element will project a favorable image of US actions, use all resources to channel the behavior of the target audience so that it supports US objectives. Given these extensive capabilities, commanders should use their PSYOP assets to complement the FID plan in the following roles:

(a) Providing planning assistance for military support to FID. Planning tasks include identification of those military operations conducted primarily for their PSYOP effect and review of other military operations that have PSYOP impact.

(b) Working with the military PA officer and USIS to build an extensive information campaign to inform the local populace of US intentions in the FID effort and to strengthen the credibility of the HN government.

(c) Gathering intelligence through PSYOP assessments of the local area that assist in determining FID requirements and in determining measures of effectiveness.

(3) PSYOP Employment Considerations in FID. The following are areas that commanders must consider when employing PSYOP assets in support of FID operations.

(a) Accurate intelligence is imperative to successful PSYOP and FID. An inadequate analysis of the target audience could result in the use of improper themes or symbols and damage the entire PSYOP effort.

(b) PSYOP programs are audience driven and an analysis is required for each new audience and must be updated as attitudes and vulnerabilities change.

(c) PSYOP is a combat multiplier and should be used as any other weapon system. This use includes evaluation of targets through joint targeting procedures.

(d) Military PSYOP programs must be totally coordinated and in synchronization with other USG information efforts. This becomes a notable challenge for combatant commanders and other JFCs who may have significant military operations in several countries across the AO supporting FID programs.

c. Humanitarian Assistance. The third area under the CMO portion of direct support not involving combat is HA. HA employs US military personnel to promote nonmilitary objectives. The Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs (OASD (H&RA)) manages and approves all HA programs for the Department of Defense. The programs are designed to assist civil authorities in carrying out their responsibilities of providing assistance and basic services to the local populace. HA may be planned into the combatant commander's military strategy to support FID as a component of the overall program to bolster the HN's IDAD capability. Often, however, HA efforts are in response to unforeseen disaster situations. HA efforts may also extend outside the FID umbrella. When HA is provided to a nation that is experiencing lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency, these efforts must be

considered as part of the FID effort. As such, all of the PSYOP and CA considerations discussed earlier must be considered as the HA programs are planned and executed.

(1) HA Examples. Common examples of HA programs in which commanders may participate are disaster relief, medical assistance programs, transportation assistance, or other activities that provide basic services to the local populace. These services are often in response to a natural disaster such as an earthquake, a volcano or a flood. In addition, HA support may include assistance to the populace of a nation ravaged by war, disease, or environmental catastrophes.

(2) HA Coordination and Control. HA efforts are closely managed by OASD(H&RA). This office manages both HA and HCA programs, discussed later in this chapter, for the Department of Defense. Much of the HA is provided through the excess property authorization under title 10 USC 2547, which permits the transfer of excess DOD property to authorized nations. A theater assessment may determine that HA is a program that would benefit certain nations within the combatant commander's AOR. During the FID planning process these requirements should be coordinated with OASD(H&RA).

(a) The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance under the supervision of the DOS USAID may request that the Department of Defense conduct disaster relief operations. In these cases, DOS will reimburse the Department of Defense for the services performed. Appendix A covers the legal authorizations and restrictions for these operations.

(b) HA may be required in response to unforeseen disasters. If plans for a response to this type of situation do not exist, the combatant commander may believe that he must provide assistance quickly in order to save lives or relieve suffering. Normal coordination and approval leadtimes may not be available. In this situation, the combatant commander is authorized to commit the command's resources to provide immediate assistance. This general authority is provided under DOD Directive 5100.46. As always, the commander should

consult the command's legal advisers before providing any assistance in response to a disaster or other emergency.

(3) HA Employment Considerations. Certain major points that combatant commanders and other JFCs should consider when planning or executing HA operations are listed below.

(a) Constructing likely event contingency plans. Theater contingency plans should be established for likely events that may require an HA response. For example, if the combatant command's area of operations covers a likely earthquake region, the command's response for an earthquake should be included in a contingency plan to decrease response time and make execution easier and more effective.

(b) Incorporating PSYOP and CA activities into the HA program. HA programs that are not properly coordinated with local government officials, improperly assessed, or are misrepresented by opposition propaganda efforts may severely damage the theater FID program.

(c) Coordinating all HA activities with the Country Team. USAID and their subordinate element, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance must be carefully consulted on disaster assistance. In addition, ensure that all proposed HA efforts are coordinated with OASD(H&RA). The DOS is the lead agent for this type of support and all HA programs must be thoroughly coordinated to ensure an efficient national-level program.

(d) Monitoring the legal authorizations carefully. These authorizations are subject to change and misinterpretation. A legal review must be conducted before planning HA missions.

d. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. These programs can be very valuable to the combatant commander's support of FID programs while, at the same time, offering valuable training to US forces. It is important to understand the difference between HCA and HA programs. HA programs, as discussed above, focus on the use of DOD excess property, emergency transportation support, disaster relief, or other support as necessary to

alleviate urgent needs in a host country caused by some type of disaster or catastrophe. HCA programs are specific programs authorized under title 10 USC 401 funding. These are designed to provide assistance to the HN populace in conjunction with a military exercise. These are usually planned well in advance and are usually not in response to disasters, although HCA activities have been executed following disasters. Specific activities for which HCA funds can be used include medical, dental, and veterinary care; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling; construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of facilities. A detailed examination of the legal authorizations and restrictions for HCA are included in Appendix A.

(1) HCA Examples. Examples of HCA programs include engineer construction projects, well drilling, and medical support programs.

(2) HCA Coordination and Control. The coordination requirements for HCA projects are very similar to those for HA. OASD(H&RA) is also responsible for the management of this program. Coordination with the USAID and the Country Team is also very important to efficient HCA operations. The HCA program is a more decentralized program than HA. This allows the combatant commander to have greater influence in and to plan for a larger role in this area.

(a) In past years, Congress has established a ceiling on HCA authorizations. OASD(H&RA) does not receive these funds for allocation among the combatant commands, instead, the funds are included in the CINCs budgets. This allocation is made based on national security priorities and guidance from the Secretary of Defense.

(b) Valid HCA priorities are identified within the AOR and included in the FID planning process. These priorities then compete with those of other combatant commands for approval and funding. The resulting exercises and projects should then be managed as both FID and US training.

(3) HCA Employment Considerations. The nature of HCA operations makes the employment considerations

for this type of operation quite different than for HA. The following are the key employment considerations for HCA.

(a) Plan for use of RC as well as AC forces. The medical, veterinary, dental, construction, and well drilling activities of HCA are well suited to skills found in the RC forces. Typical HCA missions allow these forces to get the realistic training they normally do not receive at their home stations or at other CONUS training sites.

(b) Incorporate PSYOP and CA into HCA just as in HA operations.

(c) Subject all HCA plans to close legal scrutiny. Like HA operations, the legal aspects of all HCA operations must be understood. All HCA plans must be closely reviewed by the commander's legal staff.

(d) Plan adequate deployed force security measures. HCA operations are sometimes conducted in areas that are subject to unrest and internal instability. US forces may become targets of opposition forces' terrorist attacks. Security measures must be included in each operation.

(e) Establish the primary purpose of HCA missions as training for US forces. Incidental to this purpose are the benefits received by the civilian population.

(f) Conduct all HCA operations in support of the host civilian populace. No HCA support may be provided to the HN military or paramilitary forces.

e. Military Civic Action. MCA programs offer the FID planner a CMO opportunity to improve the HN infrastructure and the living conditions of the local populace, while enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government. These programs use predominately indigenous military forces at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other areas that contribute to the economic and social development of the nation. These programs can have

excellent long-term benefits for the HN by developing needed skills and by enhancing the legitimacy of the host government by showing the people that their government is capable of meeting the population's basic needs. MCA programs can also be helpful in gaining public acceptance of the military; which is especially important in situations requiring a clear, credible demonstration of improvement in host-military treatment of human rights. MCA is a tool combatant commanders and other JFCs should use, whenever possible, to bolster the overall FID plan.

(1) MCA Examples. US forces may advise or assist the HN military in conducting the MCA mission. This assistance may occur in conjunction with SA training or as a combatant commander's separate initiative. In all cases, the actual mission must be performed by the HN military. Some of the most common MCA projects are in the areas of construction.

(2) MCA Coordination and Control. Coordination for MCA missions is slightly less involved than for HA and HCA missions. First, the US level of involvement is generally less than that required for other types of FID missions. Second, the program is essentially a US military to HN military project. As with all FID programs, however, the Ambassador and Country Team should be aware of all operations in their assigned country. If the US military support to MCA is provided through SA, normal SA coordination procedures apply, but, if it is provided through a separate combatant commander's initiative using O&M funds, most of the coordination will be internal to the command.

(3) MCA Employment Considerations. Many of the same considerations apply to employing US military personnel in support of MCA as in supporting HA and HCA. The essential difference is that in MCA, US personnel are limited to training and advisory roles. In addition to this general point, commanders should also consider the following employment guidelines when planning or executing MCA programs.

(a) Select projects that are simple and achievable and can be maintained by the HN. If the HN military is unable to accomplish the mission, confidence in the local government and military may be significantly damaged.

(b) HN forces will do the work required to accomplish the mission.

(c) Because of the nature of MCA missions, commanders will normally include CA, PSYOP, other SOF trainers, and combat support and combat service support elements to support MCA missions.

(d) Coordinate projects with the Country Team. The USAID representative should be consulted for assistance on any major MCA developmental project and should be informed of all MCA efforts.

9. Intelligence and Communications Sharing. An active intelligence liaison should be ongoing between the HN, Country Team, and combatant commander's intelligence staff, thus establishing the basis for any intelligence and communications sharing. Counterintelligence elements can provide this support with HN military counterintelligence elements and security service and police forces when deployed in support of FID operations. During the combatant commander's assessment of the AOR, the HN intelligence and communications capabilities should be evaluated. Based on this evaluation, the combatant commander is in a good position to provide or recommend approval of intelligence or communications assistance. Intelligence and communications sharing are actually two separate areas; however, they are closely related and have many of the same employment considerations. For the purposes of FID employment, they will be discussed together. The sharing of US intelligence is a sensitive area that must be evaluated based on the circumstances of each situation. Generally, assistance may be provided in terms of evaluation, training, limited information exchange, and equipment support.

a. Any intelligence assistance must be coordinated with the Country Team intelligence assets to benefit from operational and tactical capabilities.

b. The initial focus of assistance in this area will be to evaluate HN intelligence and communications architecture. Based on this evaluation, the combatant commander will be able to determine the HN's requirements.

c. Each step of the intelligence cycle of planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination should be examined. The needs of the HN as well as their technical expertise and equipment must be

considered when evaluating their systems. The HN intelligence and communications systems must reflect the HN's environment and threat.

d. Following the evaluation, a determination must be made as to how the US FID program may assist. Any intelligence sharing must be evaluated against US national security interests and be both coordinated and approved at the national level.

e. Equipment deficiencies should be identified in the assessment. US assistance in equipment will be provided through the SA process.

f. Training support for intelligence operations, which is indirect support, will also normally be conducted under SA. Some limited informal training benefits may also be provided during exchange programs and daily interface with HN military intelligence and communications assets.

g. Employment Considerations. The following items summarize the major considerations that commanders and planners must be aware of as they conduct intelligence and communications sharing activities in support of the FID program.

(1) Direct all intelligence and communications assistance efforts toward creating a self-sufficient HN intelligence and communications capability. US assistance that creates a long-term reliance on US capabilities may damage the overall HN intelligence and communications system.

(2) Scrutinize any training assistance to ensure that it is provided within legal authorizations and ensure that information or processes are not revealed without authorization.

(3) Tailor assistance to the level of the threat, equipment, and technology within the HN. HUMINT may require a much greater focus than is common in US intelligence doctrine.

10. Logistic Support. The final area to be discussed under the FID category of direct support (not involving combat operations) is logistic support to the HN military. Logistic support, as discussed here, does not include activities authorized under SA. Logistic support operations are limited by US law and usually consist of transportation or limited

maintenance support. Legal restrictions prohibit the transfer of equipment or supplies under these programs. In addition, authorization for combatant commanders to provide logistic support to the HN military must be received from the NCA. Often, authorization to provide this type of support is in response to a major military emergency that threatens the internal security of the HN. This type of support will normally be authorized for limited periods to accomplish very narrow objectives.

a. In some cases, the NCA may direct a show of force exercise to demonstrate support for the HN and to provide the vehicle for provision of logistic support. An example of such a show of force was Operation GOLDEN PHEASANT conducted in support of the Government of Honduras in 1987.

b. Logistic support is integrated into the overall theater FID plan. This is even more important if the supported nation is involved in an active conflict.

c. The following are major employment considerations that should be considered when providing logistic support as part of the theater FID program.

(1) Develop definitive ROE and force protection measures. US forces involved in supporting HN tactical operations must be prepared if attacked by hostile elements. US forces must be adequately protected and have the authority to act in self-defense if necessary. This area must be closely examined and managed by the combatant commander's staff to avoid unfortunate incidents that could damage US image and effectiveness in the area.

(2) Educate all members of the command on permissible activities in providing the logistic support mission. For example, ensure everyone understands that equipment and supplies may not be transferred to the HN military.

(3) Build a logistics EEI file on logistic resources available in country. This data base should include information of local supply availability, warehousing and maintenance facilities, transportation assets, LOCs, and labor force availability.

(4) Align the proper types of equipment maintenance and training sustainability packages to the needs of the HN.

SECTION D--COMBAT OPERATIONS

11. General. US participation in combat operations as part of a FID effort is a serious decision that requires Presidential authority.

12. Considerations for US Combat Operations. The primary mission for combatant commanders and other JFCs is to prepare for war and if engaged in war, to terminate on terms favorable to the United States. Commanders have Service and other joint doctrine and JTTP that guide them in the employment of their forces in combat situations. This section is not designed to provide a doctrinal guide for combat operations in FID or to supplement existing publications in the area of tactics. The purpose is to discuss areas at the operational and strategic levels that must be considered when conducting combat operations in support of an HN's IDAD program. Many of the considerations discussed in the other two categories of FID remain important in tactical operations. The most notable of these involve the coordinated use of PSYOP and CA as well as coordination with other USG agencies operating within the HN. The following are areas that the commander should also consider when employing combat forces in support of FID.

a. HN IDAD Organization. Maintain close coordination with the HN IDAD organization. If a nation has reached a point in its internal affairs that it requires combat support from the United States, it should have already developed a comprehensive IDAD strategy. The organization to effect this strategy will vary among nations. The important point is that an organization exists to pull together all elements of power to defeat the source of internal instability. JFCs must be involved in this coordination and control process. Appendix C provides a detailed explanation of an IDAD strategy as well as a sample IDAD organization. US commanders supporting an IDAD program must be integrated into the organizational structure that controls the program.

b. Transition Points. Establish transition points at which combat operations are to be returned to the HN forces. This process establishes fixed milestones (not time dependent) that provide indicators of success of the HN IDAD program.

c. Joint and Combined Focus. Combat operations supporting FID will be executed through a jointly conducted theater plan. The plan will include combined operations involving the HN, the United States, and possibly other allies. Unilateral US combat operations should be avoided down to tactical level.

d. US Combat Operations. The first priority for US combat operations should be to identify and integrate logistics, intelligence, and other combat support means. When tactically feasible, actual combat operations and support for them should be done by HN forces; thus, increasing the legitimacy of the HN government and reducing the dependency on US forces.

e. Offensive Operations. US forces will conduct combat operations, only when necessary, to protect their personnel and resources and when so directed by legal authority to stabilize the situation and to give the local government and HN military forces time to regain the initiative. In most cases, the objective of US operations will be force protection, rather than to focus on destruction of enemy forces. Gaining the strategic initiative is the responsibility of the HN. Commanders must evaluate all operations to ensure that they do not create the impression that the United States is executing a war for a nation that has neither the will nor the public support to defeat internal threats.

f. Human Rights Considerations. Strict adherence to respect for human rights must be maintained. This includes US forces as well as forces from the HN and participating allied nations. Repression and abuses of the local population by the legitimate government will cause the NCA to consider withdrawing US support; therefore, commanders must consistently reinforce human rights policies. In many FID combat situations, the moral high ground may be just as important as the tactical high ground.

g. Rules of Engagement. Judicious and prudent ROE are absolutely required in combat operations in FID. A balance between force protection risks and danger to innocent civilians as well as damage to nonmilitary areas must be reached. Each individual must be educated to prevent unnecessary destruction or loss of civilian life. Commanders must closely monitor this situation and provide subordinate commanders with clear and enforceable ROE as well as the flexibility to modify these ROE as the situation changes.

h. Indiscriminate Use of Force. Indiscriminate use of force must be prevented; however, commanders should not feel constrained from using the requisite force to neutralize the enemy.

i. Intelligence. The US joint intelligence network must be tied into the Country Team, the local HN military, paramilitary, and police intelligence capabilities, as well as the intelligence assets of other nations participating in the operation. Deployed military counterintelligence elements can provide this liaison with local HN military counterintelligence and security and police services in their AORs. In addition, social, economic, and political information must be current to allow the commander to become aware of changes in the operational environment that might require a change in tactics. Appendix D provides detail on the type of information necessary for a thorough evaluation of the area of operation. The nature of the required information places a greater emphasis on human intelligence efforts rather than on technical collection capabilities.

j. Integration With Other FID Programs. The initiation of hostilities does not mean that other FID programs will be suspended. In fact, PSYOP, CA, SA, HA, intelligence, and logistic support are all likely to increase dramatically. The FID planning imperatives of taking the long-term approach, tailoring support to HN needs, and the HN bearing IDAD responsibility remain important throughout the combat operations phase.

13. Command and Control. The C2 relationships established for the combat operation will be modified based on the political, social, and military environment of the area. In general, the following C2 recommendations should be considered when conducting FID combat operations.

a. The HN government and military must remain in the forefront. The HN military must establish strategic policy and objectives and a single combined headquarters should be established to control combat operations.

b. US forces should remain under command of US commanders up through the operational level. C2 relationships at the HN level will be established by the US NCA in coordination with the HN government.

c. Deployed US forces will normally be organized as JTFs. Joint C2 relationships will be in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2.

14. Sustainment. As with any operation, sustainment of US forces is essential to success. Sustainment of combat operations in FID are similar to sustainment for other types of operations. The political sensitivities and concern for HN legitimacy and minimum US presence does, however, change the complexion of sustainment operations in FID. The general principles that should be considered in planning and executing sustainment of combat operations in FID are:

a. Maximum use of HN capabilities. This includes routine services, supplies, facilities, and transportation. This approach reduces US overhead and the number of US personnel required in the HN.

b. Maximum use of existing facilities such as ports, airfields, and communications sites.

c. Minimum handling of supplies. For short duration operations (90 days or less), support will be provided through existing organic support packages and through air LOCs.

d. Medical self-sufficiency. Many areas of the world where the United States is likely to conduct FID do not have adequate medical capabilities. Since commanders cannot rely on local capabilities, they must plan for self-sufficient health service support (HSS) for combat operations in FID. As a minimum adequate hospitalization, medical logistics resupply, evacuation, and preventive medicine must be established to support these operations.

e. Optimum use of mobile maintenance capabilities that stress repair as far forward as possible. Equipment evacuation for repair should be kept to a minimum.

f. Routine use of both intertheater and intratheater airlift to deliver supplies.

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CHAPTER V

TRAINING

1. General

a. As described throughout this publication, military activities in support of FID programs may be conducted by virtually all Services in a wide range of military specialties. FID programs may be conducted by a single individual in remote isolated areas, small groups, or large units involved in direct support or combat operations. In almost all of these situations, US forces will be operating in unfamiliar circumstances and cultural surroundings.

b. The nature of FID programs indicates that the environment in which they are conducted may be unstable and dangerous. This inherent instability, combined with the stresses of operating in a foreign culture, may require training that is not routinely offered by the Services to conventional forces.

c. US Service members represent their country as they conduct military activities in support of FID programs throughout the world. Regardless of rank or position, they make a lasting impression on the military and general populace of the nation they support. This impression may extend beyond personal feelings to influence future political and military relationships between the United States and its friends and allies.

d. Given a recognized need for US Service members to be prepared to operate in this environment, commanders have a responsibility to ensure preparedness. The first step in this preparation is to recognize the training requirements that are important to the success of US FID programs.

2. Responsibilities for FID Training

a. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for formulating policies for the joint training of the Armed Forces based on joint employment doctrine and for seeing that joint training is conducted in response to operational requirements deemed necessary by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions.

b. Combatant commanders exercise authoritative direction over all aspects of joint training of assigned forces.

Further, they are responsible for coordinating with components concerning aspects of training necessary to carry out the missions assigned to the command.

c. The Services are responsible for providing trained forces for joint operations in support of FID programs and maintaining language- and area-oriented forces to support FID programs.

d. USCINCSOC is charged by legislation with training assigned forces to meet mission taskings, including FID, and to ensure their interoperability with conventional non-SOF as well as other SOF. Special operations peculiar individual, continuation, and professional training and education are the direct responsibility of USCINCSOC. For more information refer to Joint Pub 3-05.

3. Training and Qualifications Needed for Success in FID. The following subparagraphs highlight some of the training needed for successful military operations in support of FID.

a. Overall US and Theater Goals for FID. Personnel engaged in military activities in support of FID programs must understand the overall goals and objectives of the supported CINC. This knowledge is similar to understanding the commander's intent in conventional operations. An understanding of these goals provides a framework for the individual to determine if his actions and programs support overall theater objectives.

b. Area and Cultural Orientation. Knowledge of the AO is required to maximize the effectiveness of military operations in support of FID programs. It is difficult to successfully interface with the HN if individuals supporting a FID program do not have an understanding of the background of the nation, the culture, and the customs. This training is particularly important for personnel who interface with HN military members or civilians.

c. Language Training. Knowing the language of the HN can be a significant aid to trainers and others who have daily contact with the local population. Personnel can function much more effectively if they have the ability to communicate with the local populace in their native language. Although language qualification is very important, it is not practical for all personnel to be language-qualified.

d. Standards of Conduct. It is extremely important that all US military personnel understand the importance of the image they project to the HN population. They may offer the only impression of the United States the HN population will ever see. This impression may have lasting effects on the ability of the United States to gain long-term support for the overall FID program. US standards of conduct regulations are, to a great extent, an example of the professionalism and respect for democratic processes inherent in our system--a respect and professionalism that can be passed by example to the HN population. Training in standards of conduct, which complement cultural awareness training, should be mandatory for all personnel involved in FID programs.

e. Relationship of FID Programs to Intelligence Collection. Because of their proximity and access to the local populace, personnel conducting military activities in support of FID programs are passive information collectors and have much valuable information to provide to the intelligence system. These units and teams absorb information on the social, economic, and political situation that is essential to the operational area evaluation discussed in Appendix D. This information would be very difficult for more distant collectors to obtain. Care must be taken however, to ensure that the relationship with their HN counterparts is not damaged by these activities. Personnel involved in FID operations must know and understand their responsibilities in these areas.

f. Coordinating Relationships With Other USG Agencies. FID programs are likely to interface at all levels with other USG agencies. For example, PSYOP elements will conduct ongoing coordination with the USIS, and CMO elements may work closely with the USAID. This type of coordination may be new to many military personnel supporting a FID program, therefore, specific training on procedures may be required.

g. Legal Guidelines. In order to function effectively, personnel supporting a FID program must be aware of a variety of legal guidelines. These include provisions of applicable status of forces agreements as well as restrictions on the transfer of equipment and on other types of assistance that may be provided. Since many military activities take place within the HN, applicable legal guidelines may include those of the HN government and the status of US personnel while in country (e.g., existing status of forces agreements). Accordingly, a

country law briefing, cultural orientation, and review of any international agreements affecting status of forces should be included in training.

h. Rules of Engagement. A thorough understanding of the ROE is very important to units involved in combat operations and for individuals involved in any military activities in support of FID in areas subject to violence.

i. Tactical Force Protection Training. FID programs often require small US elements to deploy in isolated areas to support threatened HN governments. This requirement makes for a potentially dangerous situation for US personnel. US forces must be prepared for these situations with proper training in self-protection programs and measures. Training should include individual and collective techniques.

4. FID Training Strategy. Training to prepare for military operations to support FID requires that a broad range of areas be covered. The training must also be designed to support a mix of personnel ranging from language-trained and culturally focused special operations forces to those totally untrained in the specific area where the FID program is located. Some training, such as language qualification, requires an investment in time and money that will not be practical for all personnel. A combination of institutional and unit-conducted individual and collective training will be required.

a. Institutional Training. SOF, PSYOP, and CA forces receive extensive institutional training in language, cultural considerations, and instructional techniques as qualification in their basic specialty. These personnel should be extensively used to train and facilitate liaison with the HN populace. However, consideration must be given on how to train conventional forces in required skills. Some institutional courses are available that can be used by commanders to qualify personnel better. Each situation must, of course, be examined individually to determine if specialized training is warranted. Listed below are some of the types of institutional training that is provided by one or more of the Military Services. Consult appropriate training catalogs for current course listings.

(1) Language training. Qualification courses are offered by the Defense Language Institute and language orientation courses provided by the US Army

John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS).

(2) Cultural awareness and communications training.

(3) General FID and IDAD principles training.

(4) Revolutionary warfare training.

(5) Force protection and terrorism awareness training.

(6) SA team orientation training.

(7) SA technical training.

b. Unit Training. Much of the training necessary to prepare personnel to support a FID program may be conducted within the unit. This training can be individually focused or, in the case of unit size participation, may involve large-scale collective training. Training resources may be drawn from a variety of sources, but SOF are valuable because of their area orientation and FID focus.

5. Conclusion. Training for operations to support a FID program is a command responsibility. The consequences of fielding an improperly trained FID element can have lasting effects on US national security interests. The commander has several options available, including unit, individual, and collective training as well as institutional training at the Service and subordinate command levels. Figure V-1 provides an overview of the categories of FID and the general types of training that commanders should consider for each.

	UNIT	INSTITUTIONAL
Indirect Support Security Assistance Joint/Combined Exercises Exchange Programs	Language Force protection FID/IDAD principles Cultural awareness	Language Cultural awareness Training methods Force protection Team orientation Technical skills FID/IDAD principles
Direct Support (not involving combat) CMO Intelligence/Communication Sharing Logistics	Language Force protection FID/IDAD principles Cultural awareness Overall FID objectives	PSYOP Civil affairs Technical skills
Combat operations	Force protection FID/IDAD principles Cultural awareness Overall FID objectives	Technical skills

Figure V-1. Training for FID

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APPENDIX A

COMMANDER'S LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. General

a. This appendix provides general guidance to commanders on legal guidelines for FID operations; it is not directive in nature. Legal guidance is subject to rapid change as legislation and US policy is modified. Given this, commanders must consult with their legal staff before establishing FID plans and policy.

b. Much of the information in this appendix is based on the Comptroller General's (CG's) rulings (provided in 1984 and reevaluated in 1986) on combined exercises in Honduras as supplemented by subsequent congressional authorizations for military activities.

c. Generally, legal considerations for commanders conducting FID center around using the proper funding authorizations for the type of mission being conducted. The two major types of funding are FAA funds, and O&M funds. In most instances where commanders had problems, it was because O&M funds were used for projects that should have been funded through the FAA. This concept will be discussed in more detail later in this appendix. The following fiscal principles should be observed when conducting FID operations to ensure that all activities are conducted within the limits of US law.

2. Fiscal Law Principles. Commanders must be aware of fiscal law principles to avoid possible violation of the Anti-deficiency Act (31 USC) 1341[A]). The Anti-deficiency Act violations are reportable to Congress and carry both civil and criminal penalties.

a. Expenditures must be reasonably related to the purpose for which the appropriation was made.

b. The expenditure must not be prohibited by law.

c. The expenditure must not fall specifically within the scope of some other category of appropriation.

d. If two appropriations permit the expenditure, either may be used but not in combination or interchangeably.

3. General Areas of Concern. Understanding the following discussion of recent rulings and legislation is valuable in

informing commanders and in preventing a potential violation. In the Honduras Opinions, the CG evaluated three specific military activities: training conducted before and during an exercise, MILCON in conjunction with a combined exercise, and HCA.

a. With respect to training and HCA, the CG concluded that the Department of Defense improperly spent O&M funds for SA and development assistance activities. These activities should have been funded with appropriations for the FAA and AECA.

b. With respect to MILCON, the CG concluded that the Department of Defense exceeded authorized ceilings for O&M expenditures.

c. In order to avoid repeating these errors, commanders must be able to distinguish FAA- and AECA-funded activities from DOD-funded activities.

(1) The FAA is divided into two basic parts. Part One authorizes development assistance activities (agriculture, nutritional and food assistance, and other items such as disaster relief for foreign countries). Part Two, in conjunction with the AECA, authorizes SA or military assistance to foreign countries.

(2) The FAA and AECA are managed under the authority of the Secretary of State; the Department of Defense plays a significant role in Part Two activities. The interagency transaction authorities contained in the FAA give the executive branch a good deal of latitude as to how the goals of the two basic parts of the FAA are accomplished. This authority allows the Department of Defense (with DOS approval and reimbursement) to accomplish Part One activities. For example, under this authority DOD engineers can participate in DOS-managed foreign disaster relief efforts. The essential point is that foreign assistance (including security or military assistance) activities are funded from appropriations for FAA and AECA, not from DOD appropriations.

(3) DOD appropriations are provided for diverse items such as research and development, personnel expenses, combined training, and special title 10 activities for conducting military-to-military operations. Some title 10 authorities were added after the Honduras Opinions were published in order

to increase the combatant commander's ability to engage in cooperative programs with foreign military forces. For example, funding was authorized for military personnel from developing countries to attend planning conferences in the CINC's AOR.

d. Activities funded from DOD appropriations may complement activities conducted under the FAA; however, fiscal law principles require that these activities may not augment (or duplicate) each other.

4. General Legal Authorities for Commanders To Conduct FID Operations

a. Figure A-1 provides a general explanation of how commanders may legally fund FID operations.

(1) The circle on the left indicates that O&M funds are appropriated for general rather than specific purposes. The Department of Defense has a good deal of discretion in the use of these funds because they are general purpose funds. However, O&M funds cannot be used for any foreign relations programs for which Congress has specifically appropriated funds.




Figure A-1. The Commander's Statutory Authority and Funding for FID

Figure A-1. The Commander's Statutory Authority and Funding for FID

(2) There exists on the periphery of O&M-funded activities a range of DOD operations that are

extremely useful in implementing our national and regional FID programs. These include combined exercises, exchange programs, special title 10 authorities, etc. The Department of Defense can use these kinds of activities to complement foreign assistance activities.

(3) The center figure is a square that represents a packaged program (FAA and AECA) enacted and funded by Congress for the specific purpose of conducting US foreign affairs. The FAA and AECA are the vehicle with which the United States contributes to the development of foreign countries (Part One, FAA) and to the internal and external security of foreign countries (Part Two, FAA and AECA).

(4) These combined authorities allow our Government to vary the mix of economic and military support in FID as the situation dictates. Combatant commanders should note that these authorities allow the Department of Defense to participate in DOS-managed and funded programs under Part One, FAA (Development Assistance). For example, US military participation in a roadbuilding project in a foreign country can be obtained by an agreement between local DOS representatives and the combatant commander's representatives. The terms of reimbursement for DOD participation in these types of DOS-funded activities are prescribed by the interagency authorities contained in the FAA.

(5) There is one other authority that permits DOD participation in activities that are not within DOD's statutory authority. The Economy Act Transactions (31 USC 1535) is a freestanding general authority for the USG agency providing goods and services to another USG agency on request and by mutual agreement. The agreement must include the details of reimbursement for the agency providing the goods and services. The Economy Act is not applicable where other legislation specifically authorizes interagency transactions, consequently, it is not applicable to FAA activities.

(6) The triangular figure on the right side of Figure A-1 indicates that the Department of Defense is always at the bottom point of the triangle. The Department of Defense is doing what it may lawfully do; e.g., deploy SEABEES to conduct a disaster response exercise under agreement with another USG

agency. The "other agency" authority and funding is represented by the base of the triangle. The terms of reimbursement to the Department of Defense for this kind of activity are prescribed in the Economy Act. Full and complete reimbursement of the agency providing goods and services is the guiding principle of the Economy Act.

5. Detailed Review of Authority and Restrictions. This section provides more detailed guidance and information to the commander and FID planner on the legal aspects of FID. An examination of the Honduras Opinions will serve as the tool for this analysis. In particular, the major areas of combined training, MILCON, and HCA will be examined. In addition, other FID activities funded by O&M will be reviewed.

a. Combined Exercise Training

- (1) Purpose. To test and evaluate mutual capabilities.
- (2) Type. Safety, familiarization, interoperability.
- (3) Funding. O&M for US participation, foreign force funds its own way except for special title 10 funds.

(a) In the two decisions regarding DOD activities in Central America, the Comptroller General concluded that the Department of Defense conducted such extensive training for the Hondurans that the training equated to the type of training normally provided under SA legislation (FAA and AECA).

(b) Since all these exercise-related training activities were funded with O&M funds, this conclusion was followed with a second opinion that the Department of Defense improperly expended the O&M funds used to train the Hondurans.

(c) Overview of funding sources for training.

1. O&M-Funded Training

a. Overseas training opportunities for United States personnel.

- b. Training with foreign personnel to obtain coalition warfare and interoperability objectives.

2. SA-Funded Training

- a. Training of foreign personnel in support of their defense objectives.

- b. Training of foreign personnel on US equipment sold to them under SA procedures.

(d) The following provides guidance as to whether US training of a foreign force may be O&M-funded or SA-funded:

- 1. O&M-funded combined exercises, during which HN forces receive training, must be conducted to test and evaluate mutual capabilities. Such exercises, having a primary benefit to US readiness, do not necessarily constitute prohibited training of foreign forces.

- 2. The permissible scope of HN training during an O&M-funded combined exercise includes safety training, familiarization training, and interoperability training. The level of training provided, however, must not be the formal level of training provided through SA.

- 3. Combined exercises are properly funded with O&M funds. Each force funds its own participation except in certain cases where the United States uses title 10 funds to support foreign participation.

(4) Special title 10 authorities for cooperative programs with foreign countries. As a result of fiscal restrictions announced in the Honduras Opinions, Congress provided combatant commanders additional authority and a source of funding to increase the commander's ability to interact with foreign militaries. This authority, known as the combatant commanders cooperative programs or title 10 authority, covers three specific areas that greatly expand the use of combined exercises and have great implications for FID.

(a) Title 10 cooperative programs allow combatant commanders to partially fund the participation of the developing country's armed forces in bilateral or multilateral exercises.

(b) Title 10 funding is available for the travel expenses of foreign personnel to attend conferences and planning seminars.

(c) Title 10 funding is available from the CINC Initiative Fund (CIF) for selected operations, joint exercises, HCA, military education and training, and regional conferences in support of FID.

(d) HCA authority (separate from that funded by CIF) is the final authorization under title 10 and will be discussed in detail later in this appendix.

(5) The above discussion focused on lawfully funded combined exercise training. The distinction between this O&M-funded training and SA-funded training is that the former is designed for US forces to take advantage of opportunities to train with foreign military forces while the latter is designed for US forces to provide concentrated training for foreign military forces to improve their operational readiness. There is also a hybrid form of training in which the training of US forces also results in training of HN forces as well. This is commonly known as the SOF exception.

(6) SOF exception training.

(a) Purpose. To test and evaluate special operations forces' ability to train foreign forces.

(b) Type. A special operations training force deployed to the field to perform its mission as a unit.

(c) Funding. O&M.

1. Some SOF have a mission to train foreign forces. To test their ability to accomplish this mission, SOF may train foreign nationals. This type of training

benefits the United States by using indigenous forces to obtain specific US operational goals; i.e., to evaluate SOF capabilities. Hence, this training may be O&M-funded rather than SA-funded. The Comptroller General has concluded that this training is not equivalent to SA provided training as long as it is not comparable to--nor intended as--SA.

2. The concept of training US forces in a manner that also provides training or some other benefit to a foreign military force is expanding. It is important to note that this concept allows the United States to provide SA-type support without charge to SA appropriations, again, as long as the primary benefit is to the SOF involved and not to the forces of the host government. This type of O&M-funded SOF training is expressly authorized by title 10.

(7) An expansion of this concept is known as combat logistic support exercises.

(a) Purpose. The primary purpose must be to train US military personnel.

(b) Type. Combined exercises that include repairs to HN aircraft, reorganization of a warehouse, and an inventory of items in a warehouse.

(c) Funding. O&M for US participation. HN funds or SA funds for repair parts used during the exercise.

1. The Comptroller General's comment on this point further explains the difference between SA and combined exercises. A combined exercise that repaired a foreign nation's aircraft was held not to provide an "SA" benefit as long as the benefit to the HN was incidental and minor (we did not provide repair parts) and the clear primary purpose of the exercise was to train US troops (we worked on the aircraft). Our training of the foreign force must not equate to the type of formal training normally provided by and funded as SA.

2. The opinions concerning operations in Central America make it clear that if the foreign force is not proficient enough to conduct combined operations with the US force, FMS training must be conducted to equalize that force before combined exercises are undertaken. In addition, we cannot use combined exercises to provide training to foreign military personnel if that training is normally provided as SA.

b. Exercise-Related Construction. The second of the three topics addressed in the Honduras Opinions is construction in conjunction with military exercises. In the Honduras Opinions, the Comptroller General concluded that the Department of Defense exceeded authorized O&M funding ceilings for exercise-related construction. Because of Comptroller General criticism and subsequent congressional action, two sets of rules concerning exercise-related construction are currently applicable.

(1) Non-CJCS Exercises

(a) Purpose. Construction necessary for a combined exercise.

(b) Type. Any separate construction project under US OPCON. Must be completed at a cost less than \$300,000.

(c) Funding. O&M (10 USC 2805 (C)(1)).

1. During non-CJCS combined exercises, O&M funds may be used to construct or improve facilities under US OPCON. The facilities must be necessary for US participation in the combined exercise.

2. Technical rules apply. Each project has to result in a complete and usable facility at a cost less than \$300,000. The authority to accomplish this construction is contained in an exception to statutory rules concerning unspecified minor construction; this exception sets the \$300,000 limit and permits the use of O&M funds for the construction.

(2) CJCS Exercises

(a) Purpose. Construction necessary for CJCS exercises.
(10 USC 2805)

(b) Type. The construction project must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in advance.

(c) Funding. Budget line item as authorized and appropriated by Congress. Cost per project must not exceed \$1.5 million. These funds cover only materiel, supplies, nonmilitary labor costs, overhead (except planning and design costs), and DOD-funded costs applicable to operating and maintaining the equipment.

c. HCA. The third topic addressed in the Honduras Opinions is HCA. The Comptroller General concluded that the Department of Defense conducted such extensive HCA projects that the projects should have been funded by DOS under Part One, FAA authority.

(1) HCA authorities fall under one of the following:

(a) Inherent authority.

(b) Stevens Amendment (CJCS exercises only).

(c) Interagency transactions.

(d) Title 10 authority.

1. Inherent Authority. The Comptroller General concluded that the Department of Defense has an inherent ability to undertake civic and humanitarian activities. This authority is described as activities that, incidentally, create civic or humanitarian benefits and are carried out to fulfill training requirements of the unit involved. This form of HCA is accomplished in conjunction with authorized military activities, like statutory title 10, HCA, at subparagraph 5c(1)4. below, but consists of de minimus HCA (O&M funds) for which only minimal expenditures may be incurred.

2. Stevens Amendment (CJCS exercises only). The second Comptroller General

opinion also approved of a new statutory authority for the Department of Defense to conduct civic and humanitarian activities (the Stevens Amendment). The Stevens Amendment authorized DOD personnel to conduct such activities in conjunction with CJCS- or CINC-sponsored exercises overseas. It permits DOD personnel to undertake civic and humanitarian activities unrelated to their own training requirements. The Stevens Amendment was a temporary solution, which has been continued through specific wording in annual DOD Appropriations legislation. Although funding methods could change, these HCA activities were deemed appropriate for the military.

3. Interagency Transactions. Both Comptroller General opinions recognized the ability of the Department of Defense to carry out such activities on a reimbursable basis for another USG agency with authority (and appropriations) to conduct such activities. Usually, this occurs when USAID funds economic assistance type activities under Part One, FAA. This is properly referred to as an interagency transaction. DOD personnel may perform DOS HCA activities using the interagency transaction authority contained in the FAA. Prior arrangements must be made for the DOS to reimburse the Department of Defense in accordance with the provisions of the FAA.

4. Title 10 Authority

a. A fourth, separately funded, authority to conduct civic and humanitarian activities in conjunction with military operations (not necessarily combined exercises) is contained in title 10 Cooperative Programs legislation. These programs must promote US security interests and specific operational readiness skills of the members of the Armed Forces who participate in the activities.

b. This authority permits activities that complement, not duplicate, other forms of social or economic assistance provided to a foreign country by any other department or agency of the United States. Hence, there is a requirement in this authority that the Secretary of State provide prior approval for the Department of Defense to conduct civic and humanitarian activities. This authority prohibits funding to construct airstrips. It also prohibits HCA (directly or indirectly) to any military or paramilitary activity. The authority is intended to serve the basic economic and social needs of the people of the country concerned.

c. The following specific activities are authorized:

(1) Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.

(2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.

(3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

(4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

d. Other FID activities funded with O&M funds are:

(1) Exchange Programs. The purposes of exchange programs are to foster mutual understanding and to familiarize each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other. There are three types of exchange programs: unit, personnel, and individual.

(a) Reciprocal Unit Exchange Programs (22 USC 2770a). Reciprocity is broadly defined; it is not a dollar-for-dollar bargain. This permits the United States to assume greater dollar costs; e.g., funding travel for both units. The US unit obtains comparable value by receiving

extended training in the exchange country. Reciprocity is required to be accomplished within 1 year or the exchange country must pay for the training it received from the United States. Unit exchange denotes an exchange of squad through battalion-size elements. Formal training is permitted for familiarization, normal orientation, checkout, and safety procedures. These O&M-funded activities are accomplished by international agreement approved by the appropriate Services and signed by the major commands.

(b) Personnel Exchange Program. The PEP is a 1- to 3-year PCS program run on an individual basis using an international agreement. The PEP is conducted under the general authority of the Secretaries of the Military Departments; one person from each Service is exchanged per agreement. Funding is provided by each Service involved for PCS costs, pay, entitlements, etc. The PEP is governed by Service regulations and managed at Service headquarters. These are billet-for-billet exchanges, requiring, as does the reciprocal unit exchange, comparably proficient personnel.

(c) Individual Exchange Programs. Commanders conduct individual exchange programs in their areas of operations. The exchanges are on a TDY or temporary additional duty basis rather than a PCS basis. This program is essentially a mini-PEP. Another form of individual exchange is contained in a recent amendment to the FAA. AR 12-15 permits the reciprocal exchange of training slots at professional military education institutions, excluding the Service academies. The institution that provides the training to foreign personnel must be located in the United States. This program permits one-for-one exchanges during the course of a fiscal year without charge to the participating foreign country if the training is reciprocated. This activity is conducted pursuant to international agreement. The foreign country is precluded from using SA funds to defray its costs.

(2) Combining the Exchange Programs

(a) Reciprocal unit exchange programs can be buttressed by PEP in areas where SA programs have an impact. For example, if SA programs have delivered transportation assets, it may be of value to plan a unit exchange with a squad or company of a US transportation unit that uses similar equipment. A PEP, using a truck master or maintenance warrant officer, may be equally useful.

(b) Commanders may use these exchange units in combined exercises and concentrate on areas that HN militaries want to improve. These need not be large-scale exercises. Moreover, unit exchanges are specifically authorized during CJCS exercises.

(c) With the advent of title 10 Cooperative Programs, commanders have the capacity to fund incremental costs of foreign militaries in order to encourage their participation in bilateral or multilateral exercises. In addition, they can fund key personnel attendance at important planning meetings.

(d) Important DOS-funded economic assistance projects can be complemented by exercise-related construction and humanitarian projects.

(e) The goals of SA programs can be coordinated with the mutual objectives of combined exercises and exchange programs. The coordination effort depends largely on the SAO's ability to conceptualize how these separately funded programs can complement each other.

(3) Limitations

(a) The combined exchange programs are somewhat limited by the foreign country's ability to participate in them. Both their financial ability and their military proficiency must be considered.

(b) The funds provided by title 10 Cooperative Programs are limited and may not be augmented by other funds.

(c) O&M funds for US participation are limited.

(d) Combined activities cannot be used to duplicate SA programs.

6. Summary. Figure A-1 offers a good tool to summarize how commander's can use their FID strategy to support an HN in the areas of indirect and direct support (not involving combat operations). The left side of this figure represents our ability to use normal operating funds to influence the situation. By comparison to the amount of O&M money available, there is only a peripheral amount of it to do things which may support US FID efforts. The FAA and the AECS provide a well-defined legislative system for the major portion of FID support. The mix of US support efforts can be varied from developmental or infrastructure activities to military assistance, depending on the situation. Finally, the triangle on the right indicates another way the USG may undertake a mission to support a foreign government. If the mission is not a DOD mission and there is no law prohibiting DOD participation, the Economy Act may provide the vehicle for US participation using the authority and appropriations of the USG agency with the mission.

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APPENDIX B

AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CHIEFS OF MISSIONS

The following is the text of a message (DTG 202113Z Oct 81) from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy sent to the combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Military Services outlining the responsibilities of Chiefs of Missions:

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter Outlining the Authorities and Responsibilities of Chiefs of Missions.

a. The President has informed the heads of Executive Departments and agencies that he is sending letters of instruction to each Ambassador and other Chiefs of American Diplomatic Missions outlining their authorities and responsibilities. This letter replaces the 25 Oct 77 letter from President Carter.

b. The text of the President's letter follows:

Dear Mr. (Madam) Ambassador:

I want to extend to you my personal best wishes for the success of your mission in _____. As my personal representative there, you, along with the Secretary of State, share with me the responsibility for the conduct of our relations with _____. I know we share a mutual conviction that carrying the American message of hope and freedom and advancing United States' interest abroad reinforces foundations of peace. Together we are pledged to work for national strength and economic growth, and to promote the values undergirding our Nation's unity and security.

I give you my full personal support as Chief of the United States mission in/to _____ in the exercise of your strong statutory mandate under Section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 USC 3927). I charge you to exercise full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US Government officers and employees in the country or organization to which you are accredited, except for personnel under the command of a US Area Military Commander, personnel under the authority of the chief of another US Mission (for example, one accredited to an international organization), or personnel detailed to duty on the staff of an international organization. I expect you to oversee the operation of all US Government programs and activities within

that responsibility. I have notified all heads of departments and agencies accordingly, and have instructed them to inform their personnel in the United States and abroad.

So that you can ensure effective coordination of all US Government activities within your responsibility, I ask you to provide strong program direction and leadership of operations missionwide. Please instruct all personnel under your charge that it is their duty to keep you fully informed at all times about their activities so you can effectively direct, coordinate, and supervise US programs and operations under your jurisdiction and recommend policies to Washington.

You will receive policy guidance and instructions from the Secretary of State, who is my principal foreign policy spokesman and adviser, or from me directly. I expect you to report with directness and candor. I want to emphasize that the Secretary of State has the responsibility not only for the activities of the Department of State and the Foreign Service but also, to the fullest extent provided by law, for the overall policy direction, coordination, and supervision of US Government activities overseas. There may be developments or decisions on which personnel under your authority disagree. The Secretary of State and I will always welcome the opportunity to consider your recommendations for alternative courses of action and policy proposals. As you assume your duties, I know that you will do so with a strong commitment to impartial and equitable treatment of all US Government personnel under your jurisdiction. Should any perceived inequities be amenable to elimination or mitigation by appeal to or negotiation with the host government, I urge you to pursue this course in a manner consistent with your authority and international law and established customary practice. Recognizing that various agencies operate under different legislation and regulations, should you consider legislative or executive policy changes to be desirable in this connection, you should recommend such changes through the Secretary of State. Additionally, fair treatment of all US Government personnel regardless of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin epitomizes our belief in and adherence to the principles of equality of opportunity, a value and concept that form an

important element of the American democratic tradition.

As Commander-in-Chief, I have authority over US military forces. On my behalf, you have responsibility for the direction, coordination, supervision, and safety, including security from terrorism, of all DOD personnel in _____ except those forces under the operational command and control of a US Area Military Commander and personnel detailed to international organizations. Defense Attache Offices, units engaged in security assistance, and other DOD components attached to your mission, as well as other DOD activities that may have an impact upon the conduct of our diplomatic relations with _____, fall within your responsibility.

It is imperative that you maintain close relations with concerned US Area Military Commanders and chiefs of mission accredited to international organizations. A copy of this letter is being disseminated to them. You must keep each other currently [sic] informed and cooperate on all matters of mutual interest. Any differences that cannot be resolved in the field should be reported by you to the Secretary of State; commanders of unified commands should report to the Secretary of Defense.

I expect the highest standards of professional and personal conduct from all US Government personnel abroad. You have the authority and my full support to take any action required to ensure the maintenance of such standards.

Your mission is to protect and advance US interests abroad and you will receive the resources necessary to accomplish that mission. At the same time, I expect that these resources will be used in an effective and efficient manner, and that they will be directly and carefully related to priority policy and program activities. You should inform the Secretary of State when you believe that staffing of any agency is either inadequate or excessive to the performance of essential functions.

I am confident that you will represent the United States with imagination, energy, and skill. You have my full personal confidence and best wishes.

Sincerely,

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APPENDIX C

INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

1. General. The IDAD strategy is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The strategy focuses on building viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society. Its fundamental goal is to prevent an insurgency or other forms of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and defeating the threat and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, IDAD is ideally a preemptive strategy; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, IDAD becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. FID defense planners must understand the HN's IDAD strategy if they are to plan effectively to support it.

2. Concept. The IDAD strategy should integrate military and civilian programs into a coherent, comprehensive effort. Military actions provide a level of internal security that permits and supports growth through balanced development. This development requires change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may in turn promote unrest in the society. The concept, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.

a. Often, a government must overcome the inertia and shortcomings of its own political system before it can cope with the internal threats it is facing. This may involve the adoption of reforms during a time of crisis when pressures limit flexibility and make implementation difficult.

b. The successful IDAD strategist must realize that the true nature of the threat to the government lies in the enemy's political strength rather than military power. Although the government must contain the armed elements, concentration on the military aspect of the threat does not address the real danger. Any strategy that does not pay continuing, serious attention to the political claims and demands of the opposition is severely handicapped. Military and paramilitary programs are necessary for success but are not sufficient by themselves.

3. Functions. The IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats. (See

Figure C-1.) These functions are: balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization.




Figure C-1. IDAD Strategy Model

Figure C-1. IDAD Strategy Model

a. Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, social, and economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development, thus alleviating frustration. Balanced development satisfies legitimate grievances that the opposition attempts to exploit. The government must recognize conditions that contribute to the internal threat and instability and take preventive measures. Correcting conditions that make a society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem.

b. Security includes all activities to protect the populace from the threat and to provide a safe environment for national development. Security of the populace and government resources is essential to countering the threat. Protection and control of the

populace permit development and deny the enemy access to popular support. The security effort should establish an environment in which the local populace can provide for its own security with limited government support.

c. Neutralization is a political concept that: (1) makes an organized force irrelevant to the political process; (2) is the physical and psychological separation of the threatening elements from the population; (3) includes all lawful activities (except those that degrade the government's legitimacy) to disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the insurgent organization; (4) can involve public exposure and the discrediting of leaders during a low-level of unrest with little political violence; (5) can involve arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken; or (6) can involve combat action when the enemy's violent activities escalate. All neutralization efforts must respect the country's legal system. They must scrupulously observe constitutional provisions regarding rights and responsibilities. The need for security forces to act lawfully is essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also because this reinforces government legitimacy while denying the enemy an exploitable issue. Special emergency powers may exist by legislation or decree. Government agents must not abuse these powers because they might well lose the popular support they need. Denying the enemy an opportunity to seize on and exploit legitimate issues against the government discredits their leaders and neutralizes their propaganda.

d. Mobilization provides organized manpower and materiel resources and includes all activities to motivate and organize popular support of the government. This support is essential for a successful IDAD program. If successful, mobilization maximizes manpower and other resources available to the government while it minimizes those available to the insurgent. Mobilization allows the government to strengthen existing institutions, to develop new ones to respond to demands, and promotes the government's legitimacy.

4. Principles. Although each situation is unique, certain principles guide efforts in the four functional areas, to prevent or defeat an internal threat. Planners must apply the IDAD strategy and these principles to each specific situation. The principles are: unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and a responsive government.

a. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is essential to prevent or defeat any credible threat. Unity of effort means coordinated action and centralized control at all levels. The organizational basis for coordinating and controlling activities, including those of security forces, is included in paragraph 5 of this appendix.

b. Maximum Use of Intelligence. Maximum use of intelligence requires that all operations be based on accurate, timely, and confirmed intelligence derived from reliable sources. Successful implementation of operations necessitates an extensive operational security and counterintelligence program to protect US FID operations and to counter and penetrate opposing force intelligence collection operations. Intelligence and counterintelligence operations must be designed so as to assess accurately the opposing force's capabilities; to provide timely warning to HN and US FID forces; and to penetrate and be prepared to compromise hostile operations on order. If the HN is not capable of performing these missions effectively upon the commitment of US FID forces, then US intelligence and counterintelligence elements must be deployed to accomplish these missions. In this event, the HN must develop its internal intelligence and security forces in order to perform these missions effectively. US elements may assist the HN in developing intelligence capability, within the confines of USG directives, as deemed appropriate by the Country Team, US combatant commander, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Minimum Use of Violence. A threatened government must carefully examine all COAs in response to the internal violence. The government should stress the minimum use of violence to maintain order. At times, the best way to minimize violence is to use overwhelming force; at other times, it is necessary to proceed with caution, extending the duration but limiting the intensity or scope of violence. In either case, discreet use of force is the guideline.

d. A Responsive Government. Positive measures are necessary to ensure a responsive government whose ability to mobilize manpower and resources as well as to motivate the people reflects its administrative and management capabilities. In many cases, the leadership must provide additional training, supervision, controls, and followup.

5. Organizational Guidance. This section presents a model for an organization to coordinate, plan, and conduct IDAD

activities. Actual organizations may vary from country to country in order to adapt to existing conditions. Organizations should follow the established political organization of the nation concerned. The organization should provide centralized direction and permit decentralized execution of the plan. The organization should be structured and chartered so that it can coordinate and direct the IDAD efforts of existing government agencies; however, it should minimize interference with those agencies' normal functions. Examples of national and subnational organizations show how to achieve a coordinated and unified effort at each level.

a. National-Level Organization. The national-level organization plans and coordinates programs. Its major offices normally correspond to branches and agencies of the national government concerned with insurgency, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorist or other internal threats. Figure C-2 depicts a planning and coordination organization at the national level.




Figure C-2. Counterinsurgency Planning and Coordination Organization

(1) The planning office is responsible for long-range planning to prevent or defeat the threat. Its plans provide the chief executive with a basis for delineating authority, establishing

responsibility, designating objectives, and allocating resources.

(2) The intelligence office develops concepts, directs programs, and plans and provides general guidance on intelligence related to national security. The intelligence office also coordinates intelligence production activities and correlates, evaluates, interprets, and disseminates intelligence. This office is staffed by representatives from intelligence agencies and police and military intelligence.

(3) The population and resources control (PRC) office develops economy-related policies and plans and also provides general operational guidance for all forces in the security field. Representatives of government branches concerned with commerce, as well as law enforcement and justice, staff this office.

(4) The military affairs office develops and coordinates general plans for the mobilization and allocation of the regular armed forces and paramilitary forces. Representatives from all major components of the regular and paramilitary forces staff this office.

(5) Five separate offices covering PSYOP, information, economic affairs, social affairs, and political affairs represent their parent national-level branches or agencies, and develop operational concepts and policies for inclusion in the national plan.

b. Subnational-Level Organization. Area coordination centers (ACCs) may function as combined civil-military headquarters at subnational, state, and local levels. ACCs plan, coordinate, and exercise OPCON over all military forces, and control civilian government organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The ACC does not replace unit tactical operations centers or the normal government administrative organization in the AO.

(1) ACCs perform a twofold mission, they provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction for all internal defense efforts and they ensure an immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. ACCs should conduct continuous operations and communications. ACCs are headed by

senior government officials who supervise and coordinate the activities of the staffs responsible for formulating internal defense plans and operations in their areas of interest. The staffs contain selected representatives of major forces and agencies assigned to, or operating in, the center's AOR. Each ACC includes members from the:

- (a) Area military command.
- (b) Area police agency.
- (c) Local and national intelligence organization.
- (d) Public information and PSYOP agencies.
- (e) Paramilitary forces.
- (f) Other local and national government offices involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of IDAD.

(2) There are two types of subnational ACCs that a government may form--regional and urban. The choice depends upon the environment in which the ACC operates.

(a) Regional ACCs normally locate with the nation's first subnational political subdivision with a fully developed governmental apparatus (state, province, or other). These government subdivisions are usually well-established, having exercised government functions in their areas before the insurgency's onset. They often are the lowest level of administration able to coordinate all counterinsurgency programs. A full range of developmental, informational, and military capabilities may exist at this level. Those that are not part of the normal government organization should be added when the ACC activates. This augmentation enables the ACC to coordinate its activities better by using the existing structure.

(b) Urban areas require more complex ACCs than rural areas in order to plan, coordinate, and direct counterinsurgency efforts. Urban ACCs organize like the ACCs previously described and perform the same functions. However, the urban

ACC includes representatives from local public service agencies; e.g., police, fire, medical, public works, public utilities, communications, and transportation. When necessary, the staff operates continuously to receive and act upon information requiring an immediate response.

(c) When a regional or local ACC resides in an urban area, unity of effort may dictate that urban resources locate in that center; here planners can coordinate and direct urban operations. The decision to establish an urban center or to use some other center for these purposes rests with the head of the government of the urban area who bases the decision on available resources.

(d) If the urban area comprises several separate political subdivisions with no overall political control, the ACC establishes the control necessary for proper planning and coordination. Urban ACCs are appropriate for cities and heavily populated areas lacking a higher level coordination center.

c. Civilian Advisory Committees. Committees composed of influential citizens help coordination centers at all levels monitor the success of their activities and gain popular support. These committees evaluate actions affecting civilians and communicate with the people. They provide feedback for future operational planning. Involving leading citizens in committees such as these increases their stake in, and commitment to, government programs and social mobilization objectives.

(1) The organization of a civilian committee varies according to local needs; changing situations require flexibility in structure. The chairman of the committee should be a prominent figure either appointed by the government or elected by the membership. General committee membership includes leaders in civilian organizations and other community groups who have influence with the target population. These leaders may include:

(a) Education officials (distinguished professors and teachers).

(b) Religious leaders.

- (c) Health directors.
- (d) Minority group representatives.
- (e) Labor officials.
- (f) Heads of local news media, distinguished writers, journalists, and editors.
- (g) Business and commercial leaders.
- (h) Former political leaders or retired government officials.

(2) The success of a civilian advisory committee hinges on including leading participants from all major political and cultural groupings, including minorities.

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APPENDIX D

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE FID AREA OF OPERATIONS

1. Introduction. Intelligence preparation of the AO provides the commander and commander's staff guidance on intelligence considerations critical to successful military operations. The focus of intelligence requirements for military operations in support of FID programs are different from other operations. Analysis keys on the local population and the political, economic, and social threats to the HN's stability as opposed to force-on-force templating techniques used in traditional combat operations. Intelligence preparation of the AO is divided into the following five major categories: operational area evaluation, geographic analysis, population analysis, climatology analysis, and threat evaluation. (See Joint Pub 2-0.)

2. Operational Area Evaluation. The intelligence preparation to support FID begins with a broad operational area evaluation (OAE), which covers the commander's AOR. During this phase, data is collected to satisfy basic intelligence requirements in the following areas: political, military, economic, religious, social, endemic diseases and health status of the population, geographic, psychological, cultural, friendly forces, threat forces, and nonbelligerent third party forces. Data is collected with respect to the specific operational area and mission and considers all elements of national power from a strategic perspective. Of particular interest during this stage is the evaluation of the PSYOP and CA situations.

a. The PSYOP OAE is initially comprised of the basic psychological studies and special psychological studies and assessments of the area. Analysts doing PSYOP OAE also focus on, but do not limit themselves to, identifying:

(1) The ethnic, racial, social, economic, religious, and linguistic groups of the area and their locations and densities.

(2) Key leaders and communicators in the area, both formal (e.g., politicians and government officials) and informal (e.g., businessmen and clergy).

(3) Cohesive and divisive issues within a community; e.g., what makes it a community, what would split the community, and what are the attitudes toward the HN.

(4) Literacy rates and levels of education.

(5) Types and proportions of media consumed by the community and the level of credibility each is perceived to carry within the community and/or segments within society.

(6) Any concentrations of third country nationals in the AO and their purposes and functions.

(7) Scientific and technical developments, production, and trade, including significant trade agreements, restrictions and sanctions, or lack thereof.

(8) The use of existing natural resources, industry, agriculture, and destruction or exploitation of the environment.

b. In the course of OAE, the PSYOP planners coordinate with the military PA office to prepare a matrix identifying groups, their leaders, preferred media, and key issues that should be developed. Target groups are identified. The locations of mass media facilities in the area that can be used for the dissemination of PSYOP products, and the identification of their operational characteristics, are also important in the selection of the proper outlet for these products. In particular, the PSYOP planner must evaluate:

(1) Studios and transmitters for AM and FM radio and television and their operational characteristics (wattage, frequency, programming, etc.).

(2) Heavy and light printing facilities, including locations, types, and capacities of equipment that can supplement the capabilities of PSYOP units.

(3) Accessibility of such facilities to PSYOP forces: e.g., who controls them and whether they will cooperate with the United States.

c. CA OAE in FID comprises an evaluation of HN civic action programs, PRC, civilian labor, and materiel procurement. The CA planner also evaluates future sites and programs for civic action undertaken in the AO by the HN unilaterally or with US support through CMO. In making this evaluation, the planner often relies primarily on the local and regional HUMINT assets of the HN and the supported command to get an accurate feel for

the lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, or other related FID threats that may exist in the area.

3. Geographic Analysis. The next phase in the intelligence preparation of the AO to support FID is the geographic analysis, which considers a wide range of factors that include the political, military, economic, religious, social, psychological, and cultural significance of the area.

a. Normally, the five map overlays described below are a result of the geographic analysis.

(1) Population Status Overlay. The generic population status overlay graphically represents the sectors of the population that are progovernment, antigovernment, prothreat, antithreat, and uncommitted or neutral. This overlay is important because the population can provide support and security to friendly or threat forces. The failure of the November 1989 insurgent offensive in San Salvador, El Salvador, for example, was in large part a result of the insurgents' inability to mobilize the urban masses against the government. This inability resulted in tactical and operational military failure and severely undermined the credibility of the insurgents' claim that they represented the will of the people. This graphic may also display educational, religious, ethnic, or economic aspects of the population. A more refined product in an urban environment displays the home and work places of both key friendly and threat military or civilian personnel and their relatives. In this instance, large-scale maps and/or imagery are used to accurately plot information by marking rooftops of buildings. Such a refined product should be cross-referenced to order of battle (ORBAT) files that are analogous to the represented data; e.g., personality files and or faction and organization files.

(2) Cover and Concealment Overlay. The cover and concealment overlay graphically depicts the availability, density, type, and location of cover and concealment from the ground as well as from the air. In areas of significant threat of aerial attack or observation, overhead cover and concealment may be important considerations for threat selection of base camps, mission support sites, drug laboratories, or other enemy areas. Surface configuration primarily determines cover, including natural and manmade

features such as mines, bunkers, tunnels, and fighting positions. Vegetation is the primary feature that provides concealment. The canopy closure overlay is critical for the determination of areas that offer concealment from aerial observation, particularly in tropical rain forests, and is incorporated into the cover and concealment overlay for rural and other forested areas. In built-up areas, manmade structures are also assessed for the cover and concealment they offer. When used with the population status overlay, the cover and concealment overlay can be used to determine dwelling and work places, safe houses, routes of movement, and meeting places.

(3) Logistics Sustainability Overlay. Logistics is essential to friendly and threat operations. The detection and location of supply lines and bases are critical to finding and defeating hostile activities. Attention is given to basic food, water, medicine, and materiel supply. In rural areas, the logistics sustainability overlay depicts potable water supplies, farms, orchards, growing seasons, etc. In built-up areas, this overlay depicts supermarkets, food warehouses, pharmacies, hospitals, clinics, and residences of doctors and other key medical personnel. Key to preparing this overlay is knowledge of threat and friendly forces, their logistic requirements, and the availability and location of materiel and personnel to meet these requirements.

(4) Target Overlay. The target overlay graphically portrays the location of possible threat targets within the area. In FID environments, this overlay depicts banks, bridges, electric power installations, bulk petroleum and chemical facilities, military and government facilities, the residences and work places of key friendly personnel, and other specific points most susceptible to attack based on threat capabilities and intentions. For example, the threat to a large airbase may focus on airframes, crew billets, and POL storage as opposed to runways, aprons, or the control tower. The target overlay is significant to the friendly commander's defensive planning because it shows where defenses need to be concentrated and, conversely, where defenses can be diffused. It also provides counterintelligence personnel with a focus for indicators of threat preparation to attack; e.g., to discover an indigenous worker pacing off the

distances between perimeter fences and critical nodes. The target overlay is useful in disaster relief operations by identifying likely locations for rioting, pilfering, or looting; e.g., grocery, clothing and appliance stores, and their supporting warehouses.

(5) LOCs Overlay. The LOCs overlay highlights transportation systems and nodes within the area such as railways, roads, trails, navigable waterways, airfields, drop zones (DZs), and landing zones (LZs). In urban environments, mass public transit routes and schedules, as well as underground sewage, drainage and utility tunnels, ditches and culverts, and large open areas that could be used for DZs and LZs are also shown. Where applicable, this overlay will also show seasonal variations. Care is taken to compare recent aerial imagery and map products to ensure that new LOCs are added to the final product. In many situations, LOC products will be readily available from the HN or other local sources.

b. PSYOP and CA considerations also impact the geographic analysis as described below.

(1) PSYOP considerations in a geographic analysis focus on how geography affects the population of the area and the dissemination of PSYOP products. This step may include, for example, preparation of a radio line of sight (LOS) overlay for radio and television stations derived from an obstacle overlay depicting elevations and LOS information. PSYOP terrain analysis will, for example, focus on determining the respective ranges and audibility of signals from the most significant broadcast stations identified during OAE.

(2) CA considerations in geographic analysis include the identification of critical government, insurgent, and terrorist threats and other threats to food and water storage facilities, resupply routes, and base locations. In addition, a primary consideration in FID is how terrain affects the ability of US and HN forces to conduct CMO. For example, extremely rugged or thickly vegetated areas may be unsuited for some CMO projects because of inaccessibility to the necessary manpower and equipment needed to run such projects.

4. Population Analysis. In FID, the local population is the key element to successful operations. Consequently, planners must conduct a population analysis of the AO. During this analysis, the planner identifies, evaluates, and makes overlays and other products, as appropriate, for the following factors: social organization; economic organization and dynamics; political organization and dynamics; history of the society; nature of the insurgency (if applicable); nature of the government; effects on nonbelligerents; and COAs of the insurgents, the HN government, and nonbelligerents.

a. In evaluating social organization, planners look at:

(1) Density and distribution of population by groups, balance between urban and rural groups, sparsely populated areas, and concentrations of primary racial, linguistic, religious, or cultural groups.

(2) Race, religion, national origin, tribe, economic class, political party and affiliation, ideology, education level, union memberships, management class, occupation, and age of the populace.

(3) Overlaps among classes and splits within them; e.g., the number and types of religious and racial groups to which union members belong and ideological divisions within a profession.

(4) Composite groups based on their political behavior and the component and composite strengths of each; i.e., those who actively or passively support the government or the threat, and those who are neutral.

(5) Active or potential issues motivating the political, economic, social, or military behavior of each group and subgroup.

(6) Population growth or decline, age distribution, and changes in location by groups.

Finally, planners perform a factor analysis to determine which activities and programs accommodate the goals of most of the politically and socially active groups. Then they determine which groups and composite groups support, are inclined to support, or remain neutral toward the government.

b. In evaluating economic organization and performance, planners specifically look at:

- (1) The principal economic ideology of the society and local innovations or adaptations in the operational area.
- (2) The economic infrastructure; i.e., resource locations, scientific and technical capabilities, electric power production and distribution, transport facilities, and communications networks.
- (3) Economic performance; i.e., gross national product, gross domestic product, foreign trade balance, per capita income, inflation rate, and annual growth rate.
- (4) Major industries and their sustainability; i.e., the depth and soundness of the economic base, maximum peak production levels and duration, and storage capacity.
- (5) Performance of productive segments; i.e., public and private ownership patterns, concentration and dispersal, and distribution of wealth in agriculture, manufacturing, forestry, information, professional services, mining, and transportation.
- (6) Public health factors that include, but are not limited to, birth and death rates, diet and nutrition, water supply, sanitation, health care availability, endemic diseases, health status of farm animals, and availability of veterinary services.
- (7) Foreign trade patterns; i.e., domestic and foreign indebtedness (public and private), and resource dependencies.
- (8) Availability of education; i.e., access by individuals and groups, sufficiency for individual needs; groupings by scientific technical, professional, liberal arts, and crafts training, and surpluses and shortages of skills.
- (9) Unemployment, underemployment, and exclusion of groups, as well as horizontal and vertical career mobility.
- (10) Taxing authorities, rates, and rate determination.

(11) Economic benefit and distribution, occurrence of poverty, and concentration of wealth.

(12) Population shifts and their causes and effects; i.e., rural to urban, agriculture to manufacturing, and manufacturing to service.

Finally, planners identify economic program values and resources that might generate favorable support, stabilize neutral groups, or neutralize threat groups.

c. In evaluating political organization and dynamics, planners specifically look at:

(1) The formal political structure of the government and the sources of its power; i.e., pluralist democracy based on the consensus of the voters, strong-man rule supported by the military.

(2) The informal political structure of the government and its comparison with the formal structure; i.e., is the government nominally a democracy but in reality a political dictatorship?

(3) Legal and illegal political parties and their programs, strengths, and prospects for success. Also, the prospects for partnerships and coalitions between the parties.

(4) Nonparty political organizations, motivating issues, strengths, and parties or programs they support; i.e., political action groups.

(5) Nonpolitical interest groups and the correlations of their interests with political parties or nonparty organizations; i.e., churches, cultural and professional organizations, and unions.

(6) The mechanism for government succession, the integrity of the process, roles of the populace and those in power, regularity of elections, systematic exclusion of identifiable groups, voting blocs, patron-client determinants of voting, etc.

(7) Independence or subordination and effectiveness of the judiciary. That is, does the judiciary have the power of legislative and executive review? Does the judiciary support constitutionally guaranteed rights and international concepts of human rights?

(8) Independence or control of the press and other mass media and the alternatives for the dissemination of information and opinion.

(9) Centralization or diffusion of essential decisionmaking and patterns of inclusion, or inclusion of specific individuals or groups in the process.

(10) Administrative competence of the bureaucracy. Are bureaucrats egalitarian in practice or in words only? Can individuals and groups make their voices heard within the bureaucracy?

Finally, planners correlate data concerning political, economic, and social groups and then identify political programs to neutralize opposing groups as well as provide programs favorable to friendly groups.

d. In evaluating the history of the society, planners specifically look at:

(1) The origin of the incumbent government and its leadership. Was it elected? Does it have a long history? Have there been multiple peaceful successions of government?

(2) The history of political violence. Is violence a common means for the resolution of political problems? Is there precedent for revolution, coup d'etat, assassination, or terrorism? Does the country have a history of consensus-building? Does the present insurgency have causes and aspirations in common with historic political violence?

Finally, the planners determine the legitimacy of the government, acceptance of violent and nonviolent remedies to political problems by the populace, the type and level of violence to be used by friendly and threat forces, and the groups or subgroups that will support or oppose the use of violence.

e. In evaluating the nature of the insurgency, planners specifically look at:

(1) Desired end-state of the insurgency, clarity of its formulation, openness of its articulation, commonality of point of view among the elements of

the insurgency, and differences between this end view and the end view of the government.

(2) Groups and subgroups supporting the general objectives of the insurgency.

(3) Cleavages, minority views, and dissensions within the insurgency.

(4) Groups that may have been deceived by the threat concerning the desired end-state of the insurgency.

(5) Organizational and operational patterns used by the insurgency, variations and combinations of such, and shifts and trends.

Finally, planners determine the stage and phase of the insurgency as well as how far and how long it has progressed and/or regressed over time. They identify unity and disagreement with front groups, leadership, tactics, primary targets, doctrine, training, morale, discipline, operational capabilities, and materiel resources. They evaluate external support, to include political, financial, and logistic assistance. The planners determine whether rigid commitment to a method or ideological tenet or other factor constitutes an exploitable vulnerability and/or a weakness on which the government can build strength.

f. When examining hostile groups, planners examine from hostile perspectives:

(1) The leadership and staff structure and its psychological characteristics, skills, and C2 resources.

(2) Patterns of lawless activities (e.g., illicit drug trafficking, extortion, piracy, and smuggling) or insurgent operations, base areas, LOCs, and supporters outside of the country concerned.

(3) The intelligence, OPSEC, deception, and PSYOP capabilities of the hostile groups.

(4) The appeal of the hostile groups to those who support them.

g. In evaluating the nature of the government response, planners specifically examine:

(1) General planning, or lack of planning, for countering the insurgency, lawlessness, or subversion being encountered as well as planning comprehensiveness and correctness of definitions and conclusions.

(2) Organization and methods for strategic and operational planning and execution of plans; i.e., resource requirements, constraints, and realistic priorities.

(3) Use of population and resources and the effects on each group.

(4) Organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine for security forces; i.e., how does the government protect its economic and political infrastructure?

(5) Areas where the government has maintained the initiative.

(6) Population and resource control measures.

(7) Economic development programs.

Finally, planners correlate government and insurgent strengths and weaknesses and identify necessary changes in friendly programs, plans, organization, and doctrine.

h. In evaluating the effects on nonbelligerents, planners specifically examine:

(1) Mechanisms for monitoring nonbelligerent attitudes and responses.

(2) Common objectives of groups neither supporting nor opposing the insurgency.

(3) Effects on the populace of government military, political, economic, and social operations and programs. That is, does the government often kill civilians in its counterthreat operations? Are benefits of government aid programs evenly distributed?

(4) To whom is the populace inclined to provide intelligence?

Finally, planners determine the strengths and weaknesses of the nonbelligerents, the depth of their commitment to remain neutral, and the requirements to make them remain

neutral and/or to support friendly or threat programs or forces.

i. In evaluating COAs for threat forces, the government, and nonbelligerents, planners balance the foregoing factors and determine likely COAs, as well as their possible effects, for each element.

5. Climatology Analysis. FID planning must be done with consideration of long-term effects. As such, relevant weather factors extend beyond short-term weather analysis to consideration of the broader and longer term climatological factors. The area's climate, weather, and light conditions are analyzed to determine their effects on friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent third-party operations. Planners consider climate types by area and season and their effects on military, political, social, and economic activities. Historic weather data and weather effects overlays are developed during this step. Special considerations are also made for the effect of light conditions on friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent third-party operations and activities. The effects of weather and climate are integrated with terrain analysis. Special considerations are made for the effects of weather and climate on CA projects, PSYOP media and dissemination, amounts of accessible food, storage of explosives, and population patterns; e.g., seasonal employment. Examples of potential effects are periods of drought that force farmers to become bandits or insurgents and flooding that causes isolation and interference with the distribution of food and medicine.

6. Correlation of Force Evaluation. In conducting the threat evaluation in FID, particular attention is paid to the HN government's military and paramilitary police forces and the insurgent forces and infrastructure (guerrilla, auxiliary, and underground). Correlation of force evaluation in such environments includes a detailed analysis of the following factors for friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces: composition, strength (include quantity of active members, amount of popular support, funding method, and origin), training, equipment, electronics technical data, disposition (location), tactics and methods, operational effectiveness, weaknesses and vulnerabilities, personalities, and miscellaneous data.

a. The FID planners determine how the friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces can use geography, offensive actions, security, surprise, and cross-country mobility to develop locally superior application of one or more of the elements of power. FID planners identify the

strengths and weaknesses of friendly, threat, and nonbelligerent forces, and determine the political, social, economic, and psychological effects of each side's COAs, tactics, and countertactics. Finally, the planners develop COAs that will optimize the application of the elements of power by the friendly side.

(1) The PSYOP threat evaluation serves two purposes. First, it provides the commander with an understanding of the existing and potential opposing propaganda in the area. It is a safe assumption that if US forces are conducting PSYOP in an area, some other organization is also conducting PSYOP in the same area. US PSYOP forces in the area must anticipate and be able to counter, if not prevent, threat propaganda directed at US and allied forces and the local populace. Second, the PSYOP threat evaluation provides the supported commander with the PSYOP consequences of US operations, and also provides alternative measures within each COA. To conduct an effective threat evaluation, the planner must determine the capabilities of threat organizations to conduct propaganda operations and to counteract US and allied PSYOP. (The demographics of any military or paramilitary threat should be evaluated at this step if they were not considered during OAE.) Specific capabilities to be evaluated include threat abilities to:

- (a) Conduct offensive propaganda operations targeting US or allied forces or the local populace.
- (b) Immunize its personnel against US PSYOP efforts (defensive counterpropaganda).
- (c) Counteract US PSYOP efforts by exploiting weaknesses in US PSYOP campaigns (offensive counterpropaganda).
- (d) Conduct active measures or dirty tricks campaigns.
- (e) Conduct electronic countermeasures (ECM) against US or allied PSYOP broadcasts.
- (f) Conduct electronic counter-countermeasures to safeguard organic PSYOP capability.

(2) The CA threat evaluation focuses on determining the adversaries in the HN population. This determination is especially critical when the opponent is not a standing military force or when the opposing force is not equipped with standard uniforms and weapons; e.g., guerrillas or terrorists. These forces often blend into, or intermingle with, the civilian community. CA threat evaluation identifies the threat, ORBAT, and modus operandi. Social, religious, and other types of forums through which threat forces employ the elements of power, as well as methods of countering such applications, are also identified.

APPENDIX E

CA ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. General. The purpose of a CA estimate is to provide information on HN aspects of the situation important to the CA mission. This estimate may be used in a range of circumstances from indirect FID support to combat operations and as such, the content must be tailored to the operating environment and mission. This appendix is a guide to elements that should be included; the level of detail and length of the CA estimate will be dictated by the degree of anticipated CA operations. The estimate is usually prepared by the combatant command's CA staff element in close collaboration with the other staff sections and subordinate commanders. A detailed written estimate may be made if time allows, or the format may be used as a mental checklist to ensure that all elements of the CA situation are considered. A major mission for CA in the FID environment will be to support and facilitate other CMO; therefore, any analysis of CA must include an analysis of the CMO missions. In many paragraphs of the CA estimate, both CA and CMO missions are examined together. Specific guidance for joint CA operations in support of FID is found in Joint Pub 3-57.

2. Format. The format for a CA estimate follows:

(CLASSIFICATION)

Originating Section, Issuing HQ*
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

CIVIL AFFAIRS ESTIMATE NO _____ **

() REFERENCES:

- a. () Maps and charts.
- b. () Other relevant documents

* When the CA estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command and the final page of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the originating section, division, or other official, according to local policy.

** Number CA estimates sequentially within each calendar year.

1. () MISSION

a. () The overall mission of the commander as taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statement.

b. () The CA mission to support the commander's mission.

2. () SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS

a. () Intelligence Situation. Include information obtained from the intelligence officer. When the details make it appropriate and the estimate is written, a brief summary and reference to the intelligence document or an annex of the estimate may be used.

(1) () Characteristics of the Area of Operations. Physical features, climate, and basic political, economic, and psychological factors.

(a) () Attitudes of the population. Whether cooperative or uncooperative.

(b) () Availability of basic necessities. Food, clothing, water, shelter, and medical care. Include civilian capabilities of self-support.

(c) () Availability of local materiel and personnel to support military operations.

(d) () Number of dislocated civilians in the area.

(e) () Amount and type of damage suffered by the economy from the lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency being experienced; particularly in the transportation, public utility, and communications fields.

(f) () Status and character of civil government.

(g) () State of health of the civilian populace.

(h) () Endemic and epidemic diseases and prevalence.

(2) () Enemy strengths, weaknesses, and dispositions.

(3) () Enemy capabilities. Among others, consider sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, illicit drug traffickers, potential for use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weaponry, and movement of dislocated civilians.

(a) () Affecting the mission.

(b) () Affecting CA and CMO.

b. () Tactical Situation. Include information obtained from the commander's planning guidance and from the operations officer. The detail in this paragraph depends on the type and degree of internal threat the HN is facing.

(1) () Present dispositions of major tactical elements.

(2) () Possible COAs to accomplish the mission. These COAs are carried forward throughout the remainder of the estimate.

(3) () Projected operations and other planning factors required for coordination and integration of staff estimates.

c. () Personnel Situation. Include information obtained from the personnel officer.

(1) () Present dispositions of personnel and administration units and installations that have an effect on CA and CMO.

(2) () Projected developments within the personnel field likely to influence CA and CMO operations.

d. () Logistics Situation. Include information obtained from the logistics officer.

(1) () Present dispositions of logistics units and installations that have an effect on CA or CMO.

(2) () Projected developments within the logistics field likely to influence CA or CMO.

e. () CMO Situation. In this subparagraph, status is shown under appropriate subheadings. In the case of detailed information at higher levels of command, a summary may appear under the subheading with a reference to an annex to the estimate.

(1) () Disposition and status of CA and CMO elements and related significant military and nonmilitary elements.

(2) () Current problems faced by the command. Estimate the impact of future plans of the supported unit operations pertinent to the CA mission.

(3) () Projected impact of civilian interference with military operations.

(4) () Government functions.

(a) () Public administration.

(b) () Public safety.

(c) () Public health.

(d) () Labor.

(e) () Legal.

(f) () Public welfare.

(g) () Public finance.

(h) () Public education.

(i) () Civil defense.

(5) () Economic functions.

(a) () Economy and commerce.

- (b) () Food and agriculture, including ranch operations and animal husbandry.
 - (c) () Civilian supply.
 - (d) () Property control.
- (6) () Public facilities functions.
 - (a) () Public works and utilities.
 - (b) () Public communications.
 - (c) () Public transportation.
- (7) () Special functions.
 - (a) () Displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees.
 - (b) () Arts, monuments, and archives.
 - (c) () Cultural affairs.
 - (d) () Civil information.

f. () Assumptions. Until specific planning guidance is available, assumptions may be required for initial planning or preparation of the estimate. These assumptions are modified as data become available.

3. () ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION. Under each subheading (subparagraph 2e) for each COA, analyze all CA and CMO factors, indicating problems and deficiencies.

4. () COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTION

a. () Evaluate CA critical tasks and list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA.

b. () Discuss, from the CA standpoint, the advantages and disadvantages of each tactical COA under consideration. Those that are common to all COAs or are considered minor should be eliminated from the list. Include methods of overcoming deficiencies or modifications required in each COA. Priority will be given to the CA activities that most directly relate to the mission.

5. () CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. () Indicate whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from the CA standpoint.
- b. () Indicate which COAs can best be supported from the CA standpoint.
- c. () List primary reasons why other COAs are not favored.
- d. () List the major CA problems that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include specific recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effect of these deficiencies.

(Signed) _____
J5/CA Staff Officer

() ANNEXES. (List by letter and title.) Annexes should be used when the information is in graph format or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body of the estimate would make it cumbersome. The annexes are lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

() DISTRIBUTION. (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters.)

(CLASSIFICATION)

APPENDIX F

PSYOP ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. General. The purpose of a PSYOP estimate is to provide information on PSYOP aspects of military operations to aid the commander in accomplishing his mission. This estimate is important to any plan but is particularly critical to successfully integrating FID. The estimate is usually prepared by the PSYOP staff element in close coordination with the other coordinating staff sections and subordinate commanders. Once completed, the PSYOP estimate becomes an annex to the operations officer's estimate of the situation. The estimate should be as thorough and detailed as time will permit. A detailed written estimate may be made if time allows, or the format may serve as a mental checklist to ensure that all elements of the PSYOP situation are considered. The detail varies with the level and type of command.

2. Format. The format for a PSYOP estimate follows:

(CLASSIFICATION)

Originating Section, Issuing HQ*
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

PSYOP ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION NO _____ **

() REFERENCES:

a. () Maps and charts.

b. () Other relevant documents (Basic PSYOP Studies (BPSS), special PSYOP studies, special PSYOP assessments, and intelligence estimates.)

* When the PSYOP estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the final page of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the originating section, division, or other official, according to local policy.

** Number PSYOP estimates sequentially within each calendar year. The PSYOP estimate is usually distributed as an appendix to the J3 operations annex to the estimate.

1. () MISSION

a. () The mission of the command, as a whole, taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statement.

b. () The PSYOP mission to support the maneuver commander's mission.

2. () SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS

a. () Characteristics of the AO. This paragraph summarizes data about the area taken from the intelligence estimate, area study, or BPS, with specific emphasis on significant factors influencing PSYOP activities (terrain, weather, population, and culture).

b. () Opponent forces.

(1) () Inside the AO.

(a) () Strength and Dispositions. A reference to the current intelligence estimate is appropriate.

(b) () Capabilities. Opponent capabilities taken from the current intelligence estimate are discussed with specific emphasis on their impact on PSYOP activities.

(2) () Outside the AO.

(a) () Strength and Dispositions. A reference to the current intelligence estimate is appropriate as well as any timely special PSYOP assessments or other current documents.

(b) () Capabilities. Capabilities taken from current reports and documents obtained from intelligence sources or other government agencies are discussed with specific emphasis on their impact on PSYOP activities.

c. () Nonbelligerent third parties (United Nations, foreign workers, Red Cross, World Health Organization, and the media).

(1) () Strength and dispositions.

(2) () Capabilities.

d. () Competitors (allies, neutral countries, multinational corporations).

(1) () Strength and dispositions.

(2) () Capabilities.

e. () Friendly forces.

(1) () Present Disposition of Major Elements. This subparagraph includes an estimate of the strengths of the major elements, including allies and other services. Because of the nature of the information presented here, this subparagraph may have to be marked Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals (NOFORN).

(2) () Own COAs. State the COAs under consideration obtained from the operations estimate, and the potential psychological impact of these COAs on friendly, neutral, and hostile audiences.

(3) () Probable Tactical Developments. This subparagraph should review major developments necessary in the initial and subsequent phases of the proposed operations.

f. () Personnel Situation. State known personnel problems that may affect the PSYOP situation. Consult the personnel estimate for details. (Examples of personnel problems include shortages of linguists and skilled operators for indigenous equipment.)

g. () Logistics Situation. State known logistics problems that may affect the PSYOP situation. Refer to the logistics estimate for details. (Examples of logistics problems include the lack of transportation and adequate facilities.)

h. () CA Situation. State projected developments within the CA field likely to influence or affect the PSYOP situation. Consult the CA estimate for details. (Examples of CA situations include large numbers of displaced persons, infrastructure problems, prisoners of war, and refugees.)

i. () Communications-Electronics (C-E) Situation. State the C-E situation, emphasizing known C-E problems that may affect the PSYOP situation. Consult the C-E estimate for details.

j. () Assumptions. State assumptions about the PSYOP situation made for this estimate. Since basic assumptions for the operation have already been made and will appear in planning guidance as well as the plan itself, they should not be repeated here; however, certain PSYOP assumptions that may have been made in preparing this estimate should be stated here. (For example, will the conduct of PSYOP be permitted?)

k. () Special Features. List here anything not covered elsewhere in the estimate that may influence the PSYOP situation such as themes and actions to be stressed or avoided. (For example, in certain Middle Eastern countries, female soldiers will have to cover themselves from head to toe when venturing outside US military facilities.)

l. () PSYOP Situation. State known or anticipated PSYOP problems that may influence the selection of a specific COA and the PSYOP status. (For instance, what is the prevailing mood or atmosphere?)

(1) () Disposition of PSYOP Units

(2) () PSYOP Situation. Include considerations such as occupied and liberated areas and any missions, directives, objectives, or guidance from higher authority.

(a) () Inside the AO.

(b) () Outside the AO.

(3) () Requirements for Indigenous Personnel Support

(4) () Operational Peculiarities. Peculiarities of operations to be supported that may

have an impact on PSYOP; e.g., planned use of nuclear or chemical weapons, the possibility of pursuit or exploitation across international boundaries, the planned use of deception measures, and previous operations and their effect on enemy morale.

(5) () Other factors or considerations that may detract from or assist in the accomplishment of PSYOP objectives (for instance, the Soviet support of a United Nations resolution during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM).

3. () ANALYSIS OF OWN COAs. This paragraph is an orderly examination of the PSYOP factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence and to isolate the psychological implications that should be weighed by the commander in the commander's estimate of the situation.

a. () Each COA is analyzed from the PSYOP point of view to determine its advantages and disadvantages for the conduct of PSYOP. The detail of the analysis is determined by the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

b. () The PSYOP factors described in paragraph 2 above establish the elements to be analyzed for each COA under consideration. These PSYOP factors should be realistically examined and include appropriate considerations that may have an impact on the PSYOP situation as it affects the COA; e.g., climate and weather, terrain, hydrography, enemy capabilities, and other significant elements, including political, economic, sociological, and psychological. (Throughout the analysis, the PSYOP staff officer must keep PSYOP considerations foremost in his mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision, but rather to ensure that all applicable PSYOP factors have been considered and are the basis for paragraphs 4 and 5.)

4. () COMPARISON OF OWN COAs

a. () Compare the proposed COAs to determine the one that offers the best chance of success from the PSYOP point of view. List the advantages and disadvantages of each COA affecting PSYOP.

b. () Develop and compare methods of overcoming disadvantages, if any, in each COA.

c. () State a general conclusion on the COA that offers the best chance of success for PSYOP.

5. () CONCLUSIONS

a. () State, from best to worst, the COA(s) that can be supported from a PSYOP standpoint.

b. () State significant disadvantages that may make a COA less desirable, or completely unsupportable, from the PSYOP perspective.

c. () Review significant anticipated PSYOP problems, possible solutions, and limitations on COAs imposed by these problems.

(signed) _____
J3/PSYOP Staff Officer

() ANNEXES. (List by letter and title.) Annexes should be used when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimate too cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate. When the PSYOP estimate is distributed as an annex to the N3/G3/J3 operations estimate, the annexes become appendixes.

() DISTRIBUTION. (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters.)

(CLASSIFICATION)

APPENDIX G

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

1. General. The use of HSS resources has proven historically to be a valuable low-risk asset to support FID programs. HSS is generally a noncontroversial and cost-effective means of using the military element to support US national interests in another country. The focus of HSS initiatives are not curative, but rather long-term developmental programs that are sustainable by the HN. HSS activities are targeted toward the health problems facing the HN military and, in conjunction with other US agencies, civilian health initiatives through CA and HA. This appendix is intended as a overview of HSS support to FID. Refer to Joint Pub 4-02 for more details on HSS.

a. In this environment, there are several appropriate HSS activities:

- (1) Public health activities, to include preventive medicine and veterinary care, food hygiene, immunizations of humans and animals, child care, preventive dental hygiene, and paramedic procedures.
- (2) Diagnostic and treatment training.
- (3) Development of HSS logistics programs.
- (4) Development of continuing HSS education programs.
- (5) Development of HSS intelligence and threat analysis.
- (6) Development of a HN military field HSS support system for treatment and evacuation.
- (7) Assistance in the upgrade, staffing, and supplying of existing HSS facilities.

b. HSS activities enhance HN stability by:

- (1) Developing HSS systems appropriate and affordable by the HN.
- (2) Developing sustainable training and acquisition programs.
- (3) Increasing the effectiveness of other USG agency programs such as USAID and USIA.

(4) Initiating and coordinating medical education opportunities for HN personnel through IMET.

(5) Improving the economic well-being through veterinary medicine and animal husbandry.

2. HSS in Indirect Support. HSS indirect support to FID programs in this manner is generally accomplished by medical training teams and advisers. The focus is on identification of medical threats that affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the HN military forces and designing programs to train and equip those forces.

3. HSS in Direct Support. HSS direct support to FID programs includes training and direct medical, dental, and veterinary care for the military and, when authorized, for the civilian population. Direct HSS is provided when the HN lacks the capability to provide specific types of care. Concurrent with direct HSS support, mid- and long-term plans are developed to improve HN training and HSS systems. Direct HSS is also provided during disasters and to supplement HN programs.

a. Humanitarian Assistance. HA programs allow US military medical personnel to provide care during disasters or to support nonmilitary objectives. Activities include immunizations, refugee care, dental and veterinary screening programs, and rehabilitation support (prosthetic and orthopedic device manufacture).

b. Humanitarian and Civic Action. HCA delivers HSS support to the civilian population in conjunction with HN HSS personnel. Many countries' IDAD programs lack the resources to reach their entire population. HCA combines HN military, civilian, and international health agencies, and US military efforts to provide care and to enhance legitimacy and visibility of the HN government. Coordination is critical and the use of preplanning and presite surveys are imperative to effective use of all assets. HCA programs are generally wide in scope and are often long term.

4. HSS in Combat Operations. HSS in combat operations in support of a FID program will be generally limited to support provided to US military forces, as with any contingency operation.

5. Planning for HSS

a. General. HSS support to FID programs must be an integral part of all US military planning as discussed in Chapter III.

b. Planning Process. HSS planning is driven by the situation and must consider the following requirements:

- (1) Evacuation.
- (2) Hospitalization.
- (3) HHS logistics.
- (4) Laboratory services.
- (5) Blood management.
- (6) Dental services.
- (7) Veterinary services.
- (8) Preventive medicine services.
- (9) Command, control, and communications (C3).
- (10) HSS base development factors such as facilities, transportation, and maintenance.

c. Presite Survey. A presite survey is a critical component of the planning process. This activity is accomplished 60 to 90 days in advance of the beginning of HSS support to the FID program. The presite survey team affects coordination with the HN, USG, and international agencies and gathers information to complete a detailed HSS threat assessment. This assessment is the base document for HSS planning and subsequent employment to support the FID program.

d. Legal Restrictions. As in other military activities to support FID, HSS initiatives and programs are governed by numerous laws. Refer to Appendix A for guidance concerning legal considerations.

e. Resources. Budgeting for HSS is also closely monitored and regulated. Funding from a variety of sources may be required and preplanned.

6. HSS Employment

a. General. Employment of HSS in support of FID programs is most effective when HSS personnel are used to train or to assist the HN improve its HSS capabilities to provide care to its population. Even when providing direct care to the HN, HSS should continue to emphasize this aspect.

b. RC and DOD Civilian Personnel. Much of the US military HSS assets are resident in the RC. HSS activities in support of FID offers RC personnel and units opportunities to train and increase readiness. DOD civilian personnel with specific skills can assist in filling other voids as required.

APPENDIX H

REFERENCES

1. Purpose. This appendix provides references to aid in the understanding of FID.

2. General. References contained in this appendix include publications used in the preparation of this document as well as publications related to FID. Because of the frequent updating of some of the references, publication dates are not included.

3. Public Laws

- a. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (PL-99-399).
- b. Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (PL-99-661).
- c. Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988 (PL-100-690).
- d. Foreign Assistance Act of 1981, as amended (PL 87-195).
- e. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990, Title XI.
- f. Drug Interdiction and Law Enforcement Support (PL-101-456).
- g. Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended (PL 90-629).
- h. National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1990 and FY 1991 (PL 101-89).
- i. National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991 (PL 101-510).
- j. International Narcotics Control Act of 1990 (PL 101-623).

4. Presidential Documents

- a. National Security Decision Directive 277.
- b. National Security Review 27.

c. National Security Directive 18.

5. DOD Publications

a. DOD Directive 2000.12, "Protection of DOD Personnel and Resources Against Terrorist Acts."

b. DOD Directive S-3321.1, "Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War (U)."

c. DOD Directive 5100.46, "Foreign Disaster Relief."

d. DOD Manual 5105.38M, "Security Assistance Management Manual."

e. DOD Directive 5132.3, "DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance."

f. Defense Planning Guidance, FY 92-97.

6. Multinational Documents

a. ABCA Armies Combat Development Guide to the Year 2000, Chapter 5 - Low Level Conflict.

7. Joint Publications

a. Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces."

b. Joint Pub 1-01, "Joint Publication System (Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program)."

c. Joint Pub 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms."

d. Joint Pub 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."

e. Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."

f. Joint Pub 3-05, "Doctrine for Joint Special Operations."

g. Joint Pub 3-05.3, "Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures" (in development).

h. Joint Pub 3-05.5, "Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures."

- i. Joint Test Pub 3-06, "Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations."
- j. Joint Pub 3-53, "Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations."
- k. Joint Pub 3-54, "Joint Doctrine for Operations Security."
- l. Joint Test Pub 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."
- m. Joint Pub 4-0, "Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations."
- n. Joint Pub 4-02, "Doctrine for Health Service Support of Joint Operations(U)" (in development).
- o. Joint Pub 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support" (in development).
- p. Joint Pub 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning of Joint Operations" (in development).
- q. Joint Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures."
- r. Joint Pub 5-03.1, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures" (in development).
- s. Joint Pub 6-0, "Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations."
- t. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, FY 89-90.
- u. National Military Strategy, FY 92-97.

8. Multi-Service Publications

- a. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, "Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict."
- b. FC 100-37-1/OH 7-14.1, "Unit Terrorism Counteraction."
- c. NWP 9/FMFM 1-10, "Law of Naval Warfare."
- d. AR 12-15, SECNAVINST 4950.4, AFR 50-29, "Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT) Regulation."

9. Army Publications

- a. FM 7-98 (Coordinating Draft), "Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict."
- b. FM 8-42, "Medical Operations in Low Intensity Conflict."
- c. FM 33-1, "Psychological Operations."
- d. FM 41-10, "Civil Affairs Operations."
- e. FM 46-1 (Coordinating Draft), "Public Affairs Operations."
- f. FM 90-8, "Counter guerrilla Operations."
- g. FM 100-2-20 (Coordinating Draft), "The Threat in Low Intensity Conflict."
- h. FM 100-5, "Operations."
- i. FM 100-10, "Combat Service Support."
- j. FM 100-25 (Revised Coordinating Draft), "Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces."
- k. FM 100-37, "Terrorism Counteraction."

10. Air Force Publications

- a. AFM 1-1, "Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the US Air Force."
- b. AFM 2-11, "Foreign Internal Defense Operations."
- c. AFR 208-1, "The US Air Force Antiterrorist Program (FOUO)."

11. Navy Publications

- a. NWP 1, "Strategic Concepts of the US Navy."
- b. NWP-11, "Naval Operational Planning."
- c. NWP-13-1, "Navy Riverine and Coastal Operations."
- d. NWP-15, "Naval Special Warfare."

- e. NWP-15-2, "Special Boat Squadrons in Naval Special Warfare."
- f. OPNAVINST 3070.1, "Operations Security."
- g. OPNAVINST 3490.1, "Operations Against Command (Draft)."
- h. SECNAVINST 3070.1, Operations Security.

12. Marine Corps Publications

- a. NAVMC 2890, "Small Wars Manual."
- b. FMFM 8-2, "Counterinsurgency Operations."
- c. Marine Corps Order 3410.2A, "Marine Corps Doctrine for Psychological Operations."

13. Other. The Management of Security Assistance, The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management.

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APPENDIX J

USER'S EVALUATION REPORT
ON JOINT PUB 3-07.1

1. Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this pub. Please fill out the following: User's POC, unit address, and phone (DSN) number.

2. Content

a. Does the pub provide a conceptual framework for the topic?

b. Is the information provided accurate? What needs to be updated?

c. Is the information provided useful? If not, how can it be improved? _____

d. Is this pub consistent with other joint pubs?

e. Can this pub be better organized for the best understanding of the doctrine and/or JTTP? How?

3. Writing and Appearance

a. Where does the pub need some revision to make the writing clear and concise? What words would you use?

b. Are the charts and figures clear and understandable? How would you revise them? _____

4. Recommended urgent change(s) (if any). _____

5. Other _____

6. Please fold and mail comments to the Joint Doctrine Center (additional pages may be attached if desired) or FAX to DSN 564-3990 or COMM (804) 444-3990.

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GLOSSARY

PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC	Active component
ACC	area coordination center
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
AIASA	annual integrated assessment of security assistance
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
ASD(RSA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Regional Security Affairs)
ASD(SO/LIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict)
BPS	Basic PSYOP Study
C2	command and control
C3	command, control, and communications
CA	civil affairs
CD	counterdrug
C-E	communications-electronics
CG	Comptroller General
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIF	CINC Initiative Fund
CINC	commander of a unified command
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMO	civil military operations
COA	course of action
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept form
CONUS	continental United States
DATT	Defense Attache
DC	Deputies Committee
DCCEP	Developing Country Combined Exercise Program
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOE	Department of Energy
DOS	Department of State
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DZ	drop zone
ECM	electronic countermeasures
EEI	essential elements of information
ESF	Economic Support Fund
ETSS	extended training service specialist

FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FID	foreign internal defense
FIDAF	foreign internal defense augmentation force
FMFP	foreign military financing program
FMS	foreign military sales
HA	humanitarian assistance
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HN	host nation
HNS	host nation support
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human resources intelligence
IDAD	internal defense and development
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IWG	Interagency Working Group
JFC	joint force commander
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JTF	joint task force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
LIC	low-intensity conflict
LOC	line of communications
LOS	line of sight
LZ	landing zone
MAAG	military assistance advisory group
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MCA	military civic action
MFO	multinational force and observers
MILCON	military construction
MTT	mobile training team
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NMS	National Military Strategy
NCA	National Command Authorities
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council

O&M	operation and maintenance
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OAE	operational area evaluation
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan in complete format
OPSEC	operations security
ORBAT	order of battle
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA	public affairs
PC	Principals Committee
PCS	permanent change of station
PEP	personnel exchange program
PKO	peacekeeping operations
POB	PSYOP battalion
POG	PSYOP group
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POLAD	political advisor
PRC	population and resources control
PSYOP	psychological operations
QAT	quality assurance team
RC	Reserve component
RIP	register of intelligence publications
ROE	rules of engagement
SA	security assistance
SAO	security assistance organization
SOC	Special Operations Command
SOF	special operations forces
SOG	special operations group
SOSE	special operations staff element
TAFTs	technical assistance field teams
TATs	technical assistance teams
TDY	temporary duty
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
USACOM	US Atlantic Command
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USAJFKSWCS	US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USC	United States Code
USCENTCOM US	Central Command

USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command
USDAO	US Defense Attache Office
USDP	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USDR	US Defense Representative
USEUCOM	US European Command
USG	US Government
USIA	US Information Agency
USIS	US Information Service
USPACOM	US Pacific Command
USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command
USSOCSOUTH	US Special Operations Command South
USSOUTHCOM	US Southern Command

PART II--TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts to include limited response and containment by local military forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign plan. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Also see civil affairs activities and civil administration. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-57)

civil-military operations. A group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population, and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. (This definition is provided for information)

and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-57)

combatant command. One of the unified or specified commands established by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Combatant Commander. A commander-in-chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat service support. The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorists activities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. See also antiterrorism; terrorism. (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its

society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. See also internal defense. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, or to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, times of crisis/emergencies, or war based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace conducted by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of the country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)

internal defense. The full range of measures taken by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. See also foreign internal defense. (Joint Pub 1-02)

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

internal development. Actions taken by a nation to promote its growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic, and social) that respond to the needs of its society. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint task force. A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command, a specified command, or an existing joint task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military assistance advisory group. A joint Service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of Defense, which primarily administers the US military assistance planning and programming in the host country. Also called MAAG. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

paramilitary forces. Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

propaganda. Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizational, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related

statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security assistance organization. All DOD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attache personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, political strength or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare. (Joint Pub 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use or use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

United States Country Team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)