A large body of joint doctrine (and its supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures) has been and is being developed by the US Armed Forces through the combined efforts of the Joint Staff, Services, and combatant commands. The following chart displays an overview of the development process for these publications.

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy. Joint Pub 3-04 .1 is located in the operations series of joint publications.

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Subject: Joint Pub 5-03.1, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)"

1. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth principles, doctrine, and military guidance to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States.

2. Recommendations for changes to this publication should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

3. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal.

4. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. This publication supersedes JCS Pub 5-02.1, 6 July 1988, and JCS Pub 5-02.4, 8 July 1988.

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7. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Branch, C-AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-6111.
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For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[signature]

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Colonel, USA
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1. Purpose. This publication sets forth doctrine (or doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures) to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine (or doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures) for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.

2. Application

a. Doctrine (or doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures) and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles, and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. In applying the doctrine (or doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures) set forth in this publication, care must be taken to distinguish between distinct but related responsibilities in the two channels of authority to forces assigned to combatant commands. The Military Departments and Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to combatant commands and administer and support these forces. This authority is, by law, subject to the provisions of Chapter 6, Title 10, United States Code, which is the section that details the authority of combatant commanders. Commanders of the unified and specified commands exercise combatant command (command authority) over these assigned forces. Service component commanders are subject to the orders of combatant commanders, and subject to the combatant commander’s direction, are also responsible to the Military Departments and Services in the chain of command for matters that the joint force commander has not been assigned authority.
3. Scope. This publication describes the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) functions and the environments in which planning for and executing conventional joint military operations are conducted. JOPES applies to the development and implementation of operation plans and operation orders prepared in response to NCA or CJCS requirements. It specifies the policies, procedures, and formats to be used across the spectrum of deployment, employment, mobilization, and sustainment activities as applied to the members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). JOPES is applicable (as directed) across the operational continuum of peace, conflict, and war.

4. Basis. Joint Pub 5-03.1 is based on the following primary sources:

   
   
   c. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."
   
   
   e. Joint Test Pub 5-0, 26 July 1991, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations."
   
   f. Unified Command Plan.
   
   g. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
   
   h. CJCS MOP 7, 30 January 1990, "Joint Strategic Planning System."
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This chapter provides an overview of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and its use in the joint planning process. It describes the JOPES processes and the environments in which planning for and execution of conventional joint military operations are conducted.

2. Joint Planning Process. Joint operational planning is a coordinated process used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing the mission. In peacetime, the process is called deliberate planning. In crisis situations, it is called crisis action planning. Joint planning is conducted under JOPES policy, procedures, and automated data processing (ADP) support. Joint planning has its origins in four interrelated systems that affect the development of operation plans (OPLANs) and operation orders (OPORDs):


   b. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), which, through the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), generates Chairman’s Guidance, the National Military Strategy, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA), and other joint planning guidance.

   c. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), which generates the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), Program Objective Memorandums (POMs), Issue Books, Program Decision Memorandums (PDM), Budget Estimate Submission (BES), Program Budget Decision (PBD), and the Defense budget.

   d. JOPES, which is comprised of Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), Volume II (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance) with classified supplement, and Volume III (ADP Support).

3. JOPES Overview. JOPES is the integrated joint conventional command and control system used to support military operation monitoring, planning, and execution (including theater-level nuclear and chemical plans) activities. JOPES incorporates policies, procedures, personnel, and facilities by interfacing with ADP systems, reporting systems, and underlying Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) ADP support to provide senior-level decisionmakers and their staffs with enhanced capability to plan and conduct joint military operations. JOPES procedures and ADP systems are the mechanisms for submitting movement requirements to USTRANSCOM.
4. Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). JOPES provides support to and is used by decisionmakers and their staffs at all levels of the national structure for joint planning and execution. This structure is defined as the NCA and the JPEC. The JPEC includes the following:

a. National Level
   (1) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
   (2) Other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
   (3) Joint Staff.
   (4) Services.

b. Theater Level. Supported commands (including Service component commands, subunified commands, and joint task forces).

c. Supporting Organization Level
   (1) Supporting commands (including Service component commands and supporting combatant commands).
   (2) Defense agencies.
   (3) Non-DOD departments and agencies.
   (4) Allied commands and agencies.

5. JOPES Planning and Execution Methodology. JOPES supports the joint planning and execution process used during peacetime operations, exercises, hostilities other than war, and war. JOPES procedures provide for various levels of decisionmaking in deliberate and crisis action planning environments. JOPES includes five operational functions (threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, detailed planning, and implementation) governing both deliberate and crisis action planning processes. Together with the two JOPES supporting functions (simulation and analysis and monitoring), they form the JOPES methodology.

6. JOPES Procedural Principles

   a. Single Set of ADP Procedures. JOPES embodies a single set of ADP procedures that, combined with administrative policies and procedures, govern all aspects of conventional military operation planning and execution (including theater-level nuclear and chemical plans). This single, networked system ensures that all participants in all aspects of joint military planning and execution use the same vocabulary,
procedures, and joint ADP support, thus facilitating the transition from training to planning to effective military operations.

b. Use of Existing or Programmed Capabilities and Resources. JOPES planning is capabilities based. Military planners use the forces and resources specified for regional or global planning, as appropriate, in the JSCP, CJCS orders, Service capabilities documents, and approved operation plans or operation orders. Using the forces and resources apportioned for planning, the CINCs select those forces they intend to employ within their plans to complete the assigned task. The assessment of apportioned forces and sustainment against actual sourced forces and sustainment and risk may identify shortfalls. For contingencies without global implications, planners use the specific refined forces and resources detailed in JSCP for regional plans. For contingencies with global implications, the specific forces and resources made available to the supported command will be allocated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when necessary. Thus, planning in JOPES begins with a required force rapidly compared with specific actual forces, including combat, combat support, and combat service support, as well as resources that are as well defined as possible. Supporting commands and agencies, as well as the Services, confirm force and resource availability and actively source requirements during the planning process. During this stage in the planning process, personnel and logistic data are needed to assess force sustainability and transportation feasibility more specifically. This involves coordination and cooperation with the supporting establishment of DOD agencies.

c. Shortfall Identification and Risk Analysis. JOPES contains specific procedures for the supported command to identify shortfalls between the planned requirement and the identified capability at various points in the planning process. The supported command then attempts to resolve shortfalls, conducts risk analysis if the shortfalls are not resolved, and redefines the CINC’s Strategic Concept if the resultant risk is too great.

d. Plans Maintenance. Completed and approved plans will be maintained and updated as changes occur. A new plan is required only when the threat, taskings, forces assigned, resources available, or concept of operations change to the extent the supported CINC and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff deem it necessary to develop a new plan. Otherwise, commanders and their staffs concentrate on keeping existing plans and orders up to date and executable. In support of the JOPES goal of developing and maintaining executable plans, commanders will use appropriate methods at their disposal to keep plans current and accurate, including plans maintenance conferences and teleconferences. The
TPFDD, which is Appendix 1 to Annex A of the OPLAN, is on a separate and distinct maintenance cycle and is discussed in Chapter 3, paragraph 8, TPFDD Maintenance.

7. JOPES Procedures, Guidance, and ADP Support. Procedures, guidance, and descriptions of ADP system support necessary to conduct joint operation planning and execution are contained in three JOPES volumes.

a. JOPES, Volume I (Joint Pub 5-03.1), "Planning Policies and Procedures," provides policy, guidance, and procedures for the development, coordination, dissemination, review, approval, and implementation of joint OPLANs and OPORDs. Volume I also contains standard formats and minimum content for Crisis Action Planning (CAP) procedures orders, letters, reports, and the CAP checklists.

b. JOPES, Volume I, Supplement (Joint Pub 5-03.11), "Executive Guidance and Procedures," sets forth principles, procedures, and guidance to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance and procedures for the exercise of authority by commanders of combatant commands and other joint force commanders of the US Armed Forces in preparing their respective detailed plans and orders and the execution thereof.

c. JOPES, Volume II (Joint Pub 5-03.2), "Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance," prescribes standard formats and minimum content for operation plans, concept summaries, annexes, appendixes, tabs, and exhibits. It is functionally oriented and provides directional, procedural, and planning guidance keyed to certain plan annexes. Formats for classified subjects and detailed functional area guidance are contained in the Supplement (classified) to JOPES, Volume II.

d. JOPES, Volume III (Joint Pub 5-03.3 pending), "Automated Data Processing Support," describes the standard computer-based ADP system that supports the planning and implementation of joint operations. It also describes the JOPES ADP application software, which provides automated assistance to the JPEC throughout the JOPES planning and execution process.

e. JOPES procedures to support exercises are contained in MCM-71-92, 21 May 1992, "The Joint Training Manual."
CHAPTER II

JOINT PLANNING PROCESS

1. Purpose. This chapter describes the interrelationships of the associated national-level systems for national security policy, military strategy, force and sustainment requirements, and plans and their impact on the joint planning process.

2. The National Security Council System. The NSC is the principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision. The NSC system provides the framework for establishing national strategy and policy objectives. The NSC develops policy options, considers implications, coordinates operational problems that require interdepartmental consideration, develops recommendations for the President, and monitors policy implementation. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharges a substantial part of the Chairman’s statutory responsibilities as the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense through the institutional channels of the NSC. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regularly attends NSC meetings and presents the Chairman’s views and those of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. The NSC prepares NSDs that, with Presidential approval, implement national security policy. These policy decisions provide the basis for both military planning and programming.

3. Role of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSPS is the primary formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, carries out statutory responsibilities required by title 10, USC, 6 April 1991, and further delineated in DOD 5100.1, 25 September 1987. The central process of the JSPS is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR). The JSR assesses the strategic environment for issues and factors that affect the National Military Strategy (NMS) in the near-term of the long-range. It is a process that continuously gathers information; examines current, emerging and future issues, threats, technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions; and reviews and assesses current strategy, forces, and national policy objectives. The JSR facilitates the integration of strategy, operational planning, and program assessment. When significant changes or factors in the strategic environment are identified, JSR Issue Papers will be presented to the Chairman, Chiefs of the Services, and CINCs. These papers will provide entering arguments for proposed changes to the NMS, Joint Planning Document (JPD), and/or Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and elicit Chairman’s Guidance for changing the military strategy if required. The four products of the JSPS are:
a. National Military Strategy. The NMS provides the advice of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as to the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain the national security objectives. The NMS is designed to assist the Secretary of Defense in the preparation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and to guide the development of the JSCP. Following Secretary of Defense review, the NMS is forwarded to the President. The NMS may be used to determine the CJCS position on matters of strategic importance for use in NCA-directed actions. The NMS also provides supporting documentation, through the DPG, to the Services for consideration during the development of their Department’s Program Objective Memoranda (POMs).

b. Joint Planning Document. The JPD supports the NMS by providing concise programming priorities, requirements, or advice to the Secretary of Defense for consideration during preparation of the DPG. Published as stand-alone documents addressing specific functional areas, the JPD volumes are coordinated and collaborated with the Service Chiefs and CINCs and serve as a conduit for input to the DPG.

c. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JSCP provides guidance to the CINCs and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions resources to CINCs, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the NCA.

d. Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). The CPA assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in fulfilling his responsibility to provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on how well the POMs conform to established priorities. The CPA provides assistance to the Secretary in decisions concerning the defense program subsequent to receipt of the POMs. The CPA summarizes the views of the Chairman on the balance and capabilities of the POM force and the support levels required to attain US national security objectives.

The JSPS is a flexible and interactive system intended to provide supporting military advice to the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and strategic guidance for use in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The JSPS provides the means for the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, to review the national security environment and US national security objectives; evaluate the threat; assess current strategy and
existing or proposed programs and budgets; and propose military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve those national security objectives in a resource-limited environment consistent with policies and priorities established by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The JSPS is also a formal means by which the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs carry out some of their statutory responsibilities. Therefore, the JSPS process must establish the opportunity for their timely and substantive participation in the development of every JSPS document. As programs are developed and resources allocated, the JSPS products and JSPS-related documents provide a means to evaluate capabilities and to assess the adequacy and risk associated with the programs and budgets of the Military Departments and Defense agencies and, where appropriate, propose changes to those programs and budgets in conformity with strategic priorities. Figure 1 illustrates the various JSPS products and JSPS-related document interfaces.

4. JSPS Plans and Documents. The JSPS comprises plans and documents that are described in MOP 7, as revised, and will not be superseded by other documents without the express approval of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. JSPS-Related Assessments. In addition to the JSPS plans and documents included in MOP 7, assessments are performed for the purpose of supporting those plans and documents. The following is a list of assessments that contain critical JSPS-related information and other key documents.

   a. The Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA). The JMNA is prepared by the Chairman in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs. It is submitted annually to the Secretary of Defense for approval and submission to Congress in conjunction with the submission of the Defense budget. The JMNA fulfills the Secretary of Defense’s statutory duty to submit to Congress an annual comprehensive net assessment of the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies compared with those of potential adversaries.

   b. Logistics Sustainability Analysis (LSA). The LSA of the OPLANs will be completed during the development or maintenance of the CINCs’ OPLANs. The LSA will be validated at least biennially to support planning and programming. The LSA represents the quantitative assessment of the CINC’s overall sustainment posture based on the logistics capabilities and specific limiting factors associated with the OPLAN. The supported CINC will consider LSA results during risk assessments and when preparing the IPL, and in conjunction with the Preparedness Evaluation System, the CINC’s
c. The Chairman’s Preparedness Assessment Report (PAR). The PAR evaluates the preparedness of the combatant commands to carry out assigned missions. The PAR advises the Secretary about critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities and logistics, both in terms of collective JSCP taskings and within major warfare and functional areas. Primary inputs are the CINCs’ CSPARS.

d. The Chairman’s Contingency Capabilities Assessment (CCA). The CCA supports the Chairman in his statutory responsibility to assess the effects of the critical deficiencies identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans on national security objectives, policy, and strategic plans.

e. The Defense Planning Guidance. The DPG furnishes the Secretary of Defense’s programming and fiscal guidance to the Military Departments for development of Department POMs for the defense planning period. The DPG includes major planning issues and decisions, strategy and policy, strategic elements, the Secretary’s program planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate, the Illustrative Planning Scenarios, and a series of studies. The DPG is a major link between the JSPS and the PPBS.

f. The Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG fulfills the Secretary of Defense’s statutory duty to provide annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff written policy guidance for contingency planning. The Secretary provides this guidance with the approval of the President after coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CPG focuses the guidance provided in the NMS and DPG and directly impacts on the JSCP.

6. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The PPBS is a third major national-level system related to the operation planning and execution process. The DOD military strategy formulation and resource management system develops and integrates defense policy, military strategy, Service programs, and the DOD budget. This system’s ultimate objective is the acquisition and allocation of resources to meet the warfighting needs of the combatant commanders. The PPBS, in conjunction with the JSPS, is used to define national military strategy and recommended forces and translate them into budgetary requirements to be presented to Congress. The PPBS encompasses three phases:
a. Planning. The planning phase of the PPBS defines the national policy, military strategy, and fiscally constrained force requirements to support the national defense. In response to guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense regarding projected budget levels and national security objectives, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, uses the JSPS to develop national military objectives, strategy, recommended forces, options, assessments, and evaluation of risk for the President’s consideration. Following review by the Secretary of Defense, the President considers the CJCS recommendations and makes his strategy and option decision, which is then incorporated in the development of the DPG. The DPG is developed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in close coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, and others. The final DPG is reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, the combatant commanders, and other members of the Defense Planning Resources Board (DPRB) before being forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for decision and publication. The DPG is the link between planning and programming as it furnishes the Secretary’s planning guidance and fiscal constraints to the Military Departments, the Defense agencies, and USSOCOM for the development of their POMs.

b. Programming. The programming phase of the PPBS focuses on the development of POMs and the integration of those POMs into a coherent defense program to support the warfighting requirements of the combatant commanders. With the exception of USSOCOM’s SO-peculiar requirements, the combatant commanders provide their requirements to the Services through their components and identify their highest priority needs to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by means of an integrated priority list (IPL). The Military Departments, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM develop their POMs based on the combatant command requirements and strategic concepts and guidance contained in the DPG. The POMs express the Services’ total requirements and include assessments of risk, as well as descriptions of how well the POMs support the requirements of the combatant commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses the overall balance and adequacy of the composite POM force and support levels in view of approved strategy and the requirements of the combatant commanders and documents his assessment in the CPA. In a coordinated effort, program issues are identified by the combatant commanders and DPRB members and are resolved by the DPRB. The results are promulgated in the Secretary’s PDM. The PDM is the link between programming and budgeting.
c. Budgeting. The final phase of the PPBS is budgeting. Once the PDMs are received, budget estimates are prepared by each of the Military Departments, the Defense agencies, and USSOCOM and submitted to the Secretary of Defense. The Defense budget is reviewed by OSD and OMB to ensure that it is consistent with the fiscal guidance. Changes to the budget are documented in PBDs. During this final phase of budgeting, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services, and the combatant commanders assess the impact of PBDs on warfighting capabilities. Their concerns are presented to the Secretary of Defense. Final changes are incorporated with previous PBDs to establish the DOD portion of the President’s budget, which is submitted to Congress for funding. When the President signs the congressional appropriations act into law, the Services, Defense agencies, and USSOCOM execute the budget, forces and capabilities are procured, and the next JSCP is prepared for CJCS approval.

7. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. Joint operation planning is performed in accordance with policies and procedures established in a formal DOD-directed, CJCS-selected system: JOPES. JOPES is the approved system for conventional operation planning and execution. JOPES includes policies, procedures, reporting structures, and personnel supported by C4 systems. JOPES supports and integrates joint operation planning activities at the national, theater, and supporting command levels and interrelates with three other national systems: the NSCS, JSPS, and PPBS. JOPES is the principal system within the Department of Defense for translating policy decisions into OPLANs and OPORDs in support of national security objectives. It also provides joint operation requirements to the PPBS for use in making national resource decisions that affect the PPBS and the JSPS. JOPES is a dynamic system that is evolving through the incremental integration and enhancement of two earlier systems: JOPS and JDS. As JOPES evolves, JOPS and JDS will merge and disappear within the improved capabilities of JOPES. JOPES will be the mechanism for providing movement requirements to USTRANSCOM for contingencies and all CINC or CJCS-sponsored exercises as directed by CM-1427-92, CJCS approval of VCJCS 21 August 1992 memorandum, "Strengthening Department of Defense Transportation Functions."

8. JOPES Functions. JOPES consists of seven interrelated functions that provide a framework for joint military planning and execution. Figure II-1 depicts the five operational functions and the two supporting functions. The operational functions are sequentially related, proceeding in a logical order from identification of a threat, to determination of strategy that counters the threat, to COA development, to detailed planning, and, finally, to actual implementation of military operations. The supporting functions, on the other hand, relate to all of the operational functions and have an impact on each.
a. JOPES Operational Functions. Figure II-2 displays the operational functions and identifies the major inputs and outputs of each.

(1) Threat Identification and Assessment. This function addresses procedures for describing threats to national security, continuously monitoring the international political and military environment so threats to national security can be detected and analyzed, alerting decisionmakers, and determining the specific nature of the threat. Defining enemy capabilities and intentions is emphasized using this function. All organizational levels are supported by this function during crisis action planning and execution.

(2) Strategy Determination. Using this function, the NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Staff formulate suitable and feasible military objectives to counter the threats. This function is used in formulating politico-military assessments, developing and evaluating military strategy and objectives, apportioning forces and other resources, formulating concepts and military options, and developing planning guidance leading to the preparation of COAs, OPLANs, and OPORDs. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategy guidance in light of the intelligence estimate and ends with issuance of either the JSCP in peacetime or a CJCS WARNING or PLANNING ORDER during crisis action planning situations.

(3) Course of Action Development. In COA development during peacetime, the supported command develops the CINC’s Strategic Concept based on Joint Staff and Service planning guidance and resource apportionment provided in the JSCP and Service documents. In crisis situations, the supported command develops COAs based on CJCS planning guidance and resource allocation from approved OPLANs and CJCS WARNING or ALERT ORDERS. Using this JOPES function coupled with the JOPES support function simulation and analysis, force, sustainment, and transportation feasibility are analyzed. The Services, through Service component commands, and supporting commands provide supportability estimates of the CINC's Strategic Concept or COAs to the supported command. Products from COA development include CINC’s Strategic Concept; CJCS-approved CONOPS; the Commander’s Estimate, including COAs; supportability estimates; and, time permitting, an integrated time-phased data base of notional combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) force requirements, with an estimate of required sustainment.
Figure II. JOPES Functions
Figure II-2. Functional Process Major Inputs and Outputs
(4) Detailed Planning. This function is used in developing a CONPLAN, OPLAN, or OPORD with supporting annexes and in determining preliminary movement feasibility. This function provides a detailed, fully integrated schedule of deployment, employment, mobilization, and sustainment activities based on the CJCS-approved CONOPS or COA. Detailed planning begins with CJCS guidance in the form of an approval for further planning in a peacetime environment or a CJCS ALERT or PLANNING ORDER in a crisis action planning situation and ends with a CJCS-approved OPLAN or NCA-approved OPORD.

(5) Implementation. This function provides decision-makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during the conduct of military operations. It encompasses the execution of military operations and provides procedures to issue OPORDs; conduct mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities; and adjust operations where required. The ability to monitor and compare actual with scheduled events is crucial to assessing mission accomplishment; controlling, directing, replanning, redirecting, or terminating operations; and conducting redeployment. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Implementation begins with the CJCS EXECUTE ORDER and usually ends with some type of replanning effort, such as redeployment or redirection of operations.

b. Supporting Functions. Two supporting functions identified in Figure II-1, monitoring and simulation and analysis, complement the operational functions to complete the conceptual framework of JOPES.

(1) Monitoring. This supporting function supports each of the other JOPES functions by obtaining current accurate information concerning the status of friendly, enemy, and neutral forces and resources in accomplishing mission tasks. Examples of information processed are objective accomplishment; consumption data; and the status of deployment, procurement, mobilization, forces, and facilities.

(2) Simulation and Analysis. This supporting function offers various automated techniques that enhance each of the other JOPES functions. Examples of simulation and analysis applications, when feasible, are force-on-force assessments (suitability); generation of force requirements; comparison of requirements to capabilities, such as consumption data; closure profiles (feasibility); and generation of mobilization and sustainment requirements based on need.
9. JOPES Planning Process. Joint operation planning and execution is a continuous, iterative process. It begins in response to perceived and identified threats to US security interests; continues through military option selection and COA, operation plan, and operation order development and implementation; and ends when the requirement for the plan is canceled, the operation is terminated, or the crisis is satisfactorily resolved. Figure II-3 shows the JOPES operational functions aligned with the deliberate and crisis action planning processes.
Figure II-3. JOPES Deliberate Planning Process and Crisis Action Planning Process Functional Alignment
CHAPTER III
DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

1. Purpose. This chapter describes the applicability of JOPES to deliberate planning, describes the deliberate planning process for operation plans, outlines responsibilities and recommended time requirements for the planning cycle, and provides guidance for resolving conflicts.

2. Applicability. JOPES applies to operation plans (except SIOP) prepared by CINCs in response to CJCS requirements. Operation plans are prepared in complete format (OPLANs) or in concept format (CONPLANs) as described below:

   a. OPLANs. An OPLAN is a complete and detailed joint plan and includes a full description of the concept of operations and all annexes applicable to the plan. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates for their movement into the theater. OPLANs can be quickly developed into an OPORD. OPLANs are normally prepared when:

      (1) The contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed prior planning.

      (2) Detailed planning will contribute to deterrence by demonstrating readiness through planning.

      (3) Detailed planning is required to support alliance or combined planning. OPLANs facilitate the transition to war and, through the development of supporting plans, establish the feasibility of the plan’s concept of operations.

   b. CONPLANs. A CONPLAN is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared.

   c. Functional Plans. Functional plans involve the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or nonhostile environment. Examples include plans for disaster relief, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of US citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations. Requirements for these plans
should be satisfied by command publications; e.g., USCINCEUR Reconstitution Plan, USCINCLANT Platform Protection SOP. Unless specifically directed, no requirement exists to submit these plans to the Joint Staff for review and CJCS approval, but information copies will be submitted to the Joint Staff, J-7, for internal Joint Staff distribution. Although the planning procedures and formats prescribed in JOPES, Volume II, are not mandatory for such plans, they may be useful.

3. Deliberate Planning Process for OPLANs

a. Deliberate planning is designed as a cyclic process during peacetime conditions and provides the JPEC an opportunity to develop and refine plans to be used in wartime. In its basic form, deliberate planning has five formal phases (see Figure III-1). These phases produce a family of plans (the supported commander’s plan, supporting plans, and plans designed for concurrent execution). Following the five formal deliberate planning phases, the family of plans is maintained. Although planning is essentially a sequential process, the need for concurrent, parallel, and detailed planning must be recognized by all concerned in the joint planning process.

b. Forces and sustainment requirements are developed by the supported commander and sourced by the Services, supporting commanders, and Defense agencies. The sourced forces and sustainment requiring common-user lift are time-phased by the supported CINC and scheduled for movement by USCINCTRANS. The supported commander prepares the various annexes that provide detailed guidance to supported command components and subordinate commanders. The supported commander is authorized to task supporting commands and DOD agencies to participate in the planning process to include submitting supporting plans, as required. The supported command may also request Joint Staff assistance in gaining planning support from agencies outside the Department of Defense. Supporting commands and agencies should be informed of support requirements as early as possible in the planning process. OPLANs must be thoroughly coordinated.

c. The format and content for an OPLAN are prescribed in Joint Pub 5-03.2, JOPES, Volume II.

4. Deliberate Planning Process for CONPLANs

a. The planning process for CONPLANs is the same as for OPLANs, except that the CONPLAN process normally omits the resource detail developed in the Plan Development Phase.
DELIBERATE PLANNING

THE PLANNING PROCESS

PHASE I INITIATION

- CINC RECEIVES PLANNING TASK FROM CJCS
- MAJOR FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING

PHASE II CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

- MISSION STATEMENT IS DEDUCED
- SUBORDINATE TASKS ARE DERIVED
- CINC’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT DEVELOPED

THE PRODUCT: A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

PHASE III PLAN DEVELOPMENT

- FORCES SELECTED AND TIME-PHASED
- SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS COMPUTED
- STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENTS SIMULATED/ANALYZED
- SHORTFALLS IDENTIFIED AND RESOLVED
- OPERATION PLAN COMPLETED

THE PRODUCT: A COMPLETE OPLAN

PHASE IV PLAN REVIEW

- OPLAN/CONPLAN REVIEWED & APPROVED BY CJCS
- CINC REVISES PLAN IAW REVIEW COMMENTS

THE PRODUCT: AN APPROVED PLAN

PHASE V SUPPORTING PLANS

- SUPPORTING PLANS PREPARED

Figure III-1. The Deliberate Planning Process
b. The format and content for a CONPLAN are prescribed in Joint Pub 5-03.2, JOPES, Volume II.

5. Planning Cycle Responsibilities and Time Requirements

a. JOPES uses a planning cycle that begins with publication of the JSCP and terminates at the end of the period to which the JSCP applies. An OPLAN is effective until canceled or superseded by another approved plan.

b. The Joint Staff, in the name of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, publishes the JSCP and the planning schedules and reviews OPLANS, CONPLANS, and Concept Summaries submitted by CINCs.

(1) JSCP provides guidance, assigns tasks, apportions major combat forces, and specifies items of materiel and lift assets available for planning.

(2) Following publication of the JSCP, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, will produce an initial planning schedule for the development of the operation plans and concept summaries tasked in the JSCP. The initial planning schedule will be disseminated by message and will set forth submission dates and dates for OPLAN refinement conferences. Throughout the planning cycle, updates will be published if dates are revised.

(3) Reviews of CINC’s Strategic Concepts, OPLANs, CONPLANS, and Concept Summaries are conducted in accordance with provisions of Chapter IV.

(4) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may implement the tasking contained in an OPLAN TPFDD before formal CJCS review of the OPLAN.

c. CINCs develop OPLANs, CONPLANS, and Concept Summaries in response to CJCS requirements, JSCP tasking, and self-determined contingencies; conduct reviews of their OPLANs and CONPLANS and make recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding their plans’ currency, revision, or rescission and submit the CINC’s Strategic Concepts, OPLANs, CONPLANS, and Concept Summaries to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

(1) Upon receipt and analysis of JSCP taskings and planning guidance, supported commanders make the following planning determinations:

(a) New operation plans that require development.
(b) Existing operation plans that should be canceled (see subparagraph 5c(2) below).

(c) Existing operation plans that satisfy the JSCP requirements (see subparagraph 5c(3) below).

(d) Existing operation plans that require revision or further analysis.

(2) Supported commanders may request CJCS approval to cancel CJCS-approved operation plans, including operation plans related to tasks no longer appearing in the JSCP. If the plan is canceled, the supported commanders will retain the plan on file for 2 years. Upon expiration of the 2-year period, the record copy of the OPLAN (less Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) file) or CONPLAN specified as the permanent record will be retired to the applicable Federal Records Center. Records so retired will be marked with appropriate instructions to ensure their protection against improper release in accordance with CJCS MOP 60.

(3) If the requirement for an existing operation plan is not changed by the JSCP tasking, the supported commander should review the plan to determine whether it is still sufficient and can still pass the tests of acceptability, feasibility, adequacy, and consistency with joint doctrine. (See Chapter IV and the Glossary for discussion of these terms.) If the plan still sufficiently passes these tests, the tasking may be satisfied by a message to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating that the plan has been reviewed, analyzed, and can still meet the JSCP tasking. If the CJCS review results in concurrence, a CJCS message or memorandum will approve the plan for the appropriate JSCP period.

(4) In messages commenting on the initial planning schedule, supported commanders may include:

(a) Requests for cancellation (subparagraph 5c(2) above) and statements of sufficiency (subparagraph 5c(3) above). Such requests or statements eliminate the need to comment on planning calendar dates for affected operation plans.

(b) Other planning intentions, including recommendations to place selected major plans in a lengthened planning cycle or in plans maintenance.

(5) Supported commanders, in coordination with the Joint Staff; component, subordinate, and supporting commands;
the Services; and combat support agencies, will establish a schedule for plans maintenance for existing OPLANs.

6. Conflicting Guidance

a. CINCs who are also commanders of combined commands or who conduct coordinated planning on a bilateral or combined basis will report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff any conflicts between the guidance contained herein and directives received from international authorities or provisions of any plan established by international agreement.

b. The Chairman, US Section, Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee, will report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff any conflicts between plans developed by the committee and the guidance in this document.

c. If instructions in this document conflict with guidance previously issued by the Joint Staff, other than in the JSCP or that pertaining to bilateral or combined plans, the provisions herein will have precedence pending resolution of the conflict.

d. Guidance approved after the publication of this document that conflicts with provisions herein will be reflected as an immediate change by message or as a change in the next revision of this document.

7. Deliberate Planning Procedures. Procedures for deliberate planning are designed to assist the planning community in the timely, efficient development of OPLANs and to provide a consistent framework for the planning process. The deliberate planning process phases follow:

a. Phase I--Initiation. Initiation is the phase in which planning tasks are assigned, resources available for planning are identified, and the groundwork is laid for planning.

   (1) Task Assignment. In the JSCP, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasks the CINCs to develop operation plans and Concept Summaries. When such taskings are issued by message or other directive, they will normally be incorporated into the next edition of JSCP. The extent of CINCs’ planning is not limited by JSCP taskings. Each CINC has broad responsibilities assigned in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Joint Pub 0-2 and may prepare whatever plans are necessary to discharge those responsibilities. The CINC may decide to prepare an operation plan not required by JSCP that would task forces not apportioned to the affected theater. However, the CINC will submit the requirements for the plan to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval before preparing the plan.

(2) Resources. The Joint Staff and the Services identify resources and provide guidance to the supported commander. JSCP, other JSPS documents, joint doctrine, and Service planning documents provide the following: (a) strategic guidance and intelligence, (b) Service doctrine and guidance, (c) resources available for planning, and (d) priorities for accomplishing tasks.

(3) Review Previous Operations. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL), as well as the JULLS data base, should be queried early in the planning process and periodically thereafter to obtain specific practical lessons in all areas of planning and execution based on actual operation and exercise occurrences. A regular review of this information during plan development can alert planners to known pitfalls and to successful and innovative ideas.

b. Phase II--Concept Development. Concept development is the phase in which all factors that can significantly affect mission accomplishment are collected and analyzed, mission statement is deduced, subordinate tasks are derived, COAs are developed and analyzed, the best COA determined, and the CINC’s Strategic Concept developed and documented. The sequential steps in this phase are shown in Figure III-2.

(1) Mission Analysis. In this step, the supported commander’s analysis of the JSCP tasking results in a mission statement.

(2) Planning Guidance. This step has two major objectives:

(a) Provide the supported commander’s staff with enough preliminary guidance to allow work to begin on staff estimates. Representative information might include characteristics of the area of operations, enemy capabilities, the mission statement, assumptions, special weapons, political and psychological considerations, tentative COAs, and a planning schedule.

(b) Make the above information available to the subordinate and supporting commanders and other interested parties through either written directives along the lines of the planning directives illustrated in Appendix 1 to Annex P or a planning conference.
Figure III-2. Concept Development Phase
(3) Staff Estimates. The staff estimates developed in this step provide the foundation for the Commander’s Estimate and address the supportability of tentative COAs. Although written estimates are not mandatory, useful formats for key estimates are provided in Appendixes 2 through 6 to Annex P for use as needed. The following staff estimates may be considered: personnel, intelligence, operations, (including OPSEC and military deception) logistics, and C4 systems. The intelligence estimate requires special coordination. In addition to the normal consultation with supporting commanders and component commanders, early coordination with DIA for support provided by national intelligence resources is essential.

(4) Commander’s Estimate. The Commander’s Estimate summarizes the first three steps during concept development and produces the commander’s decision on a COA to be followed. A sample format is provided in Appendix 6 to Annex P.

(5) CINC’s Strategic Concept. During this step of the concept development phase, the supported commander prepares a Strategic Concept, which is an expansion of the selected COA, as a narrative statement of how to conduct operations to accomplish the mission. The supported commander may convene a concept development conference involving representatives of subordinate and supporting commands, the Services, Joint Staff, and other interested parties.

(6) CJCS Concept Review. The CINC will forward the Strategic Concept, in the format contained in JOPES, Volume II, Chapter III, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval (see Chapter IV). Once approved for further planning by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINC’s Strategic Concept becomes the concept of operations for the plan. For a CONPLAN, concept review procedures are the same as for an OPLAN. For OPLANS and CONPLANS, this concept of operations will ultimately be used in paragraph 3 (Execution) of the Basic Plan. The concept of operations is the cornerstone upon which all detailed planning is based. A detailed description of the concept of operations will be included in Annex C to the plan.

c. Phase III--Plan Development

(1) Plan development is the phase in which the basic OPLAN or CONPLAN and supporting annexes are prepared. Upon receipt of the CJCS-approved concept of operations, the supported commander prepares the OPLAN or CONPLAN in
the format prescribed in JOPES, Volume II, and submits it to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for formal review and approval (see Chapter IV). During this phase, (a) the supported commander publishes guidance in a Letter of Instruction (LOI); (b) the force list is structured; (c) the non-unit-related materiel, non-unit-related personnel, NEO and medical evacuees, EPWs, retrograde cargo, and transportation requirements are determined; (d) the nuclear, civil engineering, and medical support planning is conducted; (e) the TPFDD file is developed; (f) shortfalls are identified; (g) transportation feasibility is determined; and (h) all the elements of the plan are documented for TPFDD refinement and preparation of the plan for submission to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. For clarity, the process of plan development will be described according to the sequential steps shown in Figure III-3; in actual circumstances, these steps may overlap, be accomplished simultaneously, or be repeated.

(2) At the beginning of the Plan Development Phase, the supported commander publishes an LOI. The purpose of the LOI is to provide specific guidance to the CINC’s component commanders and supporting commands and agencies on how to develop the plan. The LOI should be coordinated with affected organizations (e.g., USTRANSCOM, DLA) prior to publication to ensure that the planning guidance is current. As a minimum, the LOI should address the following: unit line number (ULN), cargo increment number (CIN), and personnel increment number (PIN) designators and format force requirement numbers (FRNs) for forces and their accompanying supplies and CINs and/or PINs for non-unit-related supplies (resupply and personnel; force module designators and format (FRNs, CINs, and PINs); priority of air and sea movement for major units; apportionment of airlift and Sealift capability between Service components and resupply; standard resupply EAD-LAD windows; specific guidance for the planning factors file; resupply record aggregation guidance; retrograde, chemical, and nuclear TPFDD guidance; attrition planning factors; standard ports of embarkation (POEs) and ports of debarkation (PODs) for forces and channels and resupply; CINC’s Required Delivery Date (CRDD); and key planning time lines or milestones and TPFDD points of contact for the supported and supporting CINCs’ staffs. The LOI should contain the supported commander’s classification and OPSEC planning guidance.

(3) Force Modules. Force modules are a planning and execution tool that provides a means of logically grouping records, which facilitates planning, analysis,
and monitoring. Force modules may include both forces and sustainment. There are three types of force modules.

(a) Service or Supporting Command Force Module. Built by the Service or supporting command headquarters to represent the notional force structure of a given major unit. The Service Force Module contains combat force(s), CS, CSS, and sustainment for a minimum of 30 days. The Service Force Modules
contain type units and an estimate of accompanying supplies and non-unit-related sustainment materiel required to support the unit. Current sustainment in Service Force Modules is developed by a combination of hand-generated data and computer-generated data based on Service-developed sustainment factors and will be used to determine gross transportation feasibility. The Service Force Module is designed to be a basic building block to aid the planner in both deliberate and crisis action planning. A basic library of Service force modules is maintained by the Services in the JOPES data base. This library will be revised or updated by the Services as necessary on a quarterly basis within 30 days after the release of each quarterly TUCHA. The plan identification number for this library will be the appropriate fiscal year plus the letters "FM"; e.g., 088FM. The change field will be used to indicate quarterly updates. CINCs should modularize force modules based on CINC needs and make recommendations to the Services and the Joint Staff.

(b) OPLAN-Dependent Force Module. OPLAN-Dependent Force Modules are force modules that have been modified or developed by supported CINC or Service components to respond to a specific planning task, such as flexible deterrent options or OPLAN Force Module Packages (FMPs).

(c) Force Tracking Force Module. This force module is OPLAN dependent and does not contain sustainment data. Force Tracking Force Modules, as a minimum, will consist of major Service combat units and are required for all OPLANS. See subparagraph 7c(4)(b)7 below for specific guidance.

(4) Force Planning. Force planning is the first step in the Plan Development Phase (see Figure III-3). It is the product of mission analysis and intelligence assessment with its foundation in the supported commander’s concept of operations. Force planning is based on CJCS and Service guidance and doctrine. Force planning consists of force requirements determination, force list development and refinement in light of force availability, and force shortfall identification and resolution or risk analysis of unresolved shortfalls. Force planning is the step in which the Service component commanders time phase their force lists to sequence the arrival of forces in accordance with the visualized concept of operations. This step includes determination of mode and source of transportation, POE, en route delays, POD, proposed
earliest and latest arrival dates with priorities, required delivery dates, CINC’s required delivery date, and destinations.

(a) Forces for Operation Planning

1. Major combat forces apportioned to CINCs for operation planning are designated in the JSCP. Other forces available for planning are listed in certain JSCP annexes and Service documents. Each Service, through the Service component commanders, apportions to the CINCs support forces of all types and combat units not included in the JSCP that are available for planning.

2. The forces specified in operation plans will be those projected to be actually available during the JSCP period at the level of mobilization specified for planning. They will not normally exceed:

   a. Those major combat forces and other combat and support forces apportioned in pertinent sections or annexes of JSCP.

   b. Combat and support forces apportioned by each Service, through its component commanders, as being available for planning in accordance with JSCP or Service planning documents.

3. In cases where forces designated for employment require detailed task organization identification (e.g., airborne, amphibious operations) but no explicit objective has been assigned, subordinate and supporting commanders will specify representative forces for associated force planning.

(b) TPFDD Force Data

1. The force data in the TPFDD file will include assigned, augmentation, and supporting forces to be deployed to the area of operations and forces stationed within the area of operations. For global and regional plans, a complete TPFDD file will be built and fully sourced to the limit of the actual resources available, normally 90 days. The forces and

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resources will be refined during TPFDD refinement conferences. This refined portion of the TPFDD will be submitted as Appendix 1 to Annex A of the OPLAN. After the TPFDD becomes effective for execution planning with the CJCS approval of the OPLAN, the TPFDD will be updated via TPFDD maintenance procedures outlined in paragraph 8. The length of TPFDD files for some regional OPLANs may be less than 90 days. Specific length will be determined by the supported commander in coordination with the Joint Staff.

2. Individual force requirements in the TPFDD file will be listed at the highest practicable unit level. For instance, a battalion-sized unit consisting of a headquarters (HQ) and subordinate units moving from the same origin through the same POE to the same POD and destination within a narrow timeframe (3 to 5 days) will be shown as a single unit as opposed to being split into its component parts.

3. A unit requiring both airlift and sealift modes of transportation from POE to POD will be split into two force records. A unit requiring two or more transportation sources will be fragmented into two or more force records to ensure proper scheduling, manifesting, and tracking in JOPES. The Service component commanders and individual force requirements in the TPFDD should be listed at the highest practicable unit level. Representatives of the supported command, Service components (for in-place forces), and supporting commands will provide planning information concerning unit origin and date ready to load at origin. This information may be made available in accordance with Service guidance and procedures. Coordination between the Service components of supported and supporting commands is encouraged.

4. CINC desires for arrival priority of units in theater are expressed for airlift and sealift as follows:

   a. For airlift requirements, use of the priority codes is required and will be used according to the following:
1. Major unit (or group of units) priorities are established in the CINC’s LOI and in the JOPES TPFDD containing a priority code that delineates preferred order of arrival by latest arrival date at POD (LAD) at an aerial port of debarkation (APOD). These two items must be consistent in their application.

2. A unit in a TPFDD file will normally not have its LAD earlier than the LAD of a higher priority unit.

3. RLD, ALD, and EAD will reflect real limitations. Where no limitations exist, the EAD should be the same as the ALD to provide maximum flexibility in strategic lift.

b. For sealift requirements, priority can be expressed solely by the assigned EAD-LAD window. CINCs are cautioned that the period of time two or more units’ EAD-LAD windows overlap equates to equal priority for those units during the overlapped period. CINC designation of sealift EADs should be as flexible as possible to allow greatest capability to deliver cargo by the LAD. EAD should be input to the TPFDD as the ALD plus 1 day whenever possible.

5. When a new type of unit data file (TUCHA) is networked, supported commanders’ Service components will use the latest release of TUCHA to update their TPFDD files as necessary.

6. As a minimum, when actual unit designations are not available, force requirements will be expressed as either standard type units as described in the TUCHA file or nonstandard units described in accordance with JOPESREP. Supported commanders are responsible for allocating force requirement numbers (FRNs) in accordance with Joint Staff guidance. No duplication of FRNs can occur within a family of plans under a supported commander’s control (exception--redeploying forces).

7. All TPFDD files will organize forces, as appropriate, into force tracking force modules.
and/or force module packages. These force modules are valuable aids to commands in the review, modification, and evaluation of OPLANs for both deliberate planning and execution. These force tracking force modules will be listed in the major forces section of the OPLAN description and contain force module identifier (FMID), unit name, required delivery date (RDD), destination, and number and type of aircraft. Force tracking force modules need not include sustainment. Each supported command’s TPFDD file will contain the following force modules.

a. Force modules made up of major combat forces apportioned in JSCP. These forces are defined as follows:

(1) Army. Division, Separate Brigade, Armored Cavalry Regiment. (Army units with reserve roundout elements will create three force modules: one for the entire division, one for the Active forces, and one for the Reserve forces.)

(2) Air Force. Combat Squadrons, including their sortie and sortie generation support.


(4) Marine Corps. Marine Expeditionary Force, Marine Expeditionary Brigades, Separate Marine Expeditionary Units, Air Contingency Forces.

(5) Special Operations Forces. Army, Navy, and Air Force special operations forces with organic support units.

b. Deterrent options in support of the OPLANs as reflected in JSCP.

c. Excursions (losing forces) or employment options requiring common-user lift.

d. Other force modules created at the discretion of the supported CINC.
(5) Support Planning

(a) Support planning consists of determining the materiel and personnel requirements and priority of delivery to sustain forces in combat to accomplish the JSCP planning tasks. Included are computations of support requirements based on force activity, Service planning guidance, inter-service and allied support requirements, and the time-phasing of this support in accordance with the supported commander’s overall concept of operations. Appropriate DOD agencies and General Services Administration (GSA) will provide the Services with planning information concerning origin and availability of non-Service-controlled materiel. The Services, in coordination with the supported commander, will develop consumption rates for the OPLAN force for use in establishing nonunit requirements. Consumption rates should be in line item detail and related directly to the forces during the life of the OPLAN. Non-unit-related sustainment, reported in CINs and PINs, reflects the need for common-user lift. A principal product of support planning is the development of the appropriate annexes to the plan. For example, the principal product of command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems planning is the development of Annex K to the plan, with emphasis placed on identifying critical circuit requirements, assessing the need for satellite access, and determining augmentation requirements. The supported commander consolidates subordinate component support requirements in order to time-phase resupply, replacements, and fillers into the area of operations. These data are added to the TPFDD file as CINs and PINs and are used to assess logistic and transportation feasibility.

(b) The materiel portion of Service Force Modules currently represents only requirements and should not be construed as a statement of capability to fill those requirements.

(6) Nuclear Planning. Time-phased nuclear requirements will be developed as force records in a stand-alone TPFDD file.

(7) Transportation Planning. Transportation planning is conducted by the supported commander to resolve gross feasibility questions (e.g., time phasing) impacting strategic movement and embraces those aspects of plan development that involve the movement and reception of
personnel, materiel, and equipment from POEs to PODs. In
transportation planning, the supported commanders will use the
organic lift and nonorganic, common-user strategic lift
resources made available for planning by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Annex J (Mobility) to the JSCP) for
each planning task. If additional resources are required, the
supported commander will identify the additional strategic
lift requirements and provide rationale for those
requirements.

(a) Competing requirements for limited strategic lift
resources, mobility support facilities, and intratheater
transportation assets must be assessed in terms of impact
on mission accomplishment. Priorities must be
established by the supported commander and, in light of
both movement constraints and the concept of operations,
a movement plan must be prepared.

(b) The plan will consider en route staging locations
and the ability of the locations to support the scheduled
activity. Although the TPFDD file will only accommodate
one intermediate location for each ULN, supported
commanders will ensure that all en route locations are
identified in the OPLAN. This information, with an
estimate of required site augmentation, will be
communicated to appropriate supporting commanders.

(c) EAD-LAD windows will reflect real limitations.
Where no limitations exist for airlift requirements, the
EAD will be the same as the available-to-load date (ALD)
to provide maximum flexibility in strategic lift. Where
no limitations exist for sealift requirements, the
guidance expressed in paragraph 7c(4)(b)4b should be
followed.

(d) The process for identifying the POD and refining the
POE data is as follows:

1. The supported commander submits the TPFDD file
with CINC-assigned POD.

2. USTRANSCOM identifies preferred POE to the
Services.

3. Services source the forces, taking into
consideration the CINC-assigned POD and the
USTRANSCOM-preferred POE, and identify any support
problems to the supported command through the
supported Service component.
4. Supported commander, supporting commanders, and the Services reconcile their differences (if any) when an agency deviates from the CINC’s guidance and the deviation is challenged by the supported commander. Irreconcilable differences will be referred to the Joint Staff for resolution.

5. USTRANSCOM flows the TPFDD file and prepares movement tables.

6. After coordinated review of movement tables by supported CINC and USTRANSCOM, JOPES Module T41 may be used to incorporate approved changes to POEs and feasible arrival dates (FADs) into the TPFDD.

(8) NEO Planning. The supported commander develops time-phased noncombatant evacuation requirements in coordination with the Department of State and USCINCSNTRANS. These requirements are entered into the OPLAN TPFDD or into the retrograde TPFDD, if a separate TPFDD for retrograde has been developed.

(9) Shortfall Identification. The supported commander should continually identify shortfalls throughout the planning process and, where possible, resolve them by early coordination and conference with Service component commanders and supporting commanders. If the supported commander cannot resolve shortfalls, these and other limiting factors, along with an assessment of the associated risk, will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution. Force and non-unit-related shortfalls will be submitted as a separate version of the TPFDD.

(a) To ensure that OPLANS and CONPLANS are valid capability plans, they will be based on current and projected resources (forces, support, non-unit-related cargo and personnel, and lift assets) and policy for medical evacuation in the JSCP-prescribed timeframe. The TPFDD submitted as Appendix 1 to Annex A to the OPLAN will be based on this guidance. The supported commander will notify the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when the commander determines that the resources made available for planning by JSCP or the Services are inadequate to accomplish an assigned task or that serious limiting factors exist. The notification will include:
1. A list of specific force, movement, and non-unit-related cargo and personnel shortfalls and other critical limiting factors and how these shortfalls affect mission accomplishment.

2. An estimate of the added risk incurred because of force, movement, and support shortfalls and limiting factors.

3. An estimate of the threat level for which available force and non-unit-related personnel and cargo capabilities are considered adequate.

4. If appropriate, recommended changes in missions and/or tasks.

(b) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of the Services consider shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the supported commander and coordinate resolution. However, within the limitations imposed by projected capabilities in the JSCP timeframe, completion of an operation plan will not be delayed pending the resolution of a shortfall or limiting factor. Paragraph 10 of the Plan Summary will contain a consolidated list and impact assessment of the limiting factors and shortfalls that have not been resolved by options listed below. The impact assessment should specify the missions and/or tasks that cannot be accomplished because of the shortfalls. The supportability of the CINC’s concept of operations should also be considered.

(c) The supported commander may convene a plan development conference to develop initial closure profiles and feasibility assessments to determine if the closure of forces is adequate to meet the proposed concept of operations and if the planning is valid. Coordination among all commands and agencies concerned is essential to make the detailed adjustments necessary to resolve shortfalls or limiting factors. Supporting commands and agencies, particularly USTRANSCOM, will ensure that adequate support is provided for plan development conferences. A wide range of options is available to the supported commander to resolve outstanding shortfalls before reporting them to the Joint Staff for resolution. They include:

1. Refining priorities.

2. Adjusting POEs, PODs, routing, and timing.
3. Changing lift mode and/or source.
4. Adjusting pre-positioned forces or resources.
5. Enhancing preparedness with base development.
6. Seeking additional assets.
7. Redefining the concept of operations.
8. Concluding contractual agreements or inter--Service support agreements.
9. Arranging for host nation support (HNS) where feasible.
10. Employing combinations of above.

(10) Transportation Feasibility Analysis. The supported commander conducts a gross transportation feasibility analysis during a plan development conference or before submitting the TPFDD for refinement.

(11) TPFDD Refinement. For both regional and global OPLAN development, the TPFDD refinement process consists of several discrete steps that may be conducted sequentially or concurrently, in whole or in part. These steps support the other elements of the Plan Development Phase (Figure III-3)--Forces Planning, Support Planning, Transportation Planning, and Shortfall Identification--and are collectively referred to as TPFDD refinement. The normal TPFDD refinement process consists of sequentially refining forces (to include nonunit personnel), logistics (to include both accompanying supplies and nonunit resupply), and transportation data to develop a TPFDD file that supports a feasible and adequate OPLAN. Data base size and time constraints may cause overlapping of several refinement phases. The TPFDD file for regional plans will normally be refined using two refinement conferences, a combined Forces and Logistics Conference, and a Transportation Conference. The TPFDD files for global planning will normally be refined at three separate conferences (Forces, Logistics, and Transportation Conferences) because of the number of plans undergoing concurrent refinement to meet a common planning task. Refinement conferences may be combined together or omitted as required to allow for the best refinement of a single OPLAN or a family of OPLANs established for a common planning task. For regional plans, the decision
is made by the supported commander in coordination with the Joint Staff and USTRANSCOM. For global planning, the decision will be made by the Joint Staff in coordination with the combatant commands. Regional planning conferences are conducted by the supported commander in conjunction with USTRANSCOM and in coordination with the Joint Staff. For global planning, refinement conferences are conducted by the Joint Staff in conjunction with USTRANSCOM.

(a) Forces refinement is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, Services, the Joint Staff, and other supporting agencies. USCINTRANS will normally host forces refinement conferences at the request of the supported commander. The purpose of forces refinement is to confirm that forces are sourced and tailored within JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance and to assess the adequacy of CS and CSS force apportionment and resolve shortfalls. USTRANSCOM provides sealift and airlift capability estimates based on lift apportionment throughout the process to ensure transportation feasibility.

1. Prior to any forces refinement conference, supported commanders will update force lists against the latest TUCHA file.

2. Movement requirements to compensate for shortfalls of pre-positioned equipment will be provided to the supported commander by the appropriate Service component command before any forces refinement conference.

3. Prior to any forces refinement conference, the Services will ensure the Logistic Factors file and the Civil Engineering Support Planning files reflect current data. The TUCHA file will be updated quarterly in accordance with Joint Pub 1-03.29 to reflect current force structure and data.

4. Prior to any forces refinement conference, the Services will ensure that the latest quarterly update of the Service Force Module library has been completed.

5. Forces TPFDD files will be sourced by Service sourcing agencies at least 30 days (or as specified in coordinating instructions) prior to a forces refinement conference.
JNOCC/Joint Staff/J-3, CSOD, as functional data base manager, will monitor and facilitate the transfer of data, as required.

(b) Logistic refinement is primarily conducted by the Service sourcing agencies, DLA, and CINC components under the overall direction of the Joint Staff and/or the supported commander. USCINCTRANS will normally host logistic refinement conferences for the Joint Staff and the supported commander. The purpose of logistic refinement is to confirm sourcing of logistic requirements in accordance with JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance and to assess (by the Joint Staff and the supported commander) the adequacy of resources provided by support planning, including complete medical and civil engineering planning.

1. The logistic community will begin refinement of the TPFDD with a completely sourced and adequate force list TPFDD provided by the supported commander.

2. Prior to logistic refinement conferences, the CINCs, Services, and Defense agencies involved will develop and/or source facilities and materiel support requirements.

3. Prior to the start of the logistic phase, Services and supported commanders will ensure that the appropriate planning factors are mutually agreeable and used throughout the logistic refinement process.

4. During logistic refinement conferences, the CINCs, Services, and Defense agencies involved will resolve problems related to unit and non-unit-related personnel, cargo, retrograde, medical evacuee, and resupply records including shortfalls.

5. Prior to convening a logistic refinement conference, USCINCTRANS will assess initial common-user transportation feasibility in coordination with the supported commander and the Joint Staff and provide the results to conference participants. At the conclusion of a logistic refinement conference, USCINCTRANS will reassess transportation feasibility for the supported commander to ensure the TPFDD is ready for TCC flow.

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Transportation refinement is conducted by USCINTRANS in coordination with the Joint Staff, Services, and supported and supporting commands. USCINTRANS will normally host transportation refinement conferences. The purpose of transportation refinement is to adjust the flow of OPLANs to ensure they are transportation feasible and consistent with JSCP, Joint Staff, and Service guidance.

1. Transportation refinement will begin with the supported commander providing a sourced TPFDD file to USCINTRANS for transportation flow.

2. During the transportation conference, participants will resolve transportation-related problems, as well as coordinate combined transportation requirements and shortfalls. Movement tables will be provided and the supported commander will determine if the closure profile is consistent with the concept of operations.

3. At the completion of a transportation refinement conference, the refined TPFDD will be maintained in the JOPES data base.

Upon completion of force and logistic TPFDD refinement (normally at the conclusion of the combined Forces and Logistic Conference for regional plans and at the conclusion of the Logistic Conference for global plans), USTRANSCOM will assess the gross transportation feasibility of the OPLAN. If grossly transportation feasible at that stage, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the supported commander, may deem the OPLAN "effective for planning." The term "effective for planning" recognizes that the work to date is valid and current and could be used for execution prior to submission of the final OPLAN for CJCS approval. Designation is predicated on the fact that the CINC’s Strategic Concept for the plan has received CJCS approval, current forces have been sourced and approved, sustainment requirements have been generated, and the gross transportation feasibility check indicated the plan was transportation feasible.

Refinement guidance for regional plans will be published by the supported commanders in their
TPFDD LOI prepared during the initial stage of the Plan Development Phase. General refinement guidance regarding global plans may be published for specific OPLANs or families of OPLANs, as required, to meet current conditions or resolve particular problems. Normally, such guidance will be issued by the Joint Staff, although USCINTRANS may issue guidance in coordination with the Joint Staff for the areas of data base construction, data base accuracy, and data transfer and update.

1. To enhance the flexibility and utility of the JOPES data base, the TPFDD will be intensively managed and updated to ensure data base accuracy for ready conversion to an OPORD. This intensive management will include scheduled replacement of UICs that are changed or deactivated, TUCHA and other standard reference files updates, and updates of force lists based on JSCP changes to Service force structures.

2. Normally, refinement conferences will be attended by representatives of the supported commander, supporting commanders, the Joint Staff, Services, Defense agencies, and components.

3. Completed TPFDD files will normally be made available to refinement participants through Joint Staff JNOCC/J-36/CSOD 30 days prior to refinement conferences. Medical working files, personnel working files, planning factors files, ports of support files, unit consumption factors files, and TFE output control files will be submitted with the TPFDD file.

4. The supported commander certifies that the TPFDD file is ready for refinement.

(12) Documentation. Concurrent with TPFDD refinement, the supported commander:

(a) Prepares the basic OPLAN and all required annexes in the format prescribed in Joint Pub 5-03.2, JOPES, Volume II.

(b) Produces an updated TPFDD file including an update against the most recent TUCHA file.
c. Coordinates with the JNOCC for networking of the TPFDD in JOPES to be available to the JPEC for review.


d. Phase IV--Plan Review. In this phase, all elements of the OPLAN, CONPLAN, and Concept Summary are assessed and validated. The Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services and appropriate Defense agencies, reviews OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Concept Summaries in accordance with the procedures in Chapter IV.

e. Phase V--Supporting Plans. In this final phase, all required supporting plans are completed, documented, and validated. Supporting plans, when required by the supported commander, will be submitted by the supporting command or agency to the supported commander within 60 days after CJCS approval of the supported plan. Information in the supported plan need not be repeated in the supporting plan unless directed by the supported commander. In the absence of Joint Staff instructions to the contrary, the supported commander will review and approve supporting plans.

8. TPFDD Maintenance. The objective of TPFDD maintenance is to systematically and effectively incorporate required changes to TPFDD files in a standardized manner at defined intervals after the TPFDD becomes effective for execution. By performing TPFDD maintenance at standard intervals, the supported commander's TPFDD remains a viable data base that is as up to date as possible throughout the JSCP effective period. Keeping the TPFDD viable will support a smooth transition to the next JSCP period and potentially save valuable time should execution planning be directed during a crisis. Supported CINCs will ensure TPFDD changes are loaded at scheduled intervals coordinated and published by the Joint Staff, J-7. The Joint Staff JNOCC will monitor the update process and report problems and noncompliance to the Joint Staff, J-7.

9. JOPES Standard Reference File Maintenance. New releases of JOPES standard reference files (TUCHA, Standard Specified Geographic Location File (GEOFILE), etc.) will be loaded at each site within 30 days after Joint Staff release. TPFDD files will be updated at specified intervals using the latest release of standard reference file data. DSSO will monitor the update of the standard reference files and report problems and noncompliance to the Joint Staff JNOCC.

10. Changes to Operation Plans

   a. The supported commander may publish changes to operation plans for several reasons:
(1) As a result of the CINC's review.

(a) If there is a significant change to an OPLAN concept, the plan will be submitted for Joint Staff concept review before proceeding with TPFDD refinement.

(b) If there are only TPFDD changes or relatively minor changes to the Basic Plan and these do not require a Joint Staff concept review, the changed OPLAN will be submitted, as with CONPLANs, for final CJCS plan review and approval.

(2) To rapidly incorporate new information into a plan, interim changes, clearly identified as proposed, may be issued in message form. This procedure will be used only under urgent circumstances. All changes so issued will be followed by a formal change submitted within 30 days to the Joint Staff for review in accordance with the procedures outlined in Chapter IV. Routine updates for TPFDD maintenance that are accomplished by supported or supporting commanders to maintain currency are not considered to fall within the definition of changes as used in this chapter.

(3) In response to CJCS review comments (see Chapter IV).

b. An operation plan is assigned a new plan identification number (PID) each time a plan is published in its entirety (or rolled over to the next JSCP) by changing the two-digit fiscal year suffix. Its fiscal year suffix refers to the JSCP for which the plan is written (see Chapter I, Joint Pub 5-03.2, JOPES, Volume II, for a discussion of suffixes). Changes to such plans will be published as consecutively numbered changes starting with "1." A complete reprint of an OPLAN calls for a new PID and supersedes the old plan and all changes. Changes to the new plan will also be consecutive beginning with "1." Formats for changes are contained in the OPLAN formats, Joint Pub 5-03.2, JOPES, Volume II.
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CHAPTER IV

REVIEW OF OPERATION PLANS

1. Purpose. This chapter establishes responsibilities and procedures for the review and assessment of operation plans.

2. Sources of Plans Reviewed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews plans from the following sources:

   a. Operation plans submitted by the CINCs in response to JSCP requirements and other CJCS directives, including:
      
      (1) New operation plans.
      
      (2) Existing plans, as changed.
      
      (3) Existing plans recommended for cancellation (see subparagraph 5c(2), Chapter III).
      
      (4) Existing plans recommended for continuation (see subparagraph 5c(3), Chapter III).

   b. Bilateral military plans and planning studies in coordination with comparable authorities of the other nations.

   c. Military plans of international treaty organizations. These plans will be reviewed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when:
      
      (1) The US military representative to an international treaty organization requests guidance or comments from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a plan.
      
      (2) A Major NATO Command (MNC), or other NATO command authorized by a MNC, forwards a plan to the nations concerned for national comment.

   d. Other operation plans designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or specifically requested by the Chief of a Service or a CINC.

3. Responsibilities for CJCS Review. The Joint Staff will conduct and coordinate the plan review with the Services and appropriate Defense agencies.

4. Types of Review. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will conduct the following types of reviews:
a. Review of CINC’s Strategic Concept. This review is conducted at the conclusion of the Concept Development Phase of the deliberate planning process and is applicable to new operation plans or existing plans in which the concept has changed. The following procedures apply to concepts submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.

(1) Initiation of Review. Upon receipt of the Strategic Concept, the Joint Staff will determine if the concept is ready for review. The Strategic Concept must be in the appropriate format specified in JOPES, Volume II, and conform with JSCP guidance and joint doctrine. If the concept is not ready for review, the submitting headquarters will be notified by memorandum (or message).

(2) Review Responsibilities. The Joint Staff, Services, and Defense agencies will conduct independent reviews and submit comments within 30 days of referral. Comments by Joint Staff directorates and Defense agencies will be submitted to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), which has primary staff responsibility for conduct of the review. Service comments will be submitted to the Secretary, Joint Staff.

(3) Review Criteria. The concept review will determine whether the scope and concept of operations are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned; assess the validity of the assumptions; evaluate compliance with CJCS tasking, guidance, and consistency with joint doctrine; and evaluate acceptability in regards to expected costs and military and political supportability.

(4) Review Comments. Comments will be categorized as execution-critical, substantive, and administrative.

(a) Execution-critical comments are major deficiencies that impact negatively on the capability of the plan to meet the JSCP objective and may prevent execution of the plan as written. Examples include such items as failure to meet assigned tasks, deviations from joint policy, and major logistic shortfalls.

(b) Substantive comments are less significant deficiencies that include deviations from CJCS guidance, JOPES formatting, and/or significant errors involving the TPFDD. These deficiencies would not prevent execution of the plan.
(c) Administrative comments are comments offered for clarity, accuracy, and consistency. They include such items as outdated references, improper terminology, and minor errors.

(5) Review Provisions and Completion. Reviews will be processed under the provisions of CJCS MOP 9. The review should be completed within 60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if circumstances warrant.

(6) Review Results. Results of the review will be forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum (or message) stating that the concept is either:

(a) Approved for further plan development.

(b) Disapproved and requires significant changes prior to resubmission.

(7) Post-Review Actions. A formal change incorporating CJCS execution-critical comments will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff within 30 days of receipt of the review results. Substantive comments must be incorporated when the plan is submitted for review in its entirety. A supported commander that has substantial justification to request resolution on review comments should forward resolution recommendations in a memorandum to the Joint Staff proponent for the deliberate planning process, the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7).

b. Review of US Unilateral Plans. This review is conducted during the Plan Review Phase of the deliberate planning process and is applicable to all operation plans. It is a formal review of the entire operation plan, including TPFDD, updated medical working file, and appropriate Civil Engineering Support Planning files, if applicable. The following procedures apply to US unilateral operation plans submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.

(1) Initiation of Review. Upon receipt of an operation plan, the Joint Staff will determine whether the plan is ready for review. The entire operation plan, including the TPFDD, annexes, and appendixes published separately, must be completed and submitted to the Joint Staff or responsible agency for concurrent review with the Basic Plan. If the plan is not ready for review, the submitting headquarters will be notified by memorandum (or message) that the review is being held in abeyance pending receipt of the missing elements.
(2) Review Responsibilities. The Joint Staff, Services, and Defense agencies will conduct independent reviews and submit comments within 30 days of referral. Comments by Joint Staff directorates and Defense agencies will be submitted to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), which has primary staff responsibility for conduct of the review. Service comments will be submitted to the Secretary, Joint Staff.

(3) Review Criteria. The Joint Staff will ensure that all elements of the plan are properly evaluated. The general criteria for CJCS review of an OPLAN are adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and consistency with joint doctrine.

(a) The review for adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations are capable of satisfying the JSCP taskings. The review assesses the validity of the assumptions and compliance with CJCS guidance and joint doctrine.

(b) The review for feasibility determines whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished using available resources. The primary factors considered are whether the resources made available for planning by the JSCP and Service planning documents are being used effectively or whether they are being exceeded.

(c) The review for acceptability ensures the plans are proportional and worth the expected costs. It joins with the criteria of feasibility in ensuring that the mission can be accomplished with available resources and adds the dimension that the plan can be accomplished without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. Additionally, using this criteria, the plans are reviewed to ensure they are consistent with domestic and international law, including the Law of War, and are militarily and politically supportable.

(d) Operation plans will incorporate appropriate joint doctrine as stated in approved and test publications contained in the Joint Publication System. Incorporation of appropriate joint doctrine when preparing operation plans will ease crisis action planning and the execution of operations.

(4) Review Comments. Comments will be categorized as execution-critical, substantive, or administrative and will include supporting rationale.
(a) Execution-critical comments are major deficiencies that impact negatively on the capability of the plan to meet the JSCP objective and may prevent execution of the plan as written. Examples include such items as failure to meet assigned tasks, deviations from joint policy, and major logistic shortfalls.

(b) Substantive comments are less significant deficiencies that include deviations from CJCS guidance, JOPES formatting, and/or significant errors involving the TPFDD. These deficiencies would not prevent execution of the plan.

(c) Administrative comments are comments offered for clarity, accuracy, and consistency. They include such items as outdated references, improper terminology, and minor errors.

(5) Review Provisions and Completion. Reviews will be processed under the provisions of CJCS MOP 9. The review should be completed within 60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if circumstances warrant.

(6) Review Results. Results of the review will be forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum (or message) stating that the plan is either:

(a) Approved (effective for execution, when directed). Any critical shortfalls within plans that cannot be resolved by the supported commander will be outlined within the review comments and the approval memorandum.

(b) Disapproved.

(7) Post-Review Actions

(a) Within 30 days of receipt of the CJCS review results memorandum (or message), the supported commander will send a message to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating his intentions concerning incorporation of execution-critical comments. A formal change incorporating CJCS execution-critical comments to correct resolvable items will be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff within 60 days of receipt of the review results. Substantive comments must be incorporated into the first change or by the next CJCS review. A supported commander with substantial
justification to request resolution of review comments should forward his recommendations in a memorandum to the Joint Staff proponent for the deliberate planning process, the Director, J-7.

(b) Within 15 days of receipt of the CJCS review results memorandum (or message), the supported commander will send a message to the supported commander’s component commands notifying them of operation plan approval status; operation plans replaced, deleted, or changed as a result of CJCS review; and component commands’ responsibility to notify supporting commands and agencies of operation plans effectiveness and taskings.

(c) Within 15 days of receipt of the supported commands’ operation plan review notification message, component commanders will send a message to all supporting commands and Service agencies that are tasked within the plan relaying operation plan status and effectiveness.

(d) When a formal change is received, the Joint Staff will review it to verify incorporation of CJCS comments. The scope of the review will be determined case by case.

(e) Supporting plans prepared by subordinate and supporting commanders and other agencies are normally reviewed and approved by the supported commander. Supported commanders will advise the Joint Staff when issues from these reviews cannot be resolved between the commanders concerned.

c. Review of Bilateral Plans. Bilateral plans, planning studies, and plans of international treaty organizations will be reviewed using JOPES procedures insofar as practicable. Nations and organizations outside the US Department of Defense are not subject to the policies and procedures of JOPES. However, inclusion of the major elements of JOPES formats should be encouraged to assist with the review. The following procedures apply to bilateral plans submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.

(1) Initiation of Review. Upon receipt of a bilateral plan, the Joint Staff will initiate the review.

(2) Review Responsibilities. The Joint Staff, Services, and Defense agencies will conduct independent reviews and submit comments within 30 days of referral. Comments by Joint Staff directorates and Defense agencies will be
submitted to the Joint Staff Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), which has primary staff responsibility for conduct of the review. Service comments will be submitted to the Secretary, Joint Staff.

(3) Review Considerations. Bilateral plans are approved by the US representative during the negotiating development phase. The plan review conducted by the Joint Staff provides recommendations for the development of the next edition of the plan. Comments from the previous development and review cycle should be incorporated within the production of the next plan development cycle. Because bilateral plans are a product of negotiations between two countries, review comments must be negotiated to conform as closely as possible to the CJCS-directed position for inclusion in the plan within the current review cycle. If the responsible CINC is unable to convince the other country to include the CJCS comments, the CINC will forward the revised wording to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with supporting rationale. The Joint Staff will coordinate with the Services for resolution of the revised wording. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will determine whether the revised plan is approved or disapproved. Plans of the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command will be reviewed in accordance with SM-387-78, 9 May 1978, "Plans for the Defense of the ROK."

(4) Review Comments. Comments from combined or bilateral reviews will be defined as follows:

(a) Execution-critical comments are significant comments whose incorporation is considered essential by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Substantive comments are important comments that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff desires to have incorporated into the plan.

(c) Administrative comments are comments provided for clarity, accuracy, and consistency and to correct minor errors in references, terminology, etc.

(5) Review Completion. The review should be completed within 60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if circumstances warrant.

(6) Review Results. Results of the review will be forwarded to the supported commander by memorandum (or message) stating that the plan is either:
(a) Approved. Any shortfalls within plans that cannot be resolved by the supported commander will be outlined in the review comments and the approval memorandum.

(b) Disapproved.

d. Canada-US Combined Plans. These plans are reviewed and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination with the Services, Defense agencies, and the Canadian National Defense Headquarters. The results of the simultaneous reviews are exchanged through the Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee (MCC). The MCC will act as a focal point for negotiating contentious issues between the two countries and will notify Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNORAD) (or the appropriate CINC), when the review is completed.

e. Review of NATO Plans. This review is applicable to all NATO plans, except Outline Contingency Operations Plans (OCOPs). OCOPs will not normally receive a US national review. They will be verified against the corresponding plan and retained for information. The US Representative to the Military Committee may request OCOP review, if required. A US national review will be conducted whenever the appropriate NATO authority forwards for approval a new plan, a major revision to an existing plan, or a major change to an existing plan. NATO authorities may also request a national review of a plan when a period of time (specified in NATO planning directives) has elapsed since initial approval or the last comprehensive review. The following procedures apply to US national review of NATO plans submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.

(1) Initiation of Review. Upon notification by the appropriate NATO authority, the United States will initiate a review of the plan. New plans will normally be reviewed at the "Draft Plan" stage.

(2) Review Responsibilities

(a) The Joint Staff will conduct the US national review of MNC plans, Joint MNC plans, Allied Command Europe (ACE), Major Subordinate Command (MSC) plans, and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) MSC plans. Joint Staff, Service, and Defense agency responsibilities are in accordance with the procedures outlined in subparagraph 4b(1)(b) for the unilateral review of US plans. US Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), and Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT), will submit comments for plan
reviews of MNC and MSC plans when tasked by the Joint Staff.

(b) USCINCEUR and USCINCLANT will conduct the US national review of ACE and ACLANT Principal Subordinate Command (PSC) plans, respectively.

(c) For all ACLANT plans, the US Liaison Officer (USLO) Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), will act as the point of contact for communications between the Joint Staff and ACLANT commands. ACLANT commands will send plans requiring a US national review to the USLO SACLANT, who will in turn notify the Joint Staff and USCINCLANT when a national review is required and forward copies of ACLANT plans. The USLO SACLANT will forward US national review comments from the Joint Staff or USCINCLANT to the appropriate ACLANT commander.

(3) Review Criteria. The Joint Staff, Services, Defense agencies, and applicable US unified commands will ensure that all elements of the plan are properly evaluated. The general criteria for US national review of a NATO plan are feasibility and acceptability.

(4) Review Comments. Comments will be categorized as execution-critical, substantive, or administrative and will include supporting rationale.

(a) Execution-critical comments are significant comments whose incorporation is considered essential by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Substantive comments are important comments that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff desires to have incorporated into the plan.

(c) Administrative comments are comments provided for clarity, accuracy, and consistency and to correct minor errors in references, terminology, etc.

(5) Review Provisions and Completion. Reviews will be conducted under the provisions of CJCS MOP 9. The review should be completed within 60 days of referral. The Director, Joint Staff, may extend the review period if circumstances dictate.

(6) Review Results. US national review results will be forwarded via message to the applicable ACE commander for ACE plans and to the USLO SACLANT for ACLANT plans.
5. CJCS Contingency Plan Review Program

a. General. The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 specifies that:

(1) The Secretary of Defense will provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with written policy guidance annually for the preparation and review of contingency plans.

(2) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) will assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing the policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing the plans.

(3) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans that conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense. Also, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for advising the Secretary on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistics, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans and assessing the effect of these deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and strategic plans.

b. Contingency Plan Review Program Taskings

(1) An information briefing will be developed concurrently with the CJCS review of the CINC’s Strategic Concept and during the review of the final operation plan. Following completion of the CJCS review and approval, information briefings will be available for presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Staff directorate having primary responsibility for the review will be responsible for coordination of JCS and Secretary of Defense information briefings with the appropriate CINC.

(2) The USDP will review the CINC’s Strategic Concept and the final plan for operation plans tasked by the JSCP. Following CJCS review and approval, the Joint Staff directorate having primary responsibility for the review will release the CINC’s Strategic Concept or final operation plan to USDP, who may hold these documents for the period of USDP review and information briefings to the Secretary of Defense (if required). These reviews will assist USDP in preparing the annual Contingency Planning Guidance.
(3) Upon completion of the CJCS review of the major regional contingency plans, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide the Secretary of Defense with an assessment of the results of the 2-year planning effort, including identification of aggregate strengths and deficiencies associated with the MRC OPLANs. This assessment, prepared by the Director, J-7, in collaboration with the other Joint Staff directorates and coordinated with the Services and appropriate Defense agencies, will be structured to meet the requirements of title 10, United States Code, Sections 153 (a)(3)(A) and (a)(3)(C).
CHAPTER V
CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

1. Purpose. This chapter describes how the basic planning process is adapted and employed to plan and execute joint operations in crisis situations. Crisis is defined within the context of joint operation planning and execution as an INCIDENT or SITUATION involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. An adequate and feasible military response to crisis demands a flexible adaptation of the basic planning process that emphasizes the time available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously accomplished contingency planning whenever possible. In time-sensitive situations, the JPEC follows formally established CAP procedures to adjust and implement previously prepared contingency plans or to develop and execute OPORDs where no useful contingency plan exists for the evolving crisis. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the NCA, and the prompt transmission of NCA decisions to supported commanders.

2. Relationship to Deliberate Planning. CAP procedures provide for the transition from peacetime operations to hostilities other than war or war. Deliberate planning supports crisis action planning by anticipating potential crises and operations and developing contingency plans that facilitate the rapid development and selection of a COA and execution planning during crises. Deliberate planning prepares for a hypothetical crisis based on the best available intelligence and using forces and resources projected to be available for the period during which the plan will be effective. It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. These ambiguities make it improbable that any contingency plan will be usable without modification as a given crisis unfolds, and every crisis situation cannot be anticipated. However, the detailed analysis and coordination accomplished during the time available for deliberate planning can expedite effective decisionmaking and execution planning as the crisis unfolds and assumptions and projections are replaced with facts and actual conditions. CAP procedures provide the means to respond to any crisis within a constrained timeframe. CAP routinely includes the consideration and exploitation of deliberate contingency planning whenever possible.
3. Crisis Action Planning Phases. Because crises are fluid and involve dynamic events, planning procedures must be flexible. The activities of the JPEC are keyed to the time available and the significance of the crisis. Planning procedures describe a logical sequence of events beginning with the recognition of a crisis and progressing through the employment of US military forces. Several points are identified in this sequence where key activities (or decisions) are required. The following describes the key activities or phases of CAP.

a. Phase I--Situation Development. An event with possible national security implications occurs, is recognized, and reported.

b. Phase II--Crisis Assessment. The diplomatic, military, economic, and political implications of the crisis are weighed. A decision is made on a possible requirement for military force. Current strategy and applicable operation plans are reviewed.

c. Phase III--Course of Action Development. CINCs are tasked, or a CINC is tasked, to develop and recommend COAs or the NCA develops its own COA.

d. Phase IV--Course of Action Selection. The NCA select a COA.

e. Phase V--Execution Planning. A detailed operation order is prepared to support the selected COA. The level of detail is proportional to the time available for planning.

f. Phase VI--Execution. The decision of the NCA to deploy or employ US forces is implemented.

CAP phases are further defined in the remaining chapters and annexes of this volume. Through the inherent flexibility of CAP, the time spent in each phase depends on the nature of the crisis.

4. Postexecution Activities. Postexecution requirements (including preparing detailed after-action reports, assessing results, developing lessons learned, declassifying material, releasing information, and preparing follow-on plan reviews) will be as directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. Operation Plans. In a crisis, existing OPLANs or CONPLANs are reviewed for applicability to the situation at hand. Using CAP procedures, applicable existing plans are expanded or modified to fit the situation. If no existing plan applies, CAP procedures are followed to build an OPORD.
6. Joint Planning and Execution Community Responsibilities. Many organizations are involved in planning for a crisis. The composition of the JPEC and roles of members of the JPEC are described below.

a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manages the planning process; provides advice, options, and recommendations to the NCA; and conveys NCA decisions to the CINCs (see Figure V-1). More specifically, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff receives and analyzes reports, tasks commanders to prepare estimates and COAs, reviews those estimates and COAs, resolves conflicts and shortfalls or seeks resolution from the NCA, and monitors the deployment and employment of forces. The NCA have the final responsibility and authority in a crisis. The NCA approve a COA and authorize the major actions to be taken, including the deployment, employment, or redeployment of forces. Authority to conduct military operations against a potential enemy, as delineated in the JSCP, rests solely with the NCA, except as authorized under the applicable ROE.

b. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when requested.

c. Supported Commander and Service Components. The supported commander, designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has the primary responsibility for responding to a crisis. The supported commander is usually the commander of the unified command of the geographic area in which the crisis occurs. The supported commander begins COA development as soon as he is aware that a military response may be needed and provides an estimate of the situation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In developing COAs, the supported commander will consult with and task the commanders of subordinate components, subunified commands, or JTFs. If time permits, the Service component commands will
## CJCS Order Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>SECDEF APPR REQUIRED BY</th>
<th>CJCS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WARNING ORDER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC PREPARES COAs</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUB CMDR’S ESTIMATE</td>
<td>REQUIRED ONLY WHEN DEPLOYING FORCES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPARE DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PLANNING ORDER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEGIN EXEC PLANNING</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPARE OPORD</td>
<td>(AWAITING FORMAL NCA DECISION ON COA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALERT ORDER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEGIN EXEC PLANNING</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLISH OPORD</td>
<td>(CONVEYS COA SELECTION BY NCA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPLOY PREP ORDER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCREASE/DECREASE DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE OF UNITS</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEPLOYMENT ORDER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPLOY/REDEPLOY FORCES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTAB C-DAY/L-HOUR MOVEMENT OF UNIT PERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCR DEPLOYABILITY OF FORCES AND EQUIP INTO CINC’S AOR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTABLISH JTF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXECUTE ORDER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPLEMENT NCA DECISION DIRECTING EXEC OPORD/OPERATION</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure V-1. CJCS Order Matrix
develop the Service aspects of the concept, determine force and resource requirements, and build TPFDD files to implement appropriate concepts. The Service component commands will also work within Service channels to identify CS and CSS forces, critical materiel, sustaining supplies, filler and replacement personnel, and Reserve component (RC) asset availability. Throughout the crisis, the supported commander will ensure that continuous communications are maintained with the supporting commanders concerning present requirements and anticipated future actions that might affect or necessitate additional support.

d. Supporting Commanders. Supporting commanders are designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Relationships between the supported and supporting commander will be in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2. Supporting commanders determine their ability to support each of the proposed military COAs and identify the actual units and associated movement data. Additionally, when supporting commanders provide lift assets in support of a COA, they will provide deployment estimates and schedules for those (non-USTRANSCOM) assets. Supporting commanders will ensure that all cargo and personnel requiring USTRANSCOM-provided transportation during deployment and redeployment operations will be documented in accordance with DOD 4500.32-R, MILSTAMP.

e. Services. The Services are responsible for mobilizing and calling up RC forces, when authorized; providing units, individual filler, and replacement personnel; and sustaining deployed forces.

f. USCINCTRANS and Components. As a supporting commander, USCINCTRANS is responsible for the transportation aspects of worldwide strategic mobility planning (deliberate and crisis) and centralized wartime traffic management, including:

   (1) Developing and operating the deployment elements of the crisis action planning and execution system.

   (2) Receiving, evaluating, and coordinating global strategic mobility requirements in support of the other unified and specified commands.

   (3) Optimizing the use of transportation capability.

g. Other Supporting Agencies. Combat Support Agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), and National Security Agency (NSA); and other US Government agencies, such as Department
of State (DOS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Transportation (DOT), US Coast Guard (USCG), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), play important roles as part of the planning community in developing, evaluating, selecting, and executing military COAs. These agencies provide information vital to NCA decisionmaking and should be considered early in the planning process; others supply materiel, personnel, or other resources to support the military forces.

7. Communication

a. Oral. Crises that require US military operations and develop with little or no warning may precipitate a rapid series of decisions by the NCA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CINCs. As a result, key decisions in the CAP process may be relayed orally. As a minimum, decisions requiring NCA approval will be confirmed by record communications as soon as possible.

b. Teleconferences. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct establishment of a crisis deployment teleconference (TLCF) and identify those Services, agencies, and commands required to join and monitor the TLCF, if the supported commander has not already established a TLCF. The TLCF chairman is responsible for initiating a polling process to ensure required commands are provided TLCF authorization.

c. Messages. Crisis reporting and information updates will be provided to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as necessary using formats prescribed by Joint Pub 1-03. Messages formatted in accordance with Joint Pub 6-04 will be used to the extent possible to manage the crisis action planning process and implement the decisions of the NCA.

d. Data Exchange. The primary means of exchanging detailed force and other deployment data is JOPES. JOPES will be used to develop and analyze COAs, to create and modify a detailed deployment data base for managing the deployment and redeployment of forces, and to assist in tracking or monitoring the operation. The supported CINC, with assistance from USTRANSCOM, will publish amplifying instructions for the use of JOPES in a crisis.

e. Restricted Access Planning. Certain crises may dictate that access to planning activity be restricted. In such situations, oral communications, special category (SPECAT) messages, and other control procedures will apply (see SM-670-88). The decision to use SPECAT must recognize the tradeoff in benefits between restricting access and the
potential for degrading timely planning and liaison. It is critical that JOPES ADP-trained personnel be included in SPECAT channels as soon as the possibility of deployment is foreseen. Deployment data, when required, will be developed using JOPES and will be maintained in JOPES by means of close-hold or limited-access procedures. Use of WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) TLCF and access to JOPES during these situations requires the supported commander to determine which personnel and commands require access to such data.

8. Single-Crisis Procedures. As previously discussed, a response to a crisis is normally carried out in six sequential phases. The time spent in each phase depends on the nature of the crisis. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the time spent in each phase can be compressed so that all decisions are reached in conference and orders are combined or are initially issued orally. A crisis could be so time-critical, or a single COA so obvious, that the first written directive might be a DEPLOYMENT or EXECUTE ORDER. (See restrictions on oral communications in subparagraph 7a.) The following subparagraphs describe key activities during each phase of a crisis, and Figure V-2 presents a general flow diagram of the CAP procedures.

a. Phase I--Situation Development. Phase I begins with an event having possible national security implications and ends when the CINC submits an assessment of the situation to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See Appendix 1 to Annex A.)

(1) The Initial Report. When a significant event is recognized, a report is submitted to higher headquarters (see Appendix 1 to Annex B). If the National Military Command Center (NMCC) receives the report from a source other than the commander of the unified command in whose area the event occurred, the NMCC will make every effort to establish communication with the CINC and request a report. In his CINC’s assessment report, the CINC provides as much information as possible about the nature of the crisis, the forces readily available, major constraints to possible force employment, and actions being taken, if any, within existing ROE. As appropriate, the CINC’s report also contains a succinct discussion of various COAs under consideration or recommended by the commander (see NOTE below). A report that initiates CAP may be received by message or voice. Two formal reports that could initiate action are:

(a) CRITIC--critical intelligence communication.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE I SITUATION DEVELOPMENT</th>
<th>PHASE II CRISIS ASSESSMENT</th>
<th>PHASE III COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT</th>
<th>PHASE IV COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION</th>
<th>PHASE V EXECUTION PLANNING</th>
<th>PHASE VI EXECUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EVENT</td>
<td>CINC'S REPORT/ ASSESSMENT RECEIVED</td>
<td>CJSC Publishes WARNING ORDER</td>
<td>CJCS Presents Refined and Prioritized COA to NCA</td>
<td>CINC Receives ALERT ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER</td>
<td>NCA Decision to Execute OPORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION</td>
<td>Increase Awareness</td>
<td>Develop COAs</td>
<td>CJCS Gives Military Advice to NCA</td>
<td>Adjust JOPES Database</td>
<td>CJCS Publishes EXECUTE ORDER BY AUTHORITY &amp; DIRECTION OF SECDEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Monitor World Situation</td>
<td>- Increase Reporting</td>
<td>- Evaluate COA</td>
<td>- Identify Movement Requirements</td>
<td>- CINC Executes OPORD</td>
<td>- JOPES Database Maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Problem Recognition</td>
<td>- JCS Assess Situation</td>
<td>- Create/Modify JOPES database</td>
<td>- Identify and Assign Tasks to UNITS</td>
<td>- JOPES Database Maintained</td>
<td>- JOPES Database Maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Submit CINC's Assessment</td>
<td>- JCS Advise on Possible Military Action</td>
<td>- CINC Assigns Tasks to Subordinates by Evaluation Request Message</td>
<td>- Convert COA into OPORD &amp; Supporting OPORDS</td>
<td>- Intensify Sorts Reporting</td>
<td>- JCS Reports EXECUTION STATUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCA-CJCS Evaluation</td>
<td>- CINC Reviews Evaluation Response MSGS</td>
<td>- Resolve Shortfalls and Limitations</td>
<td>- JCS Monitor OPORD</td>
<td>- JCS Reports EXECUTION STATUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- USTRANSCOM Prepares Deployment Estimates</td>
<td>- Intensify Sorts Reporting</td>
<td>- JCS Monitor OPORD DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>- JCS Reports EXECUTION STATUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTCOME</td>
<td>- NCA-CJCS Decide to Develop Military Course of Action</td>
<td>- JCS Reviews Commander's Estimate</td>
<td>- NCA Selects COA</td>
<td>- NCA Selects COA</td>
<td>- NCA Selects COA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assessment That Event May Have National Implications</td>
<td>- CINC Publishes Commander's Estimate with Recommended Course of Action</td>
<td>- CJCS Publishes Selected COA in ALERT ORDER</td>
<td>- CINC Publishes OPORD</td>
<td>- Crisis Resolved</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Report Event to NCA/CJCS</td>
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**Figure V-2 Flow Diagram of the Crisis Action Procedures**

Figure V-2. Flow Diagram of the Crisis Action Planning Procedures
Operational Report (OPREP)-3 PINNACLE--Event or incident report of possible national interest.

NOTE: The time sensitivity of some situations may require so rapid a response that the normal CAP sequence cannot be followed. Accordingly, the commander’s assessment may serve to indicate his recommended COA; i.e., to function also as the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE, normally developed in Phase III, Course of Action Development. In this situation, no formal WARNING ORDER is issued, and the next communication received by the supported commander from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the PLANNING ORDER or ALERT ORDER containing the COA to be used for execution planning. A commander’s assessment and proposals should be submitted at the earliest possible time to preclude an execution decision that may not consider the commander’s position. (See Appendix 2 to Annex B.)

(2) Other Activities. Other members of the JPEC are gathering information and developing an accurate picture of the crisis event.

b. Phase II--Crisis Assessment. Phase II begins with a report from the supported commander and ends with a decision by the NCA to return to the precrisis situation, or to have military options developed for possible consideration and possible use. Phase II is characterized by increased awareness and reporting and intense information-gathering activity. (See Appendix 2 to Annex A.)

(1) Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides the NCA with an assessment of the situation from the military point of view and provides advice on possible military action. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviews current strategy and existing OPLAN data in the JOPEs and evaluates reports from the CINC and other sources. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishes, or directs the establishment of, a crisis TLCF if the supported commander has not already established a TLCF.

(2) Activities of the Supported Commander. The CINC continues to issue status reports as required and to report the significant actions taken within the existing ROE. The CINC continues to evaluate the crisis event and the disposition of assigned and available forces. The CINC will assess the employment status and availability
of theater transportation assets and the transportation infrastructure. The CINC will establish a TLCF and announce it by AUTODIN.

(3) Other Activities. The Services participate in the CINC’s review of available military forces, when time permits. The Service review will include, as appropriate, actions within Service purview to improve force readiness and sustainability and to identify potential Reserve component (RC) requirements. USCINTRANs reviews the status of strategic lift assets and takes action as authorized and appropriate to improve the disposition and readiness of strategic lift assets and common-user port facilities.

c. Phase III--Course of Action Development. Phase III begins with a decision to develop possible military COAs, normally transmitted by a CJCS WARNING ORDER, and ends when COAs are presented to the NCA. (See Appendix 3 to Annex A.)

(1) Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During Phase III, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally publishes the WARNING ORDER (see sample format, Annex C), a planning guidance message to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC. The WARNING ORDER establishes command relationships (designating supported and supporting commanders) and states the mission, objectives, and known constraints. The WARNING ORDER usually allocates forces and strategic lift or requests the supported commander to develop force and strategic lift requirements using JOPES. A tentative C-day and L-hour are provided in the WARNING ORDER, or the supported commander is requested to propose a C-day and L-hour. Finally, the WARNING ORDER directs the supported commander to develop COAs. If time permits, the supported command should use JOPES ADP and begin entering preliminary force movement requirements. If a specific COA is already being considered, the WARNING ORDER will be used to describe that COA and request the supported commander’s assessment. The WARNING ORDER establishes a deadline for USTRANSCOM’s preliminary force deployment estimate and force closure profile and for the supported commander’s response—the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE. Time permitting, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct USTRANSCOM to develop a DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE for analytical purposes. During the preparation of the WARNING ORDER, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will use the WIN TLCF to interact with the supported commander to ensure that mission support
requirements are adequately detailed. In extremely
time-sensitive situations, the WARNING ORDER may be issued
orally or even omitted. When the WARNING ORDER is omitted, a
PLANNING ORDER or ALERT ORDER may be issued. When issued in
lieu of a WARNING ORDER, the PLANNING or ALERT ORDERS will
contain the force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour
information.

(2) Activities of the Supported Commander. In response to
the WARNING ORDER, the supported commander works with
supported command components, subunified commands, and Joint
Task Forces (JTFs) and develops possible COAs using JOPES.
The amount of time available for planning governs the level of
activity. The supported commander manages the use of JOPES to
construct COAs and tasks Service component commanders and
supporting commanders to evaluate the proposed COAs by
releasing an EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE (see sample format,
Annex K). The supported commander directs a review of
existing OPLANs for applicability. Even if not applicable in
full, deployment data extracted from existing plans may be
useful. Finally, the supported commander prepares and submits
his COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (see sample format, Annex D). It contains one or
more possible COAs and the supported commander’s
recommendation. If time permits, COAs will include deployment
estimates. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the COMMANDER’S
ESTIMATE may be provided orally.

(3) Activities of the Supporting Commanders and Service
Components. The supporting commanders and Service components
take action as directed by the supported commander’s
EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE. Activities will normally include
the creation of combat, CS, and CSS lists and generation of a
movement requirement estimate. Normally, they are directed to
provide the required information in an EVALUATION RESPONSE
MESSAGE (see sample format, Annex M) or in JOPES (by
developing a deployment data base). Sustainment planning
(non-unit-related cargo and non-unit-related personnel data)
will be coordinated with the Services as directed by the
supported commander.

(4) Activities of USCINTRANS. USCINTRANS reviews the
supported commander’s proposed COAs and prepares and forwards
deployment estimates to the supported commander, normally 24
to 36 hours prior to the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE, for each
proposed COA. As time permits (as directed by the supported
commander), the JOPES data will be used to develop a
preliminary force deployment estimate and a force closure
profile.
(5) Activities of the Services. The Services monitor COA development using JOPES and begin preliminary plans for providing support forces and sustainment. In addition, the Services continue to monitor force readiness and requirements for the RC, taking action or making recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as appropriate.

d. Phase IV--Course of Action Selection. Phase IV begins when COAs are presented to the NCA and ends when a COA is selected. The primary activity in this phase of crisis planning rests with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA. All other members of the JPEC continue their activities as described in Phases II and III. (See Appendixes 2, 3, and 4 to Annex A.)

(1) Reviewing the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviews and evaluates the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE. Based on the supported commander’s assessment, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepares to advise the NCA. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may concur in the supported commander’s recommended COA in whole or in part, direct the supported commander’s development of an additional COA, or may develop and recommend a different COA. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presents possible military COAs to the NCA and, following the NCA decision, normally issues the ALERT ORDER.

(2) The PLANNING ORDER. The PLANNING ORDER (see sample format, Annex E) is a message from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE "PLANNING ORDER" IS TO DIRECT THAT EXECUTION PLANNING ACTIVITIES BEGIN BEFORE FORMAL SELECTION OF A COA BY THE NCA. Used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER saves time by allowing the planning activities described in Phase V to begin pending a decision by the NCA. The PLANNING ORDER is designed to allow the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff additional flexibility in directing military activities taken in response to a crisis. In extremely time-sensitive situations, the PLANNING ORDER may be used in lieu of a WARNING ORDER. When used in this manner, the PLANNING ORDER will describe a specific COA; direct execution planning activities; and provide the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in a WARNING ORDER. The PLANNING ORDER will normally NOT be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If
force deployment is directed, the PLANNING ORDER will require APPROVAL OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

(3) The ALERT ORDER. The ALERT ORDER (see sample format, Annex F) is APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE and transmitted to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to announce the COA selected by the NCA. The ALERT ORDER will describe the selected COA, or COAs in unique situations, in detail sufficient to allow the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to begin the detailed planning required to deploy forces. The ALERT ORDER will also contain guidance, as needed, to change or amplify the guidance provided in the WARNING ORDER. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the ALERT ORDER may be omitted or issued in lieu of the WARNING ORDER. When issued in lieu of a WARNING ORDER, the ALERT ORDER will contain the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in the WARNING ORDER.

e. Phase V—Execution Planning. Phase V begins when a PLANNING or an ALERT ORDER is received and ends when an executable OPORD is developed and approved for execution on order. (See Appendix 5 to Annex A.)

(1) Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Execution planning activities begin with the CJCS-issued PLANNING or ALERT ORDER. If (in the case of a PLANNING ORDER) an NCA decision on a COA is still pending, then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will notify the supported commander by message, TLCF, or orally (in extremely time-sensitive situations) when the NCA decision is made. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitors the execution planning activities using JOPES and reviews the supported commander’s OPORD for adequacy and feasibility. Time permitting, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct USCINCTRANS to develop a DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE for analytical purposes. In those instances where the crisis response does not progress into Execution, CAP Procedures Phase VI, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will evaluate the situation and provide the CINC guidance on either continuing under CAP or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures delineated in Chapter III and Joint Pub 5-03.2, JOPES, Volume II.

(2) Activities of the Supported Commander. During the execution planning phase, the supported commander publishes a TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI) that provides
procedures for the deployment, replacement, and redeployment of the operation’s forces (see sample format, Annex N). The LOI provides instructions and direction to the CINC’s components, supporting CINCs, and other members of the JPEC. Also, the supported commander converts an approved COA into an OPORD (see sample format, Annex J). The purpose of the supported commander’s OPORD is to provide the components, supporting commands, and agencies a detailed operation plan and to task those involved to prepare for the operation. The supported commander also submits the OPORD to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review. The amount of time available will govern the level of activity. A primary deployment concern of the supported commander during execution planning is to ensure that early deploying force requirements are adjusted as required in response to the ALERT or PLANNING ORDER and to the current situation. When firm force requirements and priorities are established, the supported commander notifies the JPEC that the force requirements are ready for sourcing. This signals force-providing organizations and supporting commands and agencies to provide or update specific unit movement data in JOPES for the first increment of movement (normally, the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of sea movement). It also prompts the Service logistics and personnel offices to adjust sustainment requirements based on the most accurate assessments available. When the above actions have been completed, the supported commander will review the TPFDD and notify USTRANSCOM that the movement requirements are ready for lift scheduling. The supported commander also requests that the Joint Staff and supporting commands and agencies assist in resolving any critical resource shortfalls or limitations.

(3) Activities of the Supporting Commanders and Service Components. Supporting commanders providing forces will identify and task specific units and provide unit movement requirements in JOPES to allow lift scheduling for the first increment of deployment. Supporting commanders will develop OPORDs to support the approved COA effectively. The Service component commanders work with the Services and their major commands to identify and update estimated sustainment requirements in JOPES. Service components and supporting commands also schedule movements for self-deploying forces (organic moves).

(4) Activities of USCINCTRANS. USCINCTRANS takes action to provide effective air, land, and sea transportation to support the approved COA or OPORD. USTRANSCOM will apply
available transportation assets against the transportation requirement identified by the supported commander and will develop feasible airlift and sealift transportation schedules. The level of detail will be commensurate with the availability of detailed movement requirements and the time available for planning. USTRANSCOM establishes air and sea channels for movement of nonunit sustainment and personnel. In extremely time-sensitive situations, USTRANSCOM will focus its planning effort on the first increment of the movement requirement.

(5) Activities of the Services. During Phase V, the Services determine mobilization requirements and take action to request the authority to mobilize. The Services also provide nonunit sustainment and recommend the necessary actions to improve manpower and industrial readiness. The Services work with the supported commander’s components in establishing or updating sustainment requirements. The Service subordinate commands that provide augmentation forces as supporting commands also schedule organic (self-deploying) movements in JOPES.

f. Phase VI--Execution. Phase VI begins with the decision to execute an OPORD, normally transmitted by a CJCS EXECUTE ORDER, and continues until the crisis is resolved satisfactorily. (See Appendix 6 to Annex A.)

(1) Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(a) The EXECUTE ORDER. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reflecting the decision of the NCA, publishes the EXECUTE ORDER (see sample format, Annex H). The EXECUTE ORDER, issued BY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, orders the supported commander to execute his OPORD. The EXECUTE ORDER is normally a simple, straightforward message directing the deployment and employment of forces. However, in extremely time-sensitive situations, the EXECUTE ORDER may be the only message provided in a crisis. In such situations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensures that the EXECUTE ORDER contains the information normally provided in the WARNING and ALERT ORDERS. Throughout the operation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitors the deployment and employment of forces and takes actions needed to effect a quick and successful termination of the crisis. In those instances where the crisis response does not
progress into Execution, CAP Procedures Phase VI, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will evaluate the situation and provide the CINC guidance on either continuing under CAP procedures or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures delineated in Chapter III and Joint Pub 5-03.2, JOPES, Volume II.

(b) DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION and DEPLOYMENT ORDERS. Should the NCA desire to increase the deployability posture, position forces, or take other preparatory action that might signal a US intent to respond militarily to a situation, a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER will be published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see sample format, Annex G). These orders are issued BY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE and may be issued at any time throughout the crisis. Deployments or preparations for deployment may also be included as part of the WARNING, PLANNING, or ALERT ORDERS (see Annexes C, E, and F) and will always require NCA approval.

(2) Activities of the Supported Commander. The supported commander executes the OPORD and uses JOPES to monitor the force deployments. Incremental force sourcing and lift scheduling continue, with USCINCTRANS managing the deployment process in accordance with the supported commander’s force and sustainment priorities. The supported commander reports force or resource shortfalls to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution. The supported commander employs assigned forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

(3) Activities of the Supporting Commanders and Service Components. The Service component commanders work with the Services and their subordinate commands to continue to provide forces and to report movement requirements within JOPES. Supporting commanders execute their supporting OPORDs.

(4) Activities of USCINCTRANS. USCINCTRANS will manage the common-user transportation assets needed for movement of forces and sustainment and will report the progress of the deployment to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the supported commander. USCINCTRANS will support the Joint Staff in developing lift allocations and report shortfalls to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the supported commander. USCINCTRANS will
support the Joint Transportation Board (JTB), as required, during resource deliberations.

(5) Activities of the Services. The Services continue to provide for the sustainment of forces.

9. Multiple-Crisis Conditions. Multiple-crisis procedures are used by the JPEC to respond to situations in which more than one crisis is occurring simultaneously. The following procedures define only those PROCEDURES UNIQUE TO MULTIPLE-CRISIS SITUATIONS. These procedures supplement, but do not replace, those found in paragraph 8. Multiple-crisis procedures apply when all of the following conditions are met:

a. CAP procedures are in progress for two or more crises.

b. Competing demands for combat forces or resources exceed availability.

c. The supported commanders are unable to resolve the conflict over combat forces or resources.

Multiple-crisis events may occur in a single theater. The supported commander facing two or more crises may apply multiple-crisis procedures when the available forces or resources are insufficient to carry out assigned missions simultaneously.

10. Multiple-Crisis Procedures. The procedures unique to multiple crises are provided in the following subparagraphs. The procedures are organized by phases as are single-crisis procedures. Within each phase, activities are described for applicable members of the JPEC.

a. Phase I--Situation Development. No procedures unique to multiple crises are established in this phase.

b. Phase II--Crisis Assessment. The key activity in this phase is the exchange of information. When crises occur in two or more theaters, initial reports and subsequent status reports will be provided to all the supported commanders involved.

c. Phase III--Course of Action Development

(1) Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When publishing WARNING ORDERS for multiple crises, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will allocate forces and resources as necessary. Combat forces will be allocated to supported commanders within
each WARNING ORDER. If forces or resources are insufficient, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish planning priorities. The JTB or the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) may be convened, if needed, to allocate the available resources and strategic lift or recommend allocations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Activities of the Supported Commanders. The supported commanders will develop COAs using those forces and resources allocated for planning. The effect on mission accomplishment of force, materiel, strategic lift, or other resource shortfalls will be defined briefly in the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE.

(3) Activities of the Supporting Commanders and Service Components. The supporting commanders and Service components allocate CS and CSS forces to the tasked supported commanders. This allocation will be in rough proportion to the CJCS-allocated combat force. If CS and CSS forces are insufficient to meet all tasks, the supporting commanders and Service components will allocate such forces in accordance with priorities established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as outlined in subparagraph 10c(1) above.

(4) Activities of USCINCTRANS. USCINCTRANS coordinates the preparation of movement requirements and deployment estimates. USCINCTRANS will coordinate with the supported commanders to resolve potential conflicts in the use of transportation assets, to remain within port workload constraints, to identify firm movement requirements, etc. Issues that cannot be resolved will be referred to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(5) Activities of the Services. The Services will take action to identify and alleviate anticipated shortages in supplies and forces. The Services will identify and take action to activate needed Reserve units and personnel.

d. Phase IV--Course of Action Selection. The primary activity in this phase rests with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA. In recommending COAs to the NCA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will consider, and brief to the NCA, the impact of each COA on other COAs approved or contemplated. The briefing will include the impact of multiple deployments on strategic lift and other resources. If resources are insufficient to meet
the needs of all supported commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will brief plans in priority order and recommend that the available resources be based upon these priorities.

e. Phase V--Execution Planning

(1) Activities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The primary activity of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during this phase is the adjudication of conflicting demands for forces, resources, and strategic lift. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may convene the JMPAB or the JTB to resolve resource or strategic lift shortfalls.

(2) Activities of the Supported Commanders. The supported commanders monitor the process as forces and resources are identified ("sourced") in all the OPLANs being considered. The supported commanders react to conflicts, dual-tasking of units, and resource shortfalls by modifying the concept of operations or by seeking resolution by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) Activities of the Supporting Commanders and Service Components. The supporting commanders and Service components seek to allocate forces and resources without conflict (e.g., dual-tasking units) or shortfalls (e.g., unfilled force or resource requirement). The supported commander will be advised of all known unresolved conflicts or shortfalls.

(4) Activities of USCINTRANS. USCINTRANS will examine port workloads and other factors that may be affected by the execution of multiple plans. USCINTRANS will develop and integrate movement schedules.

(5) Activities of the Services. The Services will attempt to resolve dual-tasked units and shortfalls by advising the supported commander and Service component commanders of untasked or substitute units. The Services will participate in the JMPAB, assisting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in resolving resource shortfalls.

f. Phase VI--Execution. If a force deployment is in progress and a second, more threatening, crisis erupts, the NCA, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may halt existing deployments or order the redeployment of
forces. The procedures in Phases I through V of this paragraph apply.

11. Loss of JOPES and/or WIN Access. See Chapter VI.
CHAPTER VI

JOPES ADMINISTRATION

1. Purpose. This chapter provides an overview of administration of JOPES ADP support. It describes the administrative functions and responsibilities for JOPES Site and JOPES System and Network Administration.

2. General. JOPES is a WWMCCS Joint Mission Application system designed to provide timely flow of data throughout the JPEC. JOPES, a part of WWMCCS, interfaces with other information systems. JOPES ADP is designed as a near-real-time, distributed, transaction-driven information system. Users generate transactions that update data in the local data base. These transactions are simultaneously transmitted to other sites over WIN to update the data bases at all sites that maintain the affected data. The accuracy and utility of JOPES data are dependent upon the quality and timeliness of updates to the TPFDD and the various Standard Reference Files submitted by the JOPES planning community in accordance with the Joint Reporting Structure.

3. JOPES Administration. Responsibility for JOPES administration is shared among individual JOPES sites, the Joint Staff, and the Defense Systems Support Organization (DSSO). The functions and responsibilities of each level are delineated below:

   a. JOPES Site Responsibilities. JOPES site administration is divided between the site FM (formerly site Functional Data Base Manager (FDBM)) and the site TDBM in accordance with Joint Pub 6-03.15. Although in some cases these functions may be performed by the same individual, distinct responsibilities are associated with each function as follows:

      (1) Site Functional Manager

          (a) Maintain site user permissions to include access to all operation plans maintained at the site and functional user permissions to each operation plan and/or operation plan series. The site FM must ensure that permissions and access are only granted to DOD personnel who have received JOPES training appropriate to their required access. Control of these permissions also includes coordination with the local WWMCCS ADP System Security Officer (WASSO) and WIN Site Coordinator (WSC) for assignment of general WWMCCS permissions. The site FM also establishes local procedures to process, validate, and control JOPES permissions.
(b) Maintain and control nondistributed, command-unique operation plan data to include creating, building, loading, updating, downloading, and deleting nondistributed operation plans. This includes coordination with local operation plan POCs and TPFDD functional experts to ensure data quality and coordination with the site TDBM on data base sizing and requirements.

(c) Coordinate file transfer and update of network operation plans with the JNOCC, including conversion of locally developed operation plans into networked operation plans. Enforce data quality standards for online and automated update of networked operation plans.

(d) Maintain proficiency in the use of standard WIN system capabilities and management of these resources.

(e) Coordinate with site TDBM to ensure functional requirements are being accommodated at the site in accordance with data administration policy.

(f) Coordinate with the site TDBM to resolve system and user problems, including data base recovery.

(g) Act as or coordinate with site POC for JOPES training and information, including preparation and presentation of briefings on JOPES operational status, assistance to JOPES users, and coordination with the JNOCC for JOPES network management.

(2) Site Technical Data Base Manager

(a) Implement data administration policy to meet the technical requirements of the site functional managers.

(b) Perform data base load, backup, recovery, restart, and reorganization.

(c) Maintain the data dictionary.

(d) Enforce naming conventions, data element definition, and data access, integrity, and security.

(e) Support DBMS software installations and acceptance testing.
(f) Monitor and evaluate DBMS performance and file protection.

(g) Train and assist data base users and local application developers.

b. JOPES System and Network Responsibilities. JOPES system and network administration is performed by the JNOCC and the JOPES DA. The JNOCC exercises functional and technical proponency for JOPES. It consists of the JNOCC FM, the JNOCC TDBM, and the JOPES DA. They are responsible for overall system administration and network operation as well as data standardization. The JNOCC FM and the JOPES DA responsibilities are performed by the J-3, Joint Staff. The JNOCC TDBM functions are performed by the DSSO. Specific responsibilities for each are as follows:

1. JNOCC Functional Manager

(a) Initiate and synchronize network OPLANs.

(b) Coordinate distribution of OPLAN data to JOPES network sites.

(c) Change OPLAN type, distribution, or access of networked OPLANs.

(d) Manage functional analysis of JOPES operational problems and develop fixes or alternate solutions via the JOPES System Review Body (SRB).

(e) Control timing and flow of network transactions.

(f) Establish coordination requirements and procedures for site FMs.

(g) Chair the JOPES functional teleconference.

(h) Maintain synchronization for JOPES data bases.

(i) Ensure that the JOPES network supports the vital operational mission of strategic military deployment planning and execution under crisis conditions.

(j) Develop specific procedures to ensure continued operations during periods of degraded capability. This includes ensuring the integrity and synchronization of alternate data bases, developing technical
procedures for rerouting transactions to an alternate site, and maintaining functional procedures to ensure uninterrupted performance of all JOPES management functions.

(2) JOPES Data Administrator

(a) In coordination with Joint Staff, J-7, develop policy and procedures for data administration to include development and use of standard data elements, maintenance of the logical data base design, and data flow and integrity.

(b) Coordinate with FMs and TDBMs to ensure full understanding of functional and technical information requirements.

(c) Prepare data policy.

(d) Use the JOPES data dictionary to establish data element naming.

(e) Promulgate data element standardization procedures.

(f) Maintain responsibility for policy supporting data access, integrity, and security.

(g) Develop and maintain the logical data base design and model.

(h) Arbitrate and resolve competing information requirements.

(3) JNOCC Technical Data Base Manager

(a) Manage network operations and software maintenance. Act as single POC for JOPES technical-related problems.

(b) Serve as the technical representative for all JNOCC technical actions.

(c) Ensure proper JNOCC backup data base recovery.

(d) Review and audit transaction flow.

(e) Reset index pointers for revised data support files such as updated versions of TUCHA, unit movement data, and Type Unit Equipment Detail File (TUDET).
(f) Chair JOPES technical teleconference for coordination of installations.

(g) Receive and provide initial response to Incident Reports (IR) concerning network operation and software problems.

(h) Manage the IR system.

(i) Host JOPES technical and release training conferences.

(j) Manage the reproduction and distribution of JOPES software release tapes to site TDBMs.

(k) Coordinate worldwide installation of JOPES software releases.

(l) Develop and maintain JOPES technical procedures for continuity of operations.

(m) Maintain the system technical library.

c. JOPES Security. JOPES is a TOP SECRET High group of application programs resident on WWMCCS. Users may classify data up to and including TOP SECRET and, unless authorities have downgraded the data, will treat display screens and computer printouts as TOP SECRET. The WASSO assigns a Person ID (PER), a Project Code (PJ), and Person Identification Code (PIC) to each user. The PER and PJ are not classified, but the PIC is classified TOP SECRET. Therefore, JOPES users must possess a final TOP SECRET clearance. Site FMs will ensure that the WSC and the WASSO are contacted regarding the coordination of all WIN permissions for JOPES users. Additionally, site FMs are required to coordinate JOPES and WIN permissions for all local users at the primary and alternate sites shown in the JOPES Administration Manual, Appendix D. The site FM will ensure that all authorized users at sites for which the local site is a primary or alternate TELNET site are properly registered for data base access and JOPES functional and operation plan permissions. Furthermore, the JNOCC TDBM must have modify permissions in order to perform installations.

d. JOPES Training. Specific training requirements are strongly recommended for JNOCC personnel, site FMs, and TDBMs. Although the FM does not require in-depth technical knowledge in all areas, an operational familiarity with a wide-range of JOPES and WWMCCS capabilities and a general understanding of those supporting technical publications is
required. TDBMs, however, require more technical knowledge of JOPES and WWMCCS software, data bases, and procedures. Recommended training is listed below.

(1) Site and JNOCC FM
   (a) Joint Planning Orientation Course (JPOC).
   (b) JOPES basic course.
   (c) WWMCCS standard workstation user familiarization course.
   (d) WIN users course.
   (e) Additional training as required.

(2) Site and JNOCC TDBM
   (a) WIN users course.
   (b) GCOS-8 concepts and procedures.
   (c) Timesharing System (TSS) users course.
   (d) WWMCCS ADP and data base administration.
   (e) Cobol (74) programming.
   (f) JOPES basic course.
   (g) DM-IV data administration, Data Manipulation Language (DML), and TP-8 training.
   (h) TP-8 administration, programming, and analysis.
   (i) Unix fundamentals, security, and communications.
   (j) Oracle programming.
   (k) WingZ spreadsheets and graphics.
   (l) Macintosh or Powerpoint graphics training.
   (m) Additional training, as required.

4. Problem Resolution and System Changes. Malfunctions of JOPES software that adversely affect operational capability and require
urgent resolution are called "incidents." Incidents usually occur when a JOPES software failure results in the loss of a critical system capability or the display of erroneous information that severely impacts the utility or reliability of the system. Incidents are reported via IR and are prioritized for expeditious correction according to criticality. Desired enhancements to JOPES capabilities are submitted as Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs). These ECPs are evaluated for feasibility and incorporated into planned future JOPES upgrading. Procedures for submission of these requests are described below.

a. Incident Reporting. The JNOCC maintains an automated system for reporting JOPES incidents and reviewing corrective action status. Any user can submit an IR; however, coordination with the site FM is mandatory to verify that a problem exists. IRs may be initiated to report either JOPES hardware or software problems. All IRs will be submitted through the automated Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Incident Reporting (JOPESIR) system located on the NMCC host to ensure proper recording and tracking. The JNOCC TDBM manages JOPESIR by validating, evaluating, and prioritizing corrective actions.

b. Engineering Change Proposal. JOPES software frequently requires changes because of user requirements or procedure changes. Users normally identify these changes to the FMs. If a proposed software change will enhance capability above the design specification, initiating an ECP is recommended. ECPs may be initiated at any level. However, they should be processed through appropriate CINC and Service channels and forwarded to the Joint Staff (J-36/CSOD), via the CRBJOPES TLCF or message. Procedures for submission of ECPs are listed in the JOPES Administration Manual. The Joint Staff and DSSO conduct periodic SRB meetings, chaired by J-36, CSOD, which will address new ECPs. DSSO will then evaluate the proposed ECP for functional and technical feasibility, provide cost estimates, and brief the SRB on its analysis and recommendations. The analysis and recommendations will be added to the active ECP file. Once approved by the SRB, the chairman will brief the new proposal at the appropriate Configuration Review Board (CRB). The CRB is responsible for prioritizing ECPs and ensuring that current and follow-on JOPES versions support the operational needs of the NCA, Joint Staff, CINCs, Services, and supporting agencies. Planning Systems Division, J-7, Joint Staff, maintains Joint Staff responsibility for the CRB.

5. Operation Plan Management. Both exercise and real-world operation plans are stored in the same data base. Generally, real-world operation plans are those directed by the JSCP to deal
with potential contingencies. Real-world operation plans are usually classified. Exercise operation plans are those created to support the CJCS Exercise Program. Exercise operation plans are usually classified; however, training operation plans are frequently unclassified.

a. Operation Plan Permissions. JOPES functional permissions are granted to allow a user to perform specific functions within JOPES. Each permission must be granted specifically to an individual user ID before the function can be performed. These permissions will be controlled by the FM and are tailored to the specific needs of the user. Functional permissions can be assigned to any of 14 different functional categories. A list of these categories is contained in the JOPES Administration Manual.

b. Operation Plan Access. During routine operations, FMs grant a JOPES user access to one or more operation plan series; however, access can be restricted to individual operation plans, if necessary. In most cases, normal access will be granted during operation plan development. Limited access should be used only for highly sensitive operations when further access will jeopardize national security and will not be used as routine procedure. Limited access plans will be converted to normal access as soon as practicable. Limited access may be changed to normal access by the local site functional managers. Networked limited access plans may be changed to normal access only by the JNOCC. Coordination between site and network FMs and TDBMs will be required to ensure proper operation plan management and distribution. The JOPES Administration Manual should be referred to for detailed procedures in granting or changing permissions.

c. Operation Plan Storage. Operation plans may be stored on a perm file (PRMFL) or tape in TPFDD or transaction format in the JOPES data base. Operation plans are entered into JOPES data bases, and the JNOCC FM distributes them across the network.

d. Operation Plan Distribution. A networked operation plan is any operation plan that is located at more than one site. The JNOCC FM will control networked operation plans. Site FMs will control local operation plans. Site FMs will coordinate with the JNOCC for further distribution to the JOPES network for all operation plans. The JNOCC FM can modify the normal distribution scheme to meet operational needs. Once distribution is set, sites can be deleted but not added to distribution. The operation plan distribution scheme is listed in the JOPES Administration Manual, Appendix A.
e. Operation Plan Initiation. Only the JNOCC can initiate a networked operation plan regardless of whether it is limited or normal access.

f. JNOCC Control. The JNOCC exercises proponenty for the operation and maintenance of JOPES under the direction of the Joint Staff. The J-3 performs as an agent for the Joint Staff, providing functional direction for JOPES and operational control over JOPES network operations. DSSO provides technical management for the maintenance and operation of JOPES software and staffing for the JNOCC Direct Support Cell.

6. Loss of JOPES Access (Single Site). If JOPES fails locally but WIN is functional, the affected command will report the failure via the crisis TLCF and follow-up with voice communication or Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) message to the Joint Staff WIN Director and the DISA Network Operations Center, other participating CINCs, and heads of Defense agencies. The affected command will coordinate with another JOPES site and reestablish access to JOPES using telecommunication network (TELNET) procedures. The Site Functional Manager will establish permissions as required. Access to backup sites will be tested periodically to ensure that authorized personnel have permissions.

7. Loss of WIN Access (Single Site). If the WIN has failed locally but is functioning at other sites, the affected command will:

   a. Request an alternate site and report the failure via available communications capability.

   b. Report the failure via voice to the Joint Staff WIN Director and the DISA Network Operations Center and follow up with an AUTODIN message (use of AIG 8790 is recommended).

   c. Coordinate data entry and access to JOPES with DSSO, who will establish channels and procedures for reporting and retrieving deployment data.

   d. Inform the supported CINC of the loss of WIN access.

8. Loss of JOPES Control Facility. If the JNOCC facility JOPES WWMCCS host fails, JNOCC will implement the Continuity of Operations Plan by shifting OPCON of the JOPES network to a remote, operational JOPES site. Participating commands and agencies follow procedures established by JNOCC to reconstitute JOPES and recover deployment data.
9. Loss of WIN at Multiple Sites or Worldwide. Procedures contained in Joint Pub 6-03.14, 15 April 1991, "Management Procedures for the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN)," should be followed. As necessary, JNOCC will use any available communication link to coordinate and continue deployment planning or effect continued deployment as approved for execution. JNOCC will make every effort to keep the supported CINC and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed.
ANNEX A

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING CHECKLIST

Purpose. To provide a general, but not all-inclusive, checklist delineating the responsibilities and duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the supported and supporting commanders, the Services, Defense agencies, and other organizations that should be considered during the various phases of crisis action planning. The development of expanded checklists by the using organization is encouraged.
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING CHECKLIST

PHASE I--SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

1. Definition. Phase I begins with the occurrence of an event with possible national security implications and ends when that event is reported to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
   a. Monitor the world situation and evaluate all incoming reports on a developing crisis.
   b. Request a report from the supported commander, if not yet received, in whose area the crisis is developing. For close-hold situations, Focal Point system procedures will be used for reporting.
   c. Evaluate actions taken by the supported commander within existing ROE and identify supplementary ROE measures. Modifications to ROE will be coordinated with the supported commander and require approval by the Secretary of Defense.
   d. Order additional or specific intelligence-gathering activities.
   e. Provide overview of the situation to the NCA.

3. Supported Commanders
   a. Monitor current events in assigned areas of responsibility (AORs). Report significant events occurring within AORs in accordance with Joint Pubs 1-03.6, 1-03.8, 1-03.9, 1-03.15, or 6-04, as appropriate. (See Annex B.)
   b. Take appropriate action within existing ROE, requesting modifications if necessary.

4. Other Commands and Agencies. The remaining members of the JPEC monitor the developing crisis.
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING CHECKLIST

PHASE II--CRISIS ASSESSMENT

1. Definition. Phase II begins with a report from the supported commander and ends with a decision by the NCA or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop possible military COAs.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

   a. Continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event.

   b. Determine if forming a crisis response cell is required. If so, ensure early involvement of the communications planners so that adequate time is available to prepare a C4 plan.

   c. Review current strategy and existing OPLANs and CONPLANs for suitability.

   d. Provide the NCA with current information and advice as to possible military alternatives.

   e. Initiate cryptologic support package (CSP) as needed.

   f. Request the supported commander and the heads of other agencies involved to increase frequency of reporting.

   g. Request that Department of State determine the number of US nationals and other civilian noncombatants in the countries involved in the crisis who might require evacuation.

   h. Request the Services review and evaluate force readiness posture and sustainability and identify possible requirements for the Reserve components (RC).

   i. Determine if any status of forces agreements, treaties, or legal obligations exist with the governments of countries involved in the crisis or with other regional countries.

   j. Continue to review the supported commanders’ ROE and revise them as necessary.

   k. Review collected information and determine if a military COA is appropriate.
1. Request USTRANSCOM to review strategic lift asset employment availability.

m. Establish a crisis TLCF (host and alternate site) or assign task to supported commander. A TLCF participant list will be maintained in accordance with Joint Pub 6-03.14. Except when close-hold procedures apply, the TLCF will be announced by message and will be activated using the participant list. For close-hold situations, activation of the TLCF will be announced using Focal Point system procedures.

n. Redirect intelligence-gathering and reporting.

o. Involve CJCS/PA in early planning and crisis response cell. Provide CJCS/PA with information on the developing situation so that a timely determination of releasable information can be made. Direct CJCS/PA to conduct liaison with ASD(PA) as necessary.

p. Initiate an update of the JOPES data base as necessary.

q. Consider OPSEC implications of all military actions. Issue OPSEC planning guidance, if appropriate.

3. Supported Commanders

a. Continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as directed.

b. Respond as necessary within existing ROE, requesting modification if necessary.

c. Review disposition and location of assigned forces, and if needed, increase force posture and force readiness within established authority.

d. Review OPLANs and CONPLANs for applicability.

e. Assess theater transportation capabilities and advise USCINTRANS and the JPEC of constraints.

f. Use JOPES "limited-access" procedures if appropriate. (Ensure that NMCC and USCINTRANS are included on network distribution. Also, include all sites involved in the operation; e.g., Service components, supporting commands, higher headquarters, supporting agencies, and JOPES back-up sites.)
g. Evaluate the status of noncombatants in the area and determine the requirement for a noncombatant evacuation plan.

h. Advise the US Ambassador or Consul General, as applicable, of the current situation and of any potential hazards.

i. Develop command essential elements of information (EEIs). Use all available reconnaissance capabilities to gather information. Forward to the national level all unresolved EEIs.

j. Determine the key friendly, enemy, and neutral forces, and issue an intelligence estimate of the situation.

k. Implement, join, or monitor the crisis TLCF.

l. Direct the initiation of OPSEC measures, if appropriate.

4. USCINCRONS

a. Continue to monitor the crisis event.

b. Review the status of strategic lift assets.

c. Initiate an update of the JOPES data base as necessary.

d. Establish crisis TLCF if directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the TLCF is initiated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the supported commander, enter the TLCF and monitor it continuously.

5. The Services

a. Continue to monitor the crisis event.

b. Participate in the supported commanders’ review of assigned and available military forces.

c. Review and evaluate the force readiness posture and sustainability and identify possible requirements for the RCs.

d. Enter the crisis TLCF and monitor it continuously.
6. Other Commands and Agencies

   a. Continue to monitor the crisis event.

   b. Enter the crisis TLCF and monitor it continuously.
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING CHECKLIST

PHASE III--COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

1. Definition. Phase III begins with a decision to develop possible military COAs and ends when COAs are presented to the NCA.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

   a. Publish a WARNING ORDER (see sample format, Annex C).

      (1) Identify the supported commander, supporting commander, and other command relationships as required.

      (2) Define the mission and an anticipated execution day (D-day).

      (3) Define objectives, tasks, and constraints to the extent known (e.g., duration of operations, DEFCON or deployability posture, overflight rights, port clearances, existing ROE, public affairs considerations).

      (4) Allocate a generic combat force for planning or request the supported commander develop and propose a force requirement.

      (5) Provide an estimate of the strategic lift available and strategic lift assumptions or request USCINTRANS estimate the lift required.

      (6) Set a tentative C-day and L-hour or request the supported CINC to propose a C-day and L-hour.

      (7) Request the supported commander submit a COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE containing and recommending COAs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will allow the supported commander 72 hours in which to submit the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE, unless the situation is extremely time-sensitive and requires a shorter submission time.

      (8) Direct USTRANSCOM to develop a preliminary force deployment estimate and force closure profile for supported commander’s COAs.
(9) Use the WIN TLCF to interact with USCINCTRANS to ensure mission support requirements are adequately detailed.

b. Continue to review ROE and modify as necessary.

c. Monitor the COA development using JOPES.

d. Review the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE and the CONSOLIDATED DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE; analyze the COAs and recommend a COA to the NCA.

e. Provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense, the NSC, and the President.

f. Continue to involve CJCS/PA in planning, and direct that releasable, current information be provided to ASD(PA).

g. Provide OPSEC planning guidance and implement appropriate OPSEC measures.

3. Supported Commanders

a. Designate the commander of a Joint Task Force (when appropriate) in sufficient time for the JTF commander and staff to participate in subsequent phases of CAP.

b. Develop COAs. Task Service components and supporting commanders to analyze and begin tentative planning to support proposed COAs.

c. The supported commander provides guidance regarding:

   (1) The use or modification of current strategy and an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN.

   (2) The use of Service- or OPLAN-dependent force modules, including force module index assignments.

   (3) The use of JOPES ADP. (The supported commander will consider the time available, the size of the deployment, and need for accurate deployment estimates.)

      (a) Specify TPFDD development and validation coordination procedures. For example, authorize direct liaison between supporting commands and supported command Service components for purpose of TPFDD development and validation.
(b) If JOPES ADP is used for COA development and time permits, publish a TPFDD LOI.

(4) The assignment of PIDs.

(5) The requirement for non-unit-related data. (The time available, size of deployment, and requirement for accuracy in deployment estimates will be considered.)

(6) The requirements for the communications system.

(7) Potential wartime host-nation support (WHNS) agreements.

d. In COA development, consider the availability of logistic support and the physical infrastructure, including WHNS and Inter-Service Support Agreement (ISSA), in the area of operations.

e. Use an EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE (see sample format, Annex K) or include the information in the CINC's WARNING ORDER to task the component and supporting commanders to evaluate COAs.

f. Review and evaluate the EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGES provided by the component and supporting commanders and the DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE RESPONSE MESSAGE provided by USTRANSCOM. Complete COA development.

g. Publish the COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE (see sample format, Annex D), providing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with recommended and alternative COAs and with combat force and strategic lift requirements if requested in the WARNING ORDER.

h. Begin process of obtaining country clearances and overflight, landing, and staging rights.

i. Identify mapping, charting, and geodetic requirements to DMA as early as possible.

j. Identify withhold-shipping requirements for Military Sealift Command (MSC), via USTRANSCOM.

k. Determine, in coordination with supporting commanders and Service component commanders, the type of temporary duty and authorized per diem allowances under which personnel will perform duty.
1. Provide OPSEC planning guidance and implement appropriate OPSEC measures.

4. Supporting Commanders and Service Components
   
a. Analyze COAs as directed in the supported commander’s EVALUATION REQUEST MESSAGE or WARNING ORDER. Action will be taken, as directed or as time permits, to:

   (1) Identify (or source) the allocated major combat forces and determine their movement requirements.

   (2) Generate and source combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces and determine their movement requirements.

   (3) Generate sustainment (unit or non-unit-related) movement requirements.

   (4) Identify related ISSAs.

   (5) Create a TPFDD file in JOPES for COAs using assigned PIDs when directed by the supported commander.

   (6) Identify and eliminate dual-sourced units.

   (7) Provide the periodic status of the JOPES data base for COAs and notify USTRANSCOM when COAs in JOPES are ready for developing a deployment estimate.

b. Use an EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGE (see sample format, Annex M) to provide the supported commander with force and movement requirements (using JOPES) and advise the supported commander that the tentative plans to support the proposed COAs are ready for review.

5. USCINTRANS
   
a. Activate the Crisis Action Team (CAT) as required.

b. Using JOPES, assist the supporting commanders and Service components in refining force requirements (identifying and eliminating unsourced or dual-tasked units, ensuring that movement requirements are complete, etc.).

c. Develop deployment estimates as directed in the supported commander’s DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE REQUEST MESSAGE.
d. Use a DEPLOYMENT EVALUATION RESPONSE MESSAGE to provide the supported commander with a consolidated (land, air, and sea) deployment estimate for each COA. The deployment estimate will identify significant transportation limitations, if applicable (late closures, maximum port workloads, insufficient strategic lift), and other difficulties (insufficient or inaccurate movement data, unsourced units, incomplete data, etc.). This information will normally be required by the supported commander 24 to 36 hours prior to the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE submission.

6. The Services

a. Using JOPES, monitor COA development and assist Service component and supporting commanders in developing and sourcing force and support requirements.

b. Source sustainment and other non-unit-related requirements.

c. Continue to monitor and take action as authorized to improve force readiness and mobilize Reserve forces.
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX A

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING CHECKLIST

PHASE IV--COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION

1. Definition. Phase IV begins when COAs are presented to the NCA and ends when a COA is selected.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

   a. Review and evaluate COAs as provided in the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE.

   b. Refine, revise, and compile COAs as necessary; develop a new COA if appropriate. Ensure COAs proposed satisfy NCA objectives.

   c. Present COAs to the NCA, recommend a COA, and provide the NCA with advice as appropriate.

   d. If a decision of the NCA is pending and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff decides to initiate execution planning, prepare and release the PLANNING ORDER (see sample format, Annex E) to:

      (1) Direct the supported commander to begin execution planning pending a decision by the NCA.

      (2) Direct any other activity not requiring approval of the Secretary of Defense as desired in response to a crisis (e.g., modify the assigned mission, increase or decrease the forces available for planning).

      (3) Provide, amplify, or modify the information found in the WARNING ORDER. If a WARNING ORDER was not released, provide all the information normally provided in a WARNING ORDER.

   e. When a COA, or COAs in unique situations, are selected and approved by the NCA, prepare and release an ALERT ORDER (see sample format, Annex F).

      (1) Announce the decision of the NCA on a selected COA in clear, precise military objectives. If different from that submitted by the supported commander, describe the COA with sufficient detail to permit execution planning.
(2) Provide, amplify, or modify the information found in the WARNING ORDER. If a WARNING ORDER was not released, provide all the information normally provided in a WARNING ORDER.

(3) Direct the supported commander to begin execution planning.

(4) Direct preparatory force deployments and increases in force readiness as authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

f. Continue to involve CJCS/PA in planning and direct that releasable, current information be provided to ASD(PA).

g. Continue to provide OPSEC planning guidance.

3. Other Commands and Agencies. All other members of the JPEC continue with the activities described in Appendixes 1 through 3.
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX A

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING CHECKLIST

PHASE V—EXECUTION PLANNING

1. Definition. Phase V begins when a PLANNING or ALERT ORDER is received by the supported commander and ends when a decision is made to execute an OPORD.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

   a. Monitor efforts to develop the OPORD. Using JOPES, monitor data base development and act to resolve scheduling conflicts of dual-tasked units and over commitments. Monitor preparatory and pre-positioning movements.

   b. Resolve transportation shortfalls, through the JTB when established, and coordinate with the JPEC.

   c. Review the supported commander’s OPORD. Advise the NCA on the status of the situation and of military forces available to support the contingency. Ensure that the supported commander’s intent is understood by the Joint Staff and supporting commands.

   d. Continue to involve CJCS/PA in planning and direct that releasable, current information be provided to ASD(PA).

   e. Resolve conflicting materiel priorities, through JMPAB, if required.

   f. Evaluate a crisis that does not progress into Execution for possible continued planning using deliberate planning procedures in Chapter III and Joint Pub 5-03.2, JOPES, Volume II.

   g. Coordinate efforts to set a firm C-day and L-hour. Enter the C-day and L-hour in JOPES.

3. Supported Commanders

   a. Publish a TPFDD Letter of Instruction if not previously accomplished. (See sample format, Annex N).

   b. Review the PLANNING or ALERT ORDER, adjust the OPLAN if required, confirm first increment movement requirements, review deployment requirements, verify that all
elements of the communications systems are compatible, and publish an OPORD using OPREP-1 message format (see sample format, Annex J).

c. Review force and unit-related support requirements and make adjustments to JOPES as may be required to meet CJCS guidance.

d. Identify in-place or in-theater forces in JOPES.

e. Task the supporting commands to source the first increment (7 days of airlift and 30 days of sealift requirements) of the COA or OPLAN and task USCINTRANS to coordinate the overall effort.

f. Work with supporting commands to identify and resolve conflicts and shortfalls in combat forces or strategic lift.

g. Work with supporting commands and agencies to resolve critical resource shortfalls or limitations. Advise the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of all critical unresolved shortfalls or limitations.

h. Schedule, and manifest in JOPES, intratheater airlift as required.

i. Schedule MSC withhold shipping in JOPES.

j. Notify USCINTRANS (via TLCF), after review and sourcing, that the first increment of movement requirements is ready for scheduling.

k. Validate and submit movement requirements to USTRANSCOM via JOPES.

l. Use JOPES to provide USTRANSCOM and supporting commands with the number of tons per day, by channel, available for nonunit allocated lift.

m. Report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by message the early attainment of or deviations from a specified deployability posture.

n. Direct units identified to support the operation to begin SORTS reporting as defined under DEFCON 1 conditions in Joint Pub 1-03.3, Sections 1 and 15.

o. Complete agreements for country clearances required for overflight, staging, transit, and refueling for
combat, cargo, and evacuation aircraft, and for basing rights. Air Mobility Command (AMC) should arrange for own flight clearances.

p. Forward OPORD to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.

4. Supporting Commanders and Service Components

a. Review resources and identify critical shortages in forces and logistics to the supported commander and provide recommendations for resolving them. Send information copies to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Source the forces based on COA force requirements; establish preparatory and pre-positioning support requirements; report movements and publish OPORDs to support the COA.

c. Begin requesting transportation.

d. Continue force shortfall and dual-allocation resolution.

e. Begin SORTS reporting to the supported commander for forces identified for deployment.

f. Schedule the first increment of organic movement requirements from POE to POD or destination following approval by the supported commander. Intratheater movement, e.g., POD to destination, is the responsibility of the supported commander.

g. Notify supported commander via TLCF when the first increments of scheduled airlift and sealift are available in JOPES.

h. Coordinate sustainment planning between the supported commander and Services.

i. Review replacement personnel requirements and validate movement requirements in accordance with the supported CINC’s guidance.

j. Enter sealift manifest in JOPES for non-MTMC controlled ports and MSC withhold shipping.

5. USCINCTRANS

a. Release USTRANSCOM Coordinating Instruction, using both the TLCF and AUTODIN, within 8 hours following receipt of the CJCS ALERT ORDER or PLANNING ORDER.
b. Develop the air carrier and schedule data and sealift schedules to support the deployment requirements.

c. Coordinate efforts to source the first increment movement requirements. Notify the supported commander when the sourcing effort is completed.

d. Coordinate all required changes caused by conflicts and shortfalls in forces or strategic organic schedules with the supported commander.

e. Pull the initial increment for air (7 days) and surface (30 days) movement requirements. Enter the initial 4 days of airlift schedules within 36 hours after the initial pull. Subsequent airlift schedules will be completed no later than 12 hours after each pull. Initial sealift schedules will be entered when actual ship selection is made and prior to the ship’s arrival at its first SPOE. Initial sealift schedules will be entered not later than 48 hours prior to a unit’s port call. Follow-on schedules for requirements after the first 30 days increment will be entered 2 weeks prior to ships arrival at the SPOE. All schedules will be updated based on actual requests for transportation submitted.

6. The Services

a. Develop OPORD if required to support the selected COA, e.g., mobilization.

b. Review resource requirements and identify critical shortages in forces and logistics.

c. Continue SORTS reporting as requested by the supported commander for forces identified for deployment.

d. Coordinate mobilization needs with supported and supporting commands, including pre-positioning and preparatory movements and establishing mobilization stations, staging areas, or support airfield and port operations.

e. Alert transportation resources.
APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX A

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING CHECKLIST

PHASE VI--EXECUTION

1. Definition. Phase VI begins with the NCA decision to execute an OPORD and continues until the crisis situation has been resolved.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

   a. Publish an EXECUTE ORDER with the authority and under the direction of the Secretary of Defense. (See sample format, Annex H.)

      (1) Direct the supported commander to execute the operation.

      (2) Provide the execution time for the operation (D-day and H-hour) and reconfirm deployment time (C-day and L-hour) if previously stated.

      (3) Provide the final lift and resource allocation.

   b. Monitor and analyze mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities, and direct resolution of or resolve conflicts.

   c. Revise plan as conditions change.

   d. Assess accomplishment of objectives.

   e. Continue to involve CJCS/PA in planning and direct that releasable, current information be provided to ASD(PA).

   f. Direct supported and supporting commands and agencies identified to support the operation to begin reporting the status of POL and ammunition (e.g., reporting emergency petroleum, oils, and lubricants (REPOL), munitions report (MUREP)), as defined under the reporting instructions in Joint Pub 1-03.18, 13 August 1979, "Joint Reporting Structure, Logistics."

   g. Evaluate a crisis event that evolves into a prolonged situation and provide the CINC guidance on either continuing operations under CAP procedures or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures delineated in Chapter III and Joint Pub 5-03.2, JOPES, Volume II.
h. Resolve conflicting materiel priorities through JMPAB allocation procedures.

i. Resolve conflicting transportation requirements through the JTB.

3. Supported Commanders

a. Develop (if required) and execute the OPORD in accordance with the direction provided by the EXECUTE ORDER, or deploy forces as directed in the DEPLOYMENT ORDER.

b. Issue an EXECUTE ORDER to subordinate commands.

c. Revalidate movement requirements in JOPES and begin first increment deployments (if not previously accomplished).

d. Schedule subsequent increments of MSC withhold shipping.

e. Confirm next deployment increment when the first increment is under way.

f. Continue to update deployment information on the JOPES deployment data base as specified by the USTRANSCOM COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS MESSAGE.

g. Monitor and coordinate with USTRANSCOM for adjustments to transportation allocations.

h. Coordinate reprioritization of lift requirements with USTRANSCOM.

i. Evaluate reception and onward-movement capabilities.

j. Update intratheater lift schedules in JOPES and monitor organic-unit movements.

k. Monitor, assess, and report accomplishment of objectives.

l. Replan or terminate the operation, or redeploy as directed by the NCA, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

m. Report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, via the REPOL or MUREP, the status of POL and ammunition assets within the joint area of operations (JAO).
n. Prioritize items that will require strategic lift.

4. Supporting Commanders and Service Components
   a. Execute the OPORD in support of the supported commander’s OPORD.
   b. Revalidate the sourcing of the forces.
   c. Schedule and report organic movements as required by the supported CINC, using standard communications.
   d. Source and validate the next deployment increment.
   e. Update deployment information in the JOPES deployment data base as specified by the USTRANSCOM COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS MESSAGE and the Supported Commander’s TPFDD LOI.
   f. Report to the supported commander, via the REPOL or MUREP, the status of POL and ammunition assets within the JAO.
   g. Enter sealift manifest for non-MTMC-controlled ports and MSC withhold shipping into JOPES.

5. USCINCTRANS
   a. Execute OPORD in support of the supported commander’s OPORD.
   b. Coordinate with MARAD and MSC on activation of RRF and MSC-controlled shipping in support of the supported commander’s OPORD.
   c. Receive validation of first deployment increment from supported CINC and schedule movement, adjusting as required.
   d. Adjust deployment flow and schedule next deployment increment.
   e. Activate interfaces with GTN to provide planned and actual manifest data.
   f. Report arrivals and departures of air and sealift carriers in JOPES. If unable to provide automated up-dates through system interfaces, then exception reporting will be followed, i.e., 2 hours for airlift and 12 hours for sealift.
g. Continue to develop and enter movement schedules into the JOPES deployment data base and ensure that the data base reflects actual movements.

h. Provide CINC\textsc{\textregistered}s with airlift capability estimates in tons per day, by channel, as lift allocations are made or changed.

i. Provide sealift capability estimates in square feet per 5-day increment commencing with initial establishment of the sea line of communications (SLOC).

j. Dispatch USTRANSCOM liaison teams to supported and supporting commanders as necessary.

6. The Services

a. Execute OPORD in support of the supported commander’s OPORD.

b. Update deployment information in the JOPES deployment data base as specified by the USTRANSCOM COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS MESSAGE and supported CINC\textsc{\textregistered}s TPFDD LOI.

c. Ensure that movement requirements are accurate.

d. Coordinate actual sustainment movement.

e. Report the status of critical items.

f. Participate in JTB and Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) deliberations as required.
1. Purpose. This tab describes procedures to be followed during OPORD execution to expedite movement of unexpected deployment requirements.

2. Procedures. During a deployment or during OPORD execution, unexpected time-sensitive movement requirements may occur. Assuming that allocated lift assets are fully committed, these requirements can be met in one of three ways: using assets temporarily available through War Air Service Program (WASP) agreements with allies or contracting foreign airline resources; using supported commander’s allocated airlift and deferring movement of an equivalent amount of lower priority requirements; and requesting additional airlift from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See Joint Pub 4-01.)

   a. These urgent types of requirements will be identified to USCINCTRANS by the supported commander and will include Commander, AMC, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as information addressees. USCINCTRANS will investigate the availability of temporary airlift assets and schedule the requirement if these assets are available. If temporary assets are not available, USCINCTRANS will so inform the supported commander and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff so that the supported commander can decide to defer movement of a lower priority requirement or, as a last resort, to request increased airlift from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

   b. The urgency of the situation will dictate the communication means used to perform the needed coordination, with the established TLCF providing the preferred means. Movement requirements for pickup after 5 days normally can be handled through established JOPES procedures. In any event, the requirements and the lift scheduled against them will be entered into the JOPES deployment data base as expeditiously as possible, without delaying actual execution of the lift requirement.
MANAGEMENT OF CIVIL AIRLIFT AUGMENTATION RESOURCES DURING CRISES

1. Purpose. This tab outlines procedures for management of civil airlift resources during crisis execution. These procedures have been coordinated between the Departments of Defense and Transportation in consultation with the Logistics Directorate (J-4), Joint Staff. This tab is intended to provide information to those not having access to Joint Pub 4.0 series publications. The Joint Pub 4.0 series is the overall guidance publication and takes precedence when or if inconsistencies exist between this tab and Joint Pub 4.0 series documents.

2. Procedures

a. When USCINCTRANS becomes aware that DOD airlift requirements exceed (or will exceed upon realization of some stated condition) the available DOD airlift capability, USCINCTRANS will recommend to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff activation of CRAF Stages II and III. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will determine what action is needed and forward to the Secretary of Defense a request to activate either Stage II or III. Once CRAF Stage II or III is activated by the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, COMAMC will call forward the commercial airlift resources in the CRAF for which current requirements exist. COMAMC deals directly with carriers, with information to J-4 (Logistics Resource Center), USTRANSCOM, and DOT OET, on requests for incremental carrier support to meet increasing or peak demands.

b. Should airlift requirements exceed CRAF Stage III capability, USCINCTRANS may seek additional airlift resources through the following means:

   (1) Using a Portion of the War Air Service Program. To obtain additional support for unexpected or time-sensitive unprogrammed airlift requirements, use of WASP capability may be required. Requests made by USCINCTRANS for transoceanic-capable WASP aircraft support of DOD requirements will be submitted to the DOT OET. If aircraft are made available by DOT, such aircraft will be "temporarily allocated" to the CRAF program to accommodate quick access to Title XIII War Risk Insurance. Requests made by USCINCTRANS for charter use of WASP aircraft that have not been made available through commercial means will be provided to DOT, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), (Attention: WASP General Manager). If practicable, DOT, FAA, will meet such requests on a priority basis.
(2) Using Foreign-Flag International Aircraft. In special situations, USTRANSCOM may increase airlift capability through utilization of foreign-flag commercial aircraft. Additional foreign flag airlift may be obtained by the implementation of existing agreements between providing nations and the United States (such as NATO Allied Pre-Committed Civil Aircraft (NAPCAP), Canadian Airlift Assets, or Republic of Korea Civil Augmentation Programs) or by solicitation of additional airlift through normal contracting procedures.

(a) NATO strategic airlift aircraft may be obtained through the NAPCAP. NAPCAP aircraft become available after the North Atlantic Council decides the rapid reinforcement of Europe is necessary. The availability of NAPCAP augmentation is not tied to CRAF activation. Once activated, requests for NAPCAP aircraft will be made in accordance with implementation instructions signed between the providing nation and the Air Mobility Command.

(b) Strategic aircraft may be obtained from Korean Airlines in the event of a contingency involving the Korean peninsula. Implementation instructions for the use of Korean Airlines during a contingency detail the steps necessary to obtain the use of these aircraft.

(c) In addition, USCINCTRANS may request CJCS authority to obtain additional airlift assets from friendly foreign-flag carriers via normal contract procedures. Upon approval by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, USTRANSCOM obtains contracts with foreign airlines through direct procurement methods.

(3) Civil Reserve Air Fleet. To increase CRAF size when long-term (30 days or more) changes to airlift resource requirements are indicated, USCINCTRANS will follow procedures outlined in DOD or DOT Memorandum of Understanding on CRAF. Use of WASP or available foreign-flag capability should be requested before efforts are made to expand CRAF sizing.

c. As a routine practice, USCINCTRANS will be included as an information addressee on all USTRANSCOM-related message traffic.

d. Any additional civil aircraft made available and subsequently allocated beyond the CJCS allocation to satisfy US
Airlift requests will be USTRANSCOM-gained aircraft. These unplanned aircraft will be manually incorporated into the airlift flow and the JOPES data base subject to any restrictions placed on their use by the providing nation.
ANNEX B

PHASE I--CRISIS REPORTING

1. Purpose. Crisis reporting, as it applies to Phase I of the CAP procedures, is designed to:
   
   a. Provide, on an urgent basis, timely, accurate, and to the degree possible, assessed information to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

   b. Aid in the decisionmaking process with respect to the employment of US military forces in a crisis situation in support of US national interests.

2. Procedures
   
   a. The procedures for initial crisis reporting are provided in Joint Pubs 1-03.6, 1-03.8, 1-03.9, and 1-03.15.

   b. CAP procedures use the OPREP-3 format for the immediate reporting of serious incidents and events by the cognizant CINC. These reports establish the basis for crisis recognition and for the initiation of CAP.

3. Sample Reports. See Appendixes 1 and 2. Detailed instructions for crisis reports are provided in Joint Pubs 1-03.6, 1-03.8, 1-03.9, 1-03.15, and 6-04.

4. Information Provided. An OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT report will include:
   
   a. Information on the current situation.

   b. Action being taken within the constraints of the commander’s current ROE.

   c. Forces that are readily available.

   d. Timeframe for the earliest commitment of forces.

   e. Major constraints, if any, on the employment of forces.
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B
SAMPLE OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT

Voice Report

"NMCC this is a USCENTCOM FORWARD BRIGHT STAR Element OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT Over."

"USCENTCOM FORWARD BRIGHT STAR Element this is NMCC send COMMAND ASSESSMENT Over."

"This is USCENTCOM Forward BRIGHT STAR Element."

Flash

UNCLASSIFIED

OPREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT

1. Serial 001

2. COMMAND ASSESSMENT. The Blueland XXX Tactical Fighter Wing reported at 030030Z October XX rebel forces infiltrated Desert West Air Base and detonated explosive charges on two Blueland F-4s and one F-16 causing considerable damage to the aircraft.

3. It appears rebels are being supported by the Government of Yellowland.

4. Intentions of Blueland forces unknown at this time.

5. No damage or injury to US forces or equipment in position for Exercise BRIGHT STAR.

...Confirmation report will follow.

OVER."

Message Report

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: USCINCCENT//BRIGHT STAR//

TO: NMCC WASHINGTON DC

{OTHER ADDRESSES AS REQUIRED}
CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/OPREP-3PCA*/USCENTCOM/001//

REF/A/VMG/HQ USCENTCOM/030056ZOCTXX//

AMPN/PINNACLE VOICE REPORT FM FWD BRIGHT STAR ELEMENT TO NMCC//

FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/COMMAND ASSESSMENT//

GENTEXT/COMMAND ASSESSMENT/

1. ( ) DAMAGE TO BLUELAND A/C. VOICE REPORT TO NMCC 030056Z OCT ____________.

2. ( ) THE BLUELAND XXX TACTICAL FTR WG REPORTED AT 030030Z OCT REBEL FORCES INFILTRATED DESERT WEST AB AND DETONATED EXPLOSIVE CHARGES ON TWO BLUELAND F-4S AND ONE F-16 CAUSING CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO ALL A/C.

3. ( ) ONE REBEL KILLED AND ANOTHER CAPTURED. IT APPEARS REBELS ARE BEING SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF YELLOWLAND.

4. ( ) INTENTIONS OF BLUELAND FORCES ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.

5. ( ) NO DAMAGE OR INJURY TO US FORCES OR EQUIPMENT IN POSITION FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR.

6. ( ) ANTICIPATE FURTHER OPREP-3P REPORTS ON THIS INCIDENT.//

DECL/OADR//

* If harassment or attack of US forces is involved, the above sample will contain the flagword FRONT BURNER following the flagword OPREP-3PCA.
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B

SAMPLE OREP-3 PINNACLE COMMAND ASSESSMENT/CINC ASSESSMENT

Voice Report

"This is a PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT from USCINCCENT for the NMCC. In response to a report by USCENTCOM FORWARD BRIGHT STAR that an attack by rebel forces on Blueland Desert West Air Base has taken place, US forces in position for Exercise BRIGHT STAR will maintain an increased alert posture and will be prepared to assist the Government of Blueland as required. Support will initially be limited to aerial warning and surveillance capability using E-3As and RC-135s currently in place at Desert West Air Base for Exercise BRIGHT STAR. Confirmation message will follow."

Message Report

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
TO: NMCC WASHINGTON DC

{OTHER ADDRESSEES AS REQUIRED}

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE/

MSGID/OREP-3PCA/USCINCCENT/

REF/A/VMG/USCINCCENT/120050ZAPRXX/

AMPN/VOICE REPORT TO NMCC/

FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/COMMAND ASSESSMENT/

GENTEXT/COMMAND ASSESSMENT/

1. ( ) REBEL FORCES HAVE ATTACKED BLUENOND A/C AT DESERT WEST AB. VOICE REPORT TO NMCC 120050Z APR _____.

2. ( ) USCENTCOM FWD {BRIGHT STAR} HAS REPORTED REBEL FORCES INFILTRATED DESERT WEST AB AND DETONATED EXPLOSIVE CHARGES ON TWO BLUENOND F-4S AND ONE F-16 CAUSING CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO THE A/C.

3. ( ) ONE REBEL KILLED AND ANOTHER CAPTURED. IT APPEARS REBELS ARE BEING SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF YELLOWLAND.
4. ( ) INTENTIONS OF BLUELAND FORCES ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.

5. ( ) US FORCES IN POSITION FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR ARE ON INCREASED ALERT AND WILL BE PREPARED TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND, AS REQUIRED.

6. ( ) SUPPORT INITIALLY WILL BE LIMITED TO AERIAL WARNING AND SURVEILLANCE USING E-3AS AND RC-135S CURRENTLY IN PLACE AT DESERT WEST AB FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR.

7. ( ) ANTICIPATE FURTHER OPREP-3 REPORTS ON THIS INCIDENT.//

DECL/OADR//
ANNEX C

CJCS WARNING ORDER

1. Purpose. The WARNING ORDER will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate Phase III--Course of Action Development. If the crisis warrants change in the alert status of units or pre-positioning of units, then the WARNING ORDER can contain a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER. The WARNING ORDER is normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the order contains deployment of forces, Secretary of Defense authorization is required.

2. When Issued. The WARNING ORDER will be issued at the earliest practicable time following recognition of a crisis.

3. How Issued. The WARNING ORDER normally will be issued by record communication, using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate. If the situation is time-sensitive, voice communications or WIN TLCF should be used initially to pass WARNING ORDER information. A voice order or a WIN TLCF may be acted on immediately; however, a record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable to confirm oral or WIN orders, tasks, etc., and to keep all crisis participants informed. The Focal Point system will be used if the situation dictates. Restricted access SPECAT handling with a specific authorized code word on messages is often used to ensure maximum security for operational intentions and is generally transmitted to predetermined addressees.

4. Addressees. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees in the AIG include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. Contents

   a. The WARNING ORDER of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and should contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the WARNING ORDER may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be provided with essential...
guidance necessary to permit him to commence crisis planning. The WARNING ORDER should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available. During the preparation of the WARNING ORDER, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will use the WIN TLCF to interact with the supported commander to ensure mission requirements are adequately detailed. NORMALLY, THE WARNING ORDER WILL EITHER ALLOCATE MAJOR COMBAT FORCES AND STRATEGIC LIFT AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING OR REQUEST THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER’S ASSESSMENT OF FORCES AND STRATEGIC LIFT REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SHOULD BE SENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN MESSAGE FORM, REFERENCING THE INITIAL WARNING ORDER.

b. The WARNING ORDER defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, command relationships, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, such as changes to existing ROE or any specific directions from the NCA, will also be provided as necessary, but maximum flexibility will be left to the supported commander in determining how to carry out the assigned mission and tasks.

c. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the WARNING ORDER are:

(1) Purpose Statement. Statement that the message is a WARNING ORDER. Indicate specific tasking or requests to supported and supporting commanders, such as the deadline for receipt of the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE and preliminary deployment estimates.

(2) Situation. Short summary of the situation, including, as appropriate:

(a) Political situation and possible enemy forces in the expected area of operation. A brief description of the area of operation.

(b) Anticipated attitude and actions of friendly nations.

(c) Type, level, and source of major combat forces available for planning or a request for the commander’s assessment of forces and strategic lift required.

(d) Assumptions that may significantly affect the commander’s planning.
(3) Mission. A concise statement of the mission to be accomplished and its purpose.

(4) Execution

(a) Courses of Action. If the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire that specific COAs be examined, they will be listed here. Otherwise, the supported commander will develop the COAs he considers appropriate. Reference will be made to an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN if applicable.

(b) OPSEC and Deception Guidance

(c) PSYOP Guidance

1. PSYOP Mission. Directions to conduct PSYOP in support of the military mission. Circumstances may dictate a more definitive statement.

2. PSYOP Objectives. List specific target audience perceptions and behaviors sought.

3. PSYOP Themes. List themes to stress and avoid to achieve each objective, or refer to themes in an OPLAN.

(d) Intelligence Guidance

1. Intelligence personnel and equipment available to augment the supported commander.

2. Availability of national intelligence collection and communications assets.

3. Delegation of SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority.

4. ROE for intelligence collection operations.

(e) Counterintelligence (CI) Guidance

1. Designate Service(s) to provide CI element(s).

2. Establish CI liaison responsibilities.

3. Develop CI collection requirements.
(f) Civil Affairs (CA) Guidance

1. CA Mission. List required actions and specific results sought, such as minimizing interference and maximizing influence regarding the civilian population’s impact on military operations; satisfying legal and moral obligations of the commander to the civil population; determining the availability of host nation support resources; providing support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations; enhancing friendly nation stability and infrastructure development; and facilitating postconflict restoration or transition activities.

2. CA Objectives. List specific results sought, such as determination assessment of civil, indigenous, and host nation support resources; support for humanitarian assistance and population or resource control operations; assistance to civil requirements; facilitation of postconflict transition activities; and enhanced friendly nation self-help capabilities to provide socioeconomic services.

(g) Coordinating Instructions

1. Tentative C-day and L-hour (if other than 0001Z) for planning.*

2. Anticipated date of execution (D-day). The date may be highly tentative at this time, but it provides the commander with a relative timeframe for planning, based on the NCA perception of urgency.

3. Anticipated duration of operations.

4. DEFCON or deployability posture.

5. Known operational constraints; e.g., overflight, port clearances.

6. Use of the JOPES.

* Updated, if required, in a PLANNING ORDER or ALERT ORDER. Firmly established by a CJCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER or EXECUTE ORDER.
7. ROE guidance.
8. Supporting commander coordination or monitoring instructions.

(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation, as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority.

2. Allocation of strategic lift resources available for planning, if applicable (number and type if known).

3. Load planning factors for each lift resource type, if available (allowable cabin load (ACL); number of passengers; outsize, bulk, and oversize cargo).

4. Other strategic movement planning guidance as appropriate (such as fund cites for pre-positioning strategic lift resources).

(b) JOPES instructions.

(c) Force activity designators (FADs) assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code if warranted. (The CJCS project code is obtainable from JMPAB.)

(d) Known logistic constraints.

(e) Personnel deployment criteria.

(f) Code words or nicknames of the operation.

(g) Reporting instructions. Special instructions and suspenses for the submission of reports.

(h) Classification and declassification guidance.

(i) Public affairs guidance.

(j) Combat camera.

(k) Restricted access SPECAT handling.
(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications guidance.

(b) Command relationships. Specify the supported and supporting commanders and supporting agencies, coordination instructions, and provide listing of the NCA-approved command relationship the gaining command will exercise (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) over transferred forces (if known and if NCA approval has been obtained at this point in the crisis response).

(c) WIN TLCF guidance.

6. DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION and DEPLOYMENT ORDERS. If required by prevailing circumstances, the WARNING ORDER may include a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER or DEPLOYMENT ORDER; i.e., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to pre-position for impending operations. If the WARNING ORDER contains such information, the first paragraph will state "This is a WARNING ORDER. The Secretary of Defense has authorized . . . ."

7. Sample WARNING ORDER. The Appendix is a sample WARNING ORDER.
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS WARNING ORDER

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL*
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC


* AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

C-1-2
AMPN/SUFFICIENT USTRANSCOM AERIAL TANKER ASSETS TO SUPPORT THIS
OPERATION ARE APPORTIONED FOR PLANNING//

NARR/( ) THIS IS A WARNING ORDER. REQUEST USCINCCENT COMMANDERS
ESTIMATE WITH ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION FOR NCA CONSIDERATION BY
231000Z NOV____. USTRANSCOM WILL PROVIDE PRELIMINARY
DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES AND FORCE CLOSURE PROFILES TO THE SUPPORTED CINC UPON REQUEST.**

GENTEXT/SITUATION/**

1. ( ) THE SITUATION IN ORANGELAND IS EXTREMELY TENSE FOLLOWING AN ATTEMPTED COUP BY PRO-YELLOWLAND REBELS ON 20 NOV. THE CAPITAL REMAINS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, BUT EL ASSID AIRFIELD SOUTH OF THE CAPITAL HAS FALLEN TO REBEL FORCES. YELLOWLAND, RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR AID BY THE REBELS, FLEW IN ELEMENTS OF TWO COMMANDO UNITS FROM EL ODD TO EL ASSID AIRFIELD AND HAS CONDUCTED TU-22/BLINDER BOMBING MISSIONS FROM EL ODD AGAINST THE CAPITAL. THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE AGAINST THE CAPITAL IS AS YET UNDETERMINED. PRESIDENT NOSS OF ORANGELAND HAS REQUESTED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE FROM BLUELAND UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THEIR MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT. TENSIONS BETWEEN YELLOWLAND AND ORANGELAND HAVE BEEN AT A HIGH LEVEL THROUGHOUT THE YEAR. COL HOMM SUPPORTED AN EARLIER COUP ATTEMPT IN MID-FEBRUARY AND, IN RECENT MONTHS, HAS INCREASED ARMS SHIPMENTS TO REBEL FORCES WHILE DETAINING DISSIDENTS IN CAMPS WITHIN YELLOWLAND. THE LATEST COUP ATTEMPT FOLLOWS IN THE WAKE OF HOMMS CALL FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT AND A RECENT ALLIANCE OF HERETOFORE ANTAGONISTIC REBEL FORCES. AS A RESULT OF THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE AREA, THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND (GOB) HAS MADE DIPLOMATIC INQUIRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT BLUELAND EFFORTS IN ORANGELAND.

2. ( ) THE GOB WILL ASSIST US FORCES AND PROVIDE NECESSARY ACCESS TO FACILITIES AND HOST NATION SUPPORT WHERE FEASIBLE.

3. ( ) EASTLAND MAY BE EXPECTED TO DENY BASING ACCESS TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

4. ( ) WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOB TO PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCS).//

* If DEPLOYMENT ORDERS or DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS are incorporated within a WARNING ORDER, the message must be issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense (i.e., THIS IS A WARNING ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED. . . .) The Secretary of Defense should then be an information addressee as well as AMEMB and USDAO, if appropriate.

** Situation Assessments will be prepared by or in coordination with DIA.
5. ( ) COURSES OF ACTION. US ASSISTANCE MAY INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: ASSIST IN NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO), CONDUCT SHOW OF FORCES, PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUELAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS, CONDUCT OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED, AND PARTICIPATE IN A PEACEKEEPING ROLE.

   A. ( ) USCINCPAC. THE 15TH MEB AND MPS SHIPPING IN USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX ARE NO LONGER ALLOCATED TO USCINCPAC.

   B. ( ) USCINCLANT. PROVIDE ONE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE COMPOSED OF AN AMPHIBIOUS MEB AND REQUISITE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPPING TO USCINCPAC.

   C. ( ) USCINCTRANS. PLAN FOR EARLY DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE INVOLVEMENT AND PLAN TO PROVIDE HIGHEST PRIORITY MOVEMENT OF QUALIFIED MATERIAL DURING THIS OPERATION.

   D. ( ) DIRNSA. PROVIDE SIGINT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

   E. ( ) DIA. PROVIDE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

   F. ( ) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. EACH COA SHOULD BE EVALUATED IN TERMS OF THE OPSEC MEASURES NEEDED TO ENSURE THE CONDITIONS OF ESSENTIAL SECRECY REQUIRED FOR ITS EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION. IN ADDITION TO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI) DELINEATED IN THE REF, YOUR OPSEC PLANNING SHOULD ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING EEFI: (PROVIDE ADDITIONAL NCA AND CJCS EEFI, AS APPROPRIATE, CONCERNING THE CURRENT SITUATION).

6. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE

   A. ( ) PSYOP MISSION STATEMENT

   B. ( ) PSYOP OBJECTIVES

      (1) ( ) PERSUADE OPPOSING FORCES NOT TO FIGHT.

      (2) ( ) PERSUADE LOCAL POPULACE NOT TO INTERFERE.

   C. ( ) PSYOP THEMES TO STRESS

      (1) ( ) US ACTIONS ARE LAWFUL.

      (2) ( ) US FORCES ARE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO WIN.

   D. ( ) PSYOP THEMES TO AVOID
(1) ( ) STEREOTYPES OF RELIGION, RACE, ETC.
(2) ( ) PROMISES THAT CANNOT BE KEPT.

E. ( ) PSYOP OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

(1) ( ) DATE TO INITIATE IN-THEATER PSYOP.
(2) ( ) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.
(3) ( ) TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY.
(4) ( ) COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

7. ( ) INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE.

8. ( ) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE.

9. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) GUIDANCE

A. ( ) CA MISSION STATEMENT.

B. ( ) CA OBJECTIVES

(1) ( ) FACILITATE OR COORDINATE ESSENTIAL POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS.

(2) ( ) ASSIST COMMAND COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL LAW OR HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS MEETING ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN POPULACE NEEDS.

(3) ( ) DETERMINE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT CAPABILITY OR RESOURCES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS.

(4) ( ) ASSIST IN OBTAINING AVAILABLE INDIGENOUS AND HOST-NATION SUPPORT.

(5) ( ) SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS.

(6) ( ) FACILITATE COMMANDERS ACTIVITIES IN ACHIEVING DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS IN FRIENDLY NATIONS.

(7) ( ) COORDINATE SUPPORT FOR RESTORATION OF BASIC SERVICES IN AN OCCUPIED OR FRIENDLY COUNTRY.

C. ( ) CA OPERATION CONSIDERATIONS

(1) ( ) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.
10. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. ( ) TENTATIVE M-DAY AND F-HOUR. 210001Z NOV ___.

B. ( ) TENTATIVE C-DAY AND L-HOUR. 290001Z NOV ___.

C. ( ) ANTICIPATED D-DAY. 1 DEC ___.

D. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

E. ( ) DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE. AS DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT.

F. ( ) KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.

G. ( ) NO CHANGE IN USCINCCENT ROE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF IS EXPECTED.

H. ( ) SUPPORTING COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY SUPPORTED COMMANDERS. FOR EXAMPLE, USCINCTRANS WILL PROVIDE AIR-REFUELING SUPPORT AS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

I. ( ) UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.

J. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.// GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

11. ( ) TRANSPORT

A. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B2.

B. ( ) ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES IS FOR INITIAL PLANNING, SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENT IN PLANNING, ALERT, DEPLOYMENT, AND EXECUTE ORDERS.

(1) ( ) GENERAL. FOR PLANNING, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION WAS AUTHORIZED ON 17 NOV ___ IN SUPPORT OF EXECUTION OF USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX. AIRLIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM PLUS CRAFT STAGE II. SEALIFT PLANNING WAS BASED ON USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE RRF.
(2) ( ) Airlift. Supported CINC (USCINCPAC) for OPLAN XXXX may continue to plan on JSCP, Annex J, apportionment (approximately ___ percent of the total capability at partial mobilization and CRAF stage II).

(3) ( ) Sealift. USCINCPAC can continue to plan on using assets apportioned by JSCP, Annex J, in the appropriate tables under partial mobilization conditions, including USTRANSCOM and assets from the RRF and SRP.

(4) ( ) The Joint Transportation Board (JTB) has determined that a minimum of _____ percent of total air and sealift capability must be allocated to support requirements in other theaters and to maintain essential LOCs. Further, if required, the JTB has approved two sets of lift allocations for deployment and sustainment as follows:

   (A) ( ) If USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX is implemented alone, USCINCPAC may plan on all remaining capability (____ percent).

   (B) ( ) If USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX and USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX are implemented concurrently, USCINCPAC may continue to plan on JSCP, Annex J, apportionment under partial mobilization conditions with some modifications as outlined below. USCINCCENT may plan for assets made available as a result of declaration of partial mobilization and activating CRAF stage III (at approximately USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX C-DAY minus 4 for CRAF stage III). The airlift assets include up to ___ wide-body cargo, ___ wide-body passenger, ___ narrow-body cargo, ___ narrow-body passenger, ___ C-5, ___ KC-10, and ___ C-141 aircraft. If required, specific phasing of these aircraft will be outlined in the USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX alert order. Regarding and shallow draft tankers are acknowledged to be a modification to USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX planning, the temporary release of USTRANSCOM aircraft from USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX support will be on a one-for-one exchange for commercial capability from CRAF stage III assets. Regarding sealift, clean product tankers limitation; the JTB defers by-type allocations of these assets pending clearer definition of requirements and of number and location of tankers by type and capacity. USCINCTRANS and appropriate supporting commanders, in coordination with CINCs, will apply the appropriate aircraft and ship types and configurations needed to meet cargo and Pax movement requirements within each flow. If JTB must address allocations by type (e.g., C-5 aircraft or RO/RO ships), include all necessary data and rationale to support JTB action in time for alert order.

   (C) ( ) Use JSCP, Annex J, to determine load planning factors, with direct liaison authorized between Alcon if specific questions arise.
(D) ( ) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY THE JOINT STAFF. ALL REQUESTS FOR TRANSPORTATION WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH DOD 4500.32R, MILSTAMP. PARENT SERVICE(S) OF DEPLOYING UNIT(S) MUST PROVIDE FUND CITES FOR MOVEMENTS. USTRANSCOM MAY PLAN ON NCA DECISION RESPONSE TO STRATEGIC WARNING WITH SUFFICIENT LEAD-TIME TO RESPOND TO CINC(S) PRE-C-DAY MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS BEGINNING AT C-2 WITH PARTIALLY MOBILIZED LIFT ASSETS AND PERSONNEL. PRE-C-DAY MOVES PRIOR TO C-2 MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH ORGANIC AND NONMOBILIZED CAPABILITY AND EQUIVALENT CIVIL AUGMENTATION. SERVICES WILL PROVIDE FUNDING GUIDANCE TO USTRANSCOM IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT AND EXECUTE ORDER(S). IF SUPPORTED CINC(S) OR PROVIDING ORGANIZATIONS REQUIRE NON-OPORD INTRATHEATER LIFT SUPPORT PRIOR TO EXECUTE AND DEPLOYMENT ORDERS, THE PARENT SERVICE(S) OF UNITS BEING SUPPORTED WILL FUND USTRANSCOM TARIFF CHARGES AS APPLICABLE.

12. ( ) JOPES WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP COA. COORDINATE WITH THE JNOCC FUNCTIONAL MANAGER TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE JOPES SITES (TO INCLUDE NMCC) ARE ON NETWORK DISTRIBUTION FOR EACH COA PID.

13. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY THE APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

14. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS

   A. ( ) STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT ARE INADEQUATE TO PROVIDE TIMELY SUPPORT TO DEPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTIPLE REGIONAL PLANS. CINC(S) DESIGNATED FOR LESS THAN TOP PRIORITY FOR LIFT ALLOCATION MUST CONSIDER EXTENDING FORCE ARRIVAL DATES AND/OR CHANGING MODES OF LIFT. LESS THAN FULL MOBILIZATION AGGRAVATES THE SITUATION.

   B. ( ) SOME SUSTAINMENT COMMODITIES, ESPECIALLY HIGH-TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS, ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY.

   C. ( ) EXPANSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE IS NOT VIABLE IN THE SHORT TERM, ESPECIALLY ON PARTIALLY MOBILIZED FOOTING.

15. ( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. ESSENTIAL UNIT MESSING IS AUTHORIZED FOR PERSONNEL ATTACHED, ASSIGNED, OR SERVING IN A TEMPORARY DUTY OR TRAVEL STATUS.

16. ( ) CODE WORD ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS BLUENOSE.

17. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. USCINCCENT IS AUTHORIZED TO USE OPREP-1 REPORTING PROCEDURES, AS REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION, SUBMIT DETAILED AFTER-ACTION REPORTS TO CJCS IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30 AND CJCS MOP 53.
18. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

19. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

A. ( ) PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL FINAL APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN BY OASD (PA). PUBLIC AND NEWS MEDIA INQUIRIES CONCERNING THIS OPERATION SHOULD BE TAKEN AND REFERRED TO THE DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, OASD( PA). DURING REGULAR DUTY HOURS, CALL DSN 227-5131, OR COMMERCIAL (703) 697-5131. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT THE DOD PUBLIC AFFAIRS DUTY OFFICER AT THE SAME NUMBER (RECORDED MESSAGE WILL PROVIDE CELLULAR PHONE NUMBER OF DUTY OFFICER) OR CONTACT THE NMCC, DSN 227-8322 OR 225-1858 (COMMERCIAL IS 697 AND 695, RESPECTIVELY).

B. ( ) PROVIDE INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PPAG) VIA SEPARATE MESSAGE TO OASD( PA): DPL, WITH INFORMATION TO CJCS/PA. REFER TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF DOD INSTRUCTION 5405.3, DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE, FOR DETAILED GUIDANCE. UPON APPROVAL BY OASD( PA), SUCH INTERIM GUIDANCE MAY BE USED IN THE EVENT OF AN INQUIRY REGARDING ANY PART OF THE PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THIS OPERATION, WHICH MAY HAVE BECOME OBVIOUS TO THE PUBLIC OR PRESS. IN GENERAL, THE INTERIM PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

1. ( ) A PROPOSED SHORT STATEMENT (GENERAL IN NATURE) WITH RELATED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, AS APPROPRIATE.

2. ( ) A PUBLIC AFFAIRS SITUATION AND ANALYSIS REPORT. THIS SECTION OF THE INTERIM PPAG SHOULD PROVIDE THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS ASSESSMENT REGARDING:

   A. ( ) ANTICIPATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH (ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE).

   B. ( ) REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNAL INFORMATION AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS ACTIVITIES.

   C. ( ) ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT INFORMATION BUREAUS.

   D. ( ) REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS FIELD COMMUNICATIONS AND INTERTHEATER AND INTRATHEATER TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT.

   E. ( ) RECOMMENDATION FOR MEDIA ACCESS TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS (OPEN ACCESS VERSUS POOLING).

   F. ( ) ESTIMATES REGARDING THE NUMBER OF MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES THAT MAY BE ACCOMMODATED.
(G) ( ) ANTICIPATED GROUND RULES, GUIDELINES, AND ACCREDITATION FOR MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES.

(H) ( ) ANTICIPATED SECURITY REVIEW REQUIREMENTS.

(I) ( ) ESTIMATED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AUGMENTATION REQUIREMENTS.

20. ( ) COMBAT CAMERA. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED TO THE MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE EXTENT BY JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA FORCES. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (WHEN APPROPRIATE), PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, TRAINING, COMBAT MEDICAL SUPPORT, INTELLIGENCE, AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. IMPLEMENT JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA PROCEDURES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF SIGNIFICANT GUN CAMERA VIDEO AND FILM IMAGERY DEPICTING THE DELIVERY OF ORDNANCE TO MEET NCA, CJCS, AND DOD REQUIREMENTS. NEITHER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, OPERATIONS SECURITY, NOR SUBJECT SENSITIVITY SHOULD PRECLUDE COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION. COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY WILL BE CLASSIFIED TO THE LEVEL REQUIRED. EXPEDITE THE DELIVERY OF COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY TO THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER, THE PENTAGON, THROUGH THE DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE (CODEWORD ELIGIBLE ARTIST) OR OTHER APPROPRIATE TRANSPORTATION MEANS COMMENSURATE WITH THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE IMAGERY. PRECOORDINATE THE MOVEMENT OF EXPEDITED COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL WITH THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER (JCCC). IT CAN RECEIVE MATERIAL FROM ANY OF THE WASHINGTON DC AREA AIRPORTS (NATIONAL, DULLES, OR BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL) AND FROM ANDREWS AFB. IT CAN ALSO RECEIVE MATERIAL THROUGH OVERNIGHT DELIVERY SERVICES AND SATELLITE TRANSMISSIONS. ADDRESS COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL GOING TO THE JCCC AS FOLLOWS: ATTENTION: JCCC

ROOM 5A518 PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20330-1000 (RACK 2)

TELEPHONE: DUTY HOURS:
DSN: 227-2900
COMM: (703) 697-2900

PAGER: NONDUTY HOURS:
COMM: (202) 542-2579/2533 (LEAVE NUMBER AND CALL WILL BE RETURNED.)

FAX: DSN 223-4775 (703) 693-4775.//
21. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR CJCS-CONTROLLED TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCS MOP 3. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY, USCINCCENT WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

22. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCCENT IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC, USCINCLANT, USCINCSPACE, USCINTRANS, CINCFOR, USNCINCO, USCINCSOC, AND USCINCSSTRAT ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. COMACC IS A SUPPORTING RESOURCE MANAGER. NSA, DMA, DISA, AND DIA ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES. THE NCA-APPROVED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP WILL BE DETAILED IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES.//

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//
ANNEX D

COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE

1. Purpose

a. The COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE, submitted by the supported commander in response to a CJCS WARNING ORDER, provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with time-sensitive information for consideration by the NCA in meeting a crisis situation. Essentially, it reflects the supported commander’s analysis of the various COAs* that may be used to accomplish the assigned mission and contains recommendations as to the best COA. Although the estimative process at the supported commander’s level may involve a complete, detailed estimate by the supported commander, the estimate submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will normally be a greatly abbreviated version providing only that information essential to the NCA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in arriving at a decision to meet a crisis.

b. Supporting commanders normally will not submit a COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; however, they may be requested to do so by the supported commander. They may also be requested to provide other information that could assist the supported commander in formulating and evaluating the various COAs.

2. When Submitted

a. The COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE will be submitted as soon as possible after receipt of the CJCS WARNING ORDER but no later than the deadline established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the WARNING ORDER. Although submission time is normally 72 hours, extremely time-sensitive situations may require that the supported commander respond in 4 to 8 hours.

* Recommended COAs submitted for NCA approval may be contained in current OPLANs or CONPLANs or may be developed to meet situations not addressed by current plans. Regardless of origin, these courses of actions will be specifically identified when they involve military operations against a potential enemy.
b. Follow-on information or revisions to the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE should be submitted as necessary to complete, update, or refine information included in the initial estimate.

c. The supported commander may submit a COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE at the commander’s own discretion, without a CJCS WARNING ORDER, to advise the NCA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the commander’s evaluation of a potential crisis situation within the AOR. This situation may be handled by a SITREP instead of a COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE.

3. How Submitted. The COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE is submitted by record communication, normally with a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate. WIN TLCF should be used initially to pass the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE but must be followed by immediate record communication to keep all crisis participants informed.

4. Addressees. The message is sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with information copies to the Services, components, supporting commands, USTRANSCOM, TCCs, and other appropriate commands and agencies.

5. Contents

a. The COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE will follow the major headings of a COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE of the situation as outlined in Appendix 1 to Annex D but will normally be substantially abbreviated in content. As with the WARNING ORDER, the precise contents may vary widely, depending on the nature of the crisis, time available to respond, and the applicability of prior planning. In a rapidly developing situation, a formal COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE may be initially impractical, and the entire estimative process may be reduced to a commander’s conference, with corresponding brevity reflected in the estimate when submitted by record communications to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also, the existence of an applicable OPLAN may already reflect most of the necessary analysis.

b. The essential requirement of the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to provide the NCA, in a timely manner, with viable military COAs to meet a crisis. Normally, these will center on military capabilities in terms of forces available, response time, and significant logistic considerations. In the estimate, one COA will be recommended. If the supported commander desires to submit alternative COAs, an order of priority will be established. All COAs in the WARNING ORDER will be addressed.
c. The estimate of the supported commander will include specific information to the extent applicable. The following estimate format is desirable but not mandatory and may be abbreviated where appropriate.

(1) Mission. State the assigned or deduced mission and purpose. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, that the supported commander considers necessary to accomplish the mission.

(2) Situation and Courses of Action. This paragraph is the foundation of the estimate and may encompass considerable detail. Because the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is concerned primarily with the results of the estimate rather than the analysis, for purposes of the estimate submitted, include only the minimum information necessary to support the recommendation.

(a) Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Include only a brief summary, if applicable, of the major factors pertaining to the characteristics of the area and relative combat power that have a significant impact on the alternative COAs.

(b) Enemy Capability. Highlight, if applicable, the enemy capabilities and psychological vulnerabilities that can seriously affect the accomplishment of the mission, giving information that would be useful to the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in evaluating various COAs.

(c) Own Courses of Action. List COAs that offer suitable, feasible, and acceptable means of accomplishing the mission. If specific COAs were prescribed in the WARNING ORDER, they must be included. For each COA, the following specific information should be addressed:

1. Combat forces required; e.g., 2 TFS, 1 airborne brigade. List actual units if known.
2. Force provider.
3. Destination.
4. Required delivery dates.
5. Coordinated deployment estimate.

7. Strategic lift requirements, if appropriate.

(3) Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Highlight enemy capabilities that may have significant impact on US COAs.

(4) Comparison of Own Courses of Action. For the submission to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, include only the final statement of conclusions and provide a brief rationale for the favored COA. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative COAs if significant in assisting the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in arriving at a decision.

(5) Recommended Course of Action. State the supported commander’s recommended COA.*

6. Sample COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE. The Appendix is a sample of a COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE.

* Recommended COA should include any recommended changes to the ROE in effect at that time.
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D
SAMPLE COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE

IMMEDIATE {OR FLASH AS APPROPRIATE}

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
TO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO: CSA WASHINGTON DC
      CNO WASHINGTON DC
      CSAF WASHINGTON DC
      CMC WASHINGTON DC
      CDRUSEL NORAD PETERSON AFB CO
      USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
      USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
      CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
      HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
      USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
      USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
      DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
      USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE

DISTR: CINC/DCINC/CCJ1/CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ4/7/CCJ5/CCJ6

DRAFTER: LT COL J. ALBRITTON, USAF
          CCJ7, EXT 53046

* Sample shows OPREP-1 format. Narrative information of
COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE does not have to be reported via an
OPREP-1. If JOPES is not available for reporting force and
deployment data, formatted messages in accordance with JOPES
DBA Users Manual will be used {see Chapter II}. 
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

CLASSIFICATION
OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCCENT//
SUBJ/COMMANDERS ESTIMATE ( )//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV ___/__/NOTAL//

AMPN/CJCS WARNING ORDER//

REF/B/DOC/USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX//

RMKS/1. ( ) MISSION. WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUERLAND (GOB) TO PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUERLAND STRONG POINTS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOCS).

2. ( ) SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION


B. ( ) ASSIGNED AND SUPPORTING FORCES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

C. ( ) USCINCCENT HAS DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF ACTIONS (COAS):

(1) ( ) COA 1. DEPLOY AND EMPLOY FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX TPFDD. TACTICAL FIGHTER AND RECONNAISSANCE WING TO USE BABA AFB AS MAIN OPERATING BASE. 15TH MEB TO DEPLOY VIA STRATEGIC AIR TO JOIN WITH MPS EQUIPMENT. CVBG TO OPERATE MODLOC VIA SOUTHEASTERN SEA. TWO ARMY BDES DEPLOY TO PORT WASI VIA STRATEGIC AIR TO JOIN WITH EQUIPMENT SHIPPED BY SEA. SUBSEQUENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AS REQUESTED BY GOB TO INCLUDE, BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO, NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO), SHOW OF FORCE, AND PROTECTION AND DEFENSE OF BLUERLAND STRONG POINTS AND LOCS.

(2) ( ) COA 2. DEPLOY AND EMPLOY AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX TPFDD. HOLD MEB AND ARMY BDES ON CALL. SUBSEQUENT MILITARY OPERATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AS REQUESTED BY GOB.
3. ( ) ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COA. ENEMY CAPABILITIES CANNOT SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF US MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDER EITHER COA. UNDER COA 2, HOWEVER, THERE IS AN INCREASED POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE AGAINST ISOLATED AMERICANS IN RETALIATION FOR US FORCE ARRIVAL. ARRIVAL OF SMALL AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCE PACKAGES FOR SHOW OF FORCE RESTRICTS COMMANDERS POTENTIAL TO CONDUCT NEOS OR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS WITHOUT GROUND FORCES.

4. ( ) COMPARISON OF OWN COAS

   A. ( ) COA 1 PROVIDES FOR SIMULTANEOUS EMPLOYMENT OF THE ENTIRE TASK FORCE AND IS THE MOST DESIRABLE FOR TACTICAL EXECUTION. THE INITIAL PRESENCE OF AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES, COUPLED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE 15TH MEB AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT ABOARD MPS, PROVIDES CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY FOR RAPID INSERTION OF SECURITY FORCES AS REQUIRED BY GOB. THIS COA REQUIRES THE LONGEST RESPONSE TIME (___DAYS AIRLIFT AND ___DAYS SEALIFT (DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE)) FOR CLOSURE OF THE ENTIRE TASK FORCE. EMPLOYMENT COULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY.

   B. ( ) COA 2 HAS ADVANTAGE OF MOST RAPID RESPONSE (___DAYS AIRLIFT AND ___DAYS SEALIFT (DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATE)) FOR AIR FORCE AND NAVAL FORCES. IT PROVIDES FOR A REPRESENTATIVE FORCE TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO GOB AND DEMONSTRATE US RESOLVE IN AREA. ITS PRIMARY DISADVANTAGE IS THAT ALL GROUND FORCES ARE ON CALL. HOWEVER, RESPONSE TIME FOR MEB AND ARMY BDES COULD BE MINIMAL AS MPS AND MSC SHIPS COULD BE IN MODLOC POSITION OFF COAST OF PORT WASI PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL.

5. ( ) DECISION. RECOMMEND COA 1.

6. ( ) REMARKS. FORCE, LOGISTIC, AND TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENT DETAILS HAVE BEEN LOADED INTO THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) AND ARE AVAILABLE UNDER PLAN IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (PID) XXXXT (COA 1) AND PID XXXXU (COA 2).//

DECL/OADR//
ANNEX E

CJCS PLANNING ORDER

1. Purpose. The PLANNING ORDER may be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate Phase V for the supported commander. It does not eliminate the CJCS requirement in Phase IV to obtain NCA approval of a COA before execution in Phase VI. The PLANNING ORDER is normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. When Issued. A PLANNING ORDER is issued when execution planning is desired before NCA approval of a COA is obtained or to compress the phases of the CAP while obtaining NCA approval on a CJCS-recommended COA (also see Annex F).

3. How Issued. A PLANNING ORDER is normally issued by record communication using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate. If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communications or WIN TLCF can be used to pass PLANNING ORDER information; however, a record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable to confirm oral or WIN orders, tasks, etc., and to keep all crisis participants informed.

4. Addressees. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are the CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. Contents

a. At the Joint Staff level, the PLANNING ORDER generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and will contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the PLANNING ORDER may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be given the guidance necessary to permit him to begin crisis planning. The PLANNING ORDER should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available. NORMALLY, THE PLANNING ORDER WILL ALLOCATE MAJOR COMBAT FORCES AND STRATEGIC LIFT AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SHOULD BE ISSUED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN MESSAGE FORM AND REFERENCE THE INITIAL PLANNING ORDER.
b. The PLANNING ORDER defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, including any specific direction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will also be provided as necessary, but the supported commander will retain maximum flexibility in determining how he will carry out his assigned mission and tasks.

c. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the PLANNING ORDER are:

(1) Statement That the Message is a PLANNING ORDER. State that the message is a PLANNING ORDER and indicate specific taskings or requests to supported and supporting commanders, such as the deadline for receipt of the OPERATIONS ORDER. If not previously requested in a COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE REQUEST ORDER, task USTRANSCOM to provide a preliminary deployment estimate and force closure profile to the supported commander and inform the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Situation. A short summary of the situation, including, as appropriate:

(a) Political situation and possible enemy forces in the expected area of operation and a brief description of the area of operation.

(b) Anticipated attitude and actions of friendly nations.

(c) Type, level, and source of major combat forces available for planning or a request for the commander’s assessment of forces and strategic lift required.

(d) Assumptions that may significantly affect the commander’s planning.

(3) Mission. A concise statement of the mission to be accomplished and its purpose.

(4) Execution

(a) Course of Action. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will specify a COA to be planned. Reference may be made to an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN.
(b) OPSEC Guidance. Provide guidance similar to that in the WARNING ORDER.

(c) PSYOP Guidance

1. PSYOP Mission. Give directions to conduct PSYOP in support of the military mission. Circumstances may dictate a more definitive statement.

2. PSYOP Objectives. List specific target audience perceptsives and behaviors sought.

3. PSYOP Themes. List themes to stress and avoid to achieve each objective or refer to theme in an OPLAN.

(d) Intelligence Guidance

1. Intelligence personnel and equipment available to augment the supported commander.

2. Availability of national intelligence collection and communications assets.

3. Delegation of SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority.

4. ROE for intelligence collection operations.

(e) Counterintelligence (CI) Guidance

1. Designate Service(s) to provide forward CI element(s).

2. Establish CI liaison responsibilities.

3. Develop CI collection requirements.

(f) Civil Affairs (CA) Guidance

1. CA Mission. List required actions and specific results sought, such as minimizing interference and maximizing influence regarding the civilian population’s impact on military operations; satisfying legal and moral obligations of the commander to the civil population; determining the availability of host nation support resources; providing support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations; enhancing friendly nation stability and infrastructure development; and facilitating postconflict restoration or transition activities.

2. CA Objectives. List specific results sought, such as determination assessment of civil, indigenous, and host nation support resources; support for humanitarian assistance and population or resource control operations; assistance to civil requirements; facilitate postconflict transition activities; and enhance friendly nation self-help capabilities to provide socio-economic services.

(g) Coordinating Instructions

1. Proposed C-day and L-hour (if other than 0001Z) for planning.*

2. Anticipated date of execution (D-day). This date may be tentative at this time, but it provides the commander with a relative time-frame for planning, based on the CJCS perception of urgency.

3. Anticipated duration of operations.

4. DEFCON or deployability posture.

5. Known operational constraints; e.g., overflight, port clearances, and revisions to existing ROE.

6. USTRANSCOM coordination and monitoring instructions.


(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation, as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority.

* Updated, if required, in ALERT ORDER. Firmly established by a CJCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER or EXECUTE ORDER.
2. Allocation of strategic lift resources available for planning, if applicable (number and type if known).

3. Load planning factors for each type of lift resource, if available (ACL; number of passengers; outsize, bulk, and oversize cargo).

4. Other strategic movement planning guidance as appropriate (such as fund cites for prepositioning strategic lift resources).

(b) JOPES instructions.

(c) Force activity designators (FADs) assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code if warranted. (CJCS project code obtainable from JMPAB.)

(d) Known logistic constraints.

(e) Personnel deployment criteria.

(f) Code words and code numbers of the operation.

(g) Reporting instructions. Special instructions and suspenses for the submission of reports.

(h) Classification and declassification guidance.

(i) Public affairs guidance.

(j) Combat camera.

(k) Restricted access SPECAT handling.

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications guidance.

(b) Command relationships. Include a designation of supported and supporting commanders, coordination instructions, and listing of the command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) being proposed for NCA approval that the gaining commander may exercise over transferred forces and the locations where the transfer will be effective (normally the AOR boundary). When it is decided that forces will not transfer from one CINC to another but those forces
must perform actions at the direction of the supported commander, then a "support" relationship must be established between the two combatant commanders.

(c) WIN TLCF guidance.

6. Sample PLANNING ORDER. The Appendix is a sample PLANNING ORDER.
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E
SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS PLANNING ORDER

{PRECEDENCE}
FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL*
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA/CC/
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

* AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.
E-1-2
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL

JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE/

MSGID/ORDER/CJCS/

AMPN/SPECIAL HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS/

REF/A/MSG/USCINCENT/242100ZNOV__/-/NOTAL/

REF/B/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV__/-/NOTAL/

NARR/COMMANDERS ESTIMATE AND CJCS WARNING ORDER/

ORDTYP/OTR/CJCS/

AMPN/PLANNING ORDER*--MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO BLUELAND/

TIMEZONE/Z/

ORDREF/OPLAN/USCINCENT..XXXX/

HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION/

5UNIT

/JTF HEADQUARTERS /

/UNITDES /UNITLOC /CMNTS

/123INF BDE (SEP) /

/1 AMPHIB RED GP /

/MEU /

/1 TFS (F-15) /

/23 TFS (F-4) /

/8 E3AS /

/2 AERS/

* A PLANNING ORDER may be issued without a WARNING ORDER.

E-1-3
AMPN/SUFFICIENT USTRANSCOM AERIAL TANKER ASSETS TO SUPPORT THIS OPERATION ARE ALLOCATED/

NARR/( ) THIS IS A PLANNING ORDER. REQUEST USCINCCENT CONDUCT EXECUTION PLANNING IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE EXECUTION OF COA NUMBER ONE FROM REF A AND SUBMIT OPORD OR IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTION FOR NCA CONSIDERATION BY 251000Z NOV ___./*

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. ( ) SHIPPING HAS CEASED TO BLUeland FOLLOWING REPEATED ATTACKS ON MERCHANT VESSELS BY ORANGELAND AIRCRAFT. PRESIDENT JIMBO OF BLUeland HAS REQUESTED US ASSISTANCE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE HOLWELL AND ZIMMER AGREEMENT. TENSIONS BETWEEN BLUeland AND ORANGELAND HAVE BEEN HIGH FOR THE LAST 2 YEARS. BOTH NATIONS HAVE CONDUCTED MINOR ATTACKS ON INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES AND UTILITIES, UTILIZING SPECIAL OPERATIONS TEAMS, BUT NEITHER NATION IS CAPABLE OF A MAJOR ASSAULT BECAUSE OF A LACK OF AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING AND AIRBORNE FORCES. THE LACK OF SHIPPING INTO AND OUT OF BLUeland IS CRIPPLING THE NATIONS ECONOMY. AS A RESULT OF THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE AREA, THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUeland (GOB) HAS MADE DIPLOMATIC INQUIRIES ABOUT POSSIBLE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT BLUeland EFFORTS AGAINST ORANGELAND AIR ATTACKS.

2. ( ) THE GOB WILL ASSIST US FORCES AND PROVIDE NECESSARY ACCESS TO FACILITIES AND WILL PROVIDE HOST-NATION SUPPORT WHERE FEASIBLE.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

3. ( ) WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOB TO PROTECT SHIPPING AND DEFEND BLUeland STRONG POINTS AND LOCs.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

4. ( ) COURSE OF ACTION. CONDUCT DETAILED PLANNING FOR COA NUMBER ONE AS CONTAINED IN REF A. US ASSISTANCE MAY INCLUDE BUT NOT BE LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: ESTABLISH US AIR SUPERIORITY IN THE REGION, CONDUCT SHOW OF FORCES, PROTECT AND DEFEND US AND BLUeland SHIPPING, PROTECT AND DEFEND BLUeland STRONG POINTS AND LOCs, ATTACK ORANGELAND AIRFIELDS AND PORTS AS

* When not preceded by a WARNING ORDER, insert "USTRANSCOM will provide preliminary deployment estimates and force profiles to the supported commander upon request with information to the Joint Staff in accordance with Joint Pub 5-03.1."
NECESSARY, CONDUCT OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED SHORT OF MAJOR LAND ATTACKS IN ORANGELAND.

5. ( ) USCINCPAC. MAINTAIN ONE CVBG AND ONE ARG OR MEU IN THE NAS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. BE PREPARED TO AUGMENT COMIDEASTFOR WITH NTDS AND MISSILE-CAPABLE ESCORTS IF DIRECTED. BE PREPARED TO TRANSFER THESE FORCES TO USCCENT OPCON WHEN DIRECTED BY THE NCA.

6. ( ) COMACC. BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY AND TRANSFER FIGHTER SQUADRONS, RESCUE SQUADRON, AND E-3A AIRCRAFT TO USCCENT. TRANSFERRED FORCES SHOULD PLAN TO OPERATE UNDER USCCENT OPCON UPON ENTERING USCCENT AOR.

7. ( ) DIRNSA. PROVIDE SIGINT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

8. ( ) DIA. PROVIDE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

9. ( ) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT FORCE MOVEMENTS WILL GENERATE A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST FROM POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. HOSTILE COLLECTION ASSETS WILL BE ACTIVE, AND OPSEC PROCEDURES THROUGHOUT THE PLANNING, EXECUTION, AND EXERCISE ARE IMPERATIVE. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI) ARE: (AS SPECIFIED IN OPLAN OR OPORD).

10. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE

   A. ( ) PSYOP MISSION STATEMENT.
   
   B. ( ) PSYOP OBJECTIVES
      
      (1) ( ) PERSUADE OPPOSING FORCES NOT TO FIGHT.
      
      (2) ( ) PERSUADE LOCAL POPULACE NOT TO INTERFERE.
   
   C. ( ) PSYOP THEMES TO STRESS
      
      (1) ( ) US ACTIONS ARE LAWFUL.
      
      (2) ( ) US FORCES ARE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO WIN.
   
   D. ( ) PSYOP THEMES TO AVOID
      
      (1) ( ) STEREOTYPES OF RELIGION, RACE, ETC.
      
      (2) ( ) PROMISES THAT CANNOT BE KEPT.

11. ( ) INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE
12. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) GUIDANCE

A. ( ) CA MISSION STATEMENT.

B. ( ) CA OBJECTIVES

(1) ( ) DETERMINE INDIGENOUS AND HOST NATION SUPPORT CAPABILITY OR RESOURCES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS.

(2) ( ) ASSIST IN OBTAINING AVAILABLE INDIGENOUS AND HOST NATION SUPPORT.

(3) ( ) SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS.

(4) ( ) FACILITATE OR COORDINATE ESSENTIAL POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES TO MINIMIZE CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS.

(5) ( ) ASSIST COMMAND COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATIONAL LAW OR HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS MEETING ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN POPULACE NEEDS.

(6) ( ) FACILITATE COMMANDERS ACTIVITIES IN ACHIEVING DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS IN FRIENDLY NATIONS.

C. ( ) CA OPERATION CONSIDERATIONS

(1) ( ) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.

(2) ( ) TRANSPORTATION PRIORITY.

(3) ( ) COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

13. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

A. ( ) PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR, 280001Z NOV __. REQUEST USTRANSCOM COORDINATE WITH THE SUPPORTED CINCS AND RECOMMEND FIRM C-DAY, L-HOUR TO CJCS.

B. ( ) TARGET DATE FOR EXECUTION IS 30 NOV __.

C. ( ) SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED COMMANDS DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT DATA ARE REQUIRED TO USTRANSCOM BY 230400Z NOV __.

D. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION IS IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.

E. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL MANAGE DEPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF USCINCCENT.
F. ( ) DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE ARE AS DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT.

G. ( ) KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. ROE IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.//

H. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

14. ( ) TRANSPORT

A. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY IS 1B2.

B. ( ) APPORTIONMENT OF STRATEGIC LIFT RESOURCES IS FOR INITIAL PLANNING, SUBJECT TO FURTHER REFINEMENT IN ALERT, DEPLOYMENT, AND EXECUTE ORDERS.

   (1) ( ) AIRLIFT PLANNING TO BE BASED ON USTRANSCOM ASSETS. SEALIFT PLANNING TO BE BASED ON USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET FORCE PLUS THE RRF.

   (2) ( ) USTRANSCOM AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, IN COORDINATION WITH THE CINCS, WILL APPLY THE APPROPRIATE AIRCRAFT AND SHIP TYPE AND CONFIGURATIONS NEEDED TO MEET CARGO AND PAX MOVEMENT REQUIREMENTS WITHIN EACH FLOW. IF JTB MUST ADDRESS ALLOCATIONS BY TYPE (E.G., C-5 AIRCRAFT OR RO/RO SHIPS), INCLUDE ALL NECESSARY DATA AND RATIONALE TO SUPPORT JTB ACTION IN TIME FOR ALERT ORDER.

15. ( ) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WILL NOT BE PROVIDED BY THE JOINT STAFF. PARENT SERVICE(S) OF DEPLOYING UNITS(S) MUST PROVIDE FUND CITES FOR MOVEMENTS. SERVICES WILL PROVIDE FUNDING GUIDANCE TO USTRANSCOM IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT AND EXECUTE ORDER(S). IF SUPPORTED CINCS OR PROVIDING ORGANIZATIONS REQUIRE NON-OPORD INTRATHEATER LIFT SUPPORT PRIOR TO EXECUTE AND DEPLOYMENT ORDERS, THE PARENT SERVICE(S) OF UNITS BEING SUPPORTED WILL FUND TARIFF CHARGES AS APPLICABLE.

16. ( ) JOPES WILL BE USED TO DEVELOP COA. COORDINATE WITH THE JNOCC FUNCTIONAL MANAGER TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE JOPES SITES (INCLUDING NMCC) ARE ON NETWORK DISTRIBUTION FOR EACH COA PID.

17. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY THE APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

18. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.

19. ( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. ESSENTIAL UNIT MESSING IS AUTHORIZED FOR PERSONNEL ATTACHED, ASSIGNED, OR SERVING IN A
TEMPORARY DUTY OR TRAVEL STATUS. DOD PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO CARRY A VALIDATED PASSPORT WHEN DEPLOYED TO BLUELAND.

20. ( ) UNCLASSIFIED NICKNAME ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION IS BIRDMAN.

21. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. CINC IS AUTHORIZED TO USE OPREP-1 REPORTING PROCEDURES AS REQUIRED. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING AS PRESCRIBED IN JOINT PUBS 1-03 AND 6-04. MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE REPORTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED CJCS PROCEDURES. SUBMIT DETAILED AFTER-ACTION REPORTS TO CJCS IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30.

22. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

23. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

   A. ( ) PUBLIC RELEASE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS OPERATION (BEYOND ANY APPROVED INTERIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE THAT MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM CJCS WARNING ORDER TASKING) IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL APPROVED BY OASD(PA). PUBLIC AND MEDIA INQUIRIES, BEYOND THE SCOPE OF APPROVED INTERIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG), IF APPLICABLE, SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, OASD(PA). DURING REGULAR DUTY HOURS, CALL DSN 227-5131 OR COMMERCIAL (703) 697-5131. AFTER DUTY HOURS, CONTACT THE DOD PUBLIC AFFAIRS DUTY OFFICER AT THE SAME NUMBER (RECORDED MESSAGE WILL PROVIDE CELLULAR PHONE NUMBER OF DUTY OFFICER) OR CONTACT THE NMCC, DSN 227-8322 OR 225-1858 (COMMERCIAL IS 697 AND 695, RESPECTIVELY).

   B. ( ) PROVIDE DETAILED PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PPAG) VIA SEPARATE MESSAGE TO OASD(PA): DPL, WITH INFORMATION TO CJCS/PA. THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE WILL CONFORM TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF DOD INSTRUCTION 5404.3, DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE, AS FOLLOWS:

   (1) ( ) REFERENCES. IDENTIFY PERTINENT MESSAGES OR DOCUMENTS.

   (2) ( ) OPERATIONAL INFORMATION. EXPLAIN THE REFERENCES, THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT, AND ANY EXISTING OR ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS.

   (3) ( ) COORDINATION INFORMATION. EXPLAIN THE PURPOSE OF THE MESSAGE; CONFIRM THAT IT HAS BEEN FULLY COORDINATED AND THEATER-APPROVED; REQUEST ASD(PA) APPROVAL AND SPECIFY THE DATE IT IS REQUIRED FOR USE.
(4) ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS APPROACH. RECOMMEND ACTIVE OR PASSIVE APPROACH FOR THE OPERATION.

(5) ( ) PUBLIC STATEMENT. PROVIDE A STATEMENT EXPLAINING THE OPERATION. THE STATEMENT WILL BE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE IN AN ACTIVE PA APPROACH OR FOR RESPONSE TO QUERY IN A PASSIVE PA APPROACH.

(6) ( ) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. PROVIDE A LIST OF PROPOSED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED QUESTIONS.

(7) ( ) CONTINGENCY STATEMENT. PROVIDE A CONTINGENCY STATEMENT TO BE USED BEFORE RELEASE OF THE FINAL PAG. THIS STATEMENT MAY BE THE SAME AS THAT PROPOSED EARLIER IN THE INTERIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE RESULTING FROM THE CJCS WARNING ORDER TASKING.

(8) ( ) MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION. PROVIDE OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION INCLUDING:

(A) ( ) MEDIA INFORMATION CENTERS. COMPOSITION, RESPONSIBILITIES, SECURITY REVIEW PROCEDURES, ETC.

(B) ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. DESIGNATION OF SOLE APPROVING AUTHORITY FOR ALL OPERATIONS-RELATED NEWS MATERIALS, PROCEDURES FOR THE RELEASE AND/OR CLEARANCE OF INFORMATION, HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS (IF APPLICABLE), ETC.

(C) ( ) MEDIA COVERAGE. STATE WHETHER MEDIA COVERAGE IS ENCOURAGED OR SOLICITED, GIVING RATIONALE, NEWS MEDIA TRANSPORTATION INSTRUCTIONS, POINT OF CONTACT AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING SUCH REQUESTS, REQUIREMENTS FOR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES (VALID PASSPORT, WORKING MEDIA VISA), LOCAL ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS, FUNDS FOR FOOD, LODGING, RETURN TRAVEL (IF MILITARY AIR IS NOT AVAILABLE), ETC., INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING MEDIA REQUESTS FOR ACCOMPANYING TRAVEL BEFORE THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE OPERATION, ETC.

(D) ( ) DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL. IDENTIFY ARRANGEMENTS FOR LOCAL GROUND AND/OR AIR TRANSPORTATION, SPECIAL CLOTHING OR EQUIPMENT TO BE PROVIDED, MESSING, BILLETING, PROTECTION OF MEDIA EQUIPMENT AND GEAR, LOCAL ESCORT REQUIREMENTS, AND COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT OF FILING OF POOL PRODUCTS. IDENTIFY THE PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT SHOULD THE POOL BE ACTIVATED.

(E) ( ) INTERNAL MEDIA AND AUDIOVISUAL COVERAGE. IDENTIFY ASSISTANCE THAT WILL BE PROVIDED, DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (TO INCLUDE WHETHER ESCORTS ARE NECESSARY), SCREENING OF
VISUAL INFORMATION (VI) MATERIALS UPON COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION, SPONSORING COMMAND POC FOR HANDLING INTERNAL INFORMATION MATTERS, ETC. ALSO INCLUDE GUIDELINES FOR ARMED FORCES AUDIO-VISUAL TEAMS DOCUMENTING THE OPERATION.

(F) ( ) MEDIA OPPORTUNITIES. IF KNOWN IN ADVANCE, PROVIDE CHRONOLOGY OF POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL EVENTS THAT WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO MEDIA.

(G) ( ) MISCELLANEOUS PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSIDERATIONS. INDICATE ANY OTHER PROPOSED PA ACTIVITIES OR CONSIDERATIONS.

(H) ( ) POINTS OF CONTACT. IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATING POCs NAME AND PHONE NUMBER.

(I) ( ) DECLASSIFICATION INFORMATION. PROVIDE DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS IN THE LAST PART OF THE MESSAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUBSECTION 4-207 OF DOD 5200.1-R.

24. ( ) COMBAT CAMERA. THIS OPERATION WILL BE DOCUMENTED TO THE MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE EXTENT BY JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND PARTICIPATING MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA FORCES. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION IS REQUIRED FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (WHEN APPROPRIATE), PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, TRAINING, COMBAT MEDICAL SUPPORT, INTELLIGENCE, AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. IMPLEMENT JOINT COMBAT CAMERA AND MILITARY SERVICE COMBAT CAMERA PROCEDURES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF SIGNIFICANT GUN CAMERA VIDEO AND FILM IMAGERY DEPICTING THE DELIVERY OF ORDNANCE TO MEET NCA, CJCS, AND DOD REQUIREMENTS. NEITHER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, OPERATIONS SECURITY, NOR SUBJECT SENSITIVITY SHOULD PRECLUDE COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION. COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY WILL BE CLASSIFIED TO THE LEVEL REQUIRED. EXPEDITE THE DELIVERY OF COMBAT CAMERA IMAGERY TO THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER, THE PENTAGON, THROUGH THE DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE (CODENAME ELIGIBLE ARTIST) OR OTHER APPROPRIATE TRANSPORTATION MEANS COMPENSATE WITH THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE IMAGERY. PRECOORDINATE THE MOVEMENT OF EXPEDITED COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL WITH THE JOINT COMBAT CAMERA CENTER (JCCC). IT CAN RECEIVE MATERIAL FROM ANY OF THE WASHINGTON DC AREA AIRPORTS (NATIONAL, DULLES, OR BALTIMORE–WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL) AND FROM ANDREWS AFB. IT CAN ALSO RECEIVE MATERIAL THROUGH OVERNIGHT DELIVERY SERVICES AND SATELLITE TRANSMISSIONS. ADDRESS COMBAT CAMERA MATERIAL GOING TO THE JCCC AS FOLLOWS:

ATTENTION: JCCC

ROOM: 5A518 PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20330–1000 (RACK 2)
25. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. WHERE CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES ARE NOT SATISFIED BY AUGMENTING OR SUPPORTING UNITS, USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL VALIDATE AND FORWARD REQUIREMENTS FOR CJCS-CONTROLLED TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CJCS MOP 3. BECAUSE OF LIMITED SATELLITE CAPACITY, USCINCCENT WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

26. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. USCINCCENT IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER. USCINCEUR, USCINCPAC, USCINCLANT, CINCFOR, USCINCSTRAT, AND USCINCTRANS ARE SUPPORTING COMMANDERS. (COMACC IS A SUPPORTING RESOURCE MANAGER. NSA, DMA, AND DIA ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES.) FORCES TRANSFERRED FROM USCINCPAC AND COMACC TO USCINCCENT WILL PLAN TO OPERATE UNDER USCINCCENT OPCON. COMACC FORCES WILL PLAN TO TRANSFER AT THE USCINCCENT AOR BOUNDARY. LOCATION AND TIME OF TRANSFER OF USCINCPAC FORCES HAVE NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED BY THE NCA.

27. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP JOINT STAFF INFORMED USING COMMANDERS SITREP IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04.//

AKNLG/Y//

DECL/OADR//
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
ANNEX F

CJCS ALERT ORDER

1. Purpose. The ALERT ORDER will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The ALERT ORDER requires Secretary of Defense authorization because it conveys the NCA decision on COA selection that might initiate execution planning.

2. When Issued. An ALERT ORDER will normally be issued following a decision by the NCA that conduct of military operations in support of national interests is a distinct possibility. The ALERT ORDER will normally be issued following receipt of the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE. In a rapidly developing situation, however, the ALERT ORDER may be issued immediately following recognition of a crisis without the prior exchange of information normally included in Phases I, II, and III of CAP procedures, or it may be omitted if a PLANNING ORDER has been issued (also see Annex E).

3. How Issued. The ALERT ORDER will be issued by record communication, normally using a precedence of IMMEDIATE. In a particularly time-sensitive situation, a FLASH precedence or an emergency action message may be appropriate. Oral or WIN teleconferencing notification should be made but must be followed by record communication.

4. Addressees. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are the CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees in the AIG include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. Contents

   a. The specific contents of the ALERT ORDER may vary widely, as with the WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER, depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. An existing plan may be applicable as written, partially applicable, or adapted to fit the particular crisis. When no existing plan is adaptable to the crisis, the emergency preparation of an OPORD may be necessary.

   b. The ALERT ORDER will generally follow the major paragraph headings of an OPORD and may include any or all of the information listed in subparagraphs 5b(1) through (6) below. For
valid information previously covered in the WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER, reference to the order is sufficient. Information that is not applicable or is irrelevant to execution planning may be omitted. Where an OPLAN is applicable, only minimal information such as the target date for execution or changes in ROE may be necessary. The following format is designed to serve as a checklist for guidance information that may be relevant. It is not intended as a listing of mandatory information, and unnecessary headings should be deleted in situations where they are not required.

(1) Authority. Statement indicating authority for issuing the ALERT ORDER. Indicate specific taskings or requests to supported and supporting commanders.

(2) Situation. A description of the current politico-military situation as developed in the latest DIA intelligence assessment. Reference to enemy and friendly forces is not required unless necessary for execution planning or not otherwise available to the supported commander.

(3) Mission. A refined statement of the tasks and purpose to be accomplished. It may or may not have changed from the anticipated mission previously provided in the WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER or the estimate of the supported commander.

(4) Execution

(a) Course of Action. The COA as finally approved by the NCA in clear, precise military objectives. This will be the basis for the concept of operation of the supported commander.

(b) Combat Forces. A listing of the combat forces approved for the operation.

(c) Strategic Lift Pre-Positioning. Authority, if appropriate, to pre-position lift assets preparatory to deployment operations.

(d) OPSEC Guidance. When no WARNING or PLANNING ORDER has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Appendix 1, Annex C, subparagraph 5e.

(e) PSYOP Guidance. When no WARNING or PLANNING ORDER has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(c).

(f) Intelligence Guidance
(g) Counterintelligence Guidance. When no WARNING or PLANNING ORDER has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(e).

(h) Civil Affairs Guidance. When no WARNING or PLANNING ORDER has been issued, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(f).

(i) Coordinating Instructions

1. Proposed C-day and L-hour for deployments.*
2. Proposed M-day for mobilization.
3. Target D-day for execution.
4. Estimated duration of the operation.
5. DEFCON or deployability posture.
6. Operational constraints, including any special ROE for this specific operation.
7. Release of SIOP-committed forces.
8. Unit combat readiness criteria.

(j) Public Affairs Guidance. See CJCS WARNING or PLANNING ORDER.

(k) Combat Camera Guidance. See CJCS WARNING or PLANNING ORDER.

(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation, as follows:

* The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or designated agent coordinates the proposed date with USCINTRANS and the other CINCs as required and recommends changes to C-day and L-hour, if required. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish or issue a firm C-day and L-hour. One C-day and L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. In establishing L-hour, effort should be made to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day.
1. Airlift movement priority.

2. Maximum numbers and types of strategic lift resources available.

3. Load-planning factors for each type of lift resources.

4. Other strategic movement planning guidance, as appropriate.

(b) Force activity designator (FAD) assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code, if warranted.

(c) Fund citations, authorization to commit resources, or both.

(d) Personnel deployment criteria.

(e) Code names and code numbers of the operation.

(f) Reporting instructions.

(g) Classification and declassification guidance.

(h) Known logistic constraints.

(6) Command and Signal

(a) Communications Guidance. Specific guidance on request of CJCS-controlled assets.

(b) Command Relationships

1. Designation of supported and supporting commanders and coordination instructions.

2. NCA-approved command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) the gaining commander will exercise over forces transferred by the NCA and locations where the force transfers will be effective (normally AOR boundary).

6. DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDERS or DEPLOYMENT ORDERS. If required by circumstances, the ALERT ORDER may include a DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER or DEPLOYMENT ORDER; i.e., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to pre-position for impending operations.
7. Sample ALERT ORDER. The Appendix is a sample ALERT ORDER.

NOTE: Items previously provided in the WARNING ORDER or PLANNING ORDER and/or DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER need not be repeated unless information has changed.
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX F
SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS ALERT ORDER

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL*
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA//

DOCDIV

* AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action
addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph
will designate supported and supporting commanders.
Information addressees will include the Services and other
interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be
included as information addressees to speed dissemination and
facilitate planning.

F-1-1
NARR/( ) THIS IS AN ALERT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED EXECUTION PLANNING FOR USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

SUPPORTED CINC OPORD OR IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY 301000Z NOV ___.//*

GENTEX/SITUATION/
1. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEX/MISSION/
2. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEX/EXECUTION/

3. ( ) COURSE OF ACTION. THE NCA APPROVED COA NUMBER 1 AS CONTAINED IN REF B.

* In addition to narrative information, the OPORD may contain a summary of major combat forces as allocated in the WARNING ORDER. The primary method of passing force and deployment data is JOPES online, with formatted messages as a backup.
4. ( ) MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. APPROVED AS PER REF A.

5. ( ) ___________. USCINCTRANS IS AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AIRCRAFT AND STAGE CREWS TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

6. ( ) OPSEC GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. ( ) INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

9. ( ) CI GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

10. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

   A. ( ) PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR IS 290001Z OCT __. REQUEST USTRANSCOM COORDINATE WITH SUPPORTING CINCS AND RECOMMEND FIRM C-DAY, L-HOUR TO CJCS.

   B. ( ) TARGET DATE FOR EXECUTION IS 1 DEC __.

   C. ( ) SUPPORTING COMMANDS DEPLOYMENT AND MOVEMENT DATA ARE REQUIRED TO USTRANSCOM BY 280400Z NOV __. MOVEMENT SCHEDULES* REQUIRED BY 290400Z NOV __.

   D. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY USCINCCENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.

   E. ( ) OTHER COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS AS PER WARNING ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER.

   F. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

11. ( ) TRANSPORT. ALLOCATION OF STRATEGIC LIFT FOR REVISED PLANNING, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION AUTHORIZED 17 NOV __. AIRLIFT PLANNING IS BASED ON USTRANSCOM PLUS CRAF STAGE III (EFFECTIVE PROPOSED C-DAY MINUS 4). SEALIFT PLANNING IS BASED ON USTRANSCOM-CONTROLLED FLEET PLUS THE RRF AND SELECTIVE REQUISITIONING OF US FLAG MERCHANT MARINE OVER AND ABOVE THE RRF.

   A. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY. 1B2.

   B. ( ) ACTIVATING CRAF STAGE III IS PRUDENT GIVEN THE LIFT REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX. ACCORDINGLY,

* The primary method of passing above data is via JOPES online with formatted messages as a backup.
STRATEGIC ASSETS FROM CRAFT STAGE III ARE MADE AVAILABLE AS OUTLINED ABOVE. IF REQUIRED, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THE CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. AS NOTED IN THE WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER, USTRANSCOM AIRCRAFT FROM USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX SUPPORT WILL BE ON A ONE-FOR-ONE EXCHANGE FOR COMMERCIAL CAPABILITY FROM CRAFT III ASSETS. THIS ACTION WILL ENSURE THAT USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX SUPPORT WILL NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE USCINCPAC OPLAN XXXX FLOW.

12. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD). SEE CJCS WARNING AND PLANNING ORDER.

13. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.

14. ( ) FUND CITATIONS WILL BE ISSUED SEPARATELY.

15. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.

16. ( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

17. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTS--IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30.

18. ( ) CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

19. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

20. ( ) COMBAT CAMERA GUIDANCE. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED OF THIS OPERATION. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

21. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

22. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. THE NCA HAVE APPROVED USCINCCENT EXERCISE OF OPCON OVER USCINCPAC AND COMACC FORCES TRANSFERRED FOR THIS OPERATION. FOR COMACC FORCES, TRANSFER WILL OCCUR ON THEIR ENTRY INTO USCINCCENT AOR. FOR USCINCPAC FORCES, TRANSFER WILL OCCUR ON EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION.

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//
1. Purpose. A DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER or DEPLOYMENT ORDER can be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after authorization by the Secretary of Defense, to:

   a. Increase the deployability posture of units.
   b. Decrease deployability posture of units.
   c. Deploy forces.
   d. Redeploy forces.*
   e. Direct any other action that would signal planned US military action or its termination in response to a particular crisis event or incident.

2. When Issued. The DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER will be issued upon decision of the NCA to commence preparations for the conduct of a military operation (see Figure G-1). It may be issued at any point in the CAP development process. DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDERs may be incorporated within WARNING ORDERs, PLANNING ORDERs, and ALERT ORDERs, if appropriate, and approved by the NCA.

3. How Issued. The DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION or DEPLOYMENT ORDER is normally issued by record communication using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH. If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communication or WIN teleconference can be used first to pass information. A record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable.

NOTE: The DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER and DEPLOYMENT ORDER are provided in CAP to permit the above changes at any time in CAP procedures sequence, independent of WARNING ORDERs, PLANNING ORDERs, and ALERT ORDERs, and to reserve the EXECUTE ORDER solely for initiating or terminating the employment of US military forces. A DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER can be used to propose C-day and L-hour. A DEPLOYMENT ORDER may be used to indicate the CJCS-established C-day and L-hour.

* Procedures for the redeployment of forces are the same as those to deploy forces.
4. Addressees

a. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, the White House Situation Room, Defense agencies, and others as appropriate. Interested commanders, heads of Defense agencies, and component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

b. Action recipients of the implementing order should include the same addressees as the implementer in their responses to ensure that appropriate agencies are kept informed.

5. Contents

a. When prior execution planning has been accomplished through adaptation of an existing plan or the development of an emergency OPORD, most of the guidance necessary for deployment preparations will have already been passed to implementing commands in the WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, or ALERT ORDER.

b. If a crisis situation requires an increase in deployability posture, movement of forces, or establishment of a JTF (not addressed in WARNING ORDERS, PLANNING ORDERS, ALERT ORDERS, or EXECUTE ORDERS), the DEPLOYMENT or DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER must pass all essential guidance to effect these actions. This order will, in the first paragraph, include the appropriate authority; e.g., THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES....

6. Sample CJCS DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION, DEPLOYMENT AND REDeployment ORDERS. See Appendixes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
## DEPLOYMENT ORDER MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTENDED ACTION</th>
<th>DEPLOYMENT ORDER REQUIRED</th>
<th>SECDEF APPR REQUIRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CINC REQUESTS ADDITIONAL FORCES (I MEF TO CENTCOM)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPLOY PART(S) OF UNIT(S) (SQUAD TO CENTCOM)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL PERS AND EQUIPMENT</td>
<td>NO*</td>
<td>NO*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESUPPLY, SUSTAINMENT, NON-UNIT-RELATED PERS/ EQUIP (BEANS, BULLETS, ETC)</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*UNLESS DIRECTED BY SECDEF, E.G. COUNTERDRUGS

Figure G-1. Deployment Order Matrix
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC

TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL*
    USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
    USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
    CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
    USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
    USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
    USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
    USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
    USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
    USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
    DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP-CH/ASD:PA/

DOCDIV

* AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action
addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph
will designate supported and supporting commanders.
Information addressees will include the Services and other
interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be
included as information addressees to speed dissemination and
facilitate planning.
NARR/( ) THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED THE ALERTING OF FORCES IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/
2. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/
3. ( ) USCINCCENT PREPARE TO EXECUTE DEPLOYMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

4. ( ) USCINCTRANS IS AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AIRCRAFT AND STAGE CREWS TO SUPPORT ALERT STATUS STATED ABOVE.

5. ( ) OPSEC GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
6. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
7. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
8. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
   A. ( ) PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR, 290001Z NOV ___.
   B. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.
   C. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS
      REQUIRED BY THE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDER.
   D. ( ) DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE. AS DETERMINED BY
      USCINCENT.
   E. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/
9. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY.
10. ( ) TRANSPORTATION FUNDING.
11. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.
12. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY APPROPRIATE
    SERVICES.
13. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.
14. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING IN
    ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN
    ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30.
15. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCCINCENT
    OPLAN..XXXX.
16. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.//
GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/
17. ( ) STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, SERVICES, AND DEFENSE
    AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED (OR THOSE PROPOSED
    FOR APPROVAL) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE
    OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE
    EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY).//
AKNLDG/Y//
DECL/OADR//
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX G

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL*
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USD-P-CH/ASD:PA//

*AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

G-2-1
NARR/( ) THIS IS A DEPLOYMENT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED THE DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES TO BLUELAND IN ANTICIPATION (OR SUPPORT) OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/
1. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/
2. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, OR, IF REQUIRED, WRITE A SHORT, CONCISE MISSION STATEMENT.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/
3. ( ) USCINCCENT. BEGIN DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AS DEFINED IN USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX. EMPLOYMENT OF US FORCES OUTSIDE OF BLUELAND IS WITHHELD PENDING NCA DECISION.

4. ( ) USCINCTRANS. PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. PROVIDE AIR REFUELING SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.

5. ( ) COMACC. AS A RESOURCE MANAGER AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE FORCES FOR OWNING AND GAINING COMMAND, SOURCE THE FORCES LISTED BELOW TO MEET USCINCXXX REQUIREMENTS.
6. ( ) OPSEC GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
7. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
8. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
9. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
   A. ( ) C-DAY, L-HOUR, 290001Z NOV __.
   B. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.
   C. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND/OR MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY THE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDER.
   D. ( ) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
   E. ( ) UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.
   F. ( ) DIRLAUTH ACALON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/
10. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY.
11. ( ) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS.
12. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY APPROPRIATE SERVICES.
13. ( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
14. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30.
15. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
16. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
17. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.
18. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.//
GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/
19. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL ASSIST DEPLOYING UNITS WITH FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AS REQUIRED AND WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE SATELLITE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF DEPLOYING UNITS. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL PUBLISH COMSEC GUIDANCE TO ALCON.

20. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED (OR THOSE PROPOSED FOR APPROVAL) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY).//

AKNLDG/Y//=

DECL/OADR//
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX G
SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS REDEPLOYMENT ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL*
     USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
     USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
     CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
     USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
     USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
     USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
     USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
     USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
     USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
     DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
     HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
     DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SEC WASHINGTON DC
     CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC


* AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees will include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

G-3-1
THIS IS A REDEPLOYMENT ORDER. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS AUTHORIZED THE REDEPLOYMENT AND/OR REASSIGNMENT OF US FORCES DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION BLUENOSE.

1. THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND REDUCED THREAT IN THE AOR PERMIT THE REDEPLOYMENT AND/OR REASSIGNMENT OF US FORCES DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION BLUENOSE.

2. REDEPLOY FORCES RETURNING TO ORIGINALLY PROVIDING COMMANDS, HOME STATIONS, AND PORTS ACCORDING TO THE TIMETABLE DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT. MAINTAIN A DEFENSIVE COMBAT POSTURE FOR PHASED DRAWDOWN.

3. USCINCCENT. REDEPLOY FORCES TO ORIGINALLY PROVIDING COMMANDS, HOME STATIONS, AND PORTS AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE. PROVIDE REDEPLOYMENT PLAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
4. ( ) USCINCEUR, USCINCLANT, USCINCPAC, USCINCSO, USCINCSOC, USCINCTRANS, CINCFOR, COMACC, CDRJCSE, AND SECTRANS. BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE REDEPLOYING FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE.

5. ( ) USCINCTRANS. PROVIDE AIR REFUELING AND STRATEGIC AIRLIFT SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. TAKE ACTION AS NECESSARY TO REESTABLISH AIR BRIDGE TO PROVIDE REQUIRED TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT. ENSURE MAXIMUM USE OF ORGANIC STRATEGIC AIRLIFT. PRESENT CRAF AUTHORITIES REMAIN IN EFFECT.

6. ( ) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

7. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

8. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

9. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
   A. ( ) R-DAY, L-HOUR, 250001Z FEB ___.
   B. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION. IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS.
   C. ( ) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
   D. ( ) UNIT MOVE WITH APPROPRIATE MISSION-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE POSTURE (MOPP) GEAR.
   E. ( ) KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.
   F. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

10. ( ) AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY.

11. ( ) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS.

12. ( ) FORCE ACTIVITY DESIGNATOR (FAD) WILL BE ISSUED BY APPROPRIATE SERVICES.

13. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. REPORT INTENDED MOVEMENTS IN DAILY SITREP. IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30.
14. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED. SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS WILL ENSURE ALL REDPLOYING UNITS ARE REFLECTED IN JOPES CURRENT TPFDD AND ALL SORTS DATA BASES PRIOR TO REDPLOYMENT.

15. ( ) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

16. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

17. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

18. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO STATE THAT THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIP(S) THAT THE GAINING COMMANDER WAS AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE ARE TERMINATED AND THAT REDEPLOYING FORCES ARE TRANSFERRED BACK (NORMALY AT THE AOR BOUNDARY) TO THE PROVIDING COMMANDER(S) WHO WILL EXERCISE THEIR ORIGINALLY AUTHORIZED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP.//

AKNLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//
ANNEX H

CJCS EXECUTE ORDER

1. Purpose. The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct execution of an OPORD or other military operation to implement an NCA decision. The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.

2. When Issued. The EXECUTE ORDER will be issued upon decision by the NCA to execute a military operation. Under the full CAP procedures, an EXECUTE ORDER would normally result from an NCA decision, following execution planning initiated by a PLANNING or ALERT ORDER. In a particularly time-sensitive situation requiring an immediate response, an EXECUTE ORDER may be issued without prior formal crisis planning, as would normally take place in Phases I through V of CAP.

3. How Issued. Normally, the EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by record communication with IMMEDIATE or FLASH precedence. If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communication or WIN TLCF may be used initially to pass the EXECUTE ORDER, with immediate follow-up record communication to confirm oral or WIN orders and keep all crisis participants informed.

4. Addressees. AIG 8790 will normally be used in CAP messages. Action addressees in the AIG are CINCs and DIRNSA. The C2 paragraph will designate supported and supporting commanders. Information addressees in the AIG include the Services and other interested commands and agencies. Component commanders may be included as information addressees to speed dissemination and facilitate planning.

5. Contents

   a. When prior execution planning has been accomplished through adaptation of an existing plan or the development of an emergency OPORD, most of the guidance necessary for execution will already have been passed to the implementing commands, either through an existing plan or by a previously issued WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, ALERT ORDER, DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER, DEPLOYMENT ORDER, or REDEPLOYMENT ORDER. Under these circumstances, the EXECUTE ORDER need only contain the authority to execute the planned operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. Reference to previous planning documents is sufficient for additional guidance.
b. In the no-prior-warning response situation where a crisis event or incident requires an immediate response without any prior formal planning, the EXECUTE ORDER must pass all essential guidance that would normally be issued in the WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, and ALERT ORDER. Under such rapid reaction conditions, the EXECUTE ORDER will generally follow the same paragraph headings as the PLANNING or ALERT ORDER and may include the information listed in the following subparagraphs. Information and subheadings that are not applicable should be omitted. If some information may be desirable but is not readily available, it can be provided in a subsequent message because the EXECUTE ORDER will normally be very time-sensitive.

c. Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the EXECUTE ORDER are:

(1) **Authority.** Statement indicating authority for issuing the EXECUTE ORDER.

(2) **Situation.** A description of the latest politico-military situation that has generated a need for a response by US military forces. Reference to enemy and friendly forces is not required unless necessary for execution planning and not otherwise available to the supported commander.

(3) **Mission.** A refined statement of the tasks and purpose to be accomplished.

(4) **Execution**

   (a) **Course of Action.** Deployment (if not previously directed) and employment of forces approved by the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special or unusual tasks assigned to a specific commander (supported or supporting) will be enumerated as required. Designation of supported and supporting commands in subparagraph 5c(6) below automatically incorporates normal mission tasking.

   (b) **Major Combat Forces.** A listing of the major combat forces approved for the operation.

   (c) **OPSEC and Deception Guidance.**

   (d) **PSYOP Guidance.** If execution is directed without a WARNING, PLANNING, or ALERT ORDER, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(c).
(e) Civil Affairs Guidance. If execution is directed without warning, planning, or alert orders, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(f).

(f) Intelligence Guidance. If execution is directed without a WARNING, PLANNING, or ALERT ORDER, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(d).

(g) Counterintelligence Guidance. If execution is directed without a WARNING, PLANNING, or ALERT ORDER, provide guidance as shown in Annex C, subparagraph 5c(4)(e).

(h) Coordinating Instructions

1. C-day and L-hour for deployments.

2. Target date and time for execution.

3. Estimated duration of the operation. Circumstance or date that automatically terminates operations.

4. DEFCON or deployability posture.

5. Operational constraints, including any special ROE applicable to this specific operation.

6. Release of SIOP-committed forces.

7. Unit combat readiness criteria.


(5) Administration and Logistics

(a) Transportation, as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority.

2. Allocation of strategic lift resources.

3. Load planning factors for each type of lift resource.
4. Other strategic movement planning guidance, as appropriate.

(b) Force activity designator (FAD), if warranted.

(c) Fund citations, authorization to commit resources, or both.

(d) Personnel deployment criteria.

(e) Reporting instructions.

(f) Classification and declassification guidance, if required.

(g) Known logistic constraints.

(h) Public affairs guidance.

(i) Combat camera guidance.

6. Command and Signal

(a) Communications Guidance. Any specific guidance on the use or release of CJCS-controlled C2 assets contained in the JCSE.

(b) Command Relationships

1. Designation of supported and supporting commands and coordination instructions.

2. NCA-approved command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) the gaining commander will exercise over forces transferred by the NCA and locations where the force transfers will be effective (normally AOR boundary). When it is decided that forces will not transfer from one CINC to another but those forces must perform actions at the direction of the supported commander, then a "support" relationship must be established between the two combatant commanders.

6. Sample EXECUTE ORDERs. See Appendixes 1, 2, and 3.

NOTE: Items previously provided in ALERT, PLANNING, or WARNING ORDERs need not be repeated unless information has changed.
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX H

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR CJCS EXECUTE ORDER
(WARNING ORDER, PLANNING ORDER, OR ALERT ORDER PREVIOUSLY ISSUED)

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
TO: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SEC WASHINGTON DC
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL

INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USD-P-CH/ASD:PA//
CSA WASHINGTON DC

CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
CDRMTMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
COMUSNAVCENT
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
USTRANSCOM LO MACDILL AFB FL
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

H-1-2
NARR/( ) THIS IS AN EXECUTE ORDER. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS DIRECTED EXECUTION OF OPERATION BLUENOSE.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. ( ) IN RESPONSE TO YELLOWLAND INCURSIONS IN ORANGELAND, THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUENAME HAS FORMALLY REQUESTED SUBSTANTIAL US MILITARY ASSISTANCE BE DEPLOYED TO BLUENAME. THE NCA HAS AUTHORIZED THE EXECUTION OF USCINCENT OPLAN XXXX.//

GENTEXT/Mission/

2. ( ) SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.//

* If time has precluded prior issuance of these references by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, refer to instructions for preparation of WARNING and ALERT ORDERS to ensure consideration of all relevant aspects of the operations to be conducted.
3. ( ) COURSE OF ACTION. COA NUMBER 1 CONTAINED IN REF B IS APPROVED.

4. ( ) MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. USE FORCES AS STATED IN REF A.

5. ( ) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

6. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

7. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

8. ( ) INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

9. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
   A. ( ) AS STATED IN CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDERS.
   B. ( ) EXECUTE BY 1 DEC ___.
   C. ( ) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATIONS IN EXCESS OF 30 DAYS. TERMINATE OPERATIONS WHEN DIRECTED.
   D. ( ) ROE AS CONTAINED IN USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.
   E. ( ) USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS REQUIRED BY USCINCCENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS.
   F. ( ) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//

10. ( ) FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS. ISSUED SEPARATELY.

11. ( ) PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA. SEE WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

12. ( ) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.

13. ( ) REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. NORMAL OPERATIONAL REPORTING AS PRESCRIBED IN JOINT PUBS 1-03.8 AND 6-04. AFTER-ACTION REPORTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH JOINT PUB 1-03.30.
14. ( ) MOVEMENT OF FORCES WILL BE REPORTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED CJCS PROCEDURES.

15. ( ) CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

16. ( ) KNOWN LOGISTIC CONSTRAINTS.

17. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS. SEE CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, OR ALERT ORDER.

18. ( ) COMBAT CAMERA GUIDANCE. COMBAT CAMERA DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED OF THIS OPERATION. SEE CJCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER.

19. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL ASSIST DEPLOYING UNITS WITH FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AS REQUIRED AND WILL BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND RELATIVE PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATE SATELLITE CHANNELS AND CIRCUITS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS OPERATION, INCLUDING THOSE OF DEPLOYING UNITS. USCINCCENT (THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER) WILL PUBLISH COMSEC GUIDANCE TO ALCON.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

20. ( ) STATE SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINCS, RESOURCE MANAGERS, AND SUPPORTING AGENCIES, AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO LIST THE NCA-APPROVED COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THE GAINING COMMANDER WILL EXERCISE OVER TRANSFERRED FORCES AND THE LOCATIONS WHERE THE TRANSFER WILL BE EFFECTIVE (NORMALLY THE AOR BOUNDARY).//

ANKLDG/Y//

DECL/OADR//
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX H

SUPPORTED COMMANDER EXECUTE ORDER

1. Purpose. The supported commander EXECUTE ORDER may be issued by the respective supported commander in response to a CJCS EXECUTE ORDER. The purpose of the supported commander EXECUTE ORDER is to direct component execution of an OPORD based on an NCA decision and to provide any supporting commander with amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance. Authority for issue derives from the original CJCS EXECUTE ORDER.

2. When Issued

a. Although Service components are included as information addressees on the CJCS EXECUTE ORDER, a high probability exists that amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance for the supported commander may have to be passed to components based on updated situation and operational requirements.

b. Generally, most of the guidance necessary for execution may already have been passed to the supported command components by previously issued CJCS WARNING, PLANNING, ALERT, DEPLOYMENT, REDEPLOYMENT, or EXECUTE ORDERs in which components were information addressees or by the supported commander OPORD, which listed components as action addressees. In this case, the EXECUTE ORDER may need to contain only the authority to execute and the actual date and time for the execution. However, the order can be used to provide amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance from the supported commander to his component commanders regarding any additional essential guidance that may be critical for execution.

3. How Issued. Normally, the supported commander’s EXECUTE ORDER will be issued by record communication with IMMEDIATE or FLASH precedence. If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communication or WIN TLCF may be used initially to pass the supported commander’s EXECUTE ORDER, with immediate follow-up record communication to confirm oral or WIN orders and keep all crisis participants informed.

4. Addressees. The supported commander’s EXECUTE ORDER will be addressed to supported command components, with information copies to the addressees on the original CJCS EXECUTE ORDER.

5. Contents. Major paragraphs and items of information are as follows:
a. Authority. A statement indicating authority for issuance of CJCS EXECUTE ORDER.


c. Mission. A refined statement of the tasks to be accomplished.

d. Execution

(1) Courses of Action. Deployment and employment approved. Special or unusual tasks assigned to a component commander.

(2) Major Combat Forces. An updated list of major combat forces approved for the operation.

(3) OPSEC Guidance. Direct implementation of OSPEC measures specified in the applicable OPORD.

(4) PSYOP Guidance

(5) Civil Affairs Guidance

(6) Coordinating Instructions

(a) C-day and L-hour for deployments or redeployments.

(b) Date and time for execution.

(c) Estimated length of operation.

(d) DEFCON or deployability posture.

(e) Operational constraints, including any special ROE applicable to this specific operation.

(f) Unit combat readiness criteria.

(g) Authorization for direct liaison between component commands.

e. Administration and Logistics

(1) Transportation, as follows:

(a) Lift allocation for intratheater movement.
(b) Priority for lift (intratheater).

(2) Reporting instructions.

(3) Public affairs guidance.

f. Command and Signal

(1) Communications guidance.

(2) Command relationships. JFC-directed internal transfer of forces with the designated authority the receiving component may exercise (i.e., TACON, OPCON); authority of functional entities (e.g., Joint Force Air Component Commander, Joint Target Coordination Boards; internal support relationships between components when forces from one component must perform actions at the direction of another component (one of the specific support relationships in Joint Pub 0-2 (Mutual, General, Direct, or Close) must be identified as well as any limitations on the authority of the supported component commander to exercise "general direction" of the supporting effort (see Joint Pub 0-2 for details).

6. Sample Supported Commander EXECUTE ORDER. See Appendix 3.
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX H

SAMPLE FORMAT FOR SUPPORTED COMMANDER EXECUTE ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3//
TO: COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GA
     USCENTAF SHAW AFB SC//CC//
     COMUSNAVCENT
     COMUSMARCENT CAMP PENDELTON CA
     SOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

INFO USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
     USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
     CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
     USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
     USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
     USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
     USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
     USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
     USCINCNTRANSC SCOTT AFB IL
     DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
     WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
     SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
     SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
     CJCS WASHINGTON DC
     CSA WASHINGTON DC

DISTR: CINC/DCINC/CCJ1/CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5/CCJ6

H-3-1
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSEL NORAD PETERSON AFB CO
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
CDRM TMC FALLS CHURCH VA
COMSC WASHINGTON DC
DISA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
DLA CAMERON STATION VA
HQ DMA FAIRFAX VA
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CG FMFLANT
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI
CG FMFPAC
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC//
CDRJCSE MACDILL AFB FL
JOINT STAFF ICP MANAGER MACDILL AFB FL

CLASSIFICATION
OPER/BLUENOSE//

H-3-2
MSGID/ORDER/USCINCCENT/

AMPN/EXECUTE ORDER--USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX/

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV__/

REF/B/ORDER/USCINCCENT/272323ZNOV__/

ORDTYP/EXORD///

NARR/( ) REF A IS AN EXECUTE ORDER BY AUTHORITY AND DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. REF B IS OPORD FOR USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.///

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. ( ) IN RESPONSE TO GOB REQUEST, THE NCA HAVE APPROVED THE EXECUTION OF USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.///

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. ( ) SEE USCINCCENT OPORD.///

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. ( ) COURSE OF ACTION. EXECUTE USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

4. ( ) MAJOR COMBAT FORCES. SEE USCINCCENT OPORD.

5. ( ) OPSEC GUIDANCE. AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPORD.

6. ( ) PSYOP GUIDANCE. AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPORD.

7. ( ) CIVIL AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPORD.

8. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
   A. ( ) AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPORD.
   B. ( ) C-DAY AND L-HOUR.
   C. ( ) D-DAY AND H-HOUR.///

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

9. ( ) AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPORD.///

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

10. ( ) AS STATED IN USCINCCENT OPORD.///
AKNLDG/Y//
DECL/OADR//
ANNEX J

SAMPLE OPERATION ORDER

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
TO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCFOR FT MCPHERSON GA
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USCINCSPACE PETERSON AFB CO
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCSTRAT OFFUTT AFB NE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
INFO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CMC WASHINGTON DC
CDRUSELNORAD PETERSON AFB CO
DISTR: CINC/DCINC/CCJ1/CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5/CCJ6

J-1
REF/B/ORDER/CJCS/270300ZNOV__/

NARR/JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (FY), CJCS ALERT ORDER/
ORDTYP/OPORD/USCINCCENT..XXX/

MAP/1015/BLUELAND/
MAP/1020/ORANGELAND/
NARR/SCALE 1:100,000/
TIMEZONE/Z/

HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION/

5UNIT
/UNITDES /UNITLOC /CMNTS
/USCINCCENT /MACDILL AFB, FL
/USCINCLANT /NORFOLK, VA
/USCINCEUR /VAIHINGEN, GE
/USCINCPAC /CAMP SMITH, HI
/USCINCTRANS /SCOTT AFB, IL /2 TACTICAL AIRLIFT SQ, 6 KC-10

/USCINCSTRAT /OFFUTT AFB, NE 2 RC-135
/CINCFOR /FT MCPHERSON, GA

/NSA/CSS
/HQ USCENTCOM FWD - / (JTF 1000)
/HQ USARCENT (MINUS)
/1 ARMOR BDE (PLUS)
/1 INF BDE (M) (PLUS)
/1 PSYOP CO
/HQ USCENTAF (MINUS)
/1 TFW

J-3
/1 RESCUE WG
/1 RECON SQ
/4 E-3A (AWACS)
/HQ USNAVCENT (MINUS)
/SUPPORTING FORCES
/COMSUPNAVFOR
/CTG 60.1 (CVBG)
/15 MEB
/MPS
/VP SQDN (P-3)//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. ( ) INTERNAL SECURITY STABILITY IN AND SECURITY OF BLUELAND AND ORANGELAND HAVE DETERIORATED BECAUSE OF CONTINUED YELLOWLAND SUPPORT OF THE REBEL FORCES SEEKING THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ____.

   A. ( ) ENEMY FORCES. SEE CURRENT SITREP AND DIN. YELLOWLAND SUPPORTS INTERNAL INSURGENT ACTIVITY.

   B. ( ) FRIENDLY FORCES. GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND, GOVERNMENT OF ORANGELAND.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. ( ) WHEN DIRECTED, USCINCCENT WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS TO _______.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. ( ) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH SHOW-OF-FORCE AIR AND NAVAL OPERATIONS, SIMULTANEOUSLY INTRODUCE ARMY AND MARINE FORCES INTO BLUELAND TO AID BLUELAND FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX. CONTINUE BUILDUP OF GROUND FORCES AND ADVANCE ON ____.

4. ( ) FIRST TASKING ASSIGNMENT COMUSARCENT. ON ORDER OF JTF BLUEBEARD, COMMENCE MOVEMENT OF FORCES OUTLINED IN TASK ORGANIZATION OF THIS OPORD AND BE PREPARED TO _______.

J-4
5. ( ) SECOND TASKING ASSIGNMENT COMUSCENTAF. PROVIDE FORCES OUTLINED IN TASK ORGANIZATION OF THIS OPORD AND COMMENCE MOVEMENT OF ASSIGNED FORCES TO BABA AIR BASE TO CLOSE NLT ____.

6. ( ) THIRD TASKING ASSIGNMENT USCINCEUR. CHOP CTF 60 TO JTF BLUEBEARD. ON ORDER FROM CJTF BLUEBEARD, COMMENCE MOVEMENT OF MEB OUTLINED IN ____.

7. ( ) FOURTH TASKING ASSIGNMENT USTRANSCOM. PROVIDE AIRLIFT ASSETS TO MEET FORCE LIFT REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED ___.

8. ( ) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. SEE ALERT ORDER CJCS 270300Z NOV ____ AS AMENDED HEREIN.

   A. ( ) THIS OPORD EFFECTIVE FOR PLANNING UPON RECEIPT AND FOR EXECUTION ON ORDER.

   B. ( ) DIRLAUTH FOR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS WITH INFO CJCS AND ____.

   C. ( ) REPORTS WILL BE ____.

   D. ( ) ANTICIPATED TIME OF EXECUTION (D-DAY) IS ____.

   E. ( ) ROE WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH POLICY OUTLINED IN USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

   F. ( ) DIRECT COORDINATION WITH USTRANSCOM AUTHORIZED TO UPDATE TRANSPORTATION MOVEMENT INFORMATION. KEEP THIS HEADQUARTERS ADVISED. MOVEMENT SCHEDULE FROM USTRANSCOM DUE 290400Z NOV ____.

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

9. ( ) IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX AS AMENDED HEREIN.

10. ( ) MOBILITY/TRANSPORTATION. USTRANSCOM AIRLIFT WILL BE UTILIZED AS A BASIS FOR NEO FOLLOWED BY SEA EVACUATION UTILIZING CTF 60 SHIPPING WHEN ____.

11. ( ) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE PER ANNEX F AND INSTRUCTIONS PER COORDINATION WITH USCINCCENT/PA.

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

12. ( ) USCINCCENT IS SUPPORTED CINC.

13. ( ) CTF 60 IS ON-THE-SCENE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER AND WILL EXERCISE OPCON OF (SPECIFY FORCES) UNTIL HQ USCENTCOM FWD (JTF BLUEBEARD) IS ACTIVATED.
14. ( ) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AS OUTLINED IN ANNEX J, USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX.

15. ( ) COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE PER ANNEX K, USCINCCENT OPLAN XXXX AS AMENDED HEREIN.

   A. ( ) DEDICATED HF VOICE AND TELETYPE LINK WILL BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN JTF BLUEBEARD AND AMEMBASSY, BLUELAND, USING ____./

   AKNLDG/Y//

   DECL/OADR//
ANNEX K
SAMPLE COMMANDER’S EVALUATION REQUEST

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
TO: CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA
CINCARLANT FT MCPHERSON GA
(ETC.)
INFO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//
(ETC.)

CLASSIFICATION
OPER/BLUENOSE//
MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCLANT//
SUBJ/COMMANDER EVALUATION REQUEST ( )//
REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV___/-/NOTAL//
AMPN/CJCS WARNING ORDER//
NARR/( ) THIS IS A USCINCLANT COMMANDER EVALUATION REQUEST//

RMKS/1. ( ) TASKING. REQUEST THAT ACTION ADDRESSEES EVALUATE AND SUBMIT THEIR RESPECTIVE REQUIREMENTS AND PROPOSALS FOR CARRYING OUT THE COURSES OF ACTION IDENTIFIED IN REF A. SUSPENSE FOR RESPONDING IS NOT LATER THAN 230200Z JUN __. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED BELOW.

2. ( ) SITUATION. HOSTILITIES ARE UNDER WAY IN FOUR SEPARATE AREAS OF ORANGELAND, INCLUDING THE CAPITAL AND OTHER MAJOR URBAN CENTERS. LEFTIST INSURGENT FORCES HAVE MOUNTED A STRONG PSYOP CAMPAIGN AND ARE EXPLOITING WIDESPREAD ANTIGOVERNMENT FEELING TO
GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT. MASS UPRISINGS BY SYMPATHETIC DISSIDENTS ARE ALSO IMMINENT UNLESS . . . .

3. ( ) FACTORS AFFECTING POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. THE MAIN AIR AND SEA ACCESSES TO ORANGELAND ARE ISOLATED, INOPERABLE BECAUSE OF DAMAGE, OR UNDER INSURGENT CONTROL. INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS ARE SEVERELY DISRUPTED AND RAIL AND HIGHWAY NETWORKS IN THE INTERIOR ARE CUT. THE APPROACHING RAINY SEASON . . . .

4. ( ) ENEMY CAPABILITIES. TOTAL EFFECTIVE INSURGENT STRENGTH IS ESTIMATED AT 2,000 TO 2,500, LIMITED TO LIGHT ARMAMENT BUT WELL TRAINED AND HIGHLY MOBILE (COMMANDEERED CIVILIAN VEHICLES). INSURGENT-LED IRREGULAR AUXILIARIES REPORTEDLY NUMBER ANOTHER . . . .

5. ( ) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. ( ) GENERAL. TO MINIMIZE FURTHER CASUALTIES AND DESTRUCTION, US MILITARY ACTION WILL BE DESIGNED TO END HOSTILITIES SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ALL INSURGENT AREAS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE OVERALL OPERATIONAL CONCEPT IS FOR A RAPID SURGE OF FORCE APPLICATION FROM THE OUTSET, WITH SUFFICIENT FORCES COMMITTED WITHIN THE INITIAL 6-HOUR PERIOD TO SAFEGUARD THREATENED US NATIONALS, SUPPRESS ORGANIZED RESISTANCE IN THE FOUR CRITICAL POPULATION CENTERS, AND PREVENT . . . .

B. ( ) COURSE OF ACTION PLANNING PARAMETERS

(1) ( ) COURSE OF ACTION ONE: EMPLOY A JOINT ARMY-AIR FORCE TASK FORCE. MAJOR ARMY TACTICAL CONTINGENTS WILL CONSIST OF A TWO-BRIGADE FORCE (UP TO SIX MANEUVER BATTALIONS), WITH APPROPRIATE ACCOMPANYING COMBAT SUPPORT, TO BE INTRODUCED BY AIR, PLUS FOLLOW-ON SERVICE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. MAJOR AIR FORCE TACTICAL CONTINGENTS WILL CONSIST OF UP TO . . . .

(2) ( ) COURSE OF ACTION TWO: EMPLOY A MARINE LANDING FORCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS, SURFACE, AND AIR SUPPORT ELEMENTS. THE MAJOR MARINE TACTICAL CONTINGENT WILL CONSIST OF UP TO . . . .

(3) ( ) COURSE OF ACTION THREE: EMPLOY A JOINT ARMY-NAVY-MARINE-AIR FORCE TASK FORCE, WITH COORDINATED AIR AND AMPHIBIOUS INTRODUCTION OF GROUND ELEMENTS. MAJOR TACTICAL CONTINGENTS WILL CONSIST OF . . . .

6. ( ) OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. BLUELAND IS EXPECTED TO ABROGATE EXISTING TREATIES GRANTING US STAGING, BASING, AND MARITIME PRIVILEGES. OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS ARE LIKELY TO BE DENIED BY PINKLAND AND . . . .
7. ( ) OBJECTIVE. THIS REPORT PROVIDES AMPLIFYING GUIDANCE FOR DEVELOPING COURSE OF ACTION EVALUATIONS BY COMPONENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDS HAVING A ROLE IN PROJECTED OPERATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CURRENT ORANGELAND CRISIS.

8. ( ) REMARKS. FORCE AS SHOWN IN JOPES DATA BASE, OPLAN IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS XXXXA, XXXXB, AND XXXXC.// DECL/OADR//
ANNEX M

SAMPLE OREP-1 COMPONENT’S EVALUATION RESPONSE

(PRECEDENCE)

FROM: CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
TO: USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
INFO: CJCS WASHINGTON DC
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
USCINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL
(ETC.)

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE/

MSGID/GENADMIN/CINCUSAFE/

SUBJ/CINCUSAFE COMPONENT EVALUATION RESPONSE ()/

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/211742ZNOV___/-/NOTAL/

AMPN/CJCS WARNING ORDER/

REF/B/COMMANDER EVALUATION REQUEST/USCINCEUR/220100ZAUG___/-/NOTAL/

AMPN/USCINCEUR EVALUATION REQUEST/

REF/C/COMMANDER EVALUATION REQUEST/USCINCLANT/221503ZNOV___/-/NOTAL/

AMPN/USCINCLANT COMMANDER EVALUATION REQUEST/

RMKS/1. () COURSE OF ACTION. RECOMMEND COURSE OF ACTION ONE AS THE MOST RAPID WAY OF BRINGING US MILITARY FORCES TO BEAR IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA IN TIME TO PREVENT . . . . COURSE OF ACTION THREE REQUIRES TOO LONG A LEADTIME FOR SURFACE DEPLOYMENT . . . . COURSE OF ACTION TWO DOES NOT INVOLVE USAFE.
2. ( ) OBJECTIVE. THIS REPORT PROVIDES EVALUATION AND INFORMATION ON MAJOR FORCES FOR COURSES OF ACTION OUTLINED IN REFERENCED USCINCEUR REQUEST.

3. ( ) REMARKS

A. ( ) FORCES AS LISTED IN JOPES DATA BASE OPLAN IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS XXXXA, XXXXB, AND XXXXC.

B. ( ) BARE-BASE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS AT PALM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT WILL RESULT IN 4- TO 6-HOUR DELAY IN ACHIEVING INITIAL ______.// DECL/OADR//
ANNEX N

SAMPLE TPFDD LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

This document constitutes the LOI for use of JOPES during Operation BLUENOSE. The overall classification of this document is ________.

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USCENTCOM
USTRANSCOM

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I. ( ) Introduction

a. ( ) Purpose

(1) ( ) This LOI provides time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) procedures for deployment, replacement, and redeployment of Operation BLUENOSE forces. This LOI provides instructions and direction to USCENTCOM components, supporting CINCs, and JOPES planners.

(2) ( ) This LOI will be retained in the USCENTCOM host CAT/file string CENT JOPES/BLUENOSE/TPFDD LOI Updated versions of each appendix will be retained in the CAT/file string listed in the table of contents. Appendixes will be updated to reflect current information along with the change date. Periodically, USCENTCOM will list the appendixes with the dates of their current versions in its daily validation message to USTRANSCOM. Comparing the dates on the hard copy appendixes with those on the validation message will ensure use of most current information.

b. ( ) Scope

(1) ( ) USCENTCOM CCJ3 exercises office of primary responsibility (OPR) for oversight, review, coordination, and administration of BLUENOSE deployment and redeployment data in JOPES.

(2) ( ) USCENTCOM J4/7 (CCJ4/7) is the OPR for validating movement requirements.

(3) ( ) CCJ3 is the OPR for monitoring and coordinating all TPFDD movements.

(4) ( ) CCJ3 and CCJ4/7 will coordinate the transportation issues affecting the deployment and redeployment of BLUENOSE forces.

(5) ( ) CCJ5 is the OPR for oversight, review, coordination, and administration of force planning and associated movement dates.

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions

(1) ( ) USCENTCOM REAR CCJ3-PJ (JOPES) coordinates TPFDD requirements and acts as the OPR for TPFDD issues. Requirements generated within the AOR for deployment and redeployment will be coordinated through USCENTCOM JOPES
FORWARD (FWD). USCENTCOM JOPES FWD may interface directly with supporting CINCs and components or through USCENTCOM REAR JOPES.

(2) Coordination of requirements with supporting CINCs requires special consideration. USCINCCENT components translate USCINCCENT direction into Service requirements, establish Service ULN structure, and set movement priorities to match lift allocation. Therefore, direct liaison between USCINCCENT components and supporting CINCs is authorized to ensure immediate resolution of competing movement requirements and proper TPFDD structure.

(a) For Deployment. In the case of joint requirements, supporting CINCs will coordinate directly with USCENTCOM. USCENTCOM components will validate Service requirements. Supporting CINCs will validate joint requirements and verify to USCINCCENT and USCINCTRANS that tasked units and equipment are available for movement as indicated in the TPFDD.

(b) For Redeployment. USCENTCOM components will prioritize and validate Service requirements in accordance with USCINCCENT redeployment priorities and lift allocations. Supporting CINCS and providing organizations will coordinate with appropriate USCENTCOM Service components to manage redeployment movement requirements.

(3) Providing organizations (e.g., AMC, ACC) will coordinate TPFDD requirements directly with USCENTCOM components.

(4) Component responsibility for deployment operations is as follows:

(a) Army--FORSOM/FCJ5/.
(b) Air Force--CENTAF REAR/BSD/.
(c) Navy--NAVCENT.
(d) Marines--MARCENT/G3/.
(e) SOF--SOCOM/CAT/.

(5) Component responsibility for redeployment operations is as follows:
(a) ( ) Army---ARCENT//G5//.
(b) ( ) Air Force--CENTAF FWD//XPX//.
(c) ( ) Navy--NAVCENT.
(d) ( ) Marines--MARCENT//G3//.
(e) ( ) SOF--SOCCENT.

(6) ( ) The primary means of communication and coordination for TPFDD issues is the 104BN (series) WIN Teleconference. GENSER message traffic should be held to a minimum.

d. ( ) References

(1) ( ) Joint Pub 5-03 1, Proposed Final, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures)."

(2) ( ) Joint Pub 5-03 3, In Development, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume III (JOPES ADP Support)."

(3) ( ) Joint Pub 4-01, 15 September 1983, "Mobility System Policies, Procedures and Considerations."

II. ( ) Planning and Execution Instructions

a. ( ) Concept of Operations

(1) ( ) TPFDD Concept

(a) ( ) The timeframe of the transition from deployment to unit or nonunit personnel and equipment exchanges (replacements) to redeployment cannot be forecast. The most difficult, and possibly most likely, scenario is for redeployment to occur simultaneously as replacements and additional deployments are ongoing. To keep the process simple and direct, deploying forces, including replacements to the AOR, will continue to be entered into one TPFDD, presently PID 152BN. Redeploying forces, including replaced units leaving the AOR, will be entered into a second TPFDD, presently designated 152RP. Because all units and equipment (ULNs) must be prepared to eventually redeploy, all forces deployed to the AOR will be entered into the redeployment TPFDD, 152RP.
Redeploying forces (air and sea movements) will be coded "DEP" by the components in the project code field of PID 152RP. When they have departed the AOR, PID 152RP will then reflect the remaining deployed force.

(b) USCINCENT components will create force modules in all BLUENOSE TPFDDs files in order to identify the current status of all major units. "Major combat units" for each component are defined as follows:

CENTAF—Squadron and above.

ARCENT—Brigade and above.

MARCENT—MEB, regiment, and aircraft group and above.

NAVCENT—Current ULN structure in 152BN is appropriate.

SOCCENT—One force module each for AFSOC, Army SF, and NSWTG components. Supporting CINCS may create additional force modules (e.g., regiments, battalions, squadrons); however, force modules must exist for the designated units.

(c) The following ULN blocks are designated for indicated components and commands:

Force ULNs

(1st character) (2d character)

T—Army C—USCENTCOM
W—Navy/Marine E—USEUCOM
V—Air Force F—FORSCOM
U—Joint/Non-US/SOF P—USPACOM
S—USSOUTHCOM
T—ACC

The intent is to provide unit visibility showing parent or subordinate relationships. Therefore,
the ULN structure must remain the same for both 152BN and 152RP TPFDDs files. Force modules must be accurate and correct as described in subparagraph IIa(1)(b) above.

(d) All requirements from the 152BN TPFDD that have actually deployed to the AOR will be entered into the 152RP TPFDD immediately. These records will be updated if necessary to reflect actual cargo and passenger (PAX) data. Level 2 detail is acceptable for airlift. Level 4 detail will be provided when available. However, a minimum of Level 3 detail is required for sealift to obtain square foot data for sealift planning. The RLD, ALD, EAD, and RDD fields of each ULN will be blanked and the LAD will be coded "9999" (on call) until movement data are known and destination and origin locations (GEOCODEs) are reversed. The providing organization code will not be changed to maintain visibility of the original providing organization. Finally, a Critical Employment Indicator (CEI) code or "R" will be used to distinguish redeployment requirements from other 152RP entries.

(e) ULNs in the redeployment TPFDD will be prioritized according to mode and source as follows:

1. ULNs redeploying (152RP) via air (AMC or supporting CINC) will be prioritized from 1-999 by each component. No priority number will be repeated unless the ULN is less than 400 passengers or 100 short tons. In this case ULNs can be assigned the same priority number until a total of 400 passengers or 100 short tons is exceeded.

2. ULNs in the redeployment TPFDD (152RP) requiring movement by sea or MSC will be prioritized from 1-999 by each component. No priority number will be repeated unless the ULN is less than 10,000 MTONs. In this case, ULNs can have the same priority number until 10,000 MTONs is exceeded.

(f) ULNs in the deployment TPFDD, 152BN, will be coded to identify forces deploying by deployment orders. To identify different phases of the deployment, the CEI code for each ULN in the 152BN TPFDD will be coded as follows:
A--Indicates forces ordered deployed as directed by
the initial DEPLOYMENT ORDER and subsequent orders
(Phase I).

B--Indicates forces ordered deployed as directed
after 31 March 1990 and subsequent orders (Phase
II).

C--Indicates forces in an on-call status that could
be expected to deploy as replacements.

R--Indicates forces in the 152RP TPFDD designated
for redeployment to home station. Used to
distinguish forces awaiting REDEPLOYMENT ORDERs from
other 152RP requirements.

(2) ( ) Unit Personnel and Equipment Movement

(a) ( ) Air Large Units. Units moving by AMC will depart
from an APOE nearest their origin for deployments and an
APOE nearest their AOR location for redeployments. For
redeployments, the APOD (APODs will be coordinated with
USTRANSCOM) will be directed by the Service component or
the supporting CINC. Because airlift will move more
efficiently through established channels, components
should make every attempt to use channels. For each
mission, units must provide, as a minimum, the airlift
control element (ALCE) and/or aerial port commander (APC)
with the following information: ULN(s), passengers,
cargo (in short tons (STONs)), and hazardous cargo
documentation.

(b) ( ) Air Small Units. Units with less than 100
passengers and/or 10 STONs that have not been grouped at
a major APOE will move to consolidated APOEs when moving
to and from the AOR.

(c) ( ) Multiple Aerial Ports. Aircraft will not transit
multiple aerial ports for onload or offload except in
exceptional circumstances, specifically coordinated with
USCENTCOM and USTRANSCOM. TPFDD requirements must
reflect appropriate APOEs and APODs to ensure in-transit
visibility.

(d) ( ) Sea Movements SPOEs and SPODs for deploying and
redeploying requirements are listed in Appendix 1.
USCENTCOM through USTRANSCOM will designate an
aggregation SPOE in the USCENTCOM AOR when required.
Procedures for onward movement from
CONUS or OCONUS SPODs to destination will comply with Defense Traffic Management Regulations (DTMR).

(3) ( ) Nonunit Related Personnel and Equipment Movement. Nonunit related personnel type movement will be coded in compliance with Joint Pub 1-03, Appendix B, Table 18. Movement of non-unit cargo will use the Defense Transportation System (DTS). The majority of nonunit cargo moving to the AOR should move through published channels with Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP) documentation.

(4) ( ) Redeployment of Sustainment. Redeployment of sustainment and nonunit equipment, under control of deployed units, will be aggregated by Service (component) representatives in the AOR.

b. ( ) Classification of TPFDD Information. Any Operation BLUENOSE TPFDD is classified SECRET. However, TPFDD movement information such as ULN, UIC, origin, destination, providing organization, EAD/LAD, and number of passengers is UNCLASSIFIED when not associated with a unit name. When the unit name and UIC are used together with either destination or actual deployment dates, the information is classified SECRET.

c. ( ) Planning Guidance

(1) ( ) Components’ airlift and sealift allocation for TPFDD building will be in accordance with Appendix 2.

(2) ( ) The 104BNXX (Series) teleconference will continue to be used to coordinate and resolve BLUENOSE TPFDD issues.

(3) ( ) C-day and L-hour will remain the same for all deployment and redeployment TPFDDs files.

(4) ( ) The following ULN assignments will be used in all TPFDDs files.

USARCENT: TC-TC999
USCENTAF: VC-VC999
USNAVCENT: WC-WC999
USMARCENT: W1-W9999
SOCCENT: UC-UC999
USCENTCOM: U1-U9999
USEUCOM: UE-UE999
USPACOM: UP-UP999

In accordance with Joint Pub 1-03 16 (JOPSREP) Table 3, do not use the characters "I" and "O" in the TPFDD ULN structure. Also, the characters "W," "X," and "Y" are reserved fourth position characters for USAF weather and TACPs in support of Army units.

(5) ( ) SOCCENT will coordinate the redeployment of JCSE forces in direct support of SOCCENT and USCINCSOC forces provided to CENTAF and ARCENT. SOCCENT will use its lift allocation to move these forces.

d. ( ) TPFDD Management

(1) ( ) Validation Procedures. Components, supporting CINCs, and providing organizations will validate, via teleconference, active PIDs to USCENTCOM daily by 2100Z. USCENTCOM will validate to USTRANSCOM 4 hours later, 0100Z the following day, via teleconference. Validation will be by EAD 6 days from the current C-day for airlift requirements and 30 days from the current C-day for sealift requirements (see Glossary, for definition of validation). USTRANSCOM and components will report the current status of validated ULNs by coding the project code field as instructed in Appendix 3.

(2) ( ) Aircraft Allocation and Manifesting

(a) ( ) For CONUS units the AMC requirements cell will contact the unit POC to coordinate movement. For OCONUS units, the AMC requirements cell will contact the organization specified by USCINCCENT to coordinate movement.

(b) ( ) AMC will initially allocate ULNs to aircraft mission numbers and publish the allocation information in the Global Decision Support System (GDSS). USTRANSCOM will update JOPES to show ULNs allocated to air missions. Neither components nor supporting CINCs or providing organizations will change or reassign ULN(s) or aircraft mission numbers without first notifying USCENTCOM and informing USTRANSCOM via teleconference.

(c) ( ) Components, supporting CINCs, and providing organizations will ensure that units or
shippers provide assigned ULN(s) to the airlift control element (ALCE) or aerial port commander (APC) at the APOE along with passenger and cargo quantity. The ALCE or APC will report the aircraft departure with the actual ULN(s), passengers, and cargo STONs hauled for each mission to the appropriate AMC command and control agency. Mission manifesting will be accomplished using JOPES interface of GDSS and cross-check procedures.

(d) ( ) Components, supporting CINCs, and providing organizations with requirements departing from locations without an ALCE or APC will manifest the carrier in JOPES with ULN(s), passengers, and cargo STONs actually hauled. Before the carrier departs, it may be manifested in JOPES if passengers and cargo STONs are known but not later than 12 hours after the aircraft’s departure.

III. ( ) Action

a. ( ) USCENTCOM

(1) ( ) Coordinate with USTRANSCOM to ensure that Appendixes 1 and 2 are current and correct.

(2) ( ) Update Appendixes 3 and 4 as required.

(3) ( ) Update CAT/file strings containing appendixes as required and report periodically the date of the current versions in the daily validation message to USTRANSCOM.

(4) ( ) Conduct daily validations by EAD of active TPFDDs files, 6 days from the current C-day for airlift and 30 days for sealift. Report to USTRANSCOM the validation by 0100Z via TLCF.

(5) ( ) Ensure that applicable milestones are met.

b. ( ) USTRANSCOM

(1) ( ) Coordinate with USCENTCOM to ensure that Appendixes 1 and 2 are current and correct.

(2) ( ) Report to USCENTCOM via TLCF any changes to POCs.

(3) ( ) Ensure Commander Airlift Forces (COMALF) provides a daily list of ALCE or APC locations in the AOR
by message to USCENTCOM REAR/JOPES. Also provide USCENTCOM with a current list of CONUS, OCONUS ALCE, and APC locations and advise when a change occurs to ensure that components, supporting CINCs, and providing organizations know from which APOEs they are required to manifest aircraft.

(4) ( ) Report the current status of validated ULNs according to Appendix 3.

(5) ( ) Conduct aircraft allocation and manifesting as indicated in Part II, subparagraph IID(2) of this LOI.

(6) ( ) Ensure applicable milestones are met.

c. ( ) Components

(1) ( ) Report to USCENTCOM any changes or corrections to POCs.

(2) ( ) Conduct daily validations by EAD of active TPFDD files, 6 days from the current C-day for airlift and 30 days for sealift, and report to USCENTCOM the validation by 2100Z via TLCF.

(3) ( ) Report the current status of validated ULNs according to Appendix 3.

(4) ( ) Insert the proper CEI code for each ULN in the deployment TPFDD to identify its deployment phase.

(5) ( ) Build a redeployment TPFDD of all forces currently deployed to the AOR according to directions provided in this LOI and information contained in the appendixes. The TPFDD must contain force modules showing major combat units and indicate priority of redeployment by ULN according to the priority code field of the ULN record. Report the force module structure of major units via TLCF to USCENTCOM.

(6) ( ) Ensure the redeployment TPFDD is maintained to reflect forces currently in the AOR that may require redeployment.

(7) ( ) Manifest assigned carriers at APOEs with ALCE and port commanders.

(8) ( ) Review USCENTCOM’s daily validation message to USTRANSCOM to ensure TPFDD planning information
provided in the appendixes to this LOI is up to date. Later versions of the appendixes can be obtained from the files listed with the appendixes.

(9) ( ) Ensure applicable milestones are met.

(10) ( ) Ensure there is a 24-hour POC for all ULNs in the validated period (see subparagraph d of Part II). POCs for ULNs can be disseminated a number of ways to include established procedures or including the POC and phone number with the ULN data in "nonbaseline" field.

d. ( ) Supporting CINCs and Providing Organizations

(1) ( ) Report to USCENTCOM any changes or corrections to POCs.

(2) ( ) Conduct daily validations by EAD of active TPFDDs files, 6 days from the current C-day for airlift and 30 days for sealift. Report to USCENTCOM these validations by 2100Z via TLCF.

(3) ( ) Report the current status of validated ULNs according to Appendix 3.

(4) ( ) Insert the proper CEI code for each ULN in the deployment TPFDD to identify its deployment phase.

(5) ( ) Coordinate with appropriate USCENTCOM components on movement data for those requirements intended for a particular service. Coordinate with USCINCCENT on movement data for joint requirements.

(6) ( ) Manifest assigned carriers at APOEs without ALCE or port commanders.

(7) ( ) Review USCENTCOM’s daily validation message to USTRANSCOM to ensure that TPFDD planning information provided in the appendixes to this LOI is up to date.

(8) ( ) Ensure applicable milestones are met.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPOE and SPOD</th>
<th>GEO CODE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMSTERDAM, NE</td>
<td>AHUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTWERP, BE 1/</td>
<td>ALRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAYONNE, NJ</td>
<td>ATZG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTIMORE, MD</td>
<td>AVBU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAUMONT, TX</td>
<td>BBNV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BREMERHAVEN, GE 1/</td>
<td>CHCY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLESTON, SC</td>
<td>DKSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCORD, CA 2/</td>
<td>EGNN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIEGO GARCIA</td>
<td>FGDB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEMSHAVE, GE</td>
<td>FTAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMDEN, GE</td>
<td>FYVQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FALMUTH, UK</td>
<td>GLXR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GALVESTON, TX</td>
<td>HQLL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLEN DOUGLAS, UK</td>
<td>HVNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSTON, TX</td>
<td>LCMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACKSONVILLE, FL</td>
<td>LSGM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIVORNO, IT</td>
<td>NBDY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG BEACH, CA</td>
<td>NPTU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOREHEAD CITY, NC</td>
<td>QTUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAHA, OK</td>
<td>REPL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW ORLEANS, LA</td>
<td>RQNK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWPORT, UK</td>
<td>RUDL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NEWPORT NEWS, VA        RULV
NORDENHAM, GE 3/      SAYM
NORFOLK, VA        SBEA
OAKLAND, CA        SERU
PEARL HARBOR, HI    SYSS
PORT HUENEME, CA    TNZY
ROTA, SP 1/         UMXA
ROTTERDAM, NL 1/     UNAP
SAN DIEGO, CA       UTAC
SAN FRANCISCO, CA   UTLS
SAVANNAH, GA        UZXJ
SOUDA BAY, GR       VXQR
SUNNY POINT, NC 4/   WMPT
TACOMA, WA          WPVT
TENGAN, JA          WTTH
WILMINGTON, NC      ZBES

Notes:
1/ Potential SPOEs and SPODs for the deployment or redeployment of
   USEUCOM-provided forces.
2/ Retrograde of ammunition for West Coast.
3/ Potential SPOEs and SPODs for the deployment of ammunition
   originally sourced from USEUCOM.
4/ Retrograde of ammunition and 4th MEB.
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX N

SAMPLE AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT ALLOCATION

1. ( ) The deployment of forces to the AOR will be conducted as a two-phase operation. The following allocation will apply for deployment of Phase I forces (COO0–C060):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PAX/DAY</th>
<th>STON/DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARCENT</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCENT</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTAF</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCCENT</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVCENT</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCCENT</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>3,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. ( ) The following allocation will apply for sustained deployment of Phase II forces (C+061+):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PAX/DAY</th>
<th>STON/DAY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARCENT</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCENT</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTAF</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCCENT</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVCENT</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCCENT</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,475</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX N

SAMPLE PROJECT CODE FIELD

1. To more clearly identify the status of ULNs in the airlift process, the project code field will be used as follows:

   a. USTRANSCOM will insert the current C-day into the field when the ULN is pulled for scheduling. For example, if the ULN is pulled for scheduling on C+70, then "070" will be placed into the project code field.

   b. Components, supporting CINC’s, and providing organizations (components, supporting CINC’s, providing organizations) will place "DEP" in the field when a ULN has cleared an APOE and SPOE. (Note: "DEP" is the only code described in this appendix that must be inserted into the project code field of ULNs that have departed an SPOE.)

   c. If a ULN is 3 days past its LAD and still not coded "DEP," the components, supporting CINC’s, or providing organizations must take action to resolve the ULN’s status by initiating one of the following:

      (1) Code the ULN "DEP" if ULN has departed APOE and SPOE.
      (2) Code the ULN "REV" indicating the ULN is revalidated and still requires airlift.
      (3) Move the ULN out of the validated window for validation at a later date.

   d. If a ULN is revalidated and coded "REV," USTRANSCOM will reflow the requirement and place a new date in the project code field. Since the ULN will be past its LAD, components, supporting CINC’s, or providing organizations must confirm movement within 3 days of this new date and resolve the ULN’s status as indicated in paragraph c above.

   e. USTRANSCOM will input the following codes to identify problem ULNs:

      (1) "NR" indicates the unit or shipper of the ULN was contacted and stated the ULN was not ready or prepared for airlift.
      (2) "NA" indicates the ULN is not appropriate for airlift. For example, the ULN is too small and not aggregated with other TPFDD requirements.
(3) "INV" indicates a ULN is invalid. For example, the ULN is significantly larger than indicated in the TPFDD or incorrect routing is entered.

f. Once the problem ULNs coded "NA," "NR," or "INV" have been resolved, the components, supporting CINCs, or providing organizations will then revalidate the ULN by inserting the "REV" code or moving the ULN out of the validated window. When "NR" is used, the EAD or LAD and RDD will be changed to reflect new scheduling dates, outside the validated window, based on the unit’s readiness to move. If new scheduling dates are inside the validated window, then the components, supporting CINCs, or providing organizations must request the change by TLCF with operational justification.

2. In the case of a ULN that is 3 days past its LAD and has only partially moved with requirements still remaining, the ULN will be coded "REV" by the component. The number of passengers and cargo STONs remaining will be reported in the components, supporting CINCs, or providing organizations daily validation message.

3. A summary of authorized project codes entries and their meaning follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>MEANING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>Valid airlift requirement, ULN will be scheduled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C-day)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REV</td>
<td>ULN is revalidated and ready for scheduling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>ULN is not ready, components, supporting CINCs, or providing organizations must revalidate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Not appropriate for airlift, must revalidate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INV</td>
<td>Invalid ULN, components, supporting CINCS, or providing organizations must correct movement data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>ULN has departed APOE and SPOE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX N
SAMPLE DEFINITIONS

The following definitions apply to Operation BLUENOSE:

a. ( ) Unit Number Line (ULN). A ULN defines a movement requirement. Often referred to simply as a requirement.

b. ( ) Validation Components have verified the correctness of RLD, LAD, POD, number of passengers, and cargo data for ULNs within the validated period.

c. ( ) Availability to Load Date (ALD). The date in a TPFDD that unit and nonunit equipment and forces can begin loading on an aircraft or ship at the port of embarkation (POE).

d. ( ) Ready to Load Date (RLD). The date in a TPFDD when the unit, nonunit equipment, and forces are prepared to depart their origin on organic transportation or are prepared to begin loading on USTRANSCOM-provided transportation.

e. ( ) Aerial Port of Embarkation or Debarkation (APOE or APOD). Location from which or to which a strategic intertheater air movement may occur.

f. ( ) Channel. Two geographic points between which common-user transportation service is provided. A channel does not represent the actual routing of the transportation asset, although the two may be the same.

g. ( ) Earliest Arrival Date (EAD). The earliest time a unit can arrive at an APOD or SPOD HQ. AMC normally schedules requirements to arrive as close to this date as possible. Units should plan a minimum of a 2-day EAD-LAD window to the maximum extent possible. EAD-LAD windows of less than 2 days should be explained in the TLCF.

h. ( ) Latest Arrival Date (LAD). The latest date a unit can arrive at an APOD or SPOD HQ AMC normally needs a 2-day window between EAD-LAD. See EAD.

NOTE: Definitions are amplifications or simplifications of the standard definitions found in the glossary of JOPES, Volume I, and in JOPESREP.
1. The CINC normally will provide his staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders with pertinent initial planning guidance to permit work to begin on developing the CINC’s Strategic Concept. The staffs use this guidance to begin work on developing the Staff Estimates that will be used to form the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE.

2. Typical data provided in preliminary guidance will usually include characteristics of the area of operations, enemy capabilities, the mission statement, assumptions, special weapons, political and psychological considerations, tentative COAs, and a proposed planning schedule.

3. The example formats contained in Appendixes 1 through 6 to this annex may be useful in developing the CINC’s Planning Directive, Staff Estimates, and COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE used in the Concept Development Phase of the deliberate planning process.

Appendixes:

1--Planning Directive
2--Personnel Estimate
3--Intelligence Estimate
4--Logistic Estimate
5--Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Estimate
6--COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE of the Situation
APPENDIX 1

PLANNING DIRECTIVE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Copy Number ________

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Message Reference/Number (Date-time Group, Month, Year)

PLANNING DIRECTIVE FOR (Plan designation)

( ) REFERENCES:  a. Maps or charts

b. Pertinent documents

1. ( ) Mission

a. ( ) Write a clear and concise statement of the mission for the command.

b. ( ) A paragraph should list the tasks, including:

   (1) ( ) Those assigned by higher headquarters.

   (2) ( ) Those deduced or implied tasks that must be described to convey a clear understanding of the overall mission.

c. ( ) If the analysis of the mission or task(s) has not progressed to the point where it can be formally stated, present the commander’s best estimate of the mission.

2. ( ) Commander’s Analysis

a. ( ) This paragraph contains the commander’s analysis of the mission and, in broad terms, how the mission is to be carried out.

b. ( ) Outline, in broad terms, the phasing of the operation.

3. ( ) Assumptions

a. ( ) State assumptions necessary to continue planning. They will be treated as facts by subordinate commands.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

P-1-1
b. ( ) The list is not final; assumptions may be added or dropped during planning.

4. ( ) Forces Apportioned. Give information on the type and availability of major combat forces.
   a. ( ) Assigned forces.
   b. ( ) Augmenting forces.

5. ( ) Proposed Courses of Action
   a. ( ) List courses of action (COAs) to be considered by the staff. Include those tentative COAs that were suggested by the commander in the planning guidance, as well as those proposed by the J-5 for consideration.
   b. ( ) Any of these COAs may be discarded and/or refined and new ones identified and proposed as the planning process continues.

6. ( ) Guidance
   a. ( ) Nuclear and Chemical Defense Weapons
      (1) ( ) Include a brief statement by the commander that outlines the conditions under which nuclear and chemical defense weapons might be used.
      (2) ( ) If their encounter or use is considered a reasonable possibility, include preliminary estimates of allocations, priorities, and restraints.
   b. ( ) Political Considerations
      (1) ( ) Include guidance from higher authority.
      (2) ( ) List Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) or basing rights that affect the operation.
   c. ( ) Mobility Resources
      (1) ( ) Identify strategic or tactical lift assets apportioned for planning.
      (2) ( ) Highlight priorities or constraints for transportation assets.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

P-1-2
d. ( ) Supporting and Subordinate Commands and Agencies. Give preliminary information about support from adjacent and lower echelons.

e. ( ) Command and Control. State the command and control organization selected by the commander.

f. ( ) Other. Include guidance that the commander determines to be necessary.

7. ( ) Tasks
a. ( ) Delineate staff responsibilities to begin development of staff estimates.

b. ( ) Outline Coordinating Instructions
   (1) ( ) Joint board requirements.
   (2) ( ) Adjacent and subordinate command and agency coordination required.
   (3) ( ) Uni-Service, common, and cross-Servicing coordination required.

8. ( ) Administration
a. ( ) Planning Schedule
   (1) ( ) Planning conferences scheduled.
   (2) ( ) Plan completion suspense.
   (3) ( ) Annex completion suspense.
   (4) ( ) Other milestone events determined necessary.

b. ( ) Interstaff Liaison Instructions

c. ( ) Coordination
   (1) ( ) Action officer designation.
   (2) ( ) Reports known or anticipated.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
APPENDIX 2
PERSONNEL ESTIMATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Section, Issuing Headquarters*
Place of Issue
Date-time Group, Month, Year

PERSONNEL ESTIMATE NUMBER ___________**

( ) REFERENCES:  
   a. Maps and charts  
   b. Other pertinent documents.

1. ( ) Mission. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander’s mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.

2. ( ) Situation and Considerations

   a. ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operation. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting personnel activities.

   b. ( ) Enemy Forces

      (1) ( ) Strength and Dispositions. Refer to current intelligence estimate.

      (2) ( ) Enemy Capabilities. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on personnel matters.

* When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

** Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

P-2-1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

c. ( ) Friendly Forces

   (1) ( ) Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.

   (2) ( ) Own Courses of Action. State the proposed COAs under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.

   (3) ( ) Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments necessary in initial and subsequent phases of the operation proposed.

d. ( ) Logistic Situation. State known logistic problems, if any, that may affect the personnel situation.

e. ( ) Command, Control, and Communications Situation. State the command, control, and communications situation, emphasizing known problems that may affect the personnel situation.

f. ( ) Assumptions. State assumptions about the personnel situation made for this estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain personnel assumptions that may have been made in preparing this estimate should be stated here.

g. ( ) Special Features. List anything not covered elsewhere in the estimate that may influence the personnel situation. For example, identify civil and indigenous labor resources available or essential to support military operations.

h. ( ) Personnel Situation. State known or anticipated personnel problems that may influence selection of a specific COA.

3. ( ) Personnel Analysis of Own Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the personnel factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence and to isolate the personnel implications that should be weighed by the commander in the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE of the situation.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

P-2-2
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

a. ( ) Analyze each COA from the personnel point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

b. ( ) The personnel factors described in paragraph 2 establish the elements to be analyzed for each COA under consideration. Examine these personnel factors realistically and include appropriate considerations of climate and weather, terrain, hydrography, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the personnel situation as it affects the COAs.

c. ( ) Throughout the analysis, keep personnel considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision but to ensure that all applicable personnel factors have been considered and to be the basis of paragraphs 4 and 5.

4. ( ) Comparison of Own Courses of Action

a. ( ) List the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA--from the J-1’s point of view.

b. ( ) Use a work sheet similar to the one in the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE, if necessary.

5. ( ) Conclusions

a. ( ) State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a personnel standpoint.

b. ( ) State which COA under consideration can best be supported from a personnel standpoint.

c. ( ) Identify the major personnel deficiencies that must be brought to the commander’s attention. Include recommendations of methods to eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _____________________

J-1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
ANNEXES: (By letter and title). Use annexes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. Annexes should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)
APPENDIX 3

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Section, Issuing Headquarters*
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER _________________**

( ) REFERENCES:  
  a. Maps and charts.
  b. Other relevant documents.

1. ( ) Mission. State the assigned task and its purpose. The mission of the command as a whole is taken from the commander’s mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statement.

2. ( ) Enemy Situation. State conditions that exist and indication of effects of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned mission. This paragraph describes the area of operations, the enemy military situation, and the effect of these two factors on enemy capabilities.

   a. ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operations. Discuss the effect of the physical characteristics of the area of operations on military activities of both combatants. If an analysis of the area has been prepared separately, this paragraph in the intelligence estimate may simply refer to it, then discuss the effects of the existing situation on military operations in the area.

* When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

** Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

P-3-1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

(1) ( ) Military Geography

(a) ( ) Topography

1. ( ) Existing Situation. Describe relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, cultural features, and other characteristics in terms of their effect on key terrain, observation, fields of fire, obstacles, cover and concealment, avenues of approach, lines of communication, and landing areas and zones.

2. ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effect of topography on broad enemy capabilities such as attack and defense, describing generally how the topography affects each type of activity. The effect on employment of nuclear and CB weapons; amphibious, airborne, or airlanded forces; surveillance devices and systems; communications equipment and systems; electronic warfare; psychological operations OPSEC and military deception; logistic support; and other appropriate considerations should be included.

3. ( ) Effect on Friendly Course of Action. Discuss the effects of topography on friendly forces’ military operations (attack, defense, etc.) in the same fashion as for enemy capabilities in the preceding subparagraphs.

(b) ( ) Hydrography

1. ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the nature of the coastline; adjacent islands; location, extent, and capacity of landing beaches and their approaches and exits; nature of the offshore approaches, including type of bottom and gradients; natural obstacles; surf, tide, and current conditions.

2. ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing situation on broad enemy capabilities.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

P-3-2
3. ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(c) ( ) Climate and Weather

1. ( ) Existing Situation. Describe temperature, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, light data, and other climate and weather conditions and their general effects on roads, rivers, soil trafficability, and observation.

2. ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing climate and weather situation on broad enemy capabilities.

3. ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing climate and weather situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(2) ( ) Transportation

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe roads, railways, inland waterways, airfields, and other physical characteristics of the transportation system; capabilities of the transportation system in terms of rolling stock, barge capacities, and terminal facilities; and other pertinent data.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(3) ( ) Telecommunications

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe telecommunications facilities and capabilities in the area.
(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing telecommunications situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing telecommunications situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(4) ( ) Politics

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the organization and operation of civil government in the area of operation.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Consider the effects of the political situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Consider the effects of the political situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(5) ( ) Economics

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe industry, public works and utilities, finance, banking, currency, commerce, agriculture, trades and professions, labor force, and other related factors.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the economic situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the economic situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(6) ( ) Sociology

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe language, religion, social institutions and attitudes, minority groups, population distribution, health and sanitation, and other related factors.
(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(7) ( ) Science and Technology

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the level of science and technology in the area of operations.

(b) ( ) Effect on Enemy Capabilities. Discuss the effects of science and technology on broad enemy capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of science and technology on broad COAs for friendly forces.

b. ( ) Enemy Military Situation (Ground, Naval, Air, Other Service)

(1) ( ) Strength. State the number and size of enemy units committed and enemy reinforcements available for use in the area of operations. Ground strength, air power, naval forces, nuclear and CB weapons, electronic warfare, unconventional warfare, surveillance potential, and all other strengths (which might be significant) are considered.

(2) ( ) Composition. Outline the structure of enemy forces (order of battle) and describe unusual organizational features, identity, armament, and weapon systems.

(3) ( ) Location and Disposition. Describe the geographic location of enemy forces in the area, including fire support elements; command and control facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and bases.

(4) ( ) Availability of Reinforcements. Describe enemy reinforcement capabilities in terms of ground, air, naval, missile, nuclear, and CB forces and weapons; terrain, weather, road and rail nets, transportation, replacements, labor forces, prisoner of war policy; and possible aid from sympathetic or participating neighbors.
(5) ( ) Movements and Activities. Describe the latest known enemy activities in the area.

(6) ( ) Logistics. Describe levels of supply, resupply ability, and capacity of beaches, ports, roads, railways, airfields, and other facilities to support supply and resupply. Consider hospitalization and evacuation, military construction, labor resources, and maintenance of combat equipment.

(7) ( ) Operational Capability to Launch Missiles. Describe the total missile capability that can be brought to bear on forces operating in the area, including characteristics of missile systems, location and capacity of launch or delivery units, initial and sustained launch rates, size and location of stockpiles, and other pertinent factors.

(8) ( ) Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft. Describe the total aircraft inventory by type, performance characteristics of operational aircraft, initial and sustained sortie rates of aircraft by type, and other pertinent factors.

(9) ( ) Operational Capabilities of Combatant Vessels. Describe the number, type, and operational characteristics of ships, boats, and craft in the naval inventory; base location; and capacity for support.

(10) ( ) Technical Characteristics of Equipment. Describe the technical characteristics of major items of equipment in the enemy inventory not already considered (such as missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels).

(11) ( ) Electronics Intelligence. Describe the enemy intelligence-gathering capability using electronic devices.

(12) ( ) Nuclear and CB Weapons. Describe the types and characteristics of nuclear and CB weapons in the enemy inventory, stockpile data, delivery capabilities, nuclear and CB employment policies and techniques, and other pertinent factors.

(13) ( ) Significant Strengths and Weaknesses. Discuss the significant enemy strengths and weaknesses perceived from the facts presented in the preceding subparagraphs.
c. ( ) Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation

(1) ( ) Guerrilla. Describe the enemy capability for, policy with regard to, and current status in the area of guerrilla or insurgent operations.

(2) ( ) Psychological. Describe enemy doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of psychological operations in the area of operations.

(3) ( ) Subversion. Describe enemy doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of subversion in the area of operations.

(4) ( ) Sabotage. Outline enemy organization and potential for and conduct of sabotage in the area of operations.

3. ( ) Enemy Capabilities. List each enemy capability that can affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Each enemy capability should contain information on the following: What the enemy can do. Where they can do it. When they can start it and get it done. What strength they can devote to the task. In describing enemy capabilities, the J-2 must be able to tell the commander what the enemy can do using its forces in a joint effort. First, of course, the J-2 must assess the enemy’s ground, naval, and air forces. It is customary to enumerate separately the nuclear, CB, and unconventional warfare capacities. Hypothetical examples follow:

a. ( ) Ground Capabilities

(1) ( ) The enemy can attack at any time along our front with an estimated 6 infantry divisions and 2 tank divisions supported by 24 battalions of artillery.

(2) ( ) The enemy can defend now in its present position with 7 infantry divisions supported by 2 tank divisions and 16 battalions of medium and light artillery.

(3) ( ) The enemy can reinforce its attack (or defense) with all or part of the following units in the times and places indicated:
### SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>315th Airborne Div</td>
<td>Vic RESOGA</td>
<td>8 hrs after starting time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st Motorized</td>
<td>Vic CARDINAL</td>
<td>6 hrs after starting time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. ( ) Air Capabilities

(1) ( ) Starting now, and based on an estimated strength of 300 fighters and 100 medium bomber aircraft, the enemy can attack in the area of operations with 240 fighter sorties per day for the first 2 days, followed by a sustained rate of 150 sorties per day, and 60 bomber sorties per day, for 1 day followed by a sustained rate of 48 sorties per day.

(2) ( ) Using airfields in the vicinity of ____, the enemy has sufficient transport sorties to lift one regiment in a single lift to airfields in the vicinity of ____, ____, and ____ within 4 hours’ flying time.

c. ( ) Naval Capabilities. Starting now, the enemy can conduct sustained sea and air operations in the entire area with 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 1 CV, 7 SSNs, a mine force of 20 craft, and 70 gunboats and smaller craft now on station in the area.

d. ( ) Nuclear Capabilities. The enemy can employ at any time and in any part of the area of operations an estimated 40 to 60 nuclear weapons of yields from 2 to 50 kt delivered by cannon and rocket artillery, guided missile, and aircraft.

e. ( ) CB Capabilities. The enemy can employ the CB agents ____, ____, and ____ in the area of operations at any time delivered by air, cannon, and rocket artillery and by guided missile.

f. ( ) UW Capability. The enemy can conduct UW operations in the area within 10 days after starting the operation using dissident ethnic elements and the political adversaries of the current government.

g. ( ) Joint Capabilities. The enemy can continue to defend in its present position with 6 infantry divisions, supported by 16 artillery battalions, and reinforced by 3 mechanized divisions within 8 hours after starting movement.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

P-3-8
Enemy defense also can be supported by 150 fighter sorties daily for a sustained period and by continuous naval surface and air operations employing 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 7 SSNs, and 1 CV.

4. ( ) Analysis of Enemy Capabilities. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering all applicable factors from paragraph 2 above, and attempt to determine and give reasons for the relative order probability of adoption by the enemy. Discuss enemy vulnerabilities. In this paragraph, examine the enemy capability by discussing the factors that favor or militate against their adoption by the enemy. When applicable, the analysis of each capability should also include a discussion of enemy vulnerabilities attendant to that capability; i.e., conditions or circumstances of the enemy situation that render the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. Finally, the analysis should include a discussion of any indications that point to possible adoption of the capability. For example, the following:

a. ( ) Attack now with forces along the forward edge of the battle area . . . .

(1) ( ) The following factors favor the enemy’s adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) . . . .

(b) ( ) . . . .

(2) ( ) The following factors militate against the enemy’s adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) Road and rail nets will not support largescale troop and supply movements necessary for an attack in the area.

(b) ( ) Terrain in the area does not favor an attack.

(3) ( ) Adoption of this capability will expose the enemy’s west flank to counterattack.

(4) ( ) Except for minor patrol activity in the area, there are no indications of adoption of this capability.
b. ( ) Delay from present positions along the ___ River lie . .

(1) ( ) The following factors favor the enemy’s adoption of this capability:
   (a) ( ) There are several excellent natural barriers between the River and the Mountains.
   (b) ( ) The effectiveness of the water barriers will improve, and trafficability on the upland slopes of the terrain barriers will deteriorate with advent of the monsoon.

(2) ( ) The following factors militate against the enemy’s adoption of this capability:
   (a) ( ) . . . .
   (b) ( ) . . . .

(3) ( ) In the adoption of this capability, the enemy’s lines of communication will be restricted by a limited road and rail net that can easily be interdicted.

(4) ( ) The following facts indicate adoption of this capability:
   (a) ( ) Aerial photography indicates some preparation of barriers in successive positions.
   (b) ( ) Considerable troop movement and prepositioning of floating bridge equipment along the water barriers have been detected.

5. ( ) Conclusions. Conclusions resulting from discussion in paragraph 4 above. Include, when possible, a concise statement of the effects of each capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Cite enemy vulnerabilities where applicable. This paragraph contains a summary of enemy capabilities most likely to be adopted, listed in the order of relative probability if sufficient information is available to permit such an estimate. If appropriate, it should also include a concise statement of the effects of each enemy capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Exploitable vulnerabilities should also be listed, where applicable.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

a. ( ) Enemy Capabilities in Relative Probability of Adoption
   (1) ( ) Defend in present locations with . . . .
   (2) ( ) Delay from present positions along . . . .
   (3) ( ) Reinforce the defense or delay with . . . .
   (4) ( ) Conduct UW operations in the area . . . .

b. ( ) Vulnerabilities
   (1) ( ) Enemy left (west) flank is open to envelopment by amphibious assault . . . .
   (2) ( ) The enemy’s air search radar coverage is poor in the left (west) portion of its defensive sector . . . .

(Signed) ____________________

J-2

(The staff division chief signs the staff estimates produced by that division. If the estimate is to be distributed outside the headquarters, the heading and signature block must be changed to reflect that fact.)

ANNEXES: (By letter and title) Annexes should be included where the information is in graphs or of such detail and volume that inclusion makes the body of the estimate cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

P-3-11
APPENDIX 4

LOGISTIC ESTIMATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Division, Issuing Headquarters*

Place of Issue

Date-time Group, Month, Year

LOGISTIC ESTIMATE NUMBER ___________**

( ) REFERENCES:  
  a. Maps and charts.
  b. Other pertinent documents.

1. ( ) Mission. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander’s mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.

2. ( ) Situation and Considerations
   
   a. ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operation. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting logistic activities.

   b. ( ) Enemy Forces

      (1) ( ) Strength and Dispositions. Refer to current intelligence estimate.

      (2) ( ) Enemy Capabilities. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on the logistic situation. Address enemy abilities to interdict strategic

* When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

** Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
sealift and airlift, to attack and reduce the effectiveness of transportation nodes, and to attack pre-positioned stocks ashore and afloat, if applicable.

c. ( ) Friendly Forces

(1) ( ) Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.

(2) ( ) Own Courses of Action. State the proposed COAs under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.

(3) ( ) Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments and logistic preparations necessary in all phases of the operation proposed.

d. ( ) Logistic Situation. State known personnel problems, if any, that may affect the logistic situation.

e. ( ) Command, Control, and Communications Situation. State the command, control, and communications situation, emphasizing known command, control, and communications problems that may affect the logistic situation.

f. ( ) Assumptions. State assumptions about the logistic aspects of the situation made for this estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain logistic assumptions may have been made in preparing this estimate, and those should be stated.

g. ( ) Special Features. Special features not covered elsewhere in the estimate that may influence the logistic situation may be stated here.

h. ( ) Logistic Situation

(1) ( ) Supply and Service Installations. Describe and give location of key supply and service installations that will be used to support the operation.

(2) ( ) Supply. State availability of PWRs, authorized levels of supply, known deficiencies of supply stocks and supply systems, and responsibilities and policies regarding supply.
(3) ( ) Transportation. List air, sea, and surface transportation availability, coordination, regulations, lift capability, responsibilities, and policies regarding supply.

(4) ( ) Medical Services. Describe availability of evacuation and hospital facilities and medical responsibilities and policies, including the anticipated evacuation policy.

(5) ( ) Civil Engineering Support. List responsibilities for civil engineering support, limiting factors, and other appropriate considerations.

(6) ( ) Miscellaneous. Include other logistic matters not considered elsewhere that may influence selection of a specific COA. Include identity of known deficiencies of combat service support. Include identity of civil and indigenous materiel resources available or essential to support military operations. Also, consider the requirement to meet minimum essential needs of civil populace for whom the commander may become responsible.

3. ( ) Logistic Analysis of Own Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the logistic factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence. The objective of this analysis is to determine if the logistic requirements can be met and to isolate the logistic implications that should be weighed by the commander in the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE of the situation.

   a. ( ) Analyze each COA from the logistic point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

   b. ( ) For each COA under consideration, analyze the logistic factors described in paragraph 2. Examine these factors realistically from the standpoint of requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities, climate and weather, hydrography, time and space, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the logistic situation as it affects the COAs.

   c. ( ) Throughout the analysis, keep logistic considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to
produce a decision; it is intended to ensure that all applicable logistic factors have been properly considered and serve as the basis for the comparisons in paragraph 4.

4. ( ) Comparison of Own Courses of Action
   a. ( ) List the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA—-from the J-4’s point of view.
   b. ( ) Use a work sheet similar to that used for the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE, if necessary.

5. ( ) Conclusions
   a. ( ) State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a logistic standpoint.
   b. ( ) State which COA under consideration can best be supported from a logistic standpoint.
   c. ( ) Identify the major logistic deficiencies that must be brought to the commander’s attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods to eliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

   (Signed) ______________________

   J-4

ANNEXES: (By letter and title). Use annexes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. Annexes should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)
APPENDIX 5

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS ESTIMATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Division, Issuing Headquarters*

Place of Issue

Date-time Group, Month, Year

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS ESTIMATE
NUMBER ___________**


b. Other pertinent documents.

1. ( ) Mission. State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander’s mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statements.

2. ( ) Situation and Considerations

   a. ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operation. Summarize data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting C4 activities.

   b. ( ) Enemy Forces

      (1) ( ) Strength and Dispositions. Refer to current intelligence estimate.

      (2) ( ) Enemy Capabilities. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from the current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on the C4 situation.

* When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

** Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

c. ( ) Friendly Forces

(1) ( ) Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.

(2) ( ) Own Courses of Action. State the proposed COAs under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.

(3) ( ) Probable Tactical Developments. Review major deployments and C4 preparations necessary in all phases of the operation proposed. C3CM against enemy capabilities should be included.

d. ( ) Personnel Situation. State known personnel problems that may affect the C4 situation.

e. ( ) Logistic Situation. State known logistic problems that may affect the C4 situation.

f. ( ) Assumptions. State assumptions about the C4 aspects of the situation made for this estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain C4 assumptions may have been made in preparing this estimate, and those should be stated here.

g. ( ) Special Features. State special features that are not covered elsewhere in the estimate but that may influence the C4 situation.

h. ( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Situation. Consideration should be given to line-of-sight communications, satellite communications (SATCOM), UHF SATCOM, ground mobile command post, the DSCS Ground Mobile Segment, and DCS Interface.

   *(1) ( ) C2 Communications.

* Each subparagraph analyzes systems requirements, identifies capability and availability of equipment, and identifies facilities, installations, and units needed to satisfy requirements and furnish adequate support for the subject of that subparagraph.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

*(2) ( ) Administrative Communications.
*(3) ( ) Communications Intelligence.
*(4) ( ) Communications Security.
*(5) ( ) Communications Support for Combat Operations.
   (a) ( ) Joint Tactical Air Operations.
   (b) ( ) Air-to-Ground Operations (CAS and BAI).
   (c) ( ) Naval Surface Fire Support Operations.
*(6) ( ) Communications Control and Aids for Supporting Arms.
*(7) ( ) Communications Requirements for Other Activities.

3. ( ) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Analysis of Own Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of the C4 factors influencing the proposed COAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence. The objective of this analysis is to isolate the C4 implications that should be weighed by the commander in the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE of the situation.

   a. ( ) Analyze each COA from a C4 point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.

   b. ( ) The C4 factors in paragraph 2 are the elements to be analyzed for each COA under consideration. Examine these factors realistically and include appropriate considerations of climate and weather, hydrography, time and space, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors that may have an impact on the C4 situation as it affects the COAs.

* Each subparagraph analyzes systems requirements, identifies capability and availability of equipment, and identifies facilities, installations, and units needed to satisfy requirements and furnish adequate support for the subject of that subparagraph.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

P-5-3
c. ( ) Throughout the analysis, keep C4 foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision but to ensure that all applicable factors have been properly considered and serve as the basis for the comparisons in paragraph 4.

4. ( ) Comparison of Own Courses of Action

   a. ( ) As in the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE, list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed course of action from the J-6 point of view.

   b. ( ) Use a work sheet similar to the one in the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE, if necessary.

5. ( ) Conclusions

   a. ( ) State whether or not the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a C4 standpoint.

   b. ( ) State which COA under consideration can best be supported from a C4 standpoint.

   c. ( ) Identify the major C4 deficiencies that must be brought to the commander’s attention. Include recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effects of those deficiencies.

      (Signed) ________________

      J-6

ANNEXES: (By letter and title.) Use annexes when the information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume that inclusion in the body makes the estimates too cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate. Subject areas that should be discussed are communications security, C4 systems protection (including identification of initial nodes), and communications planning.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)
APPENDIX 6

COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Issuing Headquarters

Place

Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

( ) REFERENCES:  
  a. Maps and charts.
  b. Other pertinent documents.

1. ( ) Mission. State the assigned or deduced task and its purpose. If the mission is multiple, determine priorities. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, necessary to the accomplishment of the mission.

2. ( ) The Situation and Courses of Action

  a. ( ) Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Determine and analyze those factors that will influence the choice of a COA as well as those that affect the capabilities of the enemy. Consider any of the following and other factors that are involved, include under each a statement of each fact (or an assumption, if necessary), and deduce the probable influence on enemy or friendly actions.

    (1) ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operations

      (a) ( ) Military Geography

      1. ( ) Topography. Consider factors of relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, and similar characteristics because they affect such elements of an operation as observation, maneuver, fire support, concealment, cover, air and surface movement, LOCs, avenues of approach, key terrain, nuclear and CB weapons employment, electronic emissions of all types, and unconventional, psychological, and other significant activities.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

P-6-1
2. ( ) Hydrography. Include the characteristics of offshore sea areas, approaches to the beaches, currents, tides, the beaches themselves, ports, docks, and similar maritime considerations.

3. ( ) Climate and Weather. Determine and state extremes of temperature, wind velocities, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, and other such factors that can affect military operations. Sunrise, sunset, and twilight data are normally given in this subparagraph.

(b) ( ) Transportation. Indicate characteristics of roads, railways, inland waterways, and airfields, including such factors as size, capacity, conditions, and other facts that affect enemy capabilities and friendly COA.

(c) ( ) Telecommunications. List radio, cable, landline, and other communications facilities in the area of operations that might aid in the exercise of command over military forces. Facilities considered by this subparagraph are not those in the organic capability of the opposing forces, but rather those present in the area.

(d) ( ) Politics. Include such considerations in political stability, alliances, relations with other countries, aspects of international law, control over subversion and dissidence, and similar factors that may influence selection of a COA. Neutrality or nonneutrality of neighboring states in the area is often listed here.

(e) ( ) Economics. Include the organization of the economy and sometimes its mobilization capacity; the industrial base of the antagonists to support hostilities, finance, and foreign trade; and similar influences as they affect selection of a COA.

(f) ( ) Sociology. Consider social conditions, which run a wide range from the psychological ability of the populace to withstand the rigors of war to health and sanitation conditions in the area of operations. Language, social institutions and
attitudes, and similar factors that may affect selection of a COA must be considered.

(g) ( ) Science and Technology. Although little immediate military impact may result from the state of science and technology in a target area, consider the long-range effects of such factors as technical skill level of the population and scientific and technical resources in manpower and facilities in cases where they may affect the choice of a COA.

(2) ( ) Relative Combat Power

(a) ( ) Enemy

1. ( ) Strength. Give number and size of enemy units committed and those available for reinforcement in the area. This is not intended to be a tabulation of numbers of aircraft, ships, missiles, or other military weaponry. Rather, it is a study of what strength the enemy commander can bring to bear in the area in terms of ground units committed and reinforcing; aircraft sortie rates, missile delivery rates; and unconventional, psychological, and other strengths the commander thinks may affect the balance of power.

2. ( ) Composition. Include order of battle of major enemy combat formations, equivalent strengths of enemy and friendly units, and major weapon systems and armaments in the enemy arsenal and their operational characteristics.

3. ( ) Location and Disposition. Indicate geographic location of enemy units; fire support elements; command and control facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and other combat power in or deployable to the area of operations.

4. ( ) Reinforcements. Estimate the enemy reinforcement capabilities that can influence the battle in the area under consideration. This study should include ground, air, naval, and missile forces; nuclear, CB, and other
advanced weapon systems; and an estimate of the relative capacity to move these forces about, to, and in the battle area.

5. ( ) Logistics. Summarize enemy ability to support the capabilities with which they have been credited and include such considerations as supply, maintenance, hospitalization and evacuation, transportation, labor, construction, and other essential logistic means. Broadly speaking, it is a feasibility test for enemy capabilities.

6. ( ) Time and Space Factors. Estimate where and when initial forces and reinforcements can be deployed and employed. Such a study will normally include distances and travel times by land, sea, and air from major bases or mounting areas into the battle area.

7. ( ) Combat Efficiency. Estimate enemy state of training, readiness, battle experience, physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, tactical doctrine, discipline, and whatever significant strengths or weaknesses may appear.

(b) ( ) Friendly. In general, follow the same pattern used for analysis of the enemy when appraising the commander’s own force. The descriptions of what to consider and the approach to the problem outlined in subparagraph 2a(2)(a) apply to the analysis of friendly forces.

(3) ( ) Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors on which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such in paragraph 2 of the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE.

(a) ( ) Enemy Capabilities.* State the enemy capabilities that can affect the accomplishment of the COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE.

* Obtained from the Intelligence Estimate of the Situation
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

(b) ( ) Own Courses of Action. State all practicable COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission.

3. ( ) Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Determine the probable effect of each enemy capability on the success of each of the commander’s own COAs.

4. ( ) Comparison of Own Courses of Action. Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each of the commander’s COAs with respect to the governing factors. Decide which COA promises to be the most successful in accomplishing the mission.

5. ( ) Decision. Translate the COA selected into a concise statement of what the force as a whole is to do, and so much of the elements of when, where, how, and why as may be appropriate.

(Signed) ___________________

Commander

ANNEXES: (As required: by letter and title)

DISTRIBUTION: (According to policies and procedures of the issuing headquarters)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
ANNEX Q
REFERENCES

The documents listed herein provide additional guidance applicable to planning specific aspects of military operations. The references pertinent to each principal aspect of operations are grouped under appropriate headings.

1. General
   a. CJCS MOP 7, 30 January 1990, "Joint Strategic Planning System."
   c. CJCS MOP 60, 9 May 1991, "Release Procedures for Joint Staff and Joint Papers and Information."
   e. MCM-30-93, 13 April 1993, "Directives to Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands (U)."
   g. MJCS-124-88, 4 August 1988, "Implementation of the DOD Law of Armed Conflict."
   h. JCS MOP 136, 22 July 1985, "Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and the Joint Staff in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System."
   i. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."
   m. Joint Pub 4-05, 3 August 1987, "Mobilization Planning."

o. Joint Admin Pub 1-1, 1 August 1992, "Organization and Functions of the Joint Staff."

p. NWP 11F (U), September 1991, "Naval Operational Planning."


r. STANAG 2014, 22 October 1990, "Operation Orders, Annexes to Operation Orders, Administrative and Logistic Orders."


2. Planning


b. Joint Pub 5-00.1, In Development, "JTTP for Campaign Planning."


3. Intelligence


g. Joint Pub 1-03.15, 1 December 1990, "Joint Reporting Structure, Intelligence."

h. Joint Test Pub 2-0, 30 June 1991, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."

i. Joint Pub 2-01, In Development, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."

j. DOD Directive 4600.4, 27 August 1979, "Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Countermeasures."

k. DOD Directive 5105.21, 19 May 1977, "Defense Intelligence Agency."

l. DOD Directive S-5200.17, 26 January 1965, "Security, Use and Dissemination of Communications Intelligence (COMINT)."

m. The Defense Intelligence Plan.

n. Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning.

o. National Intelligence Estimates.


q. STANAG 3277, 31 March 1978, "Air Reconnaissance Request/Task Form."

r. STANAG 3377, 16 June 1980, "Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Report Forms."

s. STANAG 3483, 27 September 1990, "Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Reporting Nomenclature - ATP-26(A)."

t. STANAG 3596, 21 April 1990, "Air Reconnaissance Target Reporting Guide."

u. Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/2.

v. DIAM-57-1, 13 March 1989, "General Intelligence Production."

w. DIAM-58-5, March 1986, "Imagery Requirements."

x. DIAM-58-8, 30 July 1987, "Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Requirements."

z. DIAM 58-13, 28 March 1988, "The DOD HUMINT Management System--Volumes I, II, and III."

aa. DIA Automated Installation Intelligence File.

bb. DIA Target Data Inventories and associated handbooks.

c. DIA Contingency Planning Facilities List and associated handbooks.

4. Counterintelligence

a. SM-103-84, 22 February 1984, "Counterintelligence Responsibilities."

b. MCM-149-92, 26 October 1992, "Counterintelligence Guidance."

c. SM-288-84, 14 May 1988, "Delegation of Authority to Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands to Disclose Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations."

d. DOD Directive 5105.21, 19 May 1977, "Defense Intelligence Agency."

e. DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, June 1986, "Information Security Program Regulation."


g. DOD Directive 5200.27, 7 January 1980, "Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense."

h. DOD Directive 5230.11, 31 December 1984, "Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations."

i. DOD Instruction 5230.22, 12 July 1988, "Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information."


5. Signals Intelligence
   a. CJCS MOP 17, 10 July 1990, "Critical Information Message Preparation and Communications Procedures."
   
   b. SM-493-69, 26 July 1969, "Command, Control, and Communications in Emergency Situations."
   
   c. SM-436-76, 1 June 1976, "Operational ELINT Requirement Procedure."
   
   d. MJCS-111-88, 10 August 1988, "Concept of SIGINT Support to Military Commanders."
   
   
   
   g. DOD Directive S-5200.17, 26 January 1965, "Security, Use and Dissemination of Communications Intelligence (COMINT)."

6. Operations
   
   b. CJCS MOP 30, 17 July 1990, "Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures."
   
   
   
   
   f. Joint Test Pub 3-0, 1 January 1990, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
   
   g. Joint Pub 3-00.1, In Development, "Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations."

i. Joint Pub 3-01.2, 1 April 1986, "Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations."


m. Joint Pub 3-02.2, 16 April 1993, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation."

n. Joint Pub 3-03, 16 April 1993, "Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations."


u. Joint Pub 6-03.6, 1 October 1976, "Doctrine for Joint Worldwide Military Command and Control System Standards."

v. Joint Pub 6-03.15, 31 March 1986, "Data Administration in WWMCCS Information System."

w. DOD Directive S-3321.1, 26 July 1984, "Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War."

x. DOD Directive 4600.4, 27 August 1979, "Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Countermeasures."


7. Force Planning


c. SM-212-85, 2 April 1985, "Functional Description of the Joint Deployment System."


h. "Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP)."

i. "Army Mobilization and Operation System (AMOPS)."

j. "Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP)."

k. "Marine Corp Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN)."

8. Nuclear Operations


g. Joint Pub 3-12, 29 April 1993, "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations."

h. MJCS 188-88, 22 November 1988, "Request for Rescission on JCS Directive MSG 7551."


k. National Strategic Target List (NSTL), Annex C to SIOP.

9. Reconnaissance


c. "Nuclear Weapons Intelligence Support Plan (NISP), Appendix V to Annex B to the NISP (SIOP Route Book), 1990."

d. NUWEP Reconnaissance List.

e. NUWEP Reconnaissance Planning Manual.

f. NUWEP Reconnaissance Data Manual.

10. Chemical Warfare and NBC Defense Operations

a. SM-773-88, 26 September 1988, "Annex F (Chemical Warfare; Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense; Riot Control Agents; and Herbicides) to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, FY 1989-1990."


c. FM 3-10B, 30 November 1966, "Employment of Chemical Agents."

11. Electronic Warfare

a. CJCS MOP 6, 19 January 1990, "Electronic Warfare."


g. DOD Directive 5230.11, 31 December 1984, "Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations."

12. Psychological Operations

a. MCM-139-91, 12 August 1991, "DOD/USIA Command Relationship Agreement."


f. Joint Pub 3-53, 1 February 1987, "Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine (U)."

g. FM 33-1, 31 July 1987, "Psychological Operations."

h. MCO 3410.2A, 17 October 1975, "Marine Corps Doctrine for Psychological Operations."

i. DOD Catalog of Point Positioning Data Bases.

j. DOD Directive 3321.1, 26 July 1984, "Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of Declared War (U)."

k. DOD Psychological Operations Master Plan.

l. OPNAVINST S3061.1E, "Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan, Annex K, Operations Against Command."

m. OPNAVINST S3490.1D, "Policies and Responsibilities for Employing Operations Against Command."

n. SECNAVINST 3070.1A, "Operations Security, Chapter IV, "Persuasive Communications, and Appendixes I through L."

13. Special Operations


e. MCM-189-91, 4 November 1991, classified subject.

g. SM-232-75, 2 May 1975, classified subject.


14. Search and Rescue Operations


15. Military Deception

a. CJCS MOP 6, 19 January 1990, "Electronic Warfare."

b. CJCS MOP 54, 20 November 1990, "Joint and Combined Communications Security."

c. JCS MOP 116, 24 March 1987, "Military Deception." (Available only through J-3.)


g. DOD Directive 4600.4, 27 August 1979, "Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Countermeasures."

h. AFR 55-49, March 1989, "Tactical Deception Program."

i. OPNAVINST S3061.1E, "Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan, Annex K, Operations Against Command."

j. OPNAVINST S3490.1D, "Policies and Responsibilities for Employing Operations Against Command."

k. SECNAVINST 3070.1A, "Operations Security, Chapter IV, "Persuasive Communications, and Appendixes I through L."

l. NWP 10-1-41, "Navy Operational Deception."

16. Nonnuclear Ammunition

a. Joint Pub 1-03.18, 13 August 1979, "Joint Reporting Structure, Logistics."


d. DOD 6055.9-STD, July 1984, "The DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards."

17. Logistics


c. Joint Pub 1-03.7, 1 May 1990, "Joint Reporting Structure, Nuclear Weapon Reports (NWREP)."


e. Joint Pub 4-01, 15 September 1983, "Mobility Systems Policies, Procedures and Considerations." Upon revision,
title will be changed to Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.


g. Joint Test Pub 4-03, 1 May 1990, "Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine."

h. Joint Pub 4-05, 3 August 1987, "Mobilization Planning."


l. AR 638-25/BUMEDINST 5360.22A/AFR 143-5, 31 July 1974, "Armed Services Graves Registration Office."

m. FM 10-63/AFM 143-3/FMFM 4-8, 28 February 1986, "Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theaters of Operations."

n. STANAG 2070, 22 February 1974, "Emergency War Burial Procedures."

o. STANAG 2032, undated, "Format for Administration/Logistics Order (NATO)."

18. Civil Engineering


19. Mobility and Transportation Planning


e. Joint Pub 4-01, 15 September 1983, "Mobility Systems Policies, Procedures, and Considerations." Upon revision, title will be changed to Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.


h. Joint Pub 4-01.3, In Development, "JTTP for Joint Movement Control."

i. Joint Pub 4-01.6, 21 August 1991, "JTTP for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS)."


l. AR 220-10, 1 June 1973, "Preparation for Oversea Movement of Units (POM)."

m. AR 55-4/OPNAVINST 1120.7B/AFR 75-23/MCO 4810.1B/DLAR 4510.8, 15 December 1984, "CONUS Military Installation Materiel Outloading and Receiving Capability Report."

n. AR 55-15/OPNAVINST 4640.3A/AFR 75-95/MCO 4600.34, 22 June 1973, "Land Transportation Within Areas Outside the Continental United States."
20. Personnel


c. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 8 June 1968, "Policy for Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel."


e. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 4 December 1972, "Policy for Processing of Returned US Prisoners of War and Other Detained Military Personnel."
f. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Memorandum, 3 August 1972, "EGRESS RECAP - Public Affairs Guidance."

g. JCS MOP 173, 7 May 1981, "Manpower for Joint and International Activities."

h. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

i. DOD Directive 4525.6, 5 May 1980, "Single Manager for Military Postal Service."


l. DOD Directive 5100.69, 27 December 1972, "DOD Program for Prisoners of War and Other Detainees" (Short Title: DOD Enemy PW/Detainees Program.)

m. DOD Directive 5100.77, 10 July 1979, "DOD Law of War Program."

n. AR 37-36, 1 May 1983, "Pay, Allowance, and Deposit of Personal Funds for Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees."

o. FM 19-40, 27 February 1976, "Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons."


q. NATO STANAG 2109, 21 November 1990, "Postal Organization and Courier Service for the NATO Forces."

r. Four Geneva Conventions, 12 August 1949.

(1) DA Pamphlet 27-1, December 1956, "Treaties Governing Land Warfare."

(2) AFP 110-20, July 1981, "Selected International Agreements."

21. Public Affairs


f. DOD Directive 5410.18, 3 July 1974, "Community Relations."

g. DOD Directive 6040.2, 13 September 1967, "Release of Information from Medical Records."

h. DOD Instruction 5120.4, 14 November 1984, "DOD Newspapers and Civilian Enterprise Publications."

i. DOD Instruction 5120.20, 23 December 1980, "Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS)."

j. DOD Instruction 5230.16, 7 February 1983, "Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance."

k. DOD Instruction 5410.15, 27 March 1989, "DOD Public Affairs Assistance to Non-Government, Non-Entertainment-Oriented Print and Electronic Media."

l. DOD Instruction 5435.2, 25 April 1975, "Delegation of Authority to Approve Travel In and Use of Military Carriers for Public Affairs Purposes."

m. DOD Instruction 7230.7, 29 January 1985, "User Charges."


p. AR 40-562/NAVMEDCOMINST 6230.3/AFR 161-13/CG COMDTINST M6230.4D, 7 October 1988, "Immunizations and Chemoprohylaxis."

22. Civil Affairs


b. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

c. Joint Test Pub 3-57, 25 October 1991, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs." (Also will replace e below pending final approval.)


23. Law of Warfare


(1) Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field.

(2) Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea.

d. DOD Directive 5100.77, 10 July 1979, "DOD Law of War Program."

e. NWP 9 (Rev. A) FMFM 1-10. "Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of War."

f. AF Pamphlet 110-31, November 1976, "International Law, Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations."
g. AF Pamphlet 110-32, August 1976, "Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict."

24. Environmental Services

a. CJCS MOP 5, 2 February 1990, "Staff Environmental Support to Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands."


c. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

d. JCS MOP 50, 20 July 1987, "Control of Unclassified Meteorological, Oceanographic, and Ice Information."

e. Joint Pub 3-59, In Development, "Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support."

f. AR 115-10/AFR 105-3, 23 April 1990, "Meteorological Support for the US Army."

g. AR 115-12, 12 April 1991, "US Army Requirements for Weather and Climatological Support."

h. AWSR 55-2, "AWS Tactical Mobility."

i. FM 6-15, 30 August 1978, "Field Artillery Meteorology."

j. FM 5-33, 11 July 1990, "Terrain Analysis."

k. FM 30-10A, 22 December 1964, "Special Applications of Terrain Intelligence (U)."

l. AMC Regulation 105-1, 12 May 1992, "MAC Weather Support."

m. ACC Regulation 105-1, 30 November 1989, "Weather Support Procedures."


o. STANAG 4061, 19 May 1969, "Adoption of a Standard Ballistic Meteorological Message."

q. STANAG 4103, 17 April 1990, "Format for Requests for Meteorological Messages or Ballistic and Special Purposes."

25. Command Relationships


b. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

c. Joint Pub 6-03.6, 1 October 1976, "Doctrine for Joint Worldwide Military Command and Control System Standards."


e. DOD Directive 5100.30, 2 December 1971, "Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)."

f. FM 100-5, 5 May 1986, "Operations."

g. NATO Documents, MC 53 (August 1976--Final), MC 57/3 (27 July 1981--Final), and MC 58 (29 January 1990--Final).


26. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

a. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 8 November 1968, "Joint Mobile Relay Center (JMRC) Plan."

b. CJCS MOP 3, 31 January 1990, "CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets."


d. CJCS MOP 14, 10 May 1990, "AUTODIN and Associated Message Processing Systems."

e. CJCS MOP 17, 10 July 1990, "Critical Information Message Preparation and Communications Procedures."

f. CJCS MOP 22, 13 June 1990, "Telecommunications Economy and Discipline."

g. CJCS MOP 43, 23 August 1990, "Military Telecommunications Agreements and Arrangements Between the United States and Regional Defense Organizations or Friendly Foreign Nations."
h. CJCS MOP 54, 20 November 1990, "Joint and Combined Communications Security."

i. SM-135-73, 19 March 1973, "DOD Policy for AUTODIN, DSN (formerly AUTOVON), and AUTOSEVOCOM Service."


k. JCS MOP 178, 4 September 1986, "Military Satellite Communications Systems."

l. MJCS-255-77, 17 August 1977, "Joint Mobile Relay Center."

m. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."


r. Joint Pub 6-01.1, 1 October 1989, "Tactical Digital Information Link, Message Standards."

s. Joint Pub 6-02, 1 April 1968, "Joint Doctrine for Operational/Tactical C3 Systems."


u. DOD Directive 4630.5, 9 October 1985, "Compatibility and Interoperability of Tactical Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Systems."


y. Series of JANAPs and Supplements thereto.

z. Series of ACPs and Supplements thereto.


27. Operations Security

a. CJCS MOP 6, 19 January 1990, "Electronic Warfare."


d. AR 530-1, 1 May 1991, "Operations Security."


g. OPNAVINST S3061.1E, "Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan, Annex K, Operations Against Command."

h. OPNAVINST 3070.1, "Operations Security."

i. OPNAVINST S3490.1D, "Policies and Responsibilities for Employing Operations Against Command."

j. SECNAVINST 3070.1A, "Operations Security."

28. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy


c. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAAF)."
d. DOD Directive 5105.40, 6 December 1990, "Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)."

e. DOD Mapping, Charting, and Geodetic Area Requirements.

f. DOD-DMA Catalog of Maps, Charts, and Related Products, Parts 1 through 7.

g. DMAINST 8050.4, 17 June 1987, "Submission and Validation of Area Requirements for Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) Standard Products and Services."

h. DMAINST 8052.1, 27 December 1984, "Validation of Requirements for New or Modified Non-Crisis Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) Products and Services."

i. DMAINST 8052.6, 5 August 1988, "Crisis Support Procedures."

j. DMAINST 8680.1, 15 August 1988, "Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) War Reserve Stock (WRS)."

29. Rules of Engagement


30. Medical


c. STANAG 2068, undated, "Emergency War Surgery Handbook."

d. AR 40-535/AFR 164-5/OPNAVINST 4630.9C/MCO P 4630.9A, 1 December 1975, "Worldwide Aeromedical Evacuation."

e. AR 40-562, NAVMEDCOMINST 6230.3/AFR 161-13/CG COMDTINST M6230.4D, 7 October 1988, "Immunization and Chemoprophylaxis."

f. FM 8-8/NAVMED P-5047/AFP 160-20, 1 June 1972, "Medical Support in Joint Operations."
USERS EVALUATION REPORT  
ON JOINT PUB 5-03.1

1. Users in the field are highly encouraged to directly submit comments on this pub by removing this page and sending it to JDC. Please fill out and send in the following: Users’ POC, unit address, and phone (DSN) number.

2. Content
   a. Does the pub provide a conceptual framework for the topic?

   b. Is the information provided accurate? What needs to be updated?

   c. Is the information provided useful? If not, how can it be improved?

   d. Is this pub consistent with other joint pubs?

   e. Can this pub be better organized for the best understanding of the doctrine and/or JTTP? How?

3. Writing and Appearance
   a. Where does the pub need some revision to make the writing clear and concise? What words would you use?

   b. Are the charts and figures clear and understandable? How would you revise them?

4. Recommended urgent change(s) (if any).

5. Other

6. Please fold and mail comments to the Joint Doctrine Center (additional pages may be attached if desired) or FAX to DSN 564-3990 or COMM (804) 444-3990.
GLOSSARY

PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACC: Air Combat Command
ACE: Allied Command Europe
ACF: air contingency force
ACL: allowable cabin load
ACLANT: Allied Command Atlantic
ACP: Allied Communications Publication
AD: priority add-on; advanced deployability
ADMIN: administration
ADN: ACE DGZ number
ADP: automatic data processing; automated data processing
AFB: Air Force Base
AFP: Armed Forces Publication
AFR: Air Force Regulation
AFRTS: Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AFSC: Air Force Specialty Code
AFSOC: US Air Force Special Operations Command
AIG: address indicator group
ALCE: airlift control element
ALCON: all concerned
ALD: available-to-load date at POE; accounting line designator
AMC: Army Materiel Command; Air Mobility Command
AMEMB: American Embassy
AMOPS: Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System
AOR: area of responsibility
APC: aerial port commander
APOD: aerial port of debarkation
APOE: aerial port of embarkation
AR: Army Regulation
ARG: amphibious ready group
AUTODIN: Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVOCOM: Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AUTOVON: Automatic Voice Network (replaced by DSN)
AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System
AWS: Air Weather Service
AWSR: Air Weather Service Regulation

BAI: battlefield air interdiction
BES: Budget Estimate Submission

C2: command and control
C2W: command and control warfare
C3: command, control, and communications
C4: command, control, communications, and computer systems

GL-1
CA civil affairs
CANUS Canada-US
CAO SOP Standing Operating Procedures for Coordination of Atomic Operations
CAP Crisis Action Planning
CAS close air support
CAT Crisis Action Team; category
CB chemical-biological
CCA Chairman’s Contingency Capabilities Assessment
CDR commander
CDRMTMC Commander, Military Traffic Management Command
CDRUSELNORAD Commander, US Element, NORAD
CEI critical employment indicator
CESPG Civil Engineering Support Planning Generator
CG Chairman’s Guidance
CG FMFLANT Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic
CG FMFPAC Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific
CI counterintelligence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIN cargo increment number
CINC commander of unified or specified commands; commander in chief
CINCARLANT Commander in Chief, US Army Forces--Atlantic
CINCFOR Commander in Chief, Forces Command
CINCLANTFLT Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CINCNORAD Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command
CINCPACAF Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces
CINPACFLT Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUSAFE Commander in Chief, US Air Forces in Europe
CINCUSAREUR Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe
CINCUSNAVEUR Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe
CIR continuing intelligence requirement
CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force
CMC Commandant, US Marine Corps
CNASP Chairman’s Net Assessment for Strategic Planning
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COA course of action
COCOM Combatant Command (command authority)
COGARD Coast Guard
COMDT COGARD Commandant, US Coast Guard
COMDTINST Commandant, US Coast Guard Instruction
COMIDEASTFOR Commander, Middle East Forces
COMINT communications intelligence
COMSC Commander, Military Sealift Command
COMSEC communications security
COMSUPNAVFOR Commander, Supporting Naval Forces
COMTAC communications tactical
COMUSARCENT Commander, US Army Forces, Central Command
COMUSCENTAF Commander, US Air Force, Central Command
COMUSMARCENT Commander, US Marine Forces Central Command
COMUSNAVCENT  Commander, US Navy, Central Command
CONOPS  concept of operations
CONPLAN  operation plan in concept format
CONUS  continental United States
CPA  Chairman’s Program Assessment
CPG  Contingency Planning Guidance
CRAF  Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRB  Configuration Review Board
CRD  CINC’s Required Date
CRITIC  critical intelligence communications
CS  combat support
CSA  Chief of Staff, US Army
CSAF  Chief of Staff, US Air Force
CSOD  Command Systems Operation Division
CSP  cryptologic support package
CSPAR  CINC’s Preparedness Assessment Report
CSS  combat service support; Central Security Service
CTF  combined task force
CV  attack aircraft carrier
CVBG  aircraft carrier battle group
DA  Department of Army; data administrator; direct action
DBA  data base administrator
DBMS  data base management system
DCS  Defense Communications System; Defense Courier Service
DD  destroyer
DEFCON  Defense Readiness Condition
DEP  deployed
DEPMEDS  Deployable Medical Systems
DET  detachment; detainee
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency
DIN  Defense Intelligence Notice
DIRLAUTH  direct liaison authorized
DIRNSA  Director, National Security Agency
DISA  Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA  Defense Logistics Agency
DLAR  Defense Logistics Agency Regulation
DMA  Defense Mapping Agency
DMAINST  Defense Mapping Agency Instruction
DML  Data Manipulation Language
DNA  Defense Nuclear Agency
DOCDIV  Documents Division
DOS  Department of State; days of supply
DOT  Department of Transportation
DPG  Defense Planning Guidance
DPRB  Defense Planning Resources Board
DSCS  Defense Satellite Communications System
DSN  Defense Switched Network (formerly AUTOVON)
DSSO  Defense Systems Support Organization

GL-3
DTG  date-time group
DTRM  Defense Traffic Management Regulations
DTS  Defense Transportation System

EAD  earliest arrival date at POD
EA  electronic attack
ECP  Engineering Change Proposals
EEFI  essential elements of friendly information
EEI  essential elements of information
ELINT  electronics intelligence
EP  electronic protection
EPW  enemy prisoner of war
ES  electronic warfare support
EW  early warning; electronic warfare

FAA  Federal Aviation Administration
FAD  force activity designator; feasible arrival date
FDBM  Functional Data Base Manager
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency
FF  frigate (Navy)
FM  force module(s); field manual; functional manager
FMFM  Fleet Marine Force Manual
FMID  force module identifier
FMP  force module packages
FORSCOM  Forces Command
FRAG  fragmentation code
FRR  force requirement number
FS  fighter squadron
FSS  Fast Sealift Ship
FTS  File Transfer Service
FW  fighter wing
FWD  forward
FY  fiscal year

GDSS  Global Decision Support System
GENTEXT  general text
GEOCODES  geographic codes
GEOFILER  Standard Specified Geographic Location File
GEOLOC  Geographic Location Code
GSA  General Services Administration
GTN  Global Transportation Network

HF  high frequency
HNS  host nation support
HQ  headquarters
HUMINT  human resources intelligence

IAW  in accordance with
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization
ID  identification
IMINT  imagery intelligence
INS insert code
IPL integrated priority list
IR infrared; incident reports
ISSA Inter-Service Support Agreement

JANAP Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Publication
JAO joint area of operations
JCCC Joint Combat Camera Center
JCLL Joint Center for Lessons Learned
JCSE Joint Communications Support Element
JDS Joint Deployment System
JEPES Joint Engineering Planning and Execution System
JFAST Joint Flow and Analysis System
JFC joint force commander
JIB Joint Information Bureau
JLOTS joint logistics over the shore
JMNA Joint Military Net Assessment
JMPPAB Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board
JMRC Joint Mobile Relay Center
JNOCC JOPES Network Operation Control Center
JOPESS Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPESIR JOPES Incident Reporting System
JOPESREP JOPES Reporting System
JOPS Joint Operation Planning System
JPD Joint Planning Document
JPEC Joint Planning and Execution Community
JPOC Joint Planning Orientation Course
JRC Joint Reconnaissance Center
JRS Joint Reporting Structure
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPD Joint Strategic Planning Document
JSPDSA Joint Strategic Planning Document Supporting Analyses
JSPS Joint Strategic Planning System
JSR Joint Strategy Review
JTB Joint Transportation Board
JTF Joint Task Force
JTTP joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JULLS Joint Universal Lessons Learned System

KIA killed in action
kt kiloton(s)

LAD latest arrival date at POD
LCE Logistics Capability Estimator
LFM Landing Force Manual
LOC lines of communications
LOGSAFE Logistic Sustainment Analysis and Feasibility Estimator
LOI Letter of Instruction
LOTS logistics over-the-shore

GL-5
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LRC</td>
<td>Logistics Readiness Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSA</td>
<td>Logistics Sustainability Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine Air-Ground Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARAD</td>
<td>Maritime Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASTINT</td>
<td>measurement and signature intelligence</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Military Cooperation Committee</td>
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<td>MCM</td>
<td>Military Committee Memorandum; Memorandum in the name of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Multiple Command Manual</td>
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<td>MCO</td>
<td>Marine Corps Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Brigade</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILSTAMP</td>
<td>Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILSTRIP</td>
<td>Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures</td>
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<td>MJCS</td>
<td>Memorandum Issued in the Name of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>MNC</td>
<td>Major NATO Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MODLOC</td>
<td>miscellaneous operational details, local operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>memorandum of policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOPP</td>
<td>mission-oriented protective posture</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>Maritime Pre-Positioning Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPM</td>
<td>Medical Planning Module</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Major Regional Contingency</td>
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<td>MRG</td>
<td>Movement Requirements Generator</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Sealift Command; major subordinate command(s)</td>
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<td>MTMC</td>
<td>Military Traffic Management Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTON</td>
<td>measurement ton(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUREP</td>
<td>munitions report</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAPCAP</td>
<td>NATO Allied Pre-Committed Civil Aircraft Program</td>
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<td>NAS</td>
<td>Naval Air Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAT</td>
<td>nonair transportable (cargo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVMEDCOMINST</td>
<td>Navy Medical Command Instruction</td>
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<td>NAVSO</td>
<td>US Navy Forces Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVSUPINST</td>
<td>Navy Support Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>nuclear, biological, and chemical</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIDS</td>
<td>National Military Command Center Information Display System</td>
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<td>NISP</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapons Intelligence Support Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLT</td>
<td>not later than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCC</td>
<td>National Military Command Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCS</td>
<td>National Military Command System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMSD</td>
<td>National Military Strategy Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPG</td>
<td>nonunit personnel generator</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>non-unit-related cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>non-unit-related personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA/CSS</td>
<td>National Security Agency/Central Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCS</td>
<td>National Security Council System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSD</td>
<td>National Security Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSDD</td>
<td>National Security Decision Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSN</td>
<td>National Stock Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSTL</td>
<td>National Strategic Targets List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSWTG</td>
<td>Naval Special Warfare Task Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTDS</td>
<td>Naval Tactical Data System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUWEP</td>
<td>Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWP</td>
<td>Navy Warfare Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWREP</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapons Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAR</td>
<td>CJCS OPLANs Assessment Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCJCS</td>
<td>Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCEANCON</td>
<td>control of oceanographic information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>outside continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCOPs</td>
<td>Outline Contingency Operation Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OET</td>
<td>Office of Emergency Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan in complete format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPNAVINST</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPR</td>
<td>office of primary responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPREP</td>
<td>operational report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUT</td>
<td>outsize cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVER</td>
<td>oversize cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAG</td>
<td>public affairs guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>Public Affairs Office; public affairs officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>Chairman’s Preparedness Assessment Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAX</td>
<td>passengers</td>
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<td>PBD</td>
<td>Program Budget Decision</td>
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<td>PDM</td>
<td>Program Decision Memorandum</td>
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<td>PER</td>
<td>Person Identification</td>
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<td>PIC</td>
<td>Person Identification Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>PID</td>
<td>plan identification number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIN</td>
<td>personnel increment number</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
PJ Project Code
POC point of contact
POD port of debarkation
POE port of embarkation
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POM Program Objective Memorandum
POW prisoner of war
PPAG proposed public affairs guidance
PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PRI priority
PRMFL perm file
PSC Principal Subordinate Command
PSYOP psychological operations
PW prisoner of war
PWRSA pre-positioned war reserve stocks
RC Reserve component
RDD required delivery date (at destination)
RECON reconnaissance
REPOL reporting emergency petroleum, oils, and lubricants
RLD ready-to-load date (at origin)
RO/RO roll-on/roll-off
ROE rules of engagement
ROK Republic of Korea
RQMT requirement
RRF ready reserve force; ready reserve fleet
SAAM special assignment airlift mission
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SAR search and rescue; sealed authentication system
SATCOM satellite communications
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE Secretary of State
SECTANS Secretary of Transportation
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO)
SIGINT signals intelligence
SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
SITREP situation report
SLOC sea line of communications
SM Secretary, Joint Staff, Memorandum
SO special operations
SOCCENT Special Operations Command, Central
SOD Special Operations Division
SOF special operations forces
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
SOP standing operating procedures
SORTS Status of Resources and Training System
SPECAT special category
SPOD sea port of debarkation
SPOE sea port of embarkation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPTD CMD</td>
<td>supported command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPTG CMD</td>
<td>supporting command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRB</td>
<td>JOPES System Review Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>Sealift Readiness Program; SIOP Reconnaissance Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>attack submarine, nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>Standard NATO Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>STON</td>
<td>short ton(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVC</td>
<td>Service(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
<td>Tactical Air Control Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TC-AIMS</td>
<td>Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Transportation Component Command(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDBM</td>
<td>technical data base management</td>
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<tr>
<td>TELNET</td>
<td>telecommunication network</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFE</td>
<td>Transportation Feasibility Estimator</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLCF</td>
<td>teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TM</td>
<td>Technical Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>table of organization and equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>Technical Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data</td>
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<td>TPFDL</td>
<td>Time-Phased Force and Deployment List</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPTRL</td>
<td>Time-Phased Transportation Requirements List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRS</td>
<td>tactical reconnaissance squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSO</td>
<td>telecommunications service order</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSR</td>
<td>telecommunications service request</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSS</td>
<td>timesharing system</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUCHA</td>
<td>Type Unit Characteristics File</td>
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<td>TUDET</td>
<td>Type Unit Equipment Detail File</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>ultra high frequency</td>
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<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>unit identification code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULC</td>
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<td>UNAAF</td>
<td>Unified Action Armed Forces</td>
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<td>US Air Force, Europe</td>
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<td>US Central Command, Air Forces</td>
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<td>Commander in Chief, US Central Command</td>
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<tr>
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<td>US Commander in Chief, Europe</td>
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<td>Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command</td>
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<td>USCINCPAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCINCSO</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Southern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCINCSOC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command</td>
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</tbody>
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USCINCSPACE Commander in Chief, US Space Command
USCINCTRANS Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command
USDAO United States Defense Attache Office
USDP Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USDR&E Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
USERID user identification
USEUCOM United States European Command
USIA United States Information Agency
USLANTCOM United States Atlantic Command
USLO US Liaison Officer
USMARCENT United States Marine Central Command
USNAVCENT United States Naval Forces Central Command
USNAVEUR United States Navy, Europe
USPACOM United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command
USSPACECOM United States Space Command
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command
UTC unit type code
UW unconventional warfare
VI visual information

WAM WWMCCS ADP Modernization Program
WASP War Air Service Program
WASSO WWMCCS ADP System Security Officer
WHNS wartime host-nation support
WIN WWMCCS Intercomputer Network
WIS WWMCCS Information System
WISDIM Warfighting and Intelligence Systems Dictionary for Information Management
WMP War and Mobilization Plan
WRS war reserve stock
WSC WIN Site Coordinator
WWMCCS Worldwide Military Command and Control System
acceptability. Operation plan (OPLAN) review criterion. The determination whether the contemplated course of action (COA) is worth the cost in manpower, material, and time involved; is consistent with the law of war; and militarily and politically supportable. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

accompanying supplies. Unit supplies that deploy with forces. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

accounting line designator. A five-character code consisting of the target DGZ designator (TDD) and the striking command suffix to indicate a specific nuclear strike by a specified weapon delivery system on a target objective to the OPLAN. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

acoustic warfare. Action involving the use of underwater acoustic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the underwater acoustic spectrum and actions which retain friendly use of the underwater acoustic spectrum. There are three divisions within acoustic warfare:

1. acoustic warfare support measures. That aspect of acoustic warfare involving actions in search for, intercept, locate, record and analyze radiated acoustic energy in water for purpose of exploiting such radiations. The use of acoustic warfare support measures involves no intentional underwater acoustic emission and is generally not detectable by the enemy.

2. acoustic warfare countermeasures. That aspect of acoustic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the underwater acoustic spectrum. Acoustic warfare countermeasures involve intentional underwater acoustic emissions for deception and jamming.

3. acoustic warfare counter-countermeasures. That aspect of acoustic warfare involving actions taken to ensure friendly effective use of the underwater acoustic spectrum despite the enemy’s use of underwater acoustic warfare. Acoustic warfare counter-countermeasures involve anti-acoustic warfare support measures and anti-acoustic warfare countermeasures, and may not involve underwater acoustic emissions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

adequacy. Operation Plan review criterion. The determination whether the scope and concept of a planned operation are
sufficient to accomplish the task assigned. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

aeromedical evacuation. The movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

ALERT ORDER (CJCS). A crisis action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning for the selected course of action authorized by the Secretary of Defense. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 5-0.)

allocation. In the general sense, distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, etc. (This term and definition will replace the term and definition for "allocation" in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. The existing term will be modified to "allocation (air)".)

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism. (Joint Pub 1-02)

antiterrorism awareness. Fundamental knowledge of the terrorist threat and measures to reduce personal vulnerability to terrorism. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. (This term and definition will replace the term and definition for "apportionment" in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02. The existing term will be modified to "apportionment (air)".)

appreciations. Personal conclusions, official estimates, and assumptions about another party’s intentions, military capabilities, and activities used in planning and decisionmaking.

a. desired appreciations. Adversary personal conclusions and official estimates, valid or invalid, that result in adversary behaviors and official actions advantageous to friendly interests and objectives.
b. harmful appreciations. Adversary personal conclusions, official estimates, or assumptions, valid or invalid, that result in adversary behaviors and official actions harmful to friendly interests and objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

archive. When used in the context of deliberate planning, the directed command will remove the referenced operation plan, operation plan in concept format, or Concept Summary and any associated Joint Operation Planning and Execution System automated data processing files from its library of active plans. All material will be prepared for shipment to appropriate archive facilities in accordance with Joint Pub 5-03.1 and appropriate command directives. (See also Maintain and Retain.) (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Armed Services Medical Regulating Office. A joint agency of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, operated by the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, as Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which regulates the movement of patients by authorizing transfers to military medical treatment facilities, Department of Veterans Affairs medical treatment facilities, or National Disaster Medical System facilities and coordinates patient movement requirements with appropriate military transportation commands. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

augmentation forces. Forces to be transferred to the operational command of a supported commander during the execution of an operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

available-to-load date. A day, relative to C-day in a time-phased force and deployment data that unit and nonunit equipment and forces can begin loading on an aircraft or ship at the port of embarkation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

cargo increment number.* A seven-character alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a non-unit-cargo entry (line) in a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time-phased force and deployment data.

CINC’s required date. The original day relative to C-day, specified by the CINC for arrival of forces or cargo at the destination; shown in the time-phased force and deployment data to assess the impact of later arrival. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)
CINC’s Strategic Concept. Final document produced in Step 5 of the Concept Development Phase of the deliberate planning process. The CINC’s Strategic Concept (CSC) is used as the vehicle to distribute the CINC’s decision and planning guidance for accomplishing JSCP or other CJCS taskings. CJCS approval of the strategic concept becomes the basis of the plan for development into an OPLAN or CONPLAN. Formerly called "the concept of operations." (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 5-0.)

civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Civil Reserve Air Fleet. A program in which the Department of Defense uses aircraft owned by a US entity or citizen. The aircraft are allocated by the Department of Transportation to augment the military airlift capability of the Department of Defense. These aircraft are allocated, in accordance with DOD requirements, to segments, according to their capabilities, such as Long-Range International (cargo and passenger), Short-Range International, Domestic, Alaskan, Aeromedical, and other segments as may be mutually agreed upon by the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation. CRAF can be incrementally activated by the Department of Defense in three stages in response to defense-oriented situations, up to and including a declared national emergency or war, to satisfy DOD airlift requirements. When activated, CRAF aircraft are under the mission control of the Department of Defense while remaining a civil resource under the operational control of the responsible US entity or citizen.

a. CRAF Stage I. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources that air carriers will furnish to the Department of Defense to support substantially expanded peacetime military airlift requirements. The Commander, Air Mobility Command, may authorize activation of this stage and assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage I.

b. CRAF Stage II. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources that the air carriers will furnish to Department of Defense in a time of defense airlift emergency. The Secretary of Defense, or his designee, may authorize activation of
this stage permitting the Commander, AMC, to assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage II.

c. CRAF Stage III. This stage involves DOD use of civil air resources owned by a US entity or citizen that the air carriers will furnish to the Department of Defense in a time of declared national defense-oriented emergency or war, or when otherwise necessary for the national defense. The aircraft in this stage are allocated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense may authorize activation of this stage permitting the Commander, AMC, to assume mission control of those airlift assets committed to CRAF Stage III. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

close-hold plan. Operation plan with access to operation plan information extremely limited to specifically designated WWMCCS USERIDs and terminal IDs during initial course of action development before the involvement of outside commands, agencies, CINCs, Services, or the Joint Staff. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

closure. In transportation, the process of a unit arriving at a specified location. It begins when the first element arrives at a designated location, e.g., port of entry/port of departure, intermediate stops, or final destination, and ends when the last element does likewise. For the purposes of studies and command post exercises, a unit is considered essentially closed after 95 percent of its movement requirements for personnel and equipment are completed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

closure shortfall. The specified movement requirement or portion thereof that did not meet scheduling criteria and/or movement dates. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command. One of the unified or specified commands established by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Combatant Command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10, United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands. Combatant Command (command authority) is the authority of a Combatant Commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant Command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through
the Service component commander. Combatant Command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Combatant Commander. A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combating terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02).

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control warfare. The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict. Also called C2W. Command and control warfare is both offensive and defensive:

(1) counter command and control. To prevent effective command and control of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading or destroying the adversary command and control system.

(2) command and control protection. To maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly command and control system. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command, control, communications, and computer systems. Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander’s exercise of command and control
through all phases of the operational continuum. Also called C4 systems. (Joint Pub 1-02)

commander’s estimate of the situation. A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander’s estimate which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander’s long-range estimate of the situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

common-user lift. USTRANSCOM-controlled lift: The pool of strategic transportation assets either government owned or chartered that are under the operational control of Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, or Military Traffic Management Command for the purpose of providing common-user transportation to the Department of Defense across the operational continuum. These assets range from common-user organic or chartered pool of common-user assets available day-to-day to a larger pool of common-user assets phased in from other sources. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

completeness. Operation Plan review criterion. The determination that each course of action must be complete and answer the questions: who, what, when, where, and how. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Frequently, it is referred to as the commander’s concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

concept plan. An operation plan in concept format. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

concept summary. A concept of operations in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II. Used to address Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning tasks in a broader sense than required by a more detailed operation plan in concept format or operation plan. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

contingency planning. The development of plans for potential crisis involving military requirements that can reasonably be
expected in an area of responsibility. Contingency planning can occur anywhere within the operational continuum from peace conflict, and war and may be performed deliberately or under crisis action conditions. Contingency planning for joint operations is coordinated at the national level by assigning planning tasks and relationships among the combatant commanders and apportioning or allocating them the forces and resources available to accomplish those tasks. Commanders throughout the unified chain of command may task their staffs and subordinate commands with additional contingency planning tasks beyond those specified at the national level to provide broader contingency coverage. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

controlled information. Information and indicators deliberately conveyed or denied to foreign targets to evoke invalid official estimates that result in foreign official actions advantageous to US interests and objectives. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

conventional planning and execution. WWMCCS command and control application software and data bases that are designed to support requirements relating to joint planning mobilization and deployment, including plan development, course of action development, execution planning, execution, movement monitoring, sustainment, and redeployment from origin to destination. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

counterdeception. Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation. Counterdeception does not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

course of action. 1. A plan that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of, a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander’s estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an
integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data base will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

course of action development. The phase of JOPES within the crisis action planning process that provides for the development of military responses and includes, within the limits of the time allowed: establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units; evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility; identifying and resolving resource shortfalls; recommending resource allocations; and producing a course of action via a commander’s estimate that contains a concept of operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized COAs, and supporting data bases. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

cover (military). Actions to conceal actual friendly intentions, capabilities, operations, and other activities by providing a plausible, yet erroneous, explanation of the observable. (Joint Pub 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a situation of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-0.)

crisis action planning. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the timeframe permitted by the crisis. Also called CAP. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

critical information. Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

critical item list. Prioritized list, compiled from commanders’ composite critical item lists, identifying items and weapon systems that assist Services and Defense Logistics Agency in
selecting systems for production surge planning. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

critical sustainability items. Items described at National Stock Number level of detail, by Federal Supply Class, as part of the Logistic Factors File, that significantly affect the commander’s ability to execute his operation plan. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deception means. Methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to a foreign power. There are three categories of deception means:

a. physical means. Activities and resources used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power. (Examples: military operations, including exercises, reconnaissance, training activities, and movement of forces; the use of dummy equipment and devices; tactics, bases, logistic actions, stockpiles, and repair activity; and test and evaluation activities.)

b. technical means. Military materiel resources and their associated operating techniques used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power through the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration absorption, or reflection of energy; the emission or suppression of chemical or biological odors; and the emission or suppression of nuclear particles.

c. administrative means. Resources, methods, and techniques designed to convey or deny oral, pictorial, documentary, or other physical evidence to a foreign power. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Defense Planning Guidance. This document, issued by the Secretary of Defense, provides firm guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memorandums by the Military Departments and Defense agencies. Also called DPG. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deliberate planning. The JOPES process involving the development of joint operation plans for contingencies identified in joint strategic planning documents. Conducted principally in peacetime, deliberate planning is accomplished in prescribed cycles that complement other Department of Defense planning cycles and in accordance with the formally established Joint Strategic Planning System. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)
Deployability Posture. The state or stage of a unit’s preparedness for deployment to participate in a military operation, defined in five levels as follows:

a. Normal Deployability Posture. The unit is conducting normal activities. Commanders are monitoring the situation in any area of tension and reviewing plans. No visible overt actions are being taken to increase deployability posture. Units not at home station report their scheduled closure time at home station or the time required to return to home station if ordered to return before scheduled time and desired mode of transportation are available.

b. Increased Deployability Posture. The unit is relieved from commitments not pertaining to the mission. Personnel are recalled from training areas, pass, and leave, as required, to meet the deployment schedule. Preparation for deployment of equipment and supplies is initiated. Pre-deployment personnel actions are completed. Essential equipment and supplies located at CONUS or overseas installations are identified.

c. Advanced Deployability Posture. All essential personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies are checked, packed, rigged for deployment, and positioned with deploying unit. The unit remains at home station. Movement requirements are confirmed. Airlift, sealift, and intra-CONUS transportation resources are identified, and initial movement schedules are completed by the Transportation Component Commands.

d. Marshalled Deployability Posture. The first increment of deploying personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies is marshaled at designated POEs but not loaded. Sufficient aircraft or sealift assets are positioned at, or en route to, the POE either to load the first increment or to sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Supporting ALCEs, stage crews (if required), and support personnel adequate to sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route, and offload locations will be positioned, as required.

e. Loaded Deployability Posture. All first increment equipment and accompanying supplies are loaded aboard ships and prepared for departure to the designated objective area. Personnel are prepared for loading on minimum notice. Follow-on increments of cargo and personnel are en route or available to meet projected ship loading schedules. Sufficient airlift is positioned and loaded at the POE to move the first increment or to initiate and sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution.
Supporting ALCEs, stage aircrews (if required), and support personnel adequate to sustain the airlift flow at onload, en route, and offload locations are positioned, as required. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deployment. 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within areas of operation. 3. The positioning of forces into a formulation for battle. 4. The relocation of forces and materiel to desired areas of operations. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-CONUS, inter-theater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deployment data base. The JOPES data base containing the necessary information on forces, materiel, and filler and replacement personnel movement requirements to support execution. The data base reflects information contained in the refined time-phased force and deployment data from the deliberate planning process or developed during the various phases of the crisis action planning process, and the movement schedules or tables developed by the transportation component commands to support the deployment of required forces, personnel, and materiel. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deployment planning. Encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-CONUS, inter-theater, and intratheater movement legs, staging areas, and holding areas. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deployment preparation order. An order issued by competent authority to move forces or prepare forces for movement (e.g., increase deployability posture of units). (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

deterrent options. A course of action, developed on the best economic, diplomatic, political, and military judgment, designed to dissuade an adversary from a current course of action or contemplated operations. (In constructing an operation plan, a range of options should be presented to effect deterrence. Each option requiring deployment of forces should be a separate force module.) (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

diversion. 1. The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention. 2. A change made in a prescribed route for operational or tactical reasons. A diversion
order will not constitute a change of destination. 3. A rerouting of
cargo or passengers to a new transshipment point or destination or on a
different mode of transportation prior to arrival at ultimate
destination. 4. In naval mine warfare, a route or channel bypassing a
dangerous area. A diversion may connect one channel to another or it
may branch from a channel and rejoin it on the other side of the danger.
(Joint Pub 1-02)

earliest arrival date. A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a
planner as the earliest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or
replacement personnel can be accepted at a port of debarkation during a
deployment. Used with the latest arrival data (LAD), it defines a
delivery window for transportation planning. Also called EAD.
(Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of
electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic
spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within
electronic warfare are electronic attack, electronic protection, and
electronic warfare support.

a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare
involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack
personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading,
neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Electronic
attack includes 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s
effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and
electromagnetic deception and 2) employment of weapons that use
either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary
destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle
beams). Also called EA.

b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare
involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and
equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of
electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly,
combat capability. Also called EP.

c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic
warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an
operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and
locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated
electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat
recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information
required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare
operations and other tactical action such as threat avoidance,
targeting, and homing. Electronic warfare support data can be used
to produce
signals intelligence, both communications intelligence, and electronic intelligence. Also called ES. (Joint Pub 1-02)

emission control. The selective and controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command and control capabilities while minimizing, for operations security (OPSEC), detection by enemy sensors; to minimize mutual interference among friendly systems; and/or to execute a military deception plan. Also called EMCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

employment. The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces and materiel in an area or theater of operations. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 5-0.)

essential elements of friendly information. Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. Also called EEFI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

essential secrecy. The condition achieved from the denial of critical information to adversaries. (Joint Pub 1-02)

evacuation policy. 1. Command decision, indicating the length in days of the maximum period of noneffectiveness that patients may be held within the command for treatment. Patients who, in the opinion of responsible medical officers, cannot be returned to duty status within the period prescribed are evacuated by the first available means, provided the travel involved will not aggravate their disabilities. 2. A command decision concerning the movement of civilians from the proximity of military operations for security and safety reasons and involving the need to arrange for movement, reception, care, and control of such individuals. 3. Command policy concerning the evacuation of unserviceable or abandoned materiel and including designation of channels and designations for evacuated materiel, the establishment of controls and procedures, and the dissemination of condition standards and disposition instructions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

EXECUTE ORDER (CJCS). An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the authority and at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement an NCA decision to initiate military operations. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 5-0.)

execution planning. The phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Crisis Action Planning process that provides for the translation of an approved COA into an executable plan of action through the preparation of a complete OPLAN or OPORD.
Execution planning is detailed planning for the commitment of specified forces and resources. During crisis action planning, an approved OPLAN or other NCA-approved COA is adjusted, refined, and translated into an OPORD. Execution planning can proceed on the basis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place in the absence of prior planning. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 5-0.)

external audience. All people who are not part of the internal audience of US military members and civilian employees and their immediate families. Part of the concept of "Publics." Includes many varied subsets that may be referred to as "Audiences" or "Publics." (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

feasibility. Operation plan review criterion. The determination of whether the assigned tasks could be accomplished by using available resources. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

filler personnel. Individuals of suitable grade and skill initially required to bring a unit or organization to its authorized strength. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force closure. The point in time when supported commander determines he has sufficient personnel and equipment resources in the assigned area of operations to carry out assigned tasks. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

force list. A total list of forces required by an operation plan, including assigned forces, augmentation forces, and other forces to be employed in support of the plan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force module(s). A grouping of combat, combat service, and combat service support forces, with their accompanying supplies and the required nonunit resupply and personnel necessary to sustain forces for a minimum of 30 days. The elements of force modules are linked together or are uniquely identified so that they may be extracted from or adjusted as an entity in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System data bases to enhance flexibility and usefulness of the operation plan during a crisis. Also called FM. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

force module packages. Force modules with a specific functional orientation (e.g., air superiority, close-air support, reconnaissance, ground defense) that includes combat, associated combat support, and combat service support forces. Additionally, force module packages will contain sustainment in accordance with logistic policy contained in Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

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force protection. Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force requirement number. An alphanumeric code used to uniquely identify force entries in a given operation plan time-phased force and deployment data. Also called FRN. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

grossly transportation feasible. A determination made by the supported commander that a draft operation plan can be supported with the apportioned transportation assets. This determination is made by using a transportation feasibility estimator to simulate movement of personnel and cargo from port of embarkation to port of debarkation within a specified timeframe. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Health Service Support. All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, medical food, and medical intelligence services. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 4-02.)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, times of crisis and emergencies, or war based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

human resources intelligence. The intelligence information derived from the intelligence collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument. Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

implementation. Procedures governing the mobilization of the force and the deployment, employment, and sustainment of military
operations in response to execution orders issued by the National Command Authorities. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

implementation planning. Operational planning associated with the conduct of a continuing operation, campaign, or war to attain defined objectives. At the national level, it includes the development of strategy and the assignment of strategic tasks to the combatant commanders. At the theater level, it includes the development of campaign plans to attain assigned objectives and the preparation of OPLANs and OPORDs to prosecute the campaign. At lower levels, implementation planning prepares for the execution of assigned tasks or logistic missions. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

indications and warning. Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to United States or allied military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear and nonnuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to United States reconnaissance activities; terrorists’ attacks; and other similar events. (Joint Pub 1-02)

in-place force. 1. A NATO assigned force which, in peace-time, is principally stationed in the designated combat zone of the NATO Command to which it is committed. 2. Force within a CINC’s area of responsibility and under his combatant command. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

integrated priority list. A list of a CINC’s highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the CINC, adversely affect the capability of his forces to accomplish their assigned mission. The integrated priority list provides the CINC’s recommendations for programming funds in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System process. Also called IPL. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence system. Any formal or informal system to manage data gathering, obtain and process the data, interpret the data, and provide reasoned judgments to decisionmakers as a basis for action. The term is not limited to intelligence organizations or services but includes any system in all its parts that accomplishes the listed tasks. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intensive management. The continuous process by which the supported and supporting commanders, the Services, transportation component commands, and appropriate Defense agencies ensure that

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movement data in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time-phased force and deployment data for the initial days of deployment and/or mobilization are current to support immediate execution. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

internal audience. US military members and civilian employees and their immediate families. One of the audiences comprising the concept of "Publics." See also "external audience." (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

intertheater. Between theaters of operations or between CONUS and theaters of operations. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

intratheater. Within a theater of operations. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint operation planning. Joint operation planning activities exclusively associated with the preparation of operation plans, operation plans in concept format, and operation orders (other than the SIOP) for the conduct of military operations by the combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As such, joint operation planning includes contingency planning, execution planning, and implementation planning. Joint operation planning is performed in accordance with formally established planning and execution procedures. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. A continuously evolving system that is being developed through the integration and enhancement of earlier planning and execution systems: JOPS and JDS. It provides the foundation for conventional command and control by national- and theater-level commanders and their staffs. It is designed to satisfy their information needs in the conduct of joint planning and operations. JOPES includes joint operation planning policies, procedures, and reporting structures supported by communications and ADP systems. JOPES is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations. Also called JOPES. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Planning and Execution Community. Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation,
movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. JPEC usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, certain Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistics commands), unified and specified commands (and their Service component commands), subunified commands, Transportation Component Commands, JTFs (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency) as may be appropriate to a given scenario. Also called JPEC. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 5-0.)

Joint Staff. 1. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, or of a joint task force, which includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2. Joint Staff. The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman, and subject to the authority, direction and control of the Chairman, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman in carrying out their responsibilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Strategic Planning System. The primary means by which the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; prepares strategic plans; prepares and reviews contingency plans; advises the President and Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets; and provides net assessment on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of their potential adversaries. Also called JSPS. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Latest Arrival Date. A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as the latest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can arrive and complete unloading at the port of departure and support the concept of operations. Also called LAD. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)
level of detail. Within the current joint planning and execution systems, movement characteristics are described at five distinct levels of detail. These levels are:

a. level I. Aggregated level. Expressed as total number of passengers and total short tons, total measurement tons, total square feet and/or total hundreds of barrels by unit line number, cargo increment number, and personnel increment number.

b. level II. Summary level. Expressed as total number of passengers by ULN and PIN and short tons, measurement tons (including barrels), total square feet of bulk, oversize, outsize, and non-air-transportable cargo by ULN and CIN.

c. level III. Detail by cargo category. Expressed as total number of passengers by ULN and PIN and short tons, and/or measurement tons (including barrels), total square feet of cargo as identified by the ULN or CIN three-position cargo category code.

d. level IV. Detail expressed as number of passengers and individual dimensional data (expressed in length, width, and height in number of inches) of cargo by equipment type by ULN.

e. level V. Detail by priority of shipment. Expressed as total number of passengers by Service specialty code (i.e., USAF AFSC and USA MOS) in deployment sequence by ULN individual weight (in pounds) and dimensional data (expressed in length, width, and height in number of inches) of equipment in deployment sequence by ULN. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

limited-access plan. The limited-access plan (like the close-hold plan) is an operation plan that has access restricted to individual WWMCCS USERIDs and terminal IDs. Unlike the close-hold plan, the limited-access plan can be distributed to more than one Joint Operation Planning and Execution System site. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

limiting factor. A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. Illustrative examples are transportation network deficiencies, lack of in-place facilities, malpositioned forces or materiel, extreme climatic conditions, distance, transit or overflight rights, political conditions, etc. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

logistic assessment. An evaluation of:
a. The logistic support required to support particular military operations in a theater of operations, country, or area.

b. The actual and/or potential logistics support available for the conduct of military operations either within the theater, country, or area, or located elsewhere. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

a. Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel.

b. Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel.

c. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities.

d. Acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistics sourcing. The identification of the origin and determination of the availability of the time-phased force and deployment data nonunit logistics requirements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistic support. Logistic support encompasses the logistic services, materiel, and transportation required to support the CONUS-based and worldwide deployed forces. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

maintain. When used in the context of deliberate planning, the directed command will keep the referenced operation plan, operation plan in concept format, or Concept Summary and any associated Joint Operation Planning and Execution Planning automated data processing files active in accordance with applicable tasking documents describing the type and level of update or maintenance to be performed. General guidance is contained in JOPES, Volumes I and II. (See also archive and retain.) (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

major combat element. Those organizations and units described in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan that directly produce combat capability. The size of the element varies by Service, force capability, and the total number of such elements available. Examples are Army divisions and separate brigades, Air Force squadrons, Naval task forces, and Marine Expeditionary Forces. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)
major force. A military organization comprised of major combat elements and associated combat service, combat service support, and sustainment increments. The major force is capable of sustained military operations in response to plan employment requirements. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

manifest. A document specifying in detail the passengers or items carried for a specific destination. (Joint Pub 1-02)

materiel. All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

materiel planning. Materiel planning is a subset of logistic planning and consists of a four-step process:

a. requirements definition. Requirements for significant items must be calculated at item level detail (i.e., national stock number) to support sustainability planning and analysis. Requirements include unit roundout, consumption and attrition replacement, safety stock, and the needs of allies.

b. apportionment. Items are apportioned to the combatant commanders based on a global scenario to avoid sourcing of items to multiple theaters. The basis for apportionment is the capability provided by unit stocks, host nation support, theater pre-positioned war reserve stocks and industrial base, and CONUS DOD stockpiles and available production. Item apportionment cannot exceed total capabilities.

c. sourcing. Sourcing is the matching of available capabilities on a given date against item requirements to support sustainability analysis and the identification of locations to support transportation planning. Sourcing of any item is done within the combatant commander’s apportionment.

d. documentation. Sourced item requirements and corresponding shortfalls are major inputs to the combatant commander’s sustainability analysis. Sourced item requirements are translated into movement requirements and documented in the JOPES data base for transportation feasibility analysis. Movement requirements for nonsignificant items are estimated in tonnage. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)
medical evacuees. Personnel who are wounded, injured, or ill and must be moved to or between medical facilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military deception. Actions executed to mislead foreign decisionmakers, causing them to derive and accept desired appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations, or other activities that evoke foreign actions that contributed to the originator’s objectives.

a. strategic military deception. Military deception that targets foreign national security policy objectives, courses of action, and military strategies for the overall conduct of military campaigns as employed by heads of state and national high commands.

b. operational military deception. Military deception that targets the opposing commander’s preparations and intentions for using military force to accomplish defensive or offensive operational missions at the theater level and below. Operational military deception is employed by theater, sub-theater, and joint task force (JTF) commanders in the operational chain of command.

c. tactical military deception. Military deception that targets the on-scene opposing commander’s actions during combat. Tactical deception is employed by all levels in the operational chain of command.

d. Service military deception. Military deception planned and executed by military Services about military systems, doctrine, tactics, techniques, personnel, Service operations, or other activities to result in foreign actions which increase or maintain the originator’s capabilities relative to adversaries.

e. military deception in support of operations security. Military deception that targets the threat intelligence systems in order to support maintaining essential secrecy. Deceptive operations security measures are employed at all levels in any chain of command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military objectives. The derived set of military actions to be taken to implement NCA guidance in support of national objectives. Defines the results to be achieved by the military and assigns tasks to commanders. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

military options. A range of military force responses that can be projected to accomplish assigned tasks. Options include one or a combination of the following: civic action, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other military activities to
develop positive relationships with other countries; confidence-building and other measures to reduce military tensions; military presence; activities to convey threats to adversaries and truth projections; military deceptions and PSYOP; quarantines, blockades, and harassment operations; raids; intervention campaigns; armed conflict involving air, land, maritime, and strategic warfare campaigns and operations; support for law enforcement authorities to counter international criminal activities (terrorism, narcotics trafficking, slavery, and piracy); support for law enforcement authorities to suppress domestic rebellion; and support for insurgencies, counterinsurgency, and civil war in foreign countries. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

mobility analysis. An in-depth examination of all aspects of transportation planning in support of operation plan and operation order development. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

mobility echelon. A subordinate element of a unit that is scheduled for deployment separately from the parent unit. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

mobilization. 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. 2. The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Armed Forces includes but is not limited to the following categories:

a. selective mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and/or the President to mobilize Reserve component units, individual ready reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of the domestic emergency that is not the result of an enemy attack.

b. partial mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress (up to full mobilization) or by the President (not more than 1,000,000) to mobilize Ready Reserve component units, individual reservists, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

c. full mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all Reserve component units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, retired military
personnel, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security.

d. total mobilization. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel, beyond the existing force structure, and the resources needed for their support, to meet the total requirements of a war or other national emergency involving an external threat to the national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

movement schedule. A schedule developed to monitor or track a separate entity whether it is a force requirement, cargo or personnel increment, or lift asset. The schedule reflects the assignment of specific lift resources (such as an aircraft or ship) that will be used to move the personnel and cargo included in a specific movement increment. Arrival and departure times at ports of embarkation, etc., are detailed to show a flow and workload at each location. Movement schedules are detailed enough to support plan implementation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

movement table. A table giving detailed instructions or data for a move. When necessary it will be qualified by the words road, rail, sea, air, etc., to signify the type of movement. Normally issued as an annex to a movement order or instruction. (Joint Pub 1-02)

multidiscipline counterintelligence.* The process of determining the presence and nature of the total, all-source hostile intelligence threat to a given friendly target in order to provide a basis for countering or degrading the threat.

National Command Authorities. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

national emergency. A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue of powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be undertaken in the national interest. Action to be taken may include partial, full, or total mobilization of national resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Military Command System. The priority component of the worldwide military command and control system designed to support the National Command Authorities and Joint Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their responsibilities. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

national objectives. The aims, derived from national goals and interests, toward which a national policy or strategy is directed
and efforts and resources of the nation are applied. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

National Security Council. A governmental body specifically designed to assist the President in integrating all spheres of national security policy. The President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense are statutory members. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serve as advisers. Also called NSC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

National security interests. The foundation for the development of valid national objectives that define US goals or purposes. National security interests include preserving US political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and bolstering international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its allies. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Noncombatant evacuation operations. Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from areas of danger overseas to safe havens or to the United States. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-07.5.)

Noncombatant evacuees. 1. US citizens who may be ordered to evacuate by competent authority include: a. Civilian employees of all agencies of the US Government and their dependents, except as noted in 2a below. b. Military personnel of the US Armed Forces specifically designated for evacuation as noncombatants. c. Dependents of members of the US Armed Forces. 2. US (and non-US) citizens who may be authorized or assisted (but not necessarily ordered to evacuate) by competent authority include: a. Civilian employees of US Government agencies and their dependents, who are residents in the country concerned on their own volition, but express the willingness to be evacuated. b. Private US citizens and their dependents. c. Military personnel and dependents of members of the US Armed Forces outlined in 1c above, short of an ordered evacuation. d. Designated aliens, including dependents of persons listed in 1a through 1c above, as prescribed by the Department of State. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-07.5.)

Non-unit-related cargo. All equipment and supplies requiring transportation to an area of operations, other than those identified as the equipment or accompanying supplies of a specific unit (e.g., resupply, military support for allies, and

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support for nonmilitary programs, such as civil relief). (Joint Pub 1-02)

non-unit-related personnel. All personnel requiring transportation to or from an area of operations, other than those assigned to a specific unit (e.g., filler personnel, replacements, temporary duty or temporary additional duty personnel; civilians; medical evacuees; and retrograde personnel). (Joint Pub 1-02)

nuclear planning and execution. WWMCCS application systems that support strategic and tactical nuclear planning, execution, termination, and reconstitution. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Nuclear Planning System. Consists of personnel, directives, and electronic data processing systems to directly support theater nuclear CINCs in developing, maintaining, and disseminating nuclear operation plans. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

on-call. Preplanned, identified force or materiel requirements without designated time-phase and destination information. Will be called forward upon order of competent authority. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

operation. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational continuum.* The general states of peace, conflict, and war within which various types of military operations and activities are conducted.

operational control. Transferable command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in Combatant Command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command, operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned
missions, operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02).

operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN).

a. OPLAN. An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an OPORD. An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC’s Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the JOPES manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats.

b. Concept Plan (CONPLAN). An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC’s Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:

a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.

b. Determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations security indicators. Friendly detectable actions and open-source information that can be interpreted or pieced together by an adversary to derive critical information. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations security measures. Methods and means to gain and maintain essential secrecy about critical information. The following categories apply:

   a. action control. The objective is to eliminate indicators or the vulnerability of actions to exploitation by adversary intelligence systems. Select what actions to undertake; decide whether or not to execute actions; and determine the "who," "when," "where," and "how" for actions necessary to accomplish tasks.

   b. countermeasures. The objective is to disrupt effective adversary information gathering or prevent their recognition of indicators when collected materials are processed. Use diversions, camouflage, jamming, threats, police powers, and force against adversary information gathering and processing capabilities.

   c. counteranalysis. The objective is to prevent accurate interpretations of indicators during adversary analysis of collected materials. This is done by confusing the adversary analyst through deception techniques such as covers. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations security planning guidance. Guidance that serves as the blueprint for operations security planning by all functional elements throughout the organization. It defines the critical information that requires protection from adversary appreciations, taking into account friendly and adversary goals, estimated key adversary questions, probable adversary knowledge, desirable and harmful adversary appreciations, and pertinent intelligence system threats. It also should outline provisional operations security measures to ensure the requisite essential secrecy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations security vulnerability. A condition in which friendly actions provide operations security indicators that may be obtained and accurately evaluated by an adversary in time to provide a basis for effective adversary decisionmaking. (Joint Pub 1-02)
organic. Assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. Organic parts of a unit are those listed in its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the administrative organizations of the operating forces for the Navy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

origin. Beginning point of a deployment, where unit or non-unit-related cargo or personnel are located. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

personnel increment number. A seven-character alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a non-unit-related personnel entry (line) in a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time-phased force and deployment data. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

plan identification number. A command-unique four-digit number, followed by a suffix indicating the JSCP year for which the plan is written, e.g. "2220-95". In JOPES data base, a five-digit number representing the command unique four-digit identifier, followed by a one character alphabetic suffix indicating the OPLAN option, or a one-digit number numeric value indicating the JSCP year for which the plan is written. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

plan information capability. This capability allows a supported command to enter and update key elements of information in an operation plan stored in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

PLANNING ORDER (CJCS). An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The planning order will normally follow a commander’s estimate and will normally take the place of the CJCS ALERT ORDER. NCA approval of a selected COA is not required before issuing a CJCS PLANNING ORDER. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 5-0.)

port of debarkation. The geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. May be a seaport or aerial port of debarkation. For unit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the destination. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

port of embarkation. The geographic point in a routing scheme from which cargo or personnel depart. May be a seaport or aerial port from which personnel and equipment flow to port of debarkation. For unit and nonunit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the origin. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)
Preliminary Movement Schedule. A projection of the routing of movement requirements reflected in the time-phased force and deployment data, from origin to destination, including identification of origins, ports of embarkation, ports of debarkation, and en route stops; associated timeframes for arrival and departure at each location; type of lift assets required to accomplish the move; and cargo details by carrier. Schedules are sufficiently detailed to support comparative analysis of requirements against capabilities and to develop location workloads for reception and onward movement. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority. Provision of a public law that provides the President a means to activate not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for 90 days to meet the support requirements of any operational mission without a declaration of a national emergency. It further grants the President authority to extend the original 90 days for an additional 90 days in the interest of national security. This authority has particular utility when used in circumstances in which the escalatory national or international signals of partial or full mobilization would be undesirable. Forces available under this authority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response, or may be used as a precursor to any subsequent mobilization. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

procedure. A procedure begins with a specific documentable event that causes an activity to occur. The activity must produce a product that normally affects another external organization. Frequently, that product will be the event that causes another procedure to occur. It is important to recognize that a procedure determines "what" an organization must do at critical periods but does not direct "how" it will be done. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

public. Concept that includes all audiences, both internal and external. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

readiness planning. Operational planning required for peace-time operations. Its objective is the maintenance of high states of
readiness and the deterrence of potential enemies. It includes planning activities that influence day-to-day operations and the peacetime posture of forces. As such, its focus is on general capabilities and readiness rather than the specifics of a particular crisis, either actual or potential. The assignment of geographic responsibilities to combatant commanders, establishment of readiness standards and levels, development of peacetime deployment patterns, coordination of reconnaissance and surveillance assets and capabilities, and planning of joint exercises are examples of readiness planning. No formal joint planning system exists for readiness planning such as exists for contingency and execution planning. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

ready-to-load date. The day relative to C-day, in a time-phased force and deployment data when the unit, nonunit equipment, and forces are prepared to depart their origin on organic transportation or are prepared to begin loading on USTRANSCOM-provided transportation. Also called RLD. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

replacements. Personnel required to take the place of others who depart a unit. (Joint Pub 1-02)

requirements capability. This capability provides a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System user the ability to identify, update, review, and delete data on forces and sustainment required to support an operation plan or course of action. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

required delivery date. A date, relative to C-day, when a unit must arrive at its destination and complete offloading to properly support the concept of operations. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

resource and unit monitoring. WWMCCS application systems that support approved requirements relating to resource and unit monitoring, readiness assessment, situation assessment, and operations by integrating data from functional areas such as operations, logistics, personnel, and medical. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

resources. The forces, materiel, and other assets or capabilities apportioned or allocated to the commander of a unified or specified command. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

resupply.* See "non-unit-related cargo."

retain. When used in the context of deliberate planning, the directed command will keep the referenced operation plan, operation

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plan in concept format, or Concept Summary and any associated JOPS or JOPES automated data processing files in an inactive library or status. The plan and its associated files will not be maintained unless directed by follow-on guidance. (See also archive and maintained.) (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

retrograde cargo. Cargo evacuated from a theater of operations. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

retrograde personnel. Personnel evacuated from a theater of operations--may include medical patients, noncombatants, and civilians. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

scheduled arrival date. The projected arrival date of a specified movement requirement at a specified location. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

schedules. The carrier itinerary which may involve cargo and passenger. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

scheduling and movement capability. The capability required by Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planners and operators to allow for review and update of scheduling and movement data before and during implementation of a deployment operation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

sealift readiness program. A formal agreement, pursuant to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, between US-flag dry cargo carriers and the government for the acquisition of ships and related equipment under conditions of less than full mobilization. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

selective release process. The process involving requesting, analyzing, and obtaining approval for release of weapons to obtain specific, limited damage on selected targets. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

shortfall. The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability, reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those apportioned to a CINC for planning, that would adversely affect the command’s ability to accomplish its mission. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

SIGINT direct service. A reporting procedure to provide signals intelligence (SIGINT) to a military commander or other authorized
recipient in response to SIGINT requirements. The product may vary from recurring, serialized reports produced by the National Security Agency/Central Security Service to instantaneous and periodic reports provided to the command or other recipient, usually from a fixed SIGINT activity engaged in collection and processing. (Joint Pub 1-02)

SIGINT direct service activity. A signals intelligence (SIGINT) activity composed of collection and associated resources that normally performs in a direct service role under the SIGINT operational control of the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service. (Joint Pub 1-02)

SIGINT direct support. The provision of signals intelligence (SIGINT) information to a military commander by a SIGINT direct support unit in response to SIGINT operational tasking levied by that commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

SIGINT direct support unit. A signals intelligence (SIGINT) unit, usually mobile, designed to perform a SIGINT direct support role for a military commander under delegated authority from the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service. (Joint Pub 1-02)

SIGINT operational control. The authoritative direction of signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities, including tasking and allocation of effort, and the authoritative prescription of those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information is collected, processed, and reported. (Joint Pub 1-02)

SIGINT operational tasking. The authoritative operational direction of and direct levying of SIGINT information needs by a military commander on designated SIGINT resources. These requirements are directive, irrespective of other priorities, and are conditioned only by the capability of those resources to produce such information. Operational tasking includes authority to deploy all or part of the SIGINT resources for which SIGINT operational tasking authority has been delegated. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

staff estimates. Assessments of course of actions by the various staff elements of a command that serve as the foundation of the commander’s estimate. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

strategy determination. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System function in which analysis of changing events in the international environment and the development of national strategy to respond to those events is conducted. In joint operation planning, the responsibility for recommending military strategy to the National Command Authorities lies with the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in concert with supported commanders. In the deliberate planning process, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is produced as a result of this process. In the Crisis Assessment Phase of the crisis action planning process, Crisis Action Planning procedures are used to formulate decisions for direct development of possible military courses of action. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

subordinate command. A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

suitability. Operation Plan review criterion. The determination that the course of action will reasonably accomplish the identified objectives, mission, or task if carried out successfully. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

supported commander. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting commander. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting forces. Forces stationed in, or to be deployed to, an area of operations to provide support for the execution of an operation order. Combatant Command (command authority) of supporting forces is not passed to the supported commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

supporting plan. An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s plan. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

sustainment. The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of
the national objective. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

target. 1. A geographic area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. 2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. 3. An area designated and numbered for future firing. 4. In gunfire support usage, an impact burst which hits the target. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target list. The listing of targets maintained and promulgated by the senior echelon of command; it contains those targets that are to be engaged by supporting arms, as distinguished from a "list of targets" that may be maintained by an echelon as confirmed, suspected, or possible targets for informational and planning purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

terrorism. The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

theater. The geographic area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a unified or specified command has been assigned military responsibility. (Joint Pub 1-02)

threat identification and assessment. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System function that provides timely warning of potential threats to US interests; intelligence collection requirements; the effects of environmental, physical, and health hazards, and cultural factors on friendly and enemy operations; and determines the enemy military posture and possible intentions. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

throughput. The average quantity of cargo and passengers that can pass through a port on a daily basis from arrival at the port to loading onto a ship or aircraft, or from the discharge from a ship or aircraft to the exit (clearance) from the port complex. Throughput is usually expressed in measurement tons, short tons, or passengers. Reception and storage limitation may affect final throughput. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

times. (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400Z and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air
and surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day.

a. C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements utilizing any or all types of transport. The letter "C" will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)

b. D-day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

c. F-hour. The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units.

d. H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which particular operation commences. (Joint Pub 1-02)

e. L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence.

f. M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence.

g. N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment.

h. R-day. Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat CS and CSS forces begins in an operation.

i. S-day. The day the President authorizes Selected Reserve callup (not more than 200,000).

j. T-day. The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of National Emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup).

k. W-day. Declared by the NCA, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning). (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)
time-phased force and deployment data. The JOPES data base portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including:

a. In-place units.

b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation.

c. Routing of forces to be deployed.

d. Movement data associated with deploying forces.

e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces.

f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 5-0.)

time-phased force and deployment list. Appendix 1 to Annex A of the operation plan. It identifies types and/or actual units required to support the operation plan and indicates origin and port of debarkation or ocean area. It may also be generated as a computer listing from the time-phased force and deployment data. Also called TPFDL. (Joint Pub 1-02)

TPFDD maintenance. The deliberate planning process that requires a supported commander to incorporate changes to a time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) that occur after the TPFDD becomes effective for execution. TPFDD maintenance is conducted by the supported CINC in coordination with the supporting CINC, Service components, USTRANSCOM, and other agencies as required. At designated intervals, changes to data in the TPFDD, including force structure, standard reference files, and Services’ type unit characteristics file, are updated in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to ensure currency of deployment data. TPFDD maintenance may also be used to update the TPFDD for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan submission in lieu of refinement during the JOPES plan development phase. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

TPFDD Refinement. For both global and regional operation plan development, the process consists of several discrete phases of
time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) that may be conducted sequentially or concurrently, in whole or in part. These phases are Concept, Plan Development, and Review. The Plan Development Phase consists of several subphases: Forces, Logistics, and Transportation, with shortfall identification associated with each phase. The Plan Development phases are collectively referred to as TPFDD refinement. The normal TPFDD refinement process consists of sequentially refining forces, logistics (non-unit-related personnel and sustainment), and transportation data to develop a TPFDD file that supports a feasible and adequate overlapping of several refinement phases. The decision is made by the supported commander, unless otherwise directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For global planning, refinement conferences are conducted by the Joint Staff in conjunction with USTRANSCOM. TPFDD refinement is conducted in coordination with supported and supporting commanders, Services, the Joint Staff, and other supporting agencies. USCINCTRANS will normally host refinement conferences at the request of the Joint Staff or the supported commander. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

transportation closure. The actual arrival date of a specified movement requirement at port of debarkation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

type unit. A type of organizational or functional entity established within the Armed Forces and uniquely identified by a five-character, alphanumeric code called a unit type code. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

type unit characteristics file. A file that provides standard planning data and movement characteristics for personnel, cargo, and accompanying supplies associated with type units. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unit designation list. A list of actual units by unit identification code designated to fulfill requirements of a force list.

unit identification code. A six-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each Active, Reserve, and National Guard unit of the Armed Forces. Also called UIC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

unit line number. A seven-character, alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a unit entry (line) in a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System time-phased force and deployment data. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

unit type code. A five-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each type unit of the Armed Forces. Also called UTC. (Joint Pub 1-02).
USTRANSCOM coordinating instructions. Instructions that establish suspense dates for selected members of the joint planning and execution community to complete updates to the operation plan data base. Instructions will ensure the target date movement requirements will be validated and available for scheduling. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

validate. Execution procedure used by CINC components, supporting CINCs, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported CINC and USTRANSCOM that all the information records in a time-phased force and deployment data not only are error-free for automation purposes but also accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements. Unit readiness, movement dates, passengers, and cargo details should be confirmed with the unit before validation occurs. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

warning order. A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. (Joint Pub 1-02)

WARNING ORDER (CJCS). A crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of COAs by a supported commander and requests that a commander's estimate be submitted. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

wartime reserve modes. Characteristics and operating procedures of sensor, communications, navigation aids, threat recognition, weapons, and countermeasures systems that (a) will contribute to military effectiveness if unknown to or misunderstood by opposing commanders before they are used, but (b) could be exploited or neutralized if known in advance. WARM are deliberately held in reserve for wartime or emergency use and seldom, if ever, applied or intercepted before such use. Also called WARM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

* This term and definition are applicable only in the context of this pub and cannot be referenced outside of this publication.