A key ingredient in fighting and winning wars is joint operations planning. The joint operation planning process entails the development of the best possible plans for potential crises across the range of military operations involving forces that can reasonably be expected in a CINC’s area of responsibility. We will continue to develop plans using the collective wisdom available among all military planning staffs.

It is essential that we most efficiently plan to use the remaining resources entrusted by American citizens as forces are downsized. Diverse threats to our national interests frequently require large, complex operations. The more complex the operation, the more comprehensive the planning must be to ensure success.

The products of our planning efforts must be able to stand up to the strongest scrutiny, including the ultimate test: execution! It is incumbent upon you to ensure the plans are firmly rooted in the guidance contained in this publication. This publication guides a commander’s development of warfighting and employment aspects of the plan. Each reader is encouraged to become an expert on this vital subject.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1. Scope

Joint Pub 5-0 is the keystone document of the joint planning series. It sets forth fundamental principles and doctrine that guide planning by the Armed Forces of the United States in joint or multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders, as cited in references, and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable.
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Executive Summary

Joint operation planning is conducted within the chain of command that runs from the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the combatant commanders and is primarily the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. Joint operation planning includes the preparation of operation plans (OPLANs), OPLANs in concept format (CONPLANs), functional plans, campaign plans, and operation orders by joint force commanders, as well as those joint planning activities that support the development of these plans and orders. Joint operation planning is a sequential process performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

Joint Planning Overview

Joint operation planning is directed toward employment of military forces within the context of a military strategy to attain specified objectives for possible contingencies.

Joint operation planning encompasses planning for the full range of activities required for conducting joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces.

Mobilization Planning. Primarily the responsibility of the Services, mobilization planning is directed toward assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in times of war and for military operations other than war.
### Executive Summary

<table>
<thead>
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<th><strong>Deployment Planning</strong></th>
<th>Deployment Planning. Deployment planning is the responsibility of the combatant commanders in close coordination with US Transportation Command.</th>
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<td><strong>Sustainment Planning</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Redeployment Planning</strong></td>
<td>Redeployment Planning. Redeployment planning is directed towards the transfer of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another, or to another location within the area, or to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment.</td>
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**Planning Concepts**

Joint operation planning employs an integrated process entailing similar policies and procedures during war and military operations other than war, providing for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decisionmaking. In its peacetime application, the process is highly structured to support the thorough and fully coordinated development of deliberate plans. **In crisis, the process is shortened**, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. In wartime, the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities.

**Interoperable** planning and execution systems are essential to effective planning for joint operations. The activities of the entire planning community must be integrated through an interoperable joint system that provides for uniform policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by modern communications and computer systems. The system designed to provide interoperability is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). **JOPES** is first and foremost policies and procedures that guide joint operation planning efforts.
## Types of Planning Processes

**Joint operation planning is categorized as:** Plans are proposed under different processes depending on the focus of a specific plan. The processes are labeled as **campaign, deliberate, or crisis action planning**; however, they are interrelated.

**Campaign planning**  
**Campaign Planning.** Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of theater campaign plans. The campaign plan **embodies the combatant commander’s strategic vision** of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives. **Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.** If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes.

**Deliberate planning**  
**Deliberate Planning.** Deliberate planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and using forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. Deliberate planning is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint operation plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents.

**Crisis action planning.**  
**Crisis Action Planning (CAP).** CAP is based on current events and conducted in time-sensitive situations and emergencies using assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources. Crisis action planners base their plan on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. They follow prescribed CAP procedures that parallel deliberate planning, but are more flexible and responsive to changing events.
# Types of Deliberate Plans

## Operation Plans (OPLANs)

**OPLANs.** An OPLAN is a **complete and detailed operation plan containing a full description of the concept of operations and all required annexes with associated appendixes.** It identifies the specific forces, functional support, deployment sequence, and resources required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates for their movement into the theater. An OPLAN can be used as the basis of a campaign plan (if required) and then developed into an operation order (OPORD).

**OPLANs in Concept Format Without Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data**

**CONPLAN Without TPFDD.** A CONPLAN is **an operation plan in an abbreviated format** that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN, campaign plan, or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the Commander of a combatant commands (CINC’s) Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes either required by the JSCP or deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning.

**OPLANs in Concept Format With Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data**

**CONPLAN With TPFDD.** A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it **requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces.** Detailed planning may be required to support a contingency of compelling interest and critical to national security but is not likely to occur in the near term.

## Functional Plans

**Functional Plans.** Functional plans involve the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment. **These plans are traditionally developed for specific functions or discrete tasks** (e.g., nuclear weapon recovery or evacuation, logistics, communications, or continuity of operations) but may also be developed to address functional peacetime operations such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or counterdrug operations.
Executive Summary

Supporting Plans

Supporting Plans. Supporting plans are prepared as tasked by the supported combatant commanders in support of their deliberate plans. They are prepared by supporting combatant commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, component commanders, or other agencies.

Campaign Plans and Operation Orders

Campaign Plans. Campaign planning can be started prior to or during deliberate planning but is not completed until crisis action planning. Campaign planning and principles are the responsibility of the combatant commander.

Operation Order. OPORDs are prepared under joint procedures in prescribed formats during crisis action planning. They are in the form of a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

Assigned, Apportioned, and Allocated Forces and Resources

The categories of force and resource availability are:

Assigned forces are those forces that have been placed under the combatant command (command authority) of a unified commander by the Secretary of Defense in his “Forces For Unified Commands” memo. Forces and resources so assigned are available for normal peacetime operations of that command.

Apportioned forces and resources are those made available for deliberate planning as of a certain date. They may include those assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed. They are apportioned by the JSCP for use in developing deliberate plans and may be more or less than those allocated for execution planning.

Allocated forces and resources are those provided by the NCA for execution planning or actual implementation. The allocation of forces and resources is accomplished through procedures established for crisis action planning.
Adequacy, Feasibility, Acceptability, and Consistency with Joint Doctrine

Joint operation plans should be consistent with joint doctrine and are developed in conformance with the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability.

**Adequacy** determines whether the scope and the concept of planned operations as contained in the CINC’s Strategic Concept satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission. **Feasible plans** accomplish assigned tasks with resources that are available within the time frames contemplated by the plan. **Acceptable plans** are proportional and worth the expected cost. They provide for accomplishment of the mission with available resources without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. **Operation plans will be consistent with joint doctrine** as stated in approved and test publications contained in the Joint Publication System.

Organizing for Joint Planning

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organizes the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) for joint operation planning by establishing supported and supporting command relationships between the combatant commands. The **supported commander** is the combatant commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the JSCP or other joint operation planning authority. **Supporting commanders** provide augmentation forces or other support to a designated supported commander or commanders or develop supporting plans. Such support is provided in accordance with the principles set forth in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” and may include the preparation of plans that support the joint operation plan of the supported commander.

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

The JSCP provides the strategic direction required to coordinate the planning efforts of the combatant commanders in pursuit of national strategic objectives and to integrate their efforts with those of the remainder of the JPEC. The JSCP is the link between strategic planning and joint operation planning. It is the primary vehicle through which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises his responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation plans. The JSCP initiates deliberate joint operation planning by assigning planning tasks to the combatant commanders, apportioning major combat forces and resources, and issuing planning guidance to
integrate the joint operation planning activities of the entire JPEC within a coherent, focused framework.

**Joint Mobilization Planning**

Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. Depending on the threat to be countered, mobilization may range from manpower augmentation of the active force to widespread involvement of the nation’s economic, political, and industrial resources. Planning and executing mobilization activities are accomplished primarily by the Military Departments and Services. However, operation planning for major contingencies relies heavily on timely mobilization of the necessary forces and capabilities.

**Employment Planning**

Employment is the strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces within an operational area. Employment planning defines how existing and projected capabilities will be used to attain objectives. It involves military actions required to pursue warfare successfully: evaluating enemy actions and capabilities, devising and selecting courses of action (COAs), and positioning forces and resources; to create advantages in combat and exploit resulting opportunities to attain objectives despite enemy resistance.

**Campaign Planning**

Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Campaign planning is conducted during both deliberate and crisis action planning. A campaign is a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. It orients on the enemy’s centers of gravity; achieves simultaneous and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, space-based assets, and special operations forces; clearly defines an end state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination, or exit strategy; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning. Campaign plans are the operational extension of a combatant commander’s theater strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used.
to attain theater strategic objectives. Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater. In addition, by means of a campaign plan, combatant commanders give the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level. **Theater campaigns are conducted by joint forces.** They may follow more than one line of operation. Theater campaigns synthesize mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and their subordinate operations or campaigns into a coherent whole. **Subordinate campaign plans can be created by joint task forces or subunified commands if required.**

All other planning is for operations supporting the campaign. Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of combat operations, but can also be used in situations other than war. **Campaign plans guide the development of supporting OPLANs or OPORDs** and facilitate national-level coordination of strategic priorities and resource allocations. Tasking for strategic requirements or major contingencies may require the preparation of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, **campaign plans are based on reasonable assumptions and are not normally completed until after the NCA selects the COA during CAP.** Deliberate plans may include elements of campaign planning, however these elements will have to be updated as in any deliberate plan used at execution.

**Multinational Planning**

Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in **national and international channels.** Collective security goals, strategies, and combined operation plans are developed in accordance with individual treaty or alliance procedures. Deliberate joint operation planning for multinational operations is performed through national channels but in accordance with US doctrine and procedures. Coordination of these separate planning channels is accomplished at the national level through established coalition bodies and at the theater and operational levels by commanders of combatant commands or other subordinate joint US commands who are responsible within both channels for operation planning matters.
The JOPES is the principal system within the Department of Defense for translating policy decisions into operation plans and OPORDs in support of national security objectives. To accomplish this task, JOPES consists of a deliberate and a crisis action planning process.

Joint operation planning prepares for the use of existing capabilities to achieve objectives defined in national military strategy. The resultant plans are a measurement of the nation’s ability to successfully prosecute the national military strategy within the constraints of available forces and resources. This measurement provides a means of assessing the balance between strategy and capabilities, determining risks, and focusing the acquisition of additional resources and capabilities. Assessments derived through joint operation planning provide insight into the strengths and deficiencies of the Nation's existing military capabilities. Consequently, they can be an invaluable source of information for force development planning and the development of national military strategy.

**CONCLUSION**

This publication establishes responsibilities for planning for joint operations. It promulgates doctrine, principles, and concepts that govern: (1) planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces for joint operations; (2) development and execution of joint operation plans, campaign plans, and operation orders; (3) integration of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System with other joint systems and processes; (4) integration of joint operation planning with the administrative and logistic functions of the Military Departments and Services; and (5) use of joint operation planning to support functions of capability assessment and force development.
“But in truth, the larger the command, the more time must go into planning; the longer it will take to move troops into position, to reconnoiter, to accumulate ammunition and other supplies, and to coordinate other participating elements on the ground and in the air. To a conscientious commander, time is the most vital factor in his planning. By proper foresight and correct preliminary action, he knows he can conserve the most precious elements he controls, the lives of his men. So he thinks ahead as far as he can. He keeps his tactical plan simple. He tries to eliminate as many variable factors as he is able. He has a firsthand look at as much of the ground as circumstances render accessible to him. He checks each task in the plan with the man to whom he intends to assign it. Then—having secured in almost every instance his subordinates’ wholehearted acceptance of the contemplated mission and agreement on its feasibility—only then does he issue an order.”

General Mathew B. Ridgway: The Korean War, (1967)

1. Introduction

Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of command. Planning is performed at every echelon of command, and it is conducted across the range of military operations.

SECTION A. JOINT PLANNING OVERVIEW

2. Military Planning

Military planning includes two broad categories of planning: force planning and joint operation planning. (See Figure I-1.)

a. Force Planning. Force planning is associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments, Services, and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and is conducted under administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Chiefs of the Services. The Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. USSOCOM has similar responsibility for special operation forces, with the exception of organizing Service components. Force planning is outside the scope of this publication. However, Chapter IV, “Assessment,” discusses how joint operation planning influences force planning.

b. Joint Operation Planning. Joint operation planning is the focus of this document. It is directed toward the employment of military forces within the context of a military strategy to attain specified objectives for possible contingencies. Joint operation planning is conducted within the chain of command that runs from the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the combatant commanders and is primarily the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. At the national level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Chiefs of the Services, is principally
responsible for the unified planning to employ the Armed Forces in support of national security objectives. **Joint operation planning includes the preparation of plans (e.g., operation plans (OPLANs) and campaign plans) and orders (e.g., operation orders (OPORDs))** by the combatant commanders as well as those joint planning activities that support the development of these operation plans or orders. These activities also incorporate the functions of the Military Departments and Services. Joint operation planning is a sequential process performed simultaneously at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

- At the **strategic level**, joint operation planning involves the development of strategic military objectives and tasks in support of national security strategy and the development of force and materiel requirements necessary to accomplish those tasks. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national objectives. The NCA translates policy into national strategic military objectives. These military objectives facilitate theater strategic planning. A geographic combatant commander usually participates in discussions with the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and coalition members. The combatant commanders plan at the strategic level of war through participation in the development of national military strategy, the development of theater estimates, and theater strategies. **The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater.**

- Joint operation planning at the **operational level** links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art—the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.
• At the **tactical level** of planning, tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and to the enemy in order to use their full potential. Tactics are employed to fight and win engagements and battles.

3. **Scope of Joint Operation Planning**

As shown in Figure I-2, joint operation planning encompasses planning for the full range of activities required for conducting joint operations. These activities include the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces.

![Figure I-2. Scope of Joint Operation Planning](image)

a. **Mobilization Planning.** Primarily the responsibility of the Services, mobilization planning is directed toward **assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives** in time of war and for military operations other than war. Mobilization planning includes bringing all or part of the Armed Forces of the United States to the necessary state of readiness to meet the requirements of the specific contingency. Mobilization planning may include planning for the activation of all or part of the Reserve components, as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Joint mobilization planning is discussed in Chapter II, “Strategic Direction and Integration.”

b. **Deployment Planning.** Deployment planning is the responsibility of the supported combatant commanders in close coordination with the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Deployment planning is planning to move forces and their sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area to conduct joint operations outlined in a given plan. It involves planning for the continental United States (CONUS), intertheater (strategic), and intratheater movement of forces and the required resources to sustain them. Strategic deployment planning focuses on the inter-theater movement of forces and resources using national, allied and coalition strategic deployment capabilities.

c. **Employment Planning.** Employment planning prescribes **how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives.** Employment planning concepts are developed by the combatant commanders through their component commands. Employment planning provides the foundation and determines the scope of mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning. Employment planning is discussed in Chapter II, “Strategic Direction and Integration.”

d. **Sustainment Planning.** Sustainment planning is directed toward **providing and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables** required to sustain the planned levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity. Sustainment planning is the responsibility of the combatant commanders in close coordination with the Services and Defense agencies.
Redeployment planning is directed toward the transfer of units, individuals, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, or to another location within the area, or to the CONUS for the purpose of further employment. The demobilization of Reserve forces is considered during redeployment planning.

SECTION B.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF JOINT FORCES

4. General

Joint operation planning is an inherent command responsibility established by law and directive. This fundamental responsibility extends from the President and Secretary of Defense as the NCA, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the combatant commanders and their subordinates in the chain of command. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmits the orders of the President and the Secretary of Defense, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also oversees the activities of combatant commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff function in the planning process in their capacities as advisers to the President, National Security Council (NSC), and Secretary of Defense. Although not within this branch of the chain of command, the Military Services and their major logistic agencies participate in joint operation planning through execution of their responsibilities to: (a) organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to the combatant commands; (b) administer and support those forces; and (c) prepare plans implementing joint strategic mobility, logistic, and mobilization plans. However, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders have primary responsibility for planning the employment of joint forces. Their responsibilities, as defined in statute and directive, provide the framework for joint planning doctrine.
5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As the principal military adviser to the President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is assigned specific joint operation planning responsibilities in the areas of strategic direction, strategic planning, and joint operation planning. In carrying out functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. Subject to the direction, authority, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for (per United States Code, title 10):

a. Preparing military strategy and assessments of the associated risk. This includes the following:

- A national military strategy to support national objectives within policy and resource level guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. Such strategy will include the preparation of broad military options with the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders.

- Net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared to the capabilities of potential adversaries.

b. Assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States, including the direction of operations conducted by the combatant commanders.

c. Preparing strategic plans, including plans that conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective.

d. Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support strategic plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Military Services.

e. Advising the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of policy guidance for the preparation and review of joint operation plans.

f. Providing for the preparation and review of joint operation plans that conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

g. Preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support joint operation plans and recommending the assignment of logistic responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those plans, and ascertaining the logistic support available to execute the joint operation plans of the combatant commanders (CINCs). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will also review and recommend to the Secretary of Defense appropriate logistic guidance for the Military Services that, if implemented, will result in logistic readiness consistent with approved plans.

h. Advising the Secretary of Defense on the critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of joint operation plans and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policies and on strategic plans.
Chapter I

i. Preparing integrated plans for military mobilization.

j. Reviewing the plans and programs of the combatant commanders to determine their adequacy, consistency, acceptability, and feasibility for performing assigned missions.

k. Participating, as directed, in the preparation of multinational plans for military action in conjunction with the armed forces of other nations.

6. Joint Chiefs of Staff

The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense as specified in subparagraphs a and b.

a. Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

• When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides advice to the President, the NSC, or the Secretary of Defense, any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit advice or an opinion in disagreement with that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or advice or an opinion in addition to the advice provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will present that advice or opinion at the same time he presents his own advice. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will also, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to any matter.

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish procedures to ensure that the presentation of his own advice to the President, the NSC, or the Secretary of Defense is not unduly delayed by the submission of the individual advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Advice on Request. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, will provide advice to the President, the NSC, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the NSC, or the Secretary requests such advice.

7. Combatant Commanders

The combatant commanders are responsible for the development and production of joint operation plans. During peacetime, they act to deter war and prepare for war by planning for the transition to and from war and military operations other than war. During war, combatant commanders plan and conduct campaigns and military operations to accomplish assigned missions. Their joint operation planning responsibilities are described in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces, (UNAAF),” and include conducting operations within assigned geographic or functional areas.

a. Combatant command responsibilities include planning and conducting military operations in response to crises, to include maintaining the security of the command and protecting the United States and its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) tasks the combatant
commanders to prepare joint operation plans that may be OPLANs, OPLANs in concept format (CONPLANs) with or without time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), or functional plans.

b. The other planning activities of the combatant commanders include:

- Conducting strategic estimates.
- Assisting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing national military strategy.
- Formulating theater or functional strategies in conformance with national strategic plans.
- Developing campaign plans for conducting large-scale military operations.
- Preparing and executing joint OPORDs assigned by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Identifying and planning for contingencies not specifically assigned by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Preparing plans required to discharge responsibilities described in the UCP and the UNAAF.

SECTION C. CONCEPTS

8. Single Process

Planning for joint operations is continuous throughout the range of military operations. As such, joint operation planning employs an integrated process entailing similar policies and procedures during war and military operations other than war, providing for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decisionmaking. In its peacetime application, the process is highly structured to support the thorough and fully coordinated development of deliberate plans. In crisis, the process is shortened, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. In wartime, the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities. In all its applications, the basic process remains fundamentally unchanged and provides a consistent and logical approach for integrating the activities of the NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and all other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) (see Figure I-3) in a coherent planning and execution process to attain military objectives.

9. Interoperable Joint Planning and Execution System

Interoperable planning and execution systems are essential to effective planning for joint operations. The activities of the entire planning community must be integrated through an interoperable joint system that provides for uniform policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by modern communications and computer systems. The system designed to provide interoperability is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES encompasses the entire JPEC as shown in Figure I-3. JOPES is, first and foremost, policies and procedures that guide joint operation planning efforts. JOPES is the focus of the Joint Pub 5-03 series. JOPES Automated Data Processing (ADP) provides computer support, primarily for transportation planning associated with deployment operations.
10. **Joint Operation Planning by the Combatant Commanders**

Joint operation plans are prepared and implemented by the combatant commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, and other designated component commanders who perform such planning under the strategic and operational direction of the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In peacetime, these designated commanders prepare plans for areas and missions as directed in the JSCP and other such areas as determined by the combatant commander. Those joint operation plans tasked in the JSCP for CJCS approval are reviewed by the Joint Staff, Services, and DOD agencies. All other plans are approved by the CINCs. When directed by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, deliberate plans may be converted to campaign plans and OPORDs and implemented by the combatant commanders. During crisis situations for which an approved OPLAN does not exist, the combatant commanders, in concert with members of the JPEC as appropriate, develop courses of action (COAs) in response to specific situations or tasking and prepare campaign plans and joint OPORDs to execute COAs approved by the NCA.
11. Joint Operation Planning and Plans Process

Joint operation planning can occur anywhere within the range of military operations and may be performed deliberately or under crisis action conditions. Joint operation planning is coordinated at the national level to support Secretary of Defense Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), strategic requirements in the National Military Strategy, and emerging crises. This is achieved by assigning planning tasks and relationships among the combatant commanders and apportioning or allocating them the forces and resources available to accomplish those tasks.

12. Types of Planning Processes

“Be audacious and cunning in your plans, firm and persevering in their execution, determined to find a glorious end.”

Clausewitz: Principles of War, (1812)

Plans are proposed under different processes depending on the focus of a specific plan. The processes are labeled either campaign, deliberate, or crisis action planning; however, they are interrelated. (See Figure I-4.) As an example, campaign and crisis action planning for Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation DESERT STORM were based on an existing (although not yet completed) deliberate plan.

a. Campaign Planning. Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of theater campaign plans. The campaign plan embodies the combatant commander’s strategic vision of the arrangement of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives. Campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes. As stated in Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” “Campaign planning is done in crisis or conflict (once the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident), but the basis and framework for successful campaigns is laid by peacetime analysis, planning, and exercises.” The degree to which the amount

Figure I-4. Joint Operation Planning Processes
of work accomplished in deliberate planning may serve as the core for a campaign plan is directly dependent on the particular theater and objectives. Campaign planning is discussed in Chapter II, “Strategic Direction and Integration.”

b. Deliberate Planning. Deliberate planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and using forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning by the JSCP. It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. Deliberate planning is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint operation plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents. It is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other DOD planning systems and is performed in accordance with formally established procedures. Deliberate planning is a highly structured process that engages the commanders and staffs of the entire JPEC in the methodical development of fully coordinated, complex planning for all contingencies and the transition to and from war. Plans developed during deliberate planning provide a foundation for and ease the transition to crisis resolution. Work performed during the deliberate planning process allows the JPEC to develop the processes, procedures, and planning expertise that are critically needed during crisis action planning. Deliberate planning is discussed in Chapter III, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution.”

c. Crisis Action Planning (CAP). Crisis action planning is based on current events and conducted in time-sensitive situations and emergencies using assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources. Crisis action planners base their plan on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. They follow prescribed crisis action planning procedures that parallel deliberate planning, but are more flexible and responsive to changing events. The procedures provide for the timely flow of information and intelligence, rapid execution planning, and the communication of the decisions of the NCA to combatant commanders. Crisis action planning and crisis action planning procedures are discussed in Chapter III, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution.”

13. Types of Plans and Orders

Plans and operation orders are prepared according to deliberate, campaign and crisis action planning procedures. (See Figure I-5.)

a. Types of Deliberate Plans. Deliberate plans are prepared under joint procedures and in prescribed formats as either an OPLAN, CONPLAN with or without TPFDD, or functional plan. Supporting plans are also developed in support of each of these plans to satisfy the supported CINC’s planning requirements. The term “operation plan” is a generic term that includes OPLANS, CONPLANS with or without TPFDD, and Functional Plans.

- OPLANS. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed operation plan containing a full description of the concept of operations and all required annexes with associated appendixes. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, deployment sequence, and resources required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates for their movement into the theater. An OPLAN can be used as the basis of a campaign plan (if required) and then developed into an OPORD. OPLANS are normally prepared when:
The contingency has a compelling national interest, a specific threat, is critical to national security, and requires detailed prior planning.

The nature (large scale) of the contingency requires detailed prior planning for complex issues.

Detailed planning will contribute to deterrence by demonstrating readiness and resolve.

Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning. OPLANs facilitate the transition to war and, through the development of supporting plans, establish the feasibility of the plan’s concept of operations.

Detailed planning is necessary to determine force and sustainment requirements, determine available resources to fill identified requirements, and validate shortfalls.

**CONPLANs**

**CONPLANs Without TPFDD.** A CONPLAN is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN, campaign plan, or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s Strategic Concept, Annexes A-D and K, and other annexes and appendixes either required by the JSCP or deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning. CONPLANs are generally developed to meet common type missions that may develop rapidly and require implementation of like action but under markedly different circumstances; e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations. Unless specified in the JSCP, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared.

**CONPLANs With TPFDD.** A CONPLAN with TPFDD is a CONPLAN
that requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. Detailed planning may be required to support a contingency of compelling interest and critical to national security but is not likely to occur in the near term. These conditions require planning associated with the warfighting/employment aspects of the plan for a clear understanding of the CINC’s concept of operations. Phasing, centers of gravity, and commander’s intent enhance a clear understanding of what forces are required and when they have to be deployed (e.g., TPFDD) in order to achieve the national objective. A CONPLAN with TPFDD may also be required where the primary purpose is force movement planning in support of alliances. In this case campaign planning principles should be considered and incorporated to the maximum extent possible. Recognizing, however, that the level of detail contained in these plans is dependent upon similarly detailed alliance planning that these CONPLANs support, a campaign orientation may not be possible in all cases.

- **Functional Plans.** Functional plans involve the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment. These plans are traditionally developed for specific functions or discrete tasks (e.g., nuclear weapon recovery or evacuation, logistics, communications, or continuity of operations) but may be developed to address functional peacetime operations such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or counterdrug operations. Functional plans will be written using the JOPES procedures and formats specified for a CONPLAN (without a TPFDD).

b. Supporting plans are prepared as tasked by the supported combatant commanders in support of their deliberate plans. They are prepared by supporting combatant commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, component commanders, or other agencies. These commanders or agencies may, in turn, assign their subordinates the task of preparing additional supporting plans. Employment plans normally are the responsibility of the commander who will direct the forces when the supported plan is implemented. In many cases, however, the political or military situation cannot be clearly forecast, so employment planning may be delayed until circumstances require it. In the absence of CJCS instructions to the contrary, the combatant commanders responsible for the supported plans will review and approve supporting plans.
c. **Campaign Plans and Operation Orders**

- **Campaign Plans.** Campaign planning can begin before or during deliberate planning but is not completed until crisis action planning. Campaign planning and principles are the responsibility of the combatant commander. Campaign plan models are contained in proposed Joint Pub 5-00.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning.” Campaign plans are discussed in Chapter II, “Strategic Direction and Integration.”

- **Operation Order.** OPORDs are prepared under joint procedures in prescribed formats during crisis action planning. They are in the form of a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders to effect the coordinated execution of an operation.

### 14. Assigned, Apportioned, and Allocated Forces

Joint operation planning uses uniform categories to define the availability of forces and resources for planning and conducting joint operations. Availability categories are assigned, apportioned, and allocated.

a. **Assigned.** Assigned forces and resources are those in being that have been placed under the combatant command (command authority) of a unified command by the Secretary of Defense in his “Forces For Unified Commands” memorandum. Forces and resources so assigned are available for normal peacetime operations of that command.

b. **Apportioned.** Apportioned forces and resources are those assumed to be available for deliberate planning as of a specified date. They may include those assigned, those expected through mobilization, and those programmed. They are apportioned by the JSCP for use in developing deliberate plans and may be more or less than the forces actually allocated for execution planning.

c. **Allocated.** Allocated forces and resources are those provided by the NCA for execution planning or actual implementation. The allocation of forces and resources is accomplished through procedures established for crisis action planning. In actual implementation, allocated augmenting forces become assigned or attached forces when they are transferred or attached to the receiving combatant commander.

### 15. Adequacy, Feasibility, Acceptability, and Compliance with Joint Doctrine

Joint operation plans are developed in conformance with the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with joint doctrine.

a. **Adequacy.** Adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission. Planning assumptions should provide guidelines for the development of the plan to increase the effectiveness of the concept of operations. These assumptions must be reasonable and consistent with strategic guidance.

b. **Feasibility.** Feasible plans accomplish assigned tasks with resources that are available within the time frames contemplated by the plan. Measures to enhance feasibility include ensuring effective employment schemes, sufficiency of resources and capabilities, and maintaining alternatives and reserves.
c. Acceptability. Acceptable plans are proportional and worth the anticipated cost. They provide for accomplishment of the mission with available resources without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. They are consistent with the law of war and are militarily and politically supportable.

d. Compliance with Joint Doctrine. Operation plans will comply with joint doctrine as stated in approved and test publications contained in the Joint Publication System. Incorporation of appropriate joint doctrine when preparing operation plans facilitates crisis action planning and the execution of operations.

16. Coordination With Other Planning

The validity and utility of joint operation planning are enhanced when planning is coordinated with other DOD planning activities. Deliberate planning is cyclical, and must be integrated with other planning cycles whose primary objectives are the definition and assessment of national military strategy, the development of military capabilities, and the management of resources. Synchronized with other planning, joint operation planning promotes synergy and coherence in defense planning.

STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM: THE EARLY YEARS

In the National Security Act of 1947 the first listed duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was “to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces.” During the first five years following enactment of the basic legislation the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharged their planning responsibility in a rather unsystematic manner. Plans were drawn to meet particular contingencies but they were not prepared or revised on a regular schedule. The plans were not interrelated in a comprehensive system, nor were they scheduled to provide timely guidance for the necessary annual decisions concerning budgets, force levels, deployments, and mobilization.

Until late in 1949 the unsystematic approach to planning resulted from the relatively small size of the Joint Staff. The National Security Act Amendments of that year authorized enlarging the Joint Staff to 210 officers, more than double the number previously assigned, but not many months later the outbreak of the conflict in Korea imposed new requirements on the JCS supporting organization. Thus, although the Director, Joint Staff, had submitted recommendations for placing JCS planning on a systematic basis as early as December 1949, a formal JCS “Program for Planning” was not adopted until mid-1952.

On 14 July 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued JCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 84, which called for the preparation each year of joint strategic plans for the long-, mid-, and short-range. The Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE) would treat the five-year period starting on 1 July approximately five years after the approval of the estimate by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was designed to translate US national policy into long-range supporting military strategy and objectives and also provide guidance for research by identifying desirable objectives for technical development.
The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), the mid-range plan, would apply to the four-year period beginning 1 July three years after approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to providing strategic guidance for the mid-range period, this plan would provide specific guidance for the pre-D-day development of the forces needed to support it and for the preparation of Service budget requests for the fiscal year beginning two years after the plan was approved. It would also provide guidance for mobilization planning by the Services and the Munitions Board. The plan would have three sections. The first would provide guidance for the preparation of the part of the annual budget dealing with the development of the US and allied military forces needed during peacetime and in military conflict short of total war. The second would guide preparation of the part of the annual budget devoted to supporting the US and allied forces necessary to conduct combat operations during the initial phase of general war. The third would guide preparation of the part of the annual budget addressed to developing the additional forces and resources needed prior to D-day for the mobilization base and to meeting mobilization requirements during 48 months of general war. To assure the orderly implementation, the JSOP was to be ready for JCS consideration by 1 May each year, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to give their final approval by 30 June.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the short-range plan, assumed that D-day would occur on 1 July following JCS approval. It would guide the employment of available US and allied military forces under conditions of peace, in limited military conflict, and during the initial phase of general war. It would also guide the expansion of US and allied forces during the first 48 months of general war. The JSCP would be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by 1 November each year; they would complete action on it by 31 December.

From the first, this planning system failed to operate as anticipated. Under the schedule established by Policy Memorandum 84, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have completed the following plans by the end of 1954: two Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimates, covering the period from 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1964; two Joint Strategic Objectives Plans, for D-days of 1 July 1956 and 1 July 1957; and three Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans for fiscal years 1954, 1955, and 1956. But the planning tasks had proved more exacting and the problems of coordination more extensive than expected, and progress had been hindered even more by the fundamental disagreements among the Services over strategic concepts that the effort revealed. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had completed only one plan, the JSCP for FY 1955, and this was finished more than three months behind schedule. Two plans were in progress at the end of 1954: the next JSCP, for FY 1956, and a Joint Mid-Range War Plan (JMRWP) for a D-day of 1 July 1957. No JLRSE existed even in draft form and none was in sight within the near future. To complete the two plans under preparation became the first order of business for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the field of strategic planning during the period 1955-1956.

Chapter I

SECTION D. ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING

17. Introduction

Two factors shape the framework in which the planning and execution of joint operations occur. The first is a permanently established national organization. This structure consists of a hierarchy of individuals and organizations with continuing responsibilities and relationships. A second factor is the process through which the permanent organization responds to the requirements of a specific contingency.

18. National Structure

The national structure for joint operation planning and execution includes the NCA and the JPEC.

a. National Command Authorities. The ultimate authority for national defense rests with the President. The President is assisted by the NSC, which is the principal forum for the development of national security policy. The Secretary of Defense is the principal adviser to the President for all matters relating to the Department of Defense and is a member of the NSC. The President and the Secretary of Defense (or their duly authorized alternates or successors) are the NCA, and they alone are vested with the lawful authority to direct the Armed Forces of the United States in the execution of military action, including the movement of forces or the initiation of operations. In peacetime, the Secretary of Defense issues policy guidance for joint operation planning and reviews joint operation plans with the assistance of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In crisis and war, the Secretary plays a pivotal role in crisis action planning and execution. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the NCA.

b. Joint Planning and Execution Community. The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in planning for the mobilization, training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of forces assigned or committed to a theater of war or theater of operations are collectively termed the JPEC. The JPEC consists of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Services, the combatant commands and their component commands, subunified commands, joint task forces (JTFs) (if established), and Defense agencies (See Figure I-3.)

- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, manages the joint operation planning process. In peacetime, the Chairman assigns planning tasks and resources, establishes planning relationships, and approves joint OPLANs. In crisis and war, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff orchestrates the development of strategic options and COAs, resolves conflicts in resources, provides recommendations and risk assessments to the NCA, conveys NCA decisions to the combatant commanders, and monitors the deployment and employment of forces.

- Services. The Services and USSOCOM provide interoperable forces for assignment to the combatant commanders and provide for logistic support to the combatant commanders. USSOCOM’s responsibility to equip special operations forces (SOF) is limited to special operations-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies and services, and Service-common equipment specified in appropriate written
agreements. The Services also maintain reserve forces and prepare for the expansion of capabilities in time of war. For joint operation planning, the Services and USSOCOM make recommendations regarding the apportionment of forces and resources to the Joint Staff and, upon approval, identify the specific units and support to be allocated to the combatant commanders’ joint operation plans. The Services prepare detailed mobilization, sustainment, and mobility plans containing the identification of the actual forces and support allocated.

- **Combatant Commands.** The combatant commanders are principally responsible for the preparation and implementation of joint operation plans. During peacetime, they participate in the development of national military and theater strategies and develop operation plans in the deliberate planning process. This is a continual process. During crises, they expand and refine existing plans or develop new plans, and recommend courses of action. When military operations are required in time of conflict, combatant commanders conduct joint operations. Campaigns are planned and conducted when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation or battle.

- **Service Component Commands.** The Service component commands perform joint planning functions both within the chain of command and under the administrative control of the Military Departments. Within the chain of command, the Service component commands recommend the proper force composition and employment of Service forces, provide Service forces and support information for joint planning, and prepare component-level operation plans or OPORDs in support of taskings assigned to the combatant commands. Under administrative control, the Service component commands prepare and execute administrative and logistic plans to support operating forces.

AEGIS cruisers represent formidable capability and are integral to both deliberate and crisis action planning.
• **Special Operations Component Commands.** Combatant commanders with geographic responsibilities establish theater special operations commands (SOCs) as subordinate unified commands to serve as the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) of their unified command. Similarly, subordinate joint force commanders may establish a joint special operations task force commander to serve as the JFSOCC of a subordinate joint force. This individual typically exercises operational control or tactical control over assigned and attached forces in order to enhance unity of effort of special operations throughout the joint force. USSOCOM provides similar support to the theater SOCs that the Services provide to their respective Service component commands within the combatant commands. The JFSOCC reports to the joint force commander (JFC) and is the principal adviser for special operations within the joint force. The JFSOCC provides recommendations on organization and employment considerations for SOF and, when directed, prepares component-level operation plans. Joint Pub 3-05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,” and Joint Pub 3-05.3, “Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures,” contain additional information on special operations.

• **Subordinate Joint Commands.** When established, subunified commands and JTFs perform joint planning functions similar to those of the combatant commands for specified missions or designated joint operations areas. Such functions are accomplished under the direction of the authority that established the subordinate command.

19. **Organizing for Joint Planning**

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organizes the JPEC for joint operation planning by establishing supported and supporting command relationships between the combatant commands. (Refer to Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” and Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” for a more complete discussion of such command relationships between combatant commands and between subordinate commands of joint forces.) A supported commander is identified for each planning task, and supporting commanders, Services, USSOCOM, and agencies are designated as appropriate. This process provides for unity of command in the planning and execution of joint operations and facilitates unity of effort within the JPEC.

a. **Supported Commander.** The supported commander is the combatant commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the JSCP or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans, campaign plans, or operation orders in response to CJCS requirements.

b. **Supporting Commanders.** Supporting commanders provide augmentation forces or other support to a designated supported commander or commanders or develop supporting plans. Such support is provided in accordance with the principles set forth in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” and may include the preparation of plans that support the joint operation plan of the supported commander. Under some circumstances, a commander may be a
supporting commander for one contingency while being a supported commander for another. USTRANSCOM, US Space Command, US Strategic Command and USSOCOM perform unique functions in support of the other combatant commands. For example, USTRANSCOM and its transportation component commands plan and execute the transportation aspects of worldwide strategic mobility operations, integrate deployment-related ADP systems, and provide centralized wartime traffic management.

SECTION E. PROCEDURES FOR PLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS

20. Introduction

The joint operation planning process is a coordinated joint staff procedure used by commanders to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the actions necessary to accomplish those tasks. JOPES is used to conduct joint planning. JOPES facilitates the building and maintenance of OPLANs and CONPLANs (with or without TPFDDs). It aids in the development of effective options and OPORDs through adaptation of OPLANs or plan creation in a no-plan scenario. JOPES provides policies and procedures to ensure effective management of planning operations across the spectrum of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. As part of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), JOPES supports the deployment and transportation aspects of joint operation planning and execution. (The Global Command and Control System is replacing the WWMCCS. See Chapter II, “Strategic Direction and Integration,” paragraph 6.c.) Detailed JOPES guidance is provided in the Joint Pub 5-03 series.

21. JOPES Functions

JOPES contains five basic planning functions--threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, detailed planning, and implementation as shown in Figure I-6.

a. Threat Identification and Assessment. This function involves detecting actual and potential threats to national security, alerting decisionmakers, and then determining threat capabilities and intentions. This function supports all organizational levels during planning and execution. It gives information for strategic planning and resource allocations at the national level, by developing courses of action and detailed planning at the operational level, and monitoring and adjusting operations during execution.

b. Strategy Determination. This function furnishes direction from the national level for developing courses of action. It assists the NCA and the CJCS in formulating appropriate options to counter the threat. Strategy determination involves formulating politico-military assessments, clearly defining political and military objectives or end states, developing
 strategic concepts and options, apportioning forces and other resources, and formulating planning guidance.

c. **Course of Action Development.** COA development support includes JOPES functions that help the supported commander’s staff develop and test alternative COAs based on NCA/CJCS task assignments, guidance, and force and resource allocation. This facilitates development of the CINC’s Strategic Concept in deliberate planning and the commander’s estimate in crisis action planning.

d. **Detailed Planning.** This function supports preparation of the approved concept of operations or COA for implementation. It facilitates the following:

- Development and time-phasing of detailed force lists and required sustainment.
- Development of directives, schedules, and orders.
- Determination of support requirements, including medical, civil engineering, air refueling, host-nation support, and transportation needs.
- Identification and resolution of force and resource shortfalls and constraints.

The result is development of detailed, fully integrated mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities based on the approved concept of operations or COA.

e. **Implementation.** This function gives decisionmakers the tools to monitor, analyze, and manage plan execution. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Of particular importance is the ability to redirect forces, adjust priorities, or influence events as the situation unfolds. Implementation usually ends with some type of replanning effort, such as redeployment or redirection of operations.
CHAPTER II  
STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND INTEGRATION

“In total war it is quite impossible to draw any precise line between military and non-military problems.”

Winston Churchill: Their Finest Hour, (1949)

1. Introduction

This chapter describes planning that provides the strategic context and framework within which joint operations are planned. The emphasis is on those joint processes and plans that provide direction and integrate the JPEC in a unified effort for joint operation planning and execution.

SECTION A. NATIONAL SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES

2. Introduction

This section discusses national-level systems and processes that influence planning for joint operations. The focus is on the interrelationships and how other national-level systems complement and support the operation planning responsibilities identified in Chapter I, “Principles and Concepts.” Four interrelated defense planning systems (the NSC System, the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), and JOPES) directly impact the joint operation planning process. This section briefly describes the NSC System, PPBS, and JSPS. Chapter III, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution,” discusses JOPES.

3. National Security Council System

The NSC system is the principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision. The NSC system provides the framework for establishing national strategy and policy objectives. The NSC develops policy options, considers implications, coordinates operational problems that require interdepartmental consideration, develops recommendations for the President, and monitors policy implementation. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharges a substantial part of his statutory responsibilities as the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense through the institutional channels of the NSC. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regularly attends NSC meetings and presents his views and those of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. The NSC prepares national security guidance that, with Presidential approval, implements national security policy. These policy decisions provide the basis for military planning and programming.
4. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

The PPBS is another major national-level system related to the joint operation planning and execution process. The DOD military strategy formulation and resource management system develops and integrates defense policy, military strategy, Service programs, and the DOD budget. This system’s ultimate objective is the acquisition and allocation of resources to meet the warfighting needs of the combatant commanders. The PPBS applies JSPS derived national military strategy and recommended forces, and translates them into budgetary requirements to be presented to Congress. The PPBS encompasses three phases:

a. Planning. The planning phase of the PPBS articulates the national policy, military strategy, and the force requirements to support the national defense. In response to guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense regarding projected budget levels and national security objectives, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, uses the JSPS to develop national military objectives, strategy, recommended forces, options, assessments, and evaluation of risk for the President’s consideration. Following review by the Secretary of Defense, the President considers the recommendations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and makes his strategy and option decisions, which are then incorporated in the development of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG is developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in close coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, the Services, and others. The final DPG is reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, the combatant commanders, and other members of the Defense Planning Resources Board (DPRB) before being forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and publication. The DPG is the link between planning and programming as it articulates national defense strategy and appropriate force structure requirements, together with programming guidance sufficient to accomplish national security objectives to the Military Departments, the Defense agencies, and USSOCOM for the development of their Program Objective Memorandums (POMs).

b. Programming. The programming phase of the PPBS focuses on the development of POMs and the integration of those POMs into a coherent defense program to support the warfighting requirements of the combatant commanders. With the exception of USSOCOM’s special operations-unique requirements, the combatant commanders provide their requirements to the Services through their Service components and identify their highest priority needs to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by means of the Integrated Priority List (IPL). The Military Departments, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM develop their POMs based on the combatant command requirements and strategic concepts and guidance contained in the DPG. The POMs express the Services’ total requirements and include assessments of risk, as well as descriptions of how well the POMs support the requirements of the combatant commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses the overall balance and adequacy of the composite POM force and support levels in view of approved strategy and the requirements of the combatant commanders and documents his assessment in the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). In a coordinated effort, program issues are identified by the
combatant commanders and DPRB members and are resolved by the DPRB. The results are promulgated in the Secretary’s Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). The PDM is the link between programming and budgeting.

c. Budgeting. The final phase of the PPBS is budgeting. Once the PDMs are received, budget estimates are prepared by each of the Military Departments, the Defense agencies, and USSOCOM and submitted to the Secretary of Defense. The Defense budget is reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget to ensure that it is consistent with fiscal guidance. Changes to the budget are documented in Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). During this final phase of budgeting, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, and the combatant commanders assess the impact of PBDs on warfighting capabilities. Their concerns are presented to the Secretary of Defense. Final changes are incorporated with previous PBDs to establish the DOD portion of the President’s budget, which is submitted to Congress for funding. When the President signs the congressional appropriations act into law, the Services, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM execute the budget to procure forces and capabilities.

WAR PLANNING BY THE WAR COLLEGE

Under Major General Leonard Wood’s reorganization of the War Department General Staff in September of 1910, the War College Division (WCD) was given responsibility for preparing plans for the national defense, operating the Army War College (AWC), and handling military intelligence.

At this time, war plans were developed through the interaction of two groups, the War Plans Committee in the WCD and student planning committees in the AWC. Student committees dealt with various geographical areas and were responsible for working out details within the existing general plans. In so doing, they assisted the War Plans Committee, which was charged with finalizing the contingency plans.

These plans considered various wars that might hypothetically occur. Sometimes, however, developments in the real world added particular urgency to such planning.

The situation in Mexico in early 1912, for example, prompted a review and revision of the existing war plan. This plan, in brief, called for a main effort to be made along the axis Vera Cruz-Mexico City. A secondary thrust was to be made from the north, from Laredo to Monterrey. Finally, static defense was to be organized along the entire 1600 mile common border. Several problem areas surfaced during the course of this review. For instance, the plan called for 435,000 American troops. There was much head scratching among the planners as to where these forces would come from since only 35,000 could be provided from the regular Mobile Army units in the continental United States. The planners were further discommoded when the Commissary General, Brigadier General Henry G. Sharpe, pointed out that there were no provisions in the plan for the establishment and operation of a logistical base and line of communications.
Wood, as Chief of Staff of the Army, was not happy over how his own planning system actually worked in practice. Neither the proposed plan nor the commentary on it from the special staff sections pleased him. They showed the General Staff in a bad light and suggested that it was an inadequate planning agency. He, therefore, pointed out to the President of the AWC, who also served as Chief of the WCD, that the present plan needed work and that he would immediately give it his attention.


5. Joint Strategic Planning System

The JSPS is the primary formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out his statutory responsibilities required by title 10, US Code, 6 April 1991, and further delineated in DOD 5100.1, 25 September 1987. CJCS memorandum of policy (MOP) 7, to be revised as CJCSI 3100.01, provides policy and procedures governing the operation of the JSPS. The purpose and outputs of the JSPS are summarized in Figure II-1. The central process of the JSPS is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). The JSR is a continuous process that assesses the strategic environment for issues and factors that affect the National Military Strategy (NMS) in the near-term or the long-range. It continuously gathers information; examines current, emerging and future issues, threats, technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures and military missions; and reviews and assesses current strategy, forces, and national policy objectives. The JSR facilitates the integration of strategy, joint operation planning, and program assessment. When significant changes or factors in the strategic environment are identified, JSR issue papers are presented to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, and the combatant commanders. These papers will provide entering arguments for proposed changes to the NMS, Joint Planning Document (JPD), and JSCP and solicit the Chairman’s guid-

**Joint Strategic Planning System**

- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) discharges strategic planning responsibilities
- Series of complementary documents
- CJCS military advice to National Command Authorities
- CJCS formal input to Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

Figure II-1. Joint Strategic Planning System
Strategic Direction and Integration

The four products of the JSPS are:

a. National Military Strategy. The NMS provides the advice of the Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense on the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain national security objectives. The NMS is designed to assist the Secretary of Defense in the preparation of the DPG and to guide the development of the JSCP. Following Secretary of Defense review, the NMS is forwarded to the President. The NMS may be used to determine the CJCS position on matters of strategic importance for use in NCA-directed actions.

b. The Joint Planning Document. The JPD supports the NMS by providing concise programming priorities, requirements, or advice to the Secretary of Defense for consideration during preparation of the DPG. Published as stand-alone documents addressing specific functional areas, JPD volumes are coordinated and collaborated with the Chiefs of the Services, combatant commanders and Defense agencies, and serve as a conduit for input to the DPG.

c. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JSCP provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the NCA. It is reviewed at least biennially for required changes.

d. Chairman’s Program Assessment. The CPA assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in fulfilling his responsibility to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on how well the POMs conform to established priorities. It also provides assistance to the Secretary in decisions concerning the defense program subsequent to receipt of the POMs. The CPA summarizes the views of the Chairman on the balance and capabilities of the POM force and the support levels required to attain US national security objectives.

e. Joint Strategic Planning System Interactions. The JSPS is a flexible and interactive system intended to provide supporting military advice to the DOD PPBS and strategic guidance for use in JOPES. The JSPS provides the means for the Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to review the national security environment and US national security objectives. Additionally, it provides the means to evaluate the threat; assess current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets; and propose military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve those national security objectives in a resource-limited environment consistent with policies and priorities established by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The JSPS is also a formal means by which the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders carry out some of their statutory responsibilities. Therefore, the JSPS process must establish the opportunity for their timely and substantive participation in the development of every JSPS document. As programs are developed and resources allocated, JSPS products and JSPS-related documents provide a means to evaluate capabilities and to assess the adequacy and risk associated with the programs and budgets of the Military
Departments and Defense agencies and, where appropriate, propose changes to those programs and budgets in conformity with strategic priorities. Figure II-2 illustrates the various JSPS products and JSPS-related document interfaces.

f. JSPS Plans and Documents. The JSPS comprises plans and documents that are described in CJCS MOP 7, to be revised as CJCSI 3100.01, and will not be superseded by other documents without the express approval of the Chairman, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

g. JSPS-Related Assessments and Guidance. In addition to the JSPS plans and documents included in CJCS MOP 7, to be revised as CJCSI 3100.01, assessments are performed and planning guidance is issued to support those plans and documents. The following is a list of assessments and guidance that contain critical JSPS-related information and other key documents.
**Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA).** The JMNA is prepared by the Chairman in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. It is submitted annually to the Secretary of Defense for his approval and submission to Congress in conjunction with the submission of the defense budget. The JMNA fulfills the Secretary of Defense’s statutory duty to submit to Congress an annual comprehensive net assessment of the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies compared with those of potential adversaries.

**Logistics Sustainability Analysis (LSA).** The LSA of an operation plan will be completed during the development and maintenance of the combatant commanders' operational plan. The LSA provides a broad assessment of key logistic capabilities by: documenting the results of a process that assures an integrated evaluation of key logistic capabilities, identifying logistic support short-falls and assessing the risks, and providing a baseline for the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) process. The LSA builds upon assessments, which are formed in collaboration with the Services, supporting commanders, and DOD Agencies. The LSA assesses the combined support capabilities represented by the four pillars of logistics: material, logistic support forces, infrastructure, and lift. The LSA integrates the assessments of the individual pillars of logistics by optimizing and balancing their contributions as both enablers and constrainters of logistic support. Preparation of this analysis is a two step process. It begins with the Services and DOD Agencies assessment of their ability to support the CINC's plan, followed by the CINC's assessment of the inputs along with supported commander's analysis of theater requirements and capabilities.

**Defense Planning Guidance.** The DPG furnishes the Secretary of Defense's programming and fiscal guidance to the Military Departments for development of department POMs for the defense planning period. The DPG includes major planning issues and decisions, strategy and policy, strategic elements, the Secretary’s program planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate, the Illustrative Planning Scenarios, and a series of studies. The DPG is a major link between JSPS and the PPBS.

**Contingency Planning Guidance.** The CPG fulfills the Secretary of Defense’s statutory duty to provide annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff written policy guidance for joint operation planning. The Secretary provides this guidance with the approval of the President after coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CPG is the primary source document for the JSCP.

**SECTION B. SUPPORTING SYSTEMS**

**6. Introduction**

Systems that facilitate joint operation planning are the WWMCCS and the Service planning systems. These systems and their relationship to joint planning are described below.

a. **Worldwide Military Command and Control System.** WWMCCS is the system that provides the means for operational direction and technical administrative
support for command and control of US military forces. It supports joint operation planning and implementation. WWMCCS furnishes the multipath channel of secure communications that transmits tactical warning and assessment intelligence to the NCA and direction from the NCA to the combatant commanders. WWMCCS consists of the National Military Command System (NMCS), the command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems of the combatant commanders, the WWMCCS-related management and information systems of the Military Departments, the C4 systems of the Service component commands, and the C4 support systems of DOD agencies. Information flow is enhanced by formalized reporting structures defined in the Joint Pub 1-03 series and by standard, compatible ADP C4 systems connected in a network of reporting systems and data bases defined in the Joint Pub 6-03 series. The ADP system supports four basic functional areas: resource and unit monitoring, conventional planning and execution, nuclear planning and execution, and tactical warning and attack assessment intelligence.

b. WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN). WIN provides planners with the means to review, update, and transfer data rapidly between WWMCCS locations. It permits real-time secure communications. WIN enables commanders and staffs to work critical compartmented plans and OPORDs by innate characteristics of user IDs and other system safeguards. Within WIN, the telecommunications network permits access to computer resources at separate WWMCCS locations and use of those resources. The WIN file transfer service supports the exchange of large volumes of data such as TPFDD files between members of the JPEC. The WIN Teleconference enables interconnected members of the JPEC to confer and exchange textual information simultaneously.

c. Global Command and Control System (GCCS). The GCCS is replacing WWMCCS. GCCS furnishes warfighters at all levels with needed connectivity, rapid access, flexibility, and simplicity in operations for a comprehensive, interoperable, global command and control capability.

d. National Military Command System. The NMCS is the priority component of WWMCCS that supports the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in exercising their military command responsibilities, including planning and executing joint operations. It includes the National Military Command Center (NMCC), the Alternate National Military Command Center, the National Emergency Airborne Command Post, and other command centers designated by the Secretary of Defense. It also includes the communications connecting those command centers with the headquarters of the combatant commanders, Services, and other commands and agencies that support joint operation planning via the WWMCCS. The NMCS also provides coordination with activities outside the Department of Defense (e.g., the White House Situation Room and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operations Center) that have operation planning and execution functions. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for operating the NMCS to meet the needs of the NCA.

7. Service Planning Systems

The Secretary of each Military Department is responsible for the associated Services’ efficiency and its preparedness for military operations. Each has Service-unique planning systems that support planning for joint operations. These systems incorporate strategic guidance from Joint Staff documents, program guidance
from Military Department channels, and promulgate the guidance of the Chiefs of the Services to the component commanders for joint operation planning. The Service component commanders receive guidance through the chain of command and the administrative control channel. The component commanders are the common link in these two and support the combatant commanders. The Service planning systems are documented in the publications described in the following subparagraphs.

a. Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). The AMOPES is an integrated planning and execution system used to ensure that Army capabilities are available to support the combatant commanders during military operations. It provides a single source document for issuing policies, procedures, guidance, and planning assumptions for all levels of mobilization, as well as for military operations without the involuntary callup of the Reserve component forces. It provides policy and guidance for follow-on activities of military operations to include redeployment and demobilization.

AMOPES provides US Army mobilization and operations planning guidance, including the availability, apportionment, and employment of US Army forces. Annex R of AMOPES describes the US Army Crisis Action System and its relationships to CJCS crisis action planning.

b. Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP). The NCMP is the basic US Navy document for transmitting mobilization and operations planning guidance and for allocating forces. It provides direction and guidance to second-echelon commands, including the US Coast Guard, responsible for developing logistic support and mobilization plans.

c. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP) and Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN). The MCP and MPLAN are the basic US Marine Corps operations planning documents. The MCP presents Marine Corps capabilities to joint force commanders and staffs; provides guidance and information to joint force commanders and staffs on the deployment
and employment of Marine Corps forces; identifies Marine Corps forces apportioned to the unified commanders in the JSCP; and fuses guidance, information, planning, and capabilities from Services' planning and joint planning channels and imparts it to joint force commanders and staffs. The MPLAN provides policies, procedures, and responsibilities for the expansion of the Marine Corps to specific levels of mobilization. MPLAN Volume III contains a prioritized list of Selected Marine Corps Reserve units needed to augment and reinforce the Marine Expeditionary Forces for major regional contingencies. It also contains information on base, station, and CONUS requirements to support mobilization and Fleet Marine Force deployments. It is intended to provide information for deliberate planning and to provide a predictable basis for refining requirements during crisis action.

d. **Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP).** The Air Force WMP, published in six volumes, provides major commands and US Air Force staff agencies with consolidated guidance concerning the support of combatant forces and mobilization planning. The WMP provides consolidated lists of OPLANs, lists of combat and support forces available to support OPLANs, planned positioning and use of aircraft forces in support of joint OPLANs, basic planning factors, and base use.

e. **Coast Guard Capabilities Manual (CG CAPMAN) and Coast Guard Logistic Support and Mobilization Plan (CG LSMP).** The CG CAPMAN and CG LSMP support the NCMP and contain operational guidance and force apportionment for contingencies and war.

**SECTION C. JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN**

8. **Introduction**

The JSCP provides the strategic direction required to coordinate the planning efforts of the combatant commanders in pursuit of national strategic objectives and to integrate their efforts with those of the remainder of the JPEC. The JSCP is the link between strategic planning accomplished through the JSPS and joint operation planning conducted through JOPES. The major factors used in developing the JSCP are shown in Figure II-3. It is the primary vehicle through which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises his responsibility to provide for the preparation of joint operation plans. The JSCP and its annexes, as well as the administrative procedures governing its preparation, are described in detail in CJCS MOP 7, to be revised as CJCSI 3100.01.

**The JSCP initiates deliberate joint operation planning by:**

a. **Assigning** planning tasks to the combatant commanders.

b. **Apportioning** major combat forces and resources.

c. **Issuing** planning guidance to integrate the joint operation planning activities of the entire JPEC within a coherent, focused framework.

9. **JSCP Base Document**

The JSCP base document provides:
a. A summary of the current national military strategy for deterrence and war and a statement of general strategic taskings to combatant commanders. The JSCP provides the strategic direction required to coordinate the efforts of the combatant commanders in the attainment of national military objectives.

b. Planning guidance to the combatant commanders governing the development of plans.

c. Planning guidance to the Services and Combat Support Agencies for supporting the combatant commanders in the execution of assigned objectives and tasks.

d. A list of major combat forces expected to be available during the planning period under various conditions of mobilization and apportionment of those forces to the combatant commanders for planning.

e. Service- and force-unique information and limitations on the use of specific forces as required to meet plan taskings.

f. An intelligence estimate for planning. This estimate is an appraisal of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. It will support activities during the JSCP planning cycle.
10. **JSCP Supplemental Instructions**

The supplemental instructions to the JSCP provide additional planning guidance, capabilities, and amplification of taskings for planning in specified functional areas. JSCP supplemental instructions are:

a. CJCSI 3110.02, “Intelligence.”

b. CJCSI 3110.03, “Logistics.”

c. CJCSI 3110.04, “Nuclear.”

d. CJCSI 3110.05, “Psychological.”

e. CJCSI 3110.06, “Special Operations.”

f. CJCSI 3110.07, “Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense; Riot Control Agents; and Herbicides.”

g. CJCSI 3110.08, “Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy.”

h. CJCSI 3110.09, “Command and Control Warfare (C2W).”

i. CJCSI 3110.10, “Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems.”

j. CJCSI 3110.11, “Mobility.”

k. CJCSI 3110.12, “Civil Affairs.”

l. CJCSI 3110.13, “Mobilization.”

m. CJCSI 3110.14, “Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).”


**SECTION D. JOINT MOBILIZATION PLANNING**

11. **Introduction**

Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. Depending on the threat to be countered, mobilization may range from manpower augmentation of the active force to widespread involvement of the nation’s economic, political, and industrial resources. Planning and executing mobilization activities are accomplished primarily by the Military Departments and Services. However, operation planning for major contingencies relies heavily on timely mobilization of the necessary forces and capabilities. This mandates that joint operation planning and mobilization planning be closely integrated. This section describes joint mobilization concepts and plans through which such integration is achieved. A comprehensive discussion of joint mobilization doctrine is contained in Joint Pub 4-05, “Mobilization Planning.”

12. **Responsibilities**

The foundation of joint mobilization concepts and procedures is established by statute. The National Security Act, as amended, delineates broad responsibilities for mobilization.

a. **Military Departments and Services.** Each of the Military Departments plans for the expansion of its peacetime components to meet the needs of crisis or war and submits coordinated mobilization information to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each Service plans for the expansion of its peacetime components in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans.
b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs specific mobilization responsibilities. With the assistance of the Joint Staff and in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman prepares integrated plans for military mobilization; provides guidance for use by the Military Departments, the Services, and the Defense agencies in the preparation of their respective detailed plans; and submits general strategic recommendations for the development of industrial mobilization programs to the Secretary of Defense.

13. Integration Concepts

The DOD Master Mobilization Guide (MMG) governs coordinated planning for mobilization within the Department of Defense. The MMG and the DPG provide the guidance of the Secretary of Defense relative to mobilization planning to support joint operations. The MMG identifies mobilization responsibilities and describes tasks to be performed in peacetime and at the time of mobilization. It also delineates functional relationships among DOD components for mobilization planning and execution. The Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff amplify the Secretary’s guidance by issuing their guidance for use by the Services and developing integrated plans for joint mobilization. Based on the guidance of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments and the Services are required to develop coordinated mobilization plans for assembling, preparing, moving, and supporting mobilized forces and capabilities. The process for integrating mobilization planning with joint operation planning is outlined below:

a. The JSCP tasks the combatant commander to develop deliberate plans and apportions forces and resources for planning. It contains Service-provided availability times for major combat forces designated to augment combatant commands.

b. The mobilization annex of the JSCP provides guidance to the Services for developing supporting mobilization plans for those contingencies that require mobilization.

c. The combatant commanders, either directly or through their component commands, identify requirements not listed in the JSCP but required to support joint operations. Identified forces are provided by the Services.

d. The combatant commander develops OPLANs or OPORDs incorporating Service-provided mobilization information.

e. The Services develop detailed mobilization plans to support the OPLANs of the combatant commanders.

f. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews the OPLANs of the combatant commanders to ascertain the effect of mobilization capabilities on the adequacy and feasibility of joint OPLANs.


The goal of the Industrial Preparedness Program (IPP) is to provide an industrial base capable of producing critical military items essential to the readiness and sustainment needs of the
Armed Forces of the United States across the range of military operations. The JIMPP is the deliberate planning tool that provides documented industrial mobilization plans and analytical processes to respond to a crisis or war. The process unifies industrial mobilization planning and analytical efforts by focusing on warfighting requirements and capabilities. The JIMPP is used by the Joint Staff, Services, and Defense agencies to:

a. Estimate the capability of the industrial base to support execution of OPLANs developed through deliberate planning or COAs derived through crisis action planning.

b. Establish a baseline national industrial mobilization capability assessment based on the potential military demands identified through the JSPS.

c. Coordinate the industrial mobilization planning of the Services.

d. Identify and provide DOD industrial mobilization requirements to the IPP.

SECTION E. EMPLOYMENT PLANNING

15. Introduction

This section discusses the role of employment planning in joint operation planning, describes employment planning considerations and functions at the national, theater, and subordinate command levels, and introduces new employment planning concepts for incorporation into JSCP-tasked plans.

16. Employment Planning

Employment is the strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces within an operational area. Employment planning defines how existing and projected capabilities will be used to attain objectives. It involves military actions required to pursue warfare successfully: evaluating enemy actions and capabilities, devising and selecting COAs, and positioning forces and resources to create advantages in combat and exploit resulting opportunities to attain objectives despite enemy resistance. Employment planning influences and drives planning in the other mission areas of joint operation planning. Mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning support the concepts and requirements developed through employment planning. Detailed planning for the actual use of forces and materiel within the operational area is normally accomplished as part of joint operation planning by subordinate commanders, such as component and subordinate joint force commanders. However, in the broader context of joint operation planning, each level of command plans for the employment of its available forces and resources to achieve specified objectives.

a. National Level. At the national level, strategic plans provide for the global and theater employment of national capabilities to achieve national security and military objectives. This planning considers global requirements, national capabilities, and the theater strategies and campaigns of the combatant commanders. The JSCP describes strategic concepts, defines supporting regional objectives, and apportions forces and resources among the combatant commanders to attain prioritized national objectives. National strategic planning for mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment is based on the planned employment of forces in the individual theaters.

b. Theater Level. Employment planning at the theater level focuses on
organizing and positioning assigned and augmenting forces for the conduct of theater campaigns or major operations to attain strategic and/or theater objectives. The combatant commander’s strategic employment concept defines objectives, organizes forces, arranges and prioritizes operations, assigns tasks, and prioritizes the movement of forces and support to and within the theater. It provides strategic direction to the employment planning of subordinate commands and, when appropriate, supports alliance, coalition or treaty plans for the employment of multinational forces. Theater strategic employment planning provides the foundation for the concept of operations for joint OPLANs prepared by the combatant commander and the framework for mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning.

c. Subordinate Level. Subordinate commands, such as component commands and subordinate joint force commands, normally accomplish the detailed employment planning for the conduct of joint operations to perform missions tasked by the combatant commanders. When part of an alliance or a coalition organization, detailed employment planning is performed within the multinational or bilateral chain of command in support of multinational strategies, campaigns, and missions. Under these circumstances, multinational employment plans become the basis for joint OPLANs prepared within the US chain of command that plan for moving, preparing, and sustaining US forces dedicated to multinational operations.

17. Key Planning Concepts

To facilitate coordination of strategic priorities, deliberate and crisis action plans should contain key planning concepts that enhance understanding of the combatant commander’s strategic vision and the sequence of operations needed to attain the commander’s theater objectives. These concepts are shown in Figure II-4.

Because of the ambiguous nature of the threat in some plans, all of these concepts may not be applicable. Where possible, they should at least be considered and identified in the plan.
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, in his autobiography, “It Doesn’t Take a Hero,” recounts the events of November 14, 1990, the day he briefed his senior commanders on his campaign plan to drive the Iraqi forces from Kuwait during Desert Storm. After asserting that this would be the most important meeting of the war, General Schwarzkopf acknowledges the twenty-two generals who were in attendance, commenting “that no other theater commander in history had ever been blessed with such an array of talent,” and describes his battle plan...

“The first thing that we’re going to have to do is, I don’t like to use the word ‘decapitate,’ so I think I’ll use the word ‘attack,’ leadership, and go after his command and control. Number two, we’ve got to gain and maintain air superiority. Number three, we need to cut totally his supply lines. We also need to destroy his chemical, biological, and nuclear capability. And finally, all you tankers, listen to this. We need to destroy—not attack, not damage, not surround—I want you to destroy the Republican Guard. When you’re done with them, I don’t want them to be an effective fighting force anymore. I don’t want them to exist as a military organization.’ For the benefit of the Vietnam vets—practically the whole room—I emphasized that ‘we’re not going into this with one arm tied behind our backs. We’re not gonna say we want to be as nice as we possibly can, and if they draw back across the border that’s fine with us. That’s bullshit! We are going to destroy the Republican Guard.’ If we were ordered to go on the offensive, we would be free to use our full military strength and attack across the border into Iraq.

‘I’m now going to tell you all some stuff that not very many people know about, in Washington particularly,’ I said, and described the four phases of attack we’d mapped out for Desert Storm: strategic bombing first; then gaining control of the Kuwaiti skies; then bombing Iraqi artillery positions, trench lines, and troops. At last I turned to the plan for the ground offensive—a fully realized version of the envelopment I’d proposed to [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General] Powell three weeks before. Using the map, I showed the commanders where I wanted them to maneuver their units. The plan covered a huge area: in order to make sure we fought the campaign on our own terms, we had extended the boundary of the battlefield westward so that it encompassed a rectangle roughly the size of Pennsylvania. Saddam’s forces were concentrated at the eastern end, in and around Kuwait. Desert Shield forces would keep them from moving south; to their east was the natural barrier of the gulf; to their north was the Euphrates, which would become a natural barrier once [Joint Force Air Component Commander, Lieutenant General] Chuck Horner’s air force dropped the bridges that crossed it; and to the west were hundreds of miles of desert that would become our main avenue of attack.

‘I anticipated,’ I said, ‘a four-pronged ground assault.’ Along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border near the gulf, I wanted two divisions of U.S. Marines and a Saudi task force to thrust straight into Kuwait, with the objective of tying up Saddam’s forces and eventually encircling Kuwait City. Nodding in [U.S. Marine Commander in DESERT STORM, Lieutenant General, Walter E.] Boomer’s direction, I said, ‘I’ll leave it to Walt Boomer to figure out how he wants to do
that, but it also gives him the capability to come in from the sea with his amphibious forces.’ I’d reserved a second corridor, in the western part of Kuwait, for a parallel attack by the pan-Arab forces led by two armored divisions from Egypt and another Saudi task force. Their objective would be the road junction northwest of Kuwait City that controlled Iraqi supply lines. Eventually they would enter Kuwait City and have the dirty job of fighting the Iraqis house to house if necessary.

Meanwhile from the west would come the U.S. Army’s power punch. Looking at [Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General] Gary Luck, I indicated a section of Saudi-Iraqi border more than three hundred and fifty miles inland. ‘I am probably going to send the XVIII Airborne Corps very deep,’ I said, showing how I wanted Luck’s divisions to race north from that area to the Euphrates, blocking the Republican Guard’s last route of retreat. Once that sector was secured I told him, he would hook his forces east, ready to join the attack on the main body of the Iraqi army. Finally I turned to [Commander, VII Corps, Lieutenant General] Fred Franks. ‘I think it’s pretty obvious what your mission is going to be’, I said, moving my hand along the desert corridor just to the west of Kuwait, ‘attack through here and destroy the Republican Guard.’ I wanted to pin them with their backs against the sea, and then go in and wipe them out. I couldn’t resist adding, ‘Once they’re gone, be prepared to continue the attack to Baghdad. Because there isn’t going to be anything else out there.’ I allowed that taking Baghdad would probably be unnecessary, because by then the war would have ended.

After a question-and-answer session I tried to set a tone for the coming months. ‘Let me leave you with one thought, guys. In order for this to succeed—because the enemy is still going to outnumber us—it is going to take, for lack of a better word, killer instinct on the part of all of our leaders out there.’ I pointed again at the map. ‘What I’m saying is when the Marines hit the wire right here and when the Army forces hit the wire over here...we need commanders in the lead who absolutely, dearly understand that they will get through. And that once they’re through they’re not going to stop and discuss it. They are going to go up there and destroy the Republican Guard. I cannot afford to have commanders who do not understand that it is attack, attack, attack, attack, and destroy every step of the way. If you have somebody who doesn’t understand it, I would strongly recommend that you consider removing him from command and putting in somebody that can do the job.

‘Because, let’s face it, the prestige of the United States military is on our shoulders. But more importantly, the prestige of the entire United States of America rests on our shoulders. There isn’t going to be anybody else in this thing except us. There are no more forces coming. What we got is what’s going to do the job. And for our country we dare not fail. We cannot fail, and we will not fail. Anybody in here who doesn’t understand that, get out of the way. Any questions? Okay, good luck to you. You know what needs to be done.”

Chapter II

SECTION F. CAMPAIGN PLANNING

18. Introduction

The theater campaign plan embodies the combatant commander’s vision of the arrangement of related major operations necessary to attain strategic objectives. Preparation of a campaign plan is appropriate when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Campaign planning is appropriate to both deliberate and crisis action planning.

19. Campaign Plans

A campaign is a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. A campaign plan describes how a series of joint major operations are arranged in time, space, and purpose to achieve a strategic objective. It orients on the enemy’s centers of gravity; achieves simultaneous and synchronized employment of all available land, sea, air, space-based assets, and special operations forces; clearly defines an end state that constitutes success, failure, mission termination, or exit strategy; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning. Two of the most important aspects of this plan are the synchronized employment of forces and the concept for their sustainment. Campaign plans are the operational extension of a combatant commander’s theater strategy. They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used to attain theater strategic objectives. Through theater campaign plans, combatant commanders define objectives; describe concepts of operations and sustainment; arrange operations in time, space, and purpose; organize forces; establish command relationships; assign tasks; and synchronize air, land, sea, space, and special operations, often in coordination with allies, interagency operations, non-governmental operations, and even United Nations operations. Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater. It communicates the commander’s purpose, requirements, objectives, and concept to subordinate components and joint forces, as well as to supporting commands and Services, so that they may make necessary preparations. In addition, by means of a campaign plan, combatant commanders give the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff information needed for intertheater coordination at the national level.

“In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of the campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to the circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country.”

Napoleon II: Maxims of War, (1831)

20. Strategic Integration

Campaign plans are used by national authorities as well as by subordinates. Submission of a well-conceived campaign plan to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff gives the combatant commander’s estimated time-phased force requirements for consolidation with other combatant command forecasts at the national level. The campaign plan may be used to
Strategic Direction and Integration

influence the joint strategic planning process. As an example, during Operation DESERT SHIELD, Commander in Chief, US Central Command’s campaign plan briefing to the NCA for the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait identified the requirement for, and resulted in, the deployment of a second Army corps to Southwest Asia.

21. Types of Campaign Plans

a. Theater Campaign. Campaigns are conducted by joint forces. They may follow more than one line of operation. **Theater campaigns synthesize deployment, employment, sustainment, and subordinate operations into a coherent whole.** Additional guidance is available in Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.” Procedures for campaign planning will be published in Joint Pub 5-00.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning.” This pub is currently in development.

b. Subordinate Campaign. Subordinate JFCs may develop subordinate campaign plans or operation plans that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) **theater strategic objectives.** Thus, subordinate unified commands typically develop campaign plans to accomplish assigned missions. Also, JTFs can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation. **Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategy, theater guidance, and direction developed by the combatant commander and should contribute to achieving combatant command objectives** (see Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations”).

22. Relationship of Campaign Planning to Joint Operation Planning

Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of combat operations, but can also be used in situations other than war. **Campaign plans guide the development of supporting OPLANS or OPORDs and facilitate national-level coordination of strategic priorities and resource allocations.** The use of campaign planning is refocused as the scale of contemplated operations and the imminence of hostilities decreases. **During peacetime deliberate planning,** combatant commanders prepare joint OPLANs, including campaign plans, in direct response to taskings in the JSCP. Tasking for strategic requirements or major contingencies may require the preparation of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, campaign plans are based on reasonable assumptions and **are not normally completed until after the NCA selects the course of action during CAP.** Deliberate plans may include elements of campaign planning, however these elements will have to be updated as in any deliberate plan used at execution. Execution planning conducted is for the actual commitment of forces when conflict is imminent. It is based on the current situation and includes deployment and initial employment of forces. **When a crisis situation develops,** an assessment is conducted that may result in the issuance of a CJCS WARNING ORDER. COAs are developed based on an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN, if applicable. The combatant commander proposes COAs and makes any recommendations when the Commander’s Estimate is forwarded to the NCA. The NCA select a COA and, when directed, the
Chairman issues a CJCS ALERT ORDER. The combatant commander now has the essential elements necessary for finalizing the construction of a campaign plan using the approved COA as the centerpiece of the plan.

23. Elements of Theater Campaign Plans

Theater campaign plans are time sensitive, iterative, and adaptive, depending on the mission and forces available. Fundamentals of campaign plans are shown in Figure II-5.

FUNDAMENTALS OF CAMPAIGN PLANS

- Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives.
- Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.
- Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational, nongovernmental, private voluntary, or United Nations forces, as required.
- Incorporate the combatant commander's strategic intent and operational focus.
- Identify any special forces or capabilities the enemy has in the area.
- Identify the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance for defeating them.
- Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.
- Sequence a series of related major joint operations conducted simultaneously in depth.
- Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designate command relationships.
- Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives and potential posthostilities activities.
- Provide strategic direction; operational focus; and major tasks, objectives, and concepts to subordinates.
- Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons as required and authorized by the National Command Authorities.

Figure II-5. Fundamentals of Campaign Plans
24. Summary

If a campaign plan is required by the size, complexity, and anticipated duration of military involvement, it will be all encompassing for the theater. Subordinate campaign plans can be created by JTFs or subunified commands if required. All other planning is for operations supporting the campaign. Campaign plans are applicable to the deliberate, as well as the crisis action planning process when the assumptions, mission, forces, and threat centers of gravity are reasonably well defined (for example in Korea), and provide the strategic and operational framework within which more detailed OPLANS are prepared. Procedures for campaign planning will be provided in Joint Pub 5-00.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Campaign Planning.”

SECTION G.
MULTINATIONAL PLANNING

25. Introduction

Collective security is a strategic goal of the United States, and joint operation planning will frequently be accomplished within the context of treaty or alliance operation planning for multinational operations. There is no single doctrine for multinational action, and each alliance or coalition develops its own protocols and operation plans. Consequently, US planning for joint operations must accommodate and complement the requirements of the Nation’s collective security arrangements.

26. Multinational (Alliance or Coalition) Operations

Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or an alliance. An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one example. These alliance operations are technically combined operations, though in common usage “combined” is often used as a synonym (though not technically defined as such) for all multinational operations. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action, for instance, the coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Gulf War, 1990-1991.

27. Multinational Planning

Planning for multinational operations is accomplished in national and international channels. Collective security goals, strategies, and combined OPLANS are developed in accordance with individual treaty or alliance procedures. Deliberate joint operation planning for multinational operations is performed through national channels in accordance with US doctrine and procedures. Therefore, much of the information and guidance provided for joint operations is conceptually applicable to alliance and coalition multinational problems as well; the fundamental issues are much the same for both circumstances. Through national planning channels, host-nation support and contingency mutual support agreements are developed to facilitate joint operations. Coordination of these separate planning channels is accomplished at the national level through established coalition bodies and at the theater and operational levels by commanders of combatant commands or other subordinate joint US commands, respectively, who are responsible within both channels for operation planning matters.

a. Strategic Integration. In support of each treaty or alliance, a hierarchical organization of bilateral or multilateral
b. **Theater Integration.** Joint operation planning is integrated with alliance or coalition planning at the theater or operational level by the commander of US national forces dedicated to the alliance or coalition military organization. Normally, this will be the combatant commander or the commander of the subunified command or JTF responsible for the geographic area within which multinational operations are to be planned and executed. These commanders function within the US chain of command and that of multinational organizations. Within alliance and coalition organizations, they command or support the designated commander of multinational forces and plan, as appropriate, for multinational employment in accordance with strategic direction and guidance emanating from treaty or alliance leadership. Within the US chain of command, they command joint US forces and prepare joint operation plans in response to taskings from the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These taskings include developing joint OPLANs to support each treaty or alliance commitment within the geographic area of responsibility and planning for unilateral US contingencies within the same area. In this dual capacity within the US and alliance or coalition chains of command, the US commander coordinates alliance or coalition planning with joint operation planning.

c. **Bilateral Planning.** When directed by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, designated US commanders participate directly with the armed forces of other nations in preparing bilateral OPLANs. Bilateral operation planning involves the preparation of combined, mutually developed and approved plans governing the employment of the forces of two nations for a common contingency. Bilateral planning may be accomplished within the framework of a treaty or alliance or in the absence of such arrangements. Bilateral planning is accomplished in accordance with specific guidance provided by the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

28. **Review of Alliance and Coalition Plans**

US joint strategic or operation plans prepared in support of alliance and coalition objectives and plans are developed, reviewed, and approved exclusively within US operational channels. They are not shared in total with alliance or coalition partners. Selected portions and/or applicable planning and deployment data may be released in accordance with applicable CJCS Instructions. Coordination with alliance and coalition planning is
Strategic Direction and Integration

attained through US representatives and commanders within each collective security organization and through the formal exchange of information in mutually devised forums, documents, and plans. The review and approval of alliance and coalition plans is accomplished in accordance with unique procedures adopted by each alliance or coalition organization and may or may not include separate US review or approval. Bilateral operation plans routinely require national level US approval. Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures),” describes review and approval procedures for joint and multinational operation plans.

French troops prepare for a formation of the multinational coalition, which was formed to defeat Iraqi aggression against Kuwait during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
1. Introduction

Joint operations are planned and implemented through prescribed processes that integrate the NCA, the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commanders within a unified planning system. This chapter describes the formal process for planning joint operations and the planning and execution systems that govern such activities. This publication is broad in scope. More detailed guidance can be found in other Joint Pub 5-0 series publications as shown in Figure III-1.
SECTION A. OVERVIEW

2. General

The JOPES functions described in Chapter I, “Principles and Concepts,” emphasize joint operation planning for deterrence and effective transition to war. The preparation of joint operation plans by combatant commanders in response to strategic direction from the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, taken in conjunction with other DOD planning cycles, constitute the national strategy for military response to the full spectrum of potential threats identified through the national security planning process. Therefore, JOPES provides the means to respond to emerging crisis situations or transition to war through rapid, coordinated execution planning and implementation.

3. JOPES Planning Processes

JOPES is the principal system within the Department of Defense for translating policy decisions into operation plans and OPORDs in support of national security objectives. To accomplish this task, JOPES consists of a deliberate and a crisis planning process as shown in Figure III-2. The focus of this chapter is on these two processes.

![Figure III-2. JOPES Deliberate Planning Process and Crisis Action Planning Process Functional Alignment](image-url)
SECTION B. DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

“In times of peace the general staff should plan for all contingencies of war. Its archives should contain the historical details of the past and all statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers for the present and future.”

Jomini: Precis de l’ Art de la Guerre, (1838)

4. Introduction

This section describes how the joint operation planning process is applied during peacetime to develop joint OPLANs, CONPLANs (with and without TPFDD) or functional plans to support the national military strategy. Deliberate planning involves the participation of the entire JPEC in a coordinated planning effort to counter potential threats with available resources.

5. Planning Cycles and Schedules

The process for joint operation planning begins when a requirement is identified and continues until the requirement no longer exists. Deliberate planning is performed in a continuous cycle that complements and supports other DOD planning cycles. A new deliberate plan usually begins with the publication of a change to the JSCP. The deliberate planning cycle usually begins with the publication of a new JSCP. In coordination with the JPEC, the Joint Staff develops and issues a planning schedule that coordinates plan development activities and established submission dates for joint OPLANs.

6. Deliberate Planning Process

Deliberate planning is accomplished in five phases: initiation, concept development, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans. See Figure III-3.

a. Initiation. Planning tasks are assigned to supported commanders, forces and resources are apportioned, and planning guidance is issued during this phase. The JSCP links the JSPS to joint operation planning, identifies broad scenarios for plan development, specifies the type of plan required (i.e., OPLANs, CONPLANs [with or without TPFDDs] or functional plans) and provides additional planning guidance as necessary. A combatant commander may also initiate deliberate planning by preparing plans not specifically assigned but considered necessary to discharge command responsibilities.

b. Concept Development. The concept development phase of deliberate planning is accomplished by the supported commander responsible for developing the plan. Concept development follows six steps: mission analysis, planning guidance development, staff estimates, commander’s estimate, CINC’s Strategic Concept, and CJCS review. See Figure III-4. The assigned task is analyzed, a mission statement is developed, and planning guidance is prepared and issued to the staff as well as subordinate and supporting commands in step one. During step two, alternative COAs are developed and distributed for staff estimates of supportability to be completed in step three. In step four, alternative COAs are wargamed, analyzed, and compared to produce a commander’s estimate containing the commander’s decision on the preferred
c. Plan Development

- A CJCS-approved concept of operations is expanded into a complete OPLAN during the plan development phase of deliberate planning. Plan development is accomplished by a
designated supported commander, normally a combatant commander, with the assistance of supporting and subordinate commanders. The supported commander guides the plan development process by publishing a Letter of Instruction (LOI) to coordinate the activities of the commands and agencies involved. Eight steps can be identified in the plan development phase as shown in Figure III-5. These eight steps provide a logical planning structure within which the forces and resources required to execute the concept of operations are progressively identified, sequenced, and coupled with transportation capabilities to produce a feasible OPLAN. This
Chapter III

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**III-6**

The phase of deliberate planning is heavily dependent on JOPES ADP to produce the TPFDD.

- Although the plan development phase generally follows a prescribed sequence, **shortfall identification is performed throughout the process.** The supported commander continuously identifies limiting factors and capabilities shortfalls as plan development progresses. **Where possible, the commander resolves the shortfalls** through planning adjustments and coordination with component and supporting commanders. If the shortfalls cannot be reconciled and the resources provided by the JSCP or the Services are inadequate to perform the assigned task, the supported commander reports these limiting factors and his assessment of the associated risk to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of the Services consider shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the supported commander and coordinate resolution. **However, the completion of assigned plans is not delayed pending the resolution of shortfalls.** If shortfalls cannot be resolved within the JSCP time frame, the completed plan will include a consolidated summary and impact assessment of unresolved shortfalls.

- **One of the most time-consuming and intensively managed aspects of plan development is constructing the OPLAN TPFDD.** A TPFDD is the computer-supported data base portion of an OPLAN, necessary to complete Appendix 1 to Annex A of the OPLAN. See Figure III-6. The supported commander provides TPFDD development guidance and

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**Figure III-5. Plan Development Phase**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Force Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Support Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nuclear Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Transportation Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Shortfall Identification</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Transportation Feasibility Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>TPFDD Refinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Documentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Steps listed above are not necessarily sequential and may occur simultaneously.*
milestones to the JPEC through a TPFDD LOI. TPFDD development involves the sequential development and refinement of forces, logistics, and transportation data in a process collectively termed TPFDD refinement. A TPFDD normally contains assigned, augmentation, and supporting forces with accompanying supplies. As TPFDD refinement progresses, an estimate of resupply and personnel requirements to sustain the force based on consumption factors, computer modeling, and past experience is added. In addition, a fully refined TPFDD must be made transportation feasible. Therefore, USTRANSCOM plays a key role in the refinement process by hosting and coordinating refinement conferences and assessing transportation feasibility.

**Forces refinement** is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, Services, the Joint Staff and other supporting agencies to confirm that forces are sourced and tailored within JSCP guidance and to assess the adequacy of the combat support and combat service support sourced by the Services. USTRANSCOM provides sealift and airlift capability estimates based on lift apportionment throughout the process to ensure transportation feasibility.

**Logistic refinement** is conducted primarily by the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and Service component commanders under the overall direction of the supported commander. Logistic refinement confirms the sourcing of logistic requirements in accordance with JSCP guidance and assesses the adequacy of resources provided through support planning. USTRANSCOM coordinates on logistic planning matters and hosts conferences dedicated to logistic planning and refinement.

**Transportation refinement** simulates the planned movement resources to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. USTRANSCOM uses computer simulation to determine

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**TIME-PHASED FORCE DEPLOYMENT DATA**

- A computer data base
- Construction requires intensive planner data manipulation using JOPES automated data processing tools
- Transportation oriented
  - Priority and sequencing of deploying forces
  - Deployment routing of forces
  - Detailed cargo descriptions
  - Passenger data
- When generated, contains resupply cargo and personnel planning data

**Figure III-6. Time-Phased Force Deployment Data**
transportation feasibility. In turn, the supported commander adjusts TPFDD requirements as necessary to remain within lift capability.

- Following TPFDD refinement, the supported commander completes the documentation of the plan and coordinates distribution of the TPFDD within the JOPES network as appropriate. The supported CINC then submits the OPLAN with the TPFDD file to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.

- At the end of the OPLAN development cycle, or biennially during periods of extended maintenance cycles, the Joint Staff will host a sustainability conference to review current LSA issues. The review will convert any operational logistic deficiencies into programming requirements.

d. Plan Review. In the plan review phase of deliberate planning, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts a final review of OPLANs submitted by the supported commander. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, and Defense agencies, assesses and validates joint OPLANs prepared by supported commanders using the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with joint doctrine. It is a formal process that evaluates the entire plan, including TPFDD and other computer-supported data files, to determine whether taskings have been met and whether resources have been used effectively within the constraints of JSCP apportionment guidance. The review also identifies unresolved shortfalls in force and resource capabilities. Upon completion of the review, the supported commander is informed that the plan is approved or disapproved for reasons stated. Plans that contain critical shortfalls that are beyond the supported commander’s ability to resolve will be approved with these shortfalls identified. In such cases, the supported commander will be provided with guidance regarding specific actions planned or programmed to redress the shortfalls. Approved plans remain so until superseded or canceled. Upon notification that a plan has been approved, the supported commander incorporates CJCS-directed changes and directs the completion of supporting plans by supporting and subordinate commanders.

e. Supporting Plans. During this final phase of the deliberate planning process, the supported commander directs the completion and submission of supporting plans to the CJCS-approved OPLAN. These plans focus on the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces and resources in support of the concept described in the supported commander’s approved plan. Supporting plans are developed concurrently with operation plans and are required to be submitted to the supported commander within 60 days of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s plan approval. The plans are developed by component commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, supporting commanders, and other agencies as directed by the supported commander. The review and approval of supporting plans is the responsibility of the commander they support. However, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be requested to resolve critical issues that arise during the review of supporting plans, and the Joint Staff may coordinate the review of any supporting plans on behalf
of the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should circumstances so warrant. Employment planning is normally accomplished by the subordinate commands that will direct the forces if the plan is executed. It may be delayed when the politico-military situation cannot be clearly forecast or it may be excluded from supporting plans if employment is to be planned and executed within an alliance or treaty framework.

SECTION C. CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

7. Introduction

This section describes how the basic planning process is adapted and employed to plan and execute joint operations in crisis situations. A crisis is defined, within the context of joint operation planning and execution as an INCIDENT or SITUATION involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. An adequate and feasible military response to a crisis demands a flexible adaptation of the basic planning process that emphasizes the time available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously accomplished joint operation planning whenever possible. In crisis situations, the JPEC follows formally established CAP procedures to adjust and implement previously prepared joint operation plans or to develop and execute OPORDs where no useful joint operation plan exists for the evolving crisis. A campaign plan may also be developed if warranted by the scope of contemplated operations. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the NCA, and the prompt transmission of NCA decisions to supported commanders.

8. Relationship to Deliberate Planning

CAP procedures provide for the transition from planning of military operations to their execution. Deliberate planning supports crisis action planning by anticipating potential crises and developing joint operation plans that facilitate the rapid development and selection of a COA and execution planning during crises. Deliberate planning prepares for hypothetical crises based on the best available information and using forces and resources available for the planning period. It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. These ambiguities make it unlikely that any joint operation plan will be usable without modification as a given crisis unfolds because every crisis situation cannot be anticipated. However, the detailed analysis and coordination accomplished in the time available for deliberate planning can expedite effective decisionmaking and execution planning during a crisis. As the crisis unfolds, assumptions and projections are replaced with facts and actual conditions. Therefore, CAP includes the consideration and exploitation of deliberate joint operation planning whenever possible. A comparison of CAP and deliberate planning procedures is shown in Figure III-7.
### Chapter III

#### 9. CAP Procedures

Crisis action planning and execution are accomplished within a flexible framework of six phases as summarized in Figure III-8. *These six phases integrate the workings of the NCA and the JPEC into a single unified process* that sequen-

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Time available to plan</th>
<th>CRISIS ACTION PLANNING</th>
<th>DELIBERATE PLANNING</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hours or days</td>
<td>18-24 months</td>
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<table>
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<th>JPEC involvement</th>
<th>CRISIS ACTION PLANNING</th>
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<tr>
<td>For security reasons, possibly very limited to close-hold procedures</td>
<td>Participates fully</td>
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<th>Phases</th>
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<th>DELIBERATE PLANNING</th>
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<tr>
<td>6 Phases from situation development to execution</td>
<td>5 Phases from initiation to supporting plans</td>
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<th>DELIBERATE PLANNING</th>
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<tr>
<td>Warning order to CINC; CINC assigns tasks with evaluation request message</td>
<td>JSCP to CINC; CINC assigns tasks with planning or other written directive</td>
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<th>Forces for Planning</th>
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<th>DELIBERATE PLANNING</th>
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<tr>
<td>Allocated in the Warning, Planning, Alert, or Execute order</td>
<td>Apportioned in JSCP</td>
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<tr>
<th>Early planning guidance to staff</th>
<th>CRISIS ACTION PLANNING</th>
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<tr>
<td>Warning order from CJCS; CINC's evaluation request</td>
<td>Planning Directive issued by CINC after planning guidance step of concept development phase</td>
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<tr>
<th>Commander's estimates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communicates recommendations of CINC to the CJCS-NCA</td>
<td>Communicates the CINC's decision to staff and subordinate commanders</td>
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<tr>
<th>Decision of COA</th>
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<tr>
<td>NCA decide COA</td>
<td>CINC decides COA with review by CJCS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Execute order</td>
<td>When operation plan is implemented, it is converted to an OPORD, and executed with an Execute order</td>
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<th>Products</th>
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<th>DELIBERATE PLANNING</th>
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<tr>
<td>Campaign Plan (if reqd) with supporting OPORDs or OPORD with supporting</td>
<td>OPLAN or CONPLAN with supporting plan</td>
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**Figure III-7. Comparing Crisis Action Procedures with Deliberate Planning Procedures**
### SUMMARY OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PHASES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>PHASE I</th>
<th>PHASE II</th>
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<th>PHASE IV</th>
<th>PHASE V</th>
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<td>SITUATION DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>CRISIS ASSESSMENT</td>
<td>COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION</td>
<td>EXECUTION PLANNING</td>
<td>EXECUTION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### EVENT

- EVENT OCCURS WITH POSSIBLE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
- CINC SENDS WARNING ORDER
- CINC RECEIVES ALERT ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER
- NCA DECIDE TO EXECUTE OPORD

#### ACTION

- MONITOR WORLD SITUATION
- INCREASE AWARENESS
- DEVELOP COA’S
- CJCS SENTS WARNING ORDER
- CJCS PRESENTS REFINED AND PRIORITIZED COA’S TO NCA

- RECOGNIZE PROBLEM
- INCREASE REPORTING
- CINC ASSIGN TSKS TO SUBORDINATES BY EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE
- CJCS ADVISE TO NCA

- SUBMIT CINC’S ASSESSMENT
- JS ASSESS SITUATION
- JS ADVISE ON POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION
- CINC REVIEWS EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGE

- NCA-CJCS EVALUATION
- CINC REVIEWS EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGE
- CJCS PRESENTS Refined AND PRIORITIZED COA’S TO NCA

#### OUTCOME

- ASSESS THAT EVENT MAY HAVE NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
- NCA/CJCS DECIDE TO DEVELOP MILITARY COA
- CINC SENDS COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE WITH RECOMMENDED COA
- NCA SELECT COA
- CINC SENDS OPORD

- REPORT EVENT TO NCA/CJCS
- NCA/CJCS DECIDE TO DEVELOP MILITARY COA
- CINC SENDS COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE WITH RECOMMENDED COA
- NCA SELECT COA
- CINC SENDS OPORD

- JPEC REPORTS EXECUTION STATUS
- BEGIN REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

**NOTES:**

1. CAP phases are scenario dependent since actual planning time can vary from hours to months. Therefore, phases may be conducted sequentially, concurrently, compressed, or eliminated altogether.

2. The NCA, in coordination with the CJCS, may elect to return to situation monitoring at any point during CAP.
tially provides for the identification of a potential requirement for military response; the assessment of the requirement and formulation of strategy; the development of feasible COAs by the supported commander; the selection of a COA by the NCA; and, when directed by the NCA, implementation of the approved COA by the supported commander.

a. **Situation Development.** During the initial phase of crisis action planning, events that have potential national security implications are detected, reported, and assessed to determine whether a military response may be required. The focus of this phase of crisis action planning is on the combatant commander in whose area the event occurs and who will be responsible for the execution of any military response. The combatant commander may be the first to detect and report the event to the NMCC. However, crisis action planning may be initiated by a report to the NMCC from any of the national means used to continuously monitor the worldwide situation. If not included within the initial report, the supported commander prepares and submits an assessment of the event to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The assessment normally includes amplifying information regarding the situation, actions being taken, forces available, expected time for earliest commitment of forces, and major constraints on the employment of forces. If the time sensitivity of the situation is such that normal CAP procedures cannot be followed, the commander’s assessment may also include a recommended COA. It then serves as the commander’s estimate normally prepared in a subsequent phase of crisis action planning. The situation development phase ends when the supported commander’s assessment is submitted to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. **Crisis Assessment.** During the crisis assessment phase of crisis action planning, the NCA, the Chairman, and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation through available intelligence and determine whether a military option should be prepared. This phase is characterized by increased information and intelligence gathering, NCA review of options, and preparatory action by the JPEC. The phase begins with the receipt of the supported commander’s report and assessment of the event. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assesses the situation from a military perspective and provides advice to the NCA on possible military options. The NCA identify national interests and objectives and consider possible diplomatic, informational, economic, and military alternatives to achieve objectives. The flexibility of the CAP provides the latitude for the NCA to remain in this phase pending additional information, return to the precrisis situation, or progress to the next phase of CAP. The crisis assessment phase ends with a strategic decision by the NCA to return to the precrisis situation, or to have military options developed for consideration and possible use. The NCA decision provides strategic guidance for joint operation planning and may include specific guidance on the COAs to be developed.

c. **COA Development.** The COA development phase of crisis action planning implements an NCA decision or CJCS planning directive to develop military options. In response to that decision, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a planning guidance directive to the supported commander directing the
preparation of COAs. Normally, the directive will be a CJCS WARNING ORDER, but other CAP-prescribed orders may be used if the nature and timing of the crisis mandate acceleration of the planning. The directive establishes command relationships and identifies the mission and any planning constraints. It either identifies forces and strategic mobility resources and establishes tentative timing for execution, or it requests the supported commander develop these factors. If the NCA directs development of a specific COA, the directive will describe the COA and request the supported commander’s assessment. In response to the directive, the supported commander, with the support of subordinate and supporting commanders, develops and analyzes COAs. Joint operation plans are reviewed for applicability and used when needed. Based on the combatant commander’s guidance, supporting commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, and component commanders begin TPFDD development. Time permitting, a TPFDD is generated for each COA. USTRANSCOM reviews the proposed COAs and prepares deployment estimates. The Services monitor the development of COAs and begin planning for support forces, sustainment, and mobilization. The supported commander analyzes the COAs and submits his recommendations to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The supported commander’s estimate describes the selected COAs, summarizes the supported commander’s evaluation of the COAs, and presents recommendations. The COA development phase of crisis action planning ends with the submission of the supported commander’s estimate.

d. COA Selection. The focus of the COA selection phase is on the selection of a COA by the NCA and the initiation of execution planning. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviews and evaluates the COAs provided in the supported commander’s estimate and prepares recommendations and advice for consideration by the NCA. The NCA select a COA and direct that execution planning be accomplished. Upon receipt of the NCA decision, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a CJCS ALERT ORDER implementing the NCA decision. A CJCS ALERT ORDER is a formal, CAP-prescribed order approved by the Secretary of Defense and transmitted to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to announce the COA selected by the NCA and to initiate execution planning. The CJCS ALERT ORDER describes the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in coordination with other members of the JPEC, to conduct the detailed planning required to deploy forces. It will contain guidance to amplify or change earlier guidance provided in the CJCS WARNING ORDER. In some cases, a PLANNING ORDER is used to initiate execution planning activities before a course of action is formally selected by the NCA. Used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER saves time and allows the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff additional flexibility in directing military activities. The PLANNING ORDER will not normally be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the PLANNING ORDER will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Issuance of either the PLANNING ORDER or the ALERT ORDER marks the beginning of execution planning.
Execution Planning. An NCA-approved COA is transformed into an OPORD during the execution planning phase of crisis action planning. In this phase, the JPEC performs the detailed planning necessary to execute the approved COA when directed by the NCA. If required by the situation, the supported commander will initiate campaign planning or refine a campaign plan already in development. This should guide the development of the OPORD. Actual forces, sustainment, and strategic mobility resources are identified and the concept of operations is described in OPORD format. Following CAP procedures and using capabilities provided through JOPES and WWMCCS, the supported commander develops the OPORD and supporting TPFDD by modifying an existing OPLAN, expanding an existing CONPLAN (with or without TPFDD), or developing a new plan. Supporting commanders providing augmenting forces identify and task specific units and provide movement requirements. Component commanders identify and update sustainment requirements in coordination with the Services. USTRANSCOM develops transportation schedules to support the requirements identified by the supported commander. A transportation schedule does not mean that the supported commander’s TPFDD or COA is transportation feasible; rather, the schedules developed are the most effective and realistic given the numbers and types of assets and their location in relation to C-day and L-hour. The Services determine mobilization requirements and plan for the provision of nonunit sustainment. Force preparation action is accomplished throughout the JPEC in accordance with deployment postures directed by the Secretary of Defense, and deployability posture reporting is initiated. The Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitor execution planning activities, resolve shortfalls when required, and review the supported commander’s OPORD for feasibility and adequacy. The execution planning phase terminates with an NCA decision to implement the OPORD. In those instances where the crisis does not progress to implementation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides
guidance regarding continued planning under either crisis action or deliberate planning procedures. If the NCA decide to execute the OPORD, planning enters its final phase: execution.

f. Execution. The execution phase begins when the NCA decide to execute a military option in response to the crisis. During this phase, a military response is implemented and operations are conducted by the supported commander until the crisis is resolved. When the Secretary of Defense authorizes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct the supported commander to implement the OPORD, the Chairman issues a CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. The CJCS EXECUTE ORDER directs the deployment and employment of forces, defines the timing for the initiation of operations, and conveys guidance not provided in earlier CAP orders and instructions. The supported commander, in turn, issues an EXECUTE ORDER to subordinate and supporting commanders that directs the execution of their OPORDs. Subordinate and supporting commanders execute their OPORDs and conduct operations to accomplish objectives. The supported commander monitors movements, assesses and reports the achievement of objectives, and continues planning as necessary. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitors the deployment and employment of forces, acts to resolve shortfalls, and directs action needed to ensure successful termination of the crisis. USTRANSCOM manages common-user global air, land, and sea transportation, reporting the progress of deployments to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the supported commander. The execution phase of crisis action planning continues until the crisis is terminated or the mission is terminated and force redeploy-

ment has been completed. If the crisis is prolonged, the process may be repeated continuously as circumstances change and missions are revised. If the crisis expands to major conflict or war, crisis action planning will evolve into, and be absorbed within, the larger context of implementation planning for the conduct of the war.

10. DEPLOYMENT ORDERS, REDEPLOYMENT ORDERS, AND DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS

The DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER will be issued upon decision of the NCA to commence preparations for the conduct of a military operation. DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDERS may be incorporated within WARNING ORDERS, PLANNING ORDERS, ALERT ORDERS, and EXECUTE ORDERS. However, deployment or preparation for deployment of forces is often necessarily independent of these orders. Therefore, DEPLOYMENT ORDERS and DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS may be issued at any point in the CAP process. They can be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after authorization by the Secretary of Defense, to:

a. Increase or decrease the deployability posture of units.

b. Deploy forces.

c. Redeploy forces.

d. In the case of a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER, propose C-day and L-hour, or in the case of a DEPLOYMENT ORDER establish C-day and L-hour.
e. Direct any other action that would signal planned US military action or its termination in response to a particular crisis event or incident.

SECTION D. SUMMARY

11. Joint Planning Summary

Figure III-9 shows the interrelationships of deliberate planning and CAP. Deliberate planning provides the foundation for CAP through development of detailed plans to counter likely contingencies. During CAP, existing plans, if available, are expanded or modified to meet the crisis situation. Development, adjustment, and refinement of the TPFDD is at the heart of transportation planning and execution. Throughout CAP, planning information is exchanged through WWMCCS, on secure phone, or by OPREP messages. The end product of execution planning is the OPORD published by the supported commander. The NCA exercise the ultimate authority over the selection of the COA, deployment of forces, and execution of an OPERATION ORDER.
Figure III-9. Joint Planning Summary

**Deliberate Planning**

1. JSCP
   - I: Initiation
   - II: Concept Development
   - III: Plan Development
   - IV: Plan Review
   - V: Supporting Plans
   - VI: Execution Planning

**Crisis Action Planning**

1. Crisis
   - I: Situation Development
   - II: Crisis Assessment
   - III: Course of Action Development
   - IV: Course of Action Selection
   - V: Execution Planning
   - VI: Execution

**Joint Operational Planning and Execution (JOPES)**

- CONPLAN
- TPFDD
- OPLAN

**Supporting Plans**

- CJCS Warning Order
- CJCS Planning Order
- CJCS Alert Order
- CJCS Execute Order

**Update & Maintain Data Bases**

- Establish Data Base
- Update & Maintain Data Bases
1. Introduction

The objective of joint operation planning and execution is the attainment of military objectives in support of national security policy. Previous chapters in this publication described the principles, concepts, and processes that govern the preparation and implementation of joint OPLANs and OPORDs in support of that objective. This chapter focuses on the secondary, but vital, role that joint operation planning plays in assessing national warfighting capabilities and programming improvement. Joint operation planning prepares for the use of existing capabilities to achieve objectives defined in national military strategy. The resultant plans are a measurement of the Nation’s ability to successfully prosecute the national military strategy within the constraints of available forces and resources. This measurement provides a means of assessing the balance between strategy and capabilities, determining risks, and focusing the acquisition of additional resources and capabilities. This chapter summarizes the requirements for assessments and the concepts and processes through which joint operation planning supports these requirements.

2. Responsibilities

As the principal military adviser to the NCA, the CJCS is responsible for recommending national military strategy to attain national security objectives and for assessing the national military capability and readiness to perform the missions identified in the strategy. The Chairman’s specific responsibilities for assessment of capabilities and readiness are defined in title 10, US Code, and include the following:

a. Advising the Secretary of Defense on critical strengths and deficiencies in force capabilities (including manpower, logistics, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of joint operation plans and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.

b. Establishing and maintaining a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

c. Reviewing the plans and programs of the combatant commanders to determine their adequacy and feasibility for the performance of assigned missions.

d. Ascertaining the logistic support available to execute the joint operation plans of the combatant commanders, and reviewing and recommending to the Secretary of Defense logistic guidance for the Military Services that, if implemented, will result in logistic readiness consistent with the approved plans.

e. Periodically, not less often than every two years, reporting to the Secretary of Defense on the responsiveness and readiness of designated combat support agencies. Those include the Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, DLA, Defense Mapping Agency, National Security
Agency, Central Imagery Office, and any other Defense agency designated as a combat support agency by the Secretary of Defense.

f. Developing a uniform readiness reporting system for reporting the readiness of combat support agencies.

g. Advising the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments and other DOD components conform to the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for the requirements of the combatant commanders.

h. Advising the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of requirements, especially operational requirements, identified by the combatant commanders.

i. Submitting to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities for the requirements of the combatant commanders.

3. Integration

Assessments derived through joint operation planning provide insight into the strengths and deficiencies of the Nation’s existing military capabilities. Consequently, they can be an invaluable source of information for force development planning and the development of national military strategy. The greatest use of joint operation planning as a vehicle for assessing capabilities and influencing other defense planning is realized when deliberate planning is accomplished within a disciplined planning cycle that complements the PPBS and the JSPS. These three DOD planning systems must be integrated within a mutually supporting, complementary process. Joint operation planning conducted in response to the strategic direction provided by the JSPS must produce approved plans within a time frame that permits consideration of the results of that planning in the next succeeding strategy development evolution. Conversely, the JSPS, in conjunction with the PPBS, must provide timely strategic direction that allows the necessary time for the detailed development of adequate and feasible OPLANs. A disciplined deliberate planning process, coordinated with PPBS and JSPS and supported by an effective JOPES, is essential to exploiting the full potential of joint operation planning as a way to assess capabilities and program improvement.

4. Preparedness and Capability

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the responsibility to monitor and assess the readiness of US military forces to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy. The Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS) supports the Chairman in meeting this responsibility. Joint operation plans provide the foundation for the CRS—they are the standards against which readiness is measured in the JMRR. This senior forum is designed to assess both Unit Readiness, as reported by the Services, and Joint Readiness, as reported by the combatant commanders. The end product of the CRS is senior level consensus on the readiness of the force to successfully execute JSCP tasks. Significant shortfalls or deficiencies are assessed in terms of risk and may be remedied through operational or programmatic actions. Joint operation plans have a major role in the process to address remedies to shortfalls and deficiencies.
**FORCE DEVELOPMENT — THE OLD WAY**

Armed Forces planners continuously grapple with the intricacies and complexities of Force Development. Nagging questions of how the Army should be organized and equipped run head-on into budgetary, personnel, and international constraints. The presence of trained operations and Force Development specialists in today’s Army attests to the growing complexities of planning and developing a force structure. The thing to keep in mind, however, is that wartime expedients tend to overcome the thoughtful and careful methods used by development planners during peacetime.

The basic method of Force Development used by the Union Army in the American Civil War was to recruit new regiments rather than to replace individual losses within a given regiment. In a back-up system, two or more understrength regiments were sometimes consolidated into one. Such consolidation sounded good in theory, but in practice it created much bitterness among outfits reluctant to lose their separate identity. The problem was bad enough when the merged units were from the same state or region. But problems were far worse when an understrength regiment from one state was merged with a regiment from another state.

An extreme example of this kind of problem, with its simple solution occurred in August, 1863, when the 2nd Rhode Island Cavalry Regiment (four companies strong) was ordered to be absorbed into the 1st Louisiana (Union) Cavalry Regiment. The Rhode Islanders vocally surrounded the order and refused to leave their camp. The Louisianians then surrounded the camp and persuaded the Rhode Island regiment to unite with them. The persuasion technique was direct. The New Englanders were peremptorily ordered to form ranks with the Southern regiment. Many obeyed at last but only grumblingly and half heartedly; others remained defiant. The colonel of the 1st Louisiana then sorted out the main dissenters, who steadfastly refused to join the consolidated regiment. All attempts to dissuade them failed until FORCE development was applied. The Louisianians singled out two leading dissenters and summarily shot them in full view of the others. The remaining Rhode Islanders promptly broke camp and merged with the 1st Louisiana. Force Development the old way was simple, direct, extreme if necessary, and effective.

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2. Title 10, United States Code, April 1993.
3. CJCS MOP 7, 17 March 1993 (to be revised as CJCSI 3100.01), “Joint Strategic Planning System.”
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Appendix B

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<td>ADP</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSPS</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>Joint Strategy Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOI</td>
<td>letter of instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSA</td>
<td>logistics sustainability analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARFOR</td>
<td>Marine forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>Marine Corps Capabilities Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>memorandum of policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLAN</td>
<td>Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSCP</td>
<td>Marine Corps Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>MTMC</td>
<td>Military Traffic Management Command</td>
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<td>NAVFOR</td>
<td>Navy forces</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<td>NCMP</td>
<td>Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMCC</td>
<td>National Military Command Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMCS</td>
<td>National Military Command System</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>national military strategy</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
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<td>PBD</td>
<td>program budget decision</td>
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<td>PDM</td>
<td>Program Decision Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objective Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>special operations command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<td>United States Navy</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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<td>WIN</td>
<td>Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Intercomputer Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMP</td>
<td>Air Force War and Mobilization Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWMCCS</td>
<td>Worldwide Military Command and Control System</td>
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</table>
acceptability. Operation plan review criterion. The determination whether the contemplated course of action is worth the cost in manpower, material, and time involved; is consistent with the law of war; and militarily and politically supportable. (Joint Pub 1-02)

adequacy. Operation plan review criterion. The determination whether the scope and concept of a planned operation are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned. (Joint Pub 1-02)

alert order. 1. A crisis-action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning after the directing authority approves a military course of action. An alert order does not authorize execution of the approved course of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

alliance. An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests of the members. (Joint Pub 1-02)

allocation. In a general sense, distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

augmentation forces. Forces to be transferred from a supporting commander to the combatant command (command authority) or operational control of a supported commander during the execution of an operation order approved by the National Command Authorities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign planning. The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military
operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (Joint Pub 1-02)

CINC’s Strategic Concept. Final document produced in Step 5 of the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINC’s Strategic Concept is used as the vehicle to distribute the CINC’s decision and planning guidance for accomplishing joint strategic capabilities plan or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) taskings. CJCS approval of the strategic concept becomes the basis of the plan for development into an operation plan or operation plan in concept format. Formerly called “the concept of operations.” Also called CSC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coalition action. Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CINC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

commander’s estimate of the situation. A logical process of reasoning by which
a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander’s estimate which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander’s long-range estimate of the situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**concept of operations.** A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander’s concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**course of action development.** The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System within the crisis action planning process that provides for the development of military responses and includes, within the limits of the time allowed: establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units; evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility; identifying and resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and producing a course of action via a commander’s estimate that contains a concept of operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized courses of action, and supporting data bases. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**crisis.** An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**concept of operations.** A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander’s concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**contingency.** An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**course of action.** 1. A plan that would accomplish, or is related to, the accomplishment of a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander’s estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data base will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order. Also called COA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**course of action development.** The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System within the crisis action planning process that provides for the development of military responses and includes, within the limits of the time allowed: establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units; evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility; identifying and resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and producing a course of action via a commander’s estimate that contains a concept of operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized courses of action, and supporting data bases. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**crisis action planning.** 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an
imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. 2. The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deliberate planning. 1. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. 2. A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deployment order. A planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that authorizes and directs the transfer of forces between combatant commands by reassignment or attachment. A deployment order normally specifies the authority that the gaining combatant commander will exercise over the transferred forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deployment planning. Operational planning directed toward the movement of forces and sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area for conducting the joint operations contemplated in a given plan. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intra-theater movement legs, staging areas, and holding areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

employment. The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

employment planning. Planning that prescribes how to apply force/forces to attain specified military objectives. Employment planning concepts are developed by combatant commanders through their component commanders. (Joint Pub 1-02)

execute order. 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a National Command Authorities decision to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

execution planning. The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System crisis action planning process that provides for the translation of an approved course of action into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete operation plan or operation order. Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved operation plan or other National Command Authorities-approved course of action is adjusted, refined, and translated into an operation order. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it
can take place in the absence of prior planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**feasibility.** Operation plan review criterion. The determination of whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**force planning.** Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments and Services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**functional plans.** Plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or permissive environment developed by combatant commanders to address requirements such as disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of US citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations, or similar discrete tasks. They may be developed in response to the requirements of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, at the initiative of the CINC, or as tasked by the supported combatant commander, Joint Staff, Service, or Defense agency. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review of CINC-initiated plans is not normally required. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**implementation planning.** Operational planning associated with the conduct of a continuing operation, campaign, or war to attain defined objectives. At the national level, it includes the development of strategy and the assignment of strategic tasks to the combatant commanders. At the theater level, it includes the development of campaign plans to attain assigned objectives and the preparation of operation plans and operation orders to prosecute the campaign. At lower levels, implementation planning prepares for the execution of assigned tasks or logistic missions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**intelligence.** 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**interoperability.** 1. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide service to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint operations.** A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint operation planning.** Planning for contingencies which can reasonably be
anticipated in an area of responsibility or joint operations area of the command. Planning activities exclusively associated with the preparation of operation plans, operation plans in concept format, campaign plans, and operation orders (other than the single integrated operation plan) for the conduct of military operations by the combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint operation planning is coordinated at the national level to support Secretary of Defense Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), strategic requirements in the National Military Strategy, and emerging crises. As such, joint operation planning includes mobilization planning, deployment planning, employment planning, sustainment planning, and redeployment planning procedures. Joint operation planning is performed in accordance with formally established planning and execution procedures. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint operation planning process.** A coordinated Joint Staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

**Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.** A continuously evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems: Joint Operation Planning System and Joint Deployment System. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and automated data processing systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint planning and execution community.** Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. It usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistics commands), unified commands (and their certain Service component commands), subunified commands, transportation component commands, joint task forces (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency) as may be appropriate to a given scenario. Also called JPEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Joint Strategic Planning System.** The primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with
those of their potential adversaries. Also called JSPS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**lines of operations.** Lines which define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**mobilization.** 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories:

a. selective mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve component units, individual ready reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack.

b. partial mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000) to mobilize Ready Reserve component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

c. full mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

d. total mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**multination.** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (Joint Pub 1-02)

** multinational operations.** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**National Command Authorities.** The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operation.** A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operational control.** Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below
Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Operational level of war.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Operation order.** A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Operation plan.** Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) file.

a. OPLAN. An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC’s Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called OPLAN.

b. CONPLAN. An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to
A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. Also called CONPLAN.

c. CONPLAN With TPFDD. A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased deployment of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

planning order. 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow a commander’s estimate and a planning order will normally take the place of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert order. National Command Authorities approval of a selected course of action is not required before issuing a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning order. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of execution planning before the directing authority approves a military course of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

shortfall. The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability, reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those apportioned to a combatant commander for planning, that would adversely affect the command’s ability to accomplish its mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

specified command. A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from only one Military Department. Also called specified combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

staff estimates. Assessments of courses of action by the various staff elements of a command that serve as the foundation of the commander’s estimate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic plan. A plan for the overall conduct of a war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

subordinate command. A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

supported commander. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans, campaign plans,
or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

**supporting commander.** A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**supporting plan.** An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s plan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**sustainment.** The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**tactical level of war.** The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**theater of operations.** A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**theater of war.** Defined by the National Command Authorities or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander’s entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**theater strategy.** The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**time-phased force and deployment data.** The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including:

a. In-place units.

b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation.

c. Routing of forces to be deployed.

d. Movement data associated with deploying forces.

e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces.

f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-
user lift resources, as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**unified command.** A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**warning order.** 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. 2. A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander’s estimate be submitted. 3. A planning directive that describes the situation, allocates forces and resources, establishes command relationships, provides other initial planning guidance, and initiates subordinate unit mission planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)
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All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Pub 5-0 is the Plans keystone publication. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1** Project Proposal
- Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2** Program Directive
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCs
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3** Two Drafts
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4** CJCS Approval
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCS
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a Joint Publication

**STEP #5** Assessments/Revision
- The CINCS receive the pub and begin to assess it during use
- 16 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each pub and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each pub is revised