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1. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and military guidance to govern the conduct of joint rear area operations when operating as or in support of a joint force.

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8. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is J-7.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

H. L. SHEFFIELD
Captain, USN
Secretary, Joint Staff

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DOCTRINE FOR JOINT REAR AREA OPERATIONS

PREFACE

1. Purpose. This publication sets forth doctrine to govern the conduct of joint rear area operations during unified and joint operations. It focuses on achieving local and overall security of the joint rear area by establishing reliable command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) at every command level. It also provides guidelines for commanders of unified and specified commands, other joint force commands, and subordinate component commands for coordinating and integrating security operations with their other operational responsibilities. This publication:

   a. Defines a joint rear area.

   b. Defines joint rear area operations in terms of major functions.

   c. Establishes criteria for and responsibilities of a joint rear area coordinator.

2. Application

   a. The doctrine in this publication applies to combatant commands, components, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, and other subordinate commands. Its principles and guidelines also apply when forces of one combatant command or Service are attached to or support another combatant command or Service.

   b. This publication is authoritative but not directive. Commanders will exercise judgment in applying the procedures herein to accomplish their missions. This doctrine should be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance.

   c. In applying the procedures set forth in this publication, care must be taken to distinguish between distinct but related responsibilities in the two channels of authority to forces assigned to combatant commands. The Military Departments and Services recruit, organize, train, equip, and provide forces for assignment to
combatant commands and administer and support these forces. Commanders of the unified and specified commands exercise combatant command (command authority) over these assigned forces. Service component commanders are responsible both to joint force commanders in the operational chain of command and to the Military Departments and Services in the chain of command for matters that the joint force commander has not been assigned authority.

3. Scope. This publication provides guidelines for planning and executing joint rear area operations primarily in terms of the major functions of infrastructure development, communications, intelligence, security, combat operations, sustainment, survivability, area management, movements, and host nation support (HNS). It also addresses command and control. It places particular emphasis on the joint rear area coordinator's responsibility for the overall security of the joint rear area. It is written for those who:

a. Plan the employment of or employ joint forces.

b. Plan the support of or are supported by joint forces.

4. Basis

a. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."


d. Joint Pub 3-0 (Test), 1 January 1990, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
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CHAPTER I

THE JOINT REAR AREA

1. General

a. A theater CINC or a subordinate joint force commander (JFC) must expect and be prepared to engage the enemy in every sector of his theater or area of operations, respectively. The rear areas of a theater are increasingly vulnerable to modern enemy forces with sophisticated surveillance devices and systems; accurate, long-range weapon systems; and transport assets capable of inserting forces deep behind friendly lines. Foreign intelligence and security services will continue to pose espionage, disinformation, and psychological operations threats. Threats posed by indigenous elements capable of the full spectrum of unconventional operations ranging from sabotage to large-scale raids and ambushes are also likely.

b. The rear area of a theater or the JFC's area of operations (AO) may be small or it may span several national boundaries with divergent cultures. It will contain units and facilities from all components that are critical to successful joint force support operations. It may also contain the units and facilities of one or more allied nations. Vital sea lines of communication, through which the bulk of logistic support for forward-deployed forces flows, have their greatest vulnerability where they converge at the rear sector of the theater. Likewise, air lines of communication, which bring in forces and critical supplies, frequently terminate at airfields within range of enemy action. Numerous other support units and facilities located in rear areas are inviting targets because of their importance in sustaining theater operations. Combat support and combat service support units located in theater rear areas are required to perform their support missions and provide for their own defense. There may be exceptions to this requirement, such as military airlift or civilian reserve air fleet crews and Military Sealift Command (MSC) crews who may not have the capability for self-defense and would fall under the protection of the base commander. Other exceptions are medical units, which are included under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.

c. A theater CINC is a JFC and may form subordinate joint commands whose commanders are JFCs. The general
The term "JFC" will be used throughout the remainder of this manual to identify the commander of a joint force, except where specific responsibilities or functions are vested solely in the theater CINC's authority, in which case the term "CINC" will be used.

2. Historical Perspective. See Appendix A.

3. Joint Rear Area

a. A joint rear area (JRA) is a specific land area within a JFC's area of operations designated by the JFC to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. The size of a JRA may vary considerably and is highly dependent on the size of the theater, logistic support requirements, threat, or scope of the joint operation. A JRA is usually to the rear of the theater or combat zone, but it is not necessarily contiguous to the combat zone. The airspace above the JRA is normally not included in the JRA; theater airspace is normally considered a combat zone governed by procedures promulgated in Joint Pub 3-52, "Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone."

b. A JRA may be collocated with the communications zone (COMMZ) in some theaters but normally would not include a naval AO. Operations in sea areas are considered to be part of a combat zone and will not normally be included in a JRA. When a naval AO and a JRA meet along a coastline, the high water mark will normally designate the boundary between the two. Ports and harbors, but not the built-up areas around them, are normally included in the naval AO.

c. A JRA in a joint operation may adjoin the rear areas of one or more of the combat forces making up the combat power of the joint force.

d. A JRA can be adapted to any modern battlefield environment. In any circumstance, a JRA may be segmented and may contain isolated pockets of relatively secure support areas that may collectively make up a JRA.

e. Concurrent with the designation of a JRA, the theater CINC or subordinate JFC normally designates a joint rear area coordinator (JRAC). The JRAC is responsible for coordinating and maintaining the overall security of the JRA as directed by the JFC. The JRAC's responsibilities
are addressed in Chapter II. The JRAC is a critical link in coordinating security, establishing reliable intelligence and counterintelligence support, and secure and survivable communications with all forces operating in the JRA. However, in cases of level III threat or other emergencies, the JFC may assign a subordinate commander the responsibility to counter the threat and restore JRA security. In this case, the assigned subordinate commander would be tasked with restoring the JRA security and assume those JRAC responsibilities required to accomplish his mission. The JRAC will support any requirements requested by the assigned subordinate commander. This option would be exercised for the duration of the threat or as directed by the JFC. The Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) is responsible for the security of the airspace above the JRA.

4. Evolution of JRA

a. Austere Rear Area to Developed Theater. The JRA will typically evolve and expand as a theater develops in accordance with requirements to support and defend the joint force. It may be preceded by a maritime area of operations before establishing a lodgment in a single country. A lodgment would normally be expanded to an area including existing ports and air strips from which bare base operations could be conducted and then eventually evolve to areas including multiple countries and sea boundaries. A developed theater would generally have the characteristics of numerous forward deployed forces; extensive transportation infrastructure (ports, highway networks, airfields, and railroads); in-place command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) systems; and significant host nation support (HNS).

b. Other Environments. In other operations, the dimensions and configuration of a JRA may be particularly fluid. However, locales established within the AO may be "de facto" JRAs, i.e., areas such as metropolitan zones or regions isolated by geographic boundaries that become relatively segregated from the main areas of conflict. The JFC may designate such areas as a part of the JRA. Austere conditions should be anticipated. Support facilities, population receptiveness, and overall HNS may be unpredictable and unreliable. The joint force will normally have to rely on its own resources for support until lines of communication can be established.
5. Operations Within the JRA. Operations occurring within the JRA either protect the JRA or support the joint force. They are best described as broad functions and include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Security. The security function addresses those measures or activities used to protect against hostile threats to ensure survival and sustainment of mission capability. It also includes the specific category of security operations that contributes to the security of the joint force. Security is the principal concern of this publication. Other functions are discussed as they relate to the security of the JRA. Security, within the context of this publication, includes area damage control.

b. Communications. A C3 system should be established throughout the JRA that will provide for interoperable, secure, reliable, and redundant communications.

c. Intelligence. Effective intelligence support, merged with counterintelligence and law enforcement agency information, is essential to conducting successful security operations in the JRA. Current intelligence and counterintelligence estimates, focused on the JRA, should incorporate intelligence from all US, allied, and host nation (HN) sources.

d. Sustainment. The primary mission of many of the forces in the JRA is to sustain the campaign and major operations of the joint force. All security and counterintelligence activities are focused on providing a secure JRA in which force sustainment can continue.

e. Area Management. The effective utilization and positioning of military assets in the JRA is critical to successful operations. Both mission support and security should be considered when positioning US assets throughout the JRA.

f. Movements. The planning, routing, scheduling, control, and security of the movement of personnel and materiel in the JRA is vital to the support of the joint force. The JFC normally centralizes transportation movement control at the highest level where it can be exercised to ensure that common-user transportation resources are allocated to support command missions and priorities.

g. Infrastructure Development. The availability of adequate and secure facilities in the JRA for elements of
the joint force is essential. Close coordination with HN forces and
governing agencies is required for use of their facilities or for
construction of new facilities on their territory as well as forces
necessary to establish and maintain security of the facilities. The
required level of base development should be established as early as
possible to prevent overloading of transportation modes with excess
construction material.

h. Host Nation Support. A viable and friendly HN can provide
invaluable civil and/or military assistance to US forces throughout
the operational continuum. This assistance, backed by mutual
agreements between nations, can significantly contribute to support
of the joint force and security of the JRA. The completion of a
range of HN agreements is required in order to define relationships
and roles explicitly in areas of strategic interest to the United
States. When more than one HN is involved, careful management is
required to ensure specific national restrictions are met. Joint
areas of operations encompassing more than one HN may require
significantly different restrictions and sensitivities for each
nation involved. Violations could result in loss of HNS, which could
significantly affect US forces' ability to achieve national
objectives. Operations may occur in a foreign nation whose
sovereignty remains viable and where HNS agreements are in effect.
In such cases, responsibility for selected JRA functions may be
passed to the HN. In any case, overall responsibility for JRA
operations remains with the JFC.

6. Threat. Threats to the JRA exist throughout the operational
continuum. These threats may be related or independently prosecuted,
but their effects are frequently cumulative. Threats to JRA operations
are usually theater dependent and are not limited to those outlined in
this document. Commanders must be aware that nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) munitions may be used. The threat to the JRA is divided
into three levels in order to provide a general description and
categorization of threat activities, identify the defense requirements
to counter them, and establish a common reference for planning
guidelines. This does not imply that threat activities will occur in a
specific sequence or that there is a necessary interrelationship between
each level. The threat to JRA begins with collection by foreign
intelligence services using technical intelligence or human resource
intelligence. Throughout the operation of the JRA, foreign intelligence
services will continue to collect against air and sea ports.
of embarkation, lines of communication, marshaling areas, troop strength, and types of equipment.

a. Typical Level I Threats

(1) Enemy-Controlled Agents. Enemy-controlled agents are a potential threat throughout the JRA. Their primary missions include espionage, interdiction, sabotage, and subversion. Enemy-controlled agent activity spans the operational continuum and may increase during hostilities other than war and war to include assassination of key military and civilian personnel, kidnapping, and/or guiding special purpose individuals or teams to targets in the JRA.

(2) Enemy Sympathizers. Civilians sympathetic to the enemy may become significant threats to US and allied operations. They may be the most difficult to neutralize because they are normally not part of an established enemy agent network and their actions will be random and unpredictable. During hostilities other than war and war, indigenous groups sympathetic to the enemy or those simply opposed to the United States can be expected to provide assistance, information, and shelter to guerrilla and enemy unconventional or special purpose forces operating in the JRA.

(3) Terrorism. Terrorists are among the most insidious and difficult threats to neutralize and eradicate. Their actions span the operational continuum.

(4) Demonstrations and Riots. Although demonstrations and riots in a host country may not be sufficiently pervasive or violent enough to threaten the stability of the society, commanders should be aware of the direct or indirect threats they may pose to military operations.

b. Typical Level II Threats

(1) Guerrilla Forces. Irregular and predominantly indigenous forces conducting guerrilla warfare can pose serious threats to military forces and civilians and can cause significant disruptions to the orderly conduct of local government and services.
(2) Unconventional Forces. Special operations forces (SOF) are highly trained in unconventional warfare techniques. They are normally inserted surreptitiously into the JRA before the onset of armed conflict. They activate and establish espionage networks, carry out specific sabotage missions, develop target lists, and conduct damage assessment of targets struck.

(3) Small Tactical Units. Specially organized reconnaissance elements, as well as other potential threat forces, have the capability of conducting raids and ambushes in addition to their primary reconnaissance and intelligence gathering missions.

c. Typical Level III Threats

(1) Conventional Forces. Potential threat forces have the capability of rapidly projecting combat power by land, air, or sea deep into the JRA. Specific examples include: airborne, heliborne, and amphibious operations; large combined arms ground force operations; and infiltration operations involving large numbers of individuals or small groups infiltrated into the JRA, regrouped at predetermined times and locations, and committed against priority targets.

(2) Air or Missile. Threat forces may have the capability of launching an air or missile attack throughout the JRA. It is often difficult to distinguish quickly between a limited or full-scale attack before impact; therefore, protective measures will normally be based upon maximum threat capability.

(3) Nuclear, Biological, Chemical. Commanders must be aware that NBC munitions may be used in conjunction with air or missile or other conventional force attacks. NBC weapons could also be used at level I or II by terrorists or unconventional forces to accomplish their political or military objectives.

(4) Threat Levels. The threat level matrix (Table I-1) lists threat levels with likely appropriate responses. The threat levels listed are based on the type of threat. The matrix should not be construed as restricting the response options to any particular threat.

d. Threat Priorities. Operations against targets in the JRA will be characterized by air, ground, space, surface,
and subsurface efforts to detect and identify targets; destroy or neutralize operational weapon system capabilities; delay or disrupt the timely movement of forces and supplies; weaken the C2 network of the joint force; disrupt support to combat forces; set the stage for future enemy operations; and create panic and confusion throughout the JRA. Typical examples of enemy priority targets include: NBC weapon storage sites and delivery systems; key C3I facilities; air defense artillery (ADA) sites; air fields and air bases; port facilities; main supply routes (MSR) and MSR chokepoints; key lines of communication (LOC); reserve assembly areas; troop barracks; and critical civilian and logistic facilities.

Table I-1. Threat Level Matrix

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<th>Response</th>
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<td>Agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, terrorists</td>
<td>Unit, base, and base cluster self-defense measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Small tactical units, unconventional warfare forces, guerrillas</td>
<td>Self-defense measures and response force(s) with supporting fires</td>
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<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Large tactical force operations, including airborne, heliborne, amphibious, infiltration, and major air operations</td>
<td>May require timely commitment of tactical combat force</td>
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CHAPTER II
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE

1. Introduction. Achieving local and overall security of the JRA requires establishing unity of command and unity of effort among all forces in the JRA, to include combat forces transiting and operating in the JRA. It also requires successful planning and execution of operations using reliable C3 systems and intelligence functions. The JFC works toward this end by designating a JRA, selecting a JRA command structure, and establishing a command and control network through subordinate commanders to direct and coordinate the actions of all components toward achieving common security objectives. This network, supported by reliable and interoperable communications and intelligence, enables the JFC to exercise command authority and to achieve the desired goal of JRA security.

2. Responsibilities

a. Theater CINC's General Responsibilities. A theater CINC, as commander of a unified command, is ultimately responsible for all joint rear area operations conducted in the CINC's theater. Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," provides a listing of a theater CINC's primary responsibilities, the first of which states: "Maintain the security of the command and protect the United States, its possessions, and bases against attack or hostile incursion."

b. Theater CINC's Force Protection Responsibilities. Additional direction on the security responsibilities of a theater CINC is provided by Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations," which includes:

(1) Peacetime. Theater CINCs establish measures and procedures that preserve the combat power of their forces.

(2) Wartime. Theater CINCs carry out assigned and implied missions in pursuit of theater strategic objectives derived from national and alliance strategic goals. Force protection responsibilities are modified as necessary to ensure security of assigned forces and protect US interests in their theaters.
c. Theater CINC's Base Defense Responsibilities. Joint Pub 0-2 identifies the theater CINC's responsibilities to provide for the effective defense of bases within the command. The theater CINC is responsible for the following:

(1) Assigning Responsibility. The theater CINC assigns responsibility for local defense of a base and establishes the method of command or coordination to be exercised by the local base commander.

(2) Command Relationships. The theater CINC ensures that appropriate command relationships between subordinate area, subarea, and local base defense commanders are established and local defense areas are delineated.

(3) Base Classifications. Unless determined by higher authority, the theater CINC will determine the classification of bases in his theater in accordance with policies established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see subparagraph 3d below for general criteria for base classifications).

d. Other Command Responsibilities. The theater CINC normally assigns subordinate commanders responsibility for operations in the JRA in accordance with mission requirements, force capabilities, and the nature of the strategic environment, including the threat. The theater CINC ensures subordinate commanders are given authority commensurate with their responsibilities.

(1) Subordinate Joint Force Commander. Subordinate JFCs may be subunified or joint task force commanders.

(2) Component Commanders. This publication discusses a joint force command structure in a Service component alignment. It is equally adaptable, however, to a functional alignment.

(3) Naval Coastal Warfare Commander. The JFC assigns responsibility for security of territorial seas contiguous to the rear area to the naval component commander, who may delegate this responsibility to a naval coastal warfare commander (NCWC). The NCWC conducts naval coastal warfare (NCW) missions within a designated naval coastal geographic area. The NCWC and the JRAC, if designated, will coordinate all relevant aspects of their missions and responsibilities for their
respective areas of operations and provide mutual support to ensure the security of the JRA and the coastal area. The common boundary between the NCWC's area of operations and the JRA will normally be the high water mark. The NCWC, or designated subordinate commanders, will coordinate security operations with the JRAC, if designated, and the appropriate area or base commander(s). See Appendix B for an expanded discussion of naval coastal warfare.

e. Joint Rear Area Coordinator

(1) General. Establishing and maintaining security in the JRA, although vital to the survivability and success of the joint force, is nevertheless an economy of force mission. The JFC dedicates assets for force protection operations in proportion to the severity of the threat in order to conserve resources and prevent degradation of support, which is the primary mission of most of the forces in the JRA. In a low-threat environment, where the inherent defensive capabilities of bases and support or HN forces are generally adequate to deter the threat, and the focus of most security efforts is on thorough security planning, the JFC may determine that a JRAC, working closely with appropriate commanders, staff, and HN commands, has sufficient authority to manage the overall security of the JRA.

(2) JRAC Selection Options. The JFC may designate a subordinate commander or a member of the JFC's headquarters as the JRAC. The JFC considers mission requirements, force capabilities, the nature of the JRA, and the threat in determining the JRAC.

(3) General Responsibilities. The JRAC is responsible for coordinating the overall security of the JRA in accordance with JFC directives and priorities. The JRAC accomplishes this by coordinating with appropriate JRA commanders to ensure they maintain the security of their respective AOs to facilitate sustainment, HNS, infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force. The JRAC also ensures commanders establish reliable intelligence support and practice area management within their AOs with due consideration of security requirements. Additionally, the JRAC establishes secure and survivable communications with all forces and commands operating in or transiting the JRA. The
JRAC is also responsible for ensuring that the surface area security requirements and priorities for the JRA are integrated in the overall security requirements of the joint force and are coordinated with the area air defense commander who is responsible for defending the airspace over the joint rear area.

(4) Security Integration Responsibilities. While other agencies or components may have primary responsibility for specific JRA functions, the JRAC is responsible for coordinating the security aspects of all functions throughout the JRA. The JRAC's overall coordination responsibility for security of the JRA does not lessen the responsibility that component elements, residing or operating in the JRA, have for their own security.

(5) Specific JRAC Responsibilities. Specific responsibilities before and during wartime include coordinating with appropriate commanders and staff to ensure that:

(a) The security posture in the JRA supports the JFC's concept of operations and is adaptable to support future operations.

(b) The overall JRA security plan is developed and coordinated with appropriate US, allied, and HN commands in accordance with JFC directives and guidelines.

(c) The chain of command established by the JFC and the degree of authority granted to the JRAC are adequate for the mutual protection and security of all US personnel and assets in the JRA. (See Figure II-1 depicting generic JRA C2 network for security operations and possible selection options for JRAC.)

(d) Sufficient response forces are identified to respond to anticipated threats to the JRA.

(e) The intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement networks are responsive to the needs of commanders operating in the JRA.
Figure II-1. Joint Rear Area C2 Network
(f) Objective criteria are developed and disseminated for assessing the criticality and vulnerability of bases in the JRA in order to prioritize security improvements and position reaction forces or area damage control assets.

(g) Coordination with the AADC has been completed to ensure air defense requirements for the JRA are integrated into US, allied, and/or HN air defense plans in accordance with JFC priorities and concept of operations.

(h) Positioning and stationing of units and facilities in the JRA are made with due consideration for security.

(i) Defense plans incorporate adequate provisions and procedures for NBC defense, to include NBC warning and reporting procedures.

(j) Appropriate liaison is established with allied and HN commands for coordination of security issues.

(k) All relevant international and domestic (US and HN) legal guidelines impacting on security within the JRA (such as HNS agreements, Law of War guidance, and rules of engagement (ROE)) are disseminated to appropriate command levels.

(l) Civil Affairs and Judge Advocate support are available to assist in resolution of security issues.

(m) Development and positioning of infrastructure are made with due consideration of security requirements.

(n) Component commander(s) in the JRA coordinate security at the boundaries of their AO (if the JRA is divided) to ensure coordinated JRA security efforts.

(o) Threat estimates to the JRA are developed and disseminated to appropriate commands in a timely manner.

(p) A tactical combat force (TCF) if established by the JFC, is positioned, and
given the appropriate mission in accordance with JFC directives.

(q) Any additional security forces (US, allied, and/or HN) are properly integrated into an overall JRA defense plan.

(r) Key lines of communication through the JRA are protected to support current and future operations.

(s) Key movements and sustainment operations have priority for security, mine detection and clearing, and area damage control (ADC) assets.

(t) Liaison is established with the NCWC to coordinate security operations. (NOTE: If it is necessary to plan and/or execute an amphibious operation in the JRA, the JRAC also establishes liaison with the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and the Commander, Landing Force (CLF), as required. The JRAC's authority will not infringe on the authority granted the CATF and CLF as delineated in Joint Pub 3-02, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations."

(6) JRAC Staff Element. The JRAC may form a joint rear tactical operations center (JRTOC), using elements from JRAC's staff and representatives from components operating in the JRA, to assist in meeting joint rear area security responsibilities. Component and staff representation will vary in accordance with mission, forces, and area requirements and should support the planning, coordination, and execution of joint rear area operations. The JRAC will ensure that component representation, and representation on JRAC's own staff, is sufficient to support assigned mission responsibilities. Critical to the planning and execution of JRA operations is the interface with the JIC to provide current intelligence/counterintelligence estimates on the situation in the JRA. A counterintelligence representative from the JIC is essential to the timely flow of JRA requirements to and from the JIC. The JRTOC serves as the JRAC's centralized planning, coordinating, monitoring, and advising agency for JRA operations. It coordinates with other elements on the JRAC's staff, with higher, lower, and adjacent command staffs, and with HN
and/or allied command staffs to assist the JRAC in accomplishing his responsibilities.

f. Component Commands. The JFC may elect to segment the JRA by assigning component commands with area responsibilities. These commands, normally Army or Marine Corps commands, operate in a single geographic area under a single commander. Component commanders may further elect to subdivide their area of responsibility with subordinate commands, which also have area responsibilities. The purposes for making area command designations include achieving unity of command and effort for assigned operations; coordinating defense, combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS), and use of available facilities. An example of an Army area command that may be located, either partially or entirely, in a designated JRA includes a Theater Army with its subordinate Theater Army area commands (TAACOM) and the TAACOM's subordinate area support groups (ASGs). An example of Marine Corps area commands are Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs), the largest of which is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The MEF may locate support forces that comprise its combat service support elements (CSSEs) in a designated JRA and may have some or all of its aviation combat element (ACE) in a JRA as well. Naval forces may also locate facilities in the JRA that provide a combat service support function. Naval forces may receive operational logistic support in forward areas through advanced logistic support sites (ALSS) and/or forward logistic sites (FLS).

(1) Security Responsibilities. Component commanders with area responsibilities are responsible for the defense of the area and the overall defense of bases located in the area against enemy forces that may interfere with area or base operations. Area defense responsibilities are usually modified by HN agreements when operating in the sovereign territory of allies who normally retain responsibility for the overall security of the JRA. In these circumstances, the component commanders would continue to execute their security responsibilities (other than overall area security) as directed by the JFC through other appropriate commanders and in coordination with the JRAC, to include:

(a) With the concurrence of the JFC, organizing appropriate bases into base clusters and designating base and base cluster commanders. (NOTE: Statement applies only to
designation of bases and base commanders within JFC's authority. Selected bases may have their commanders determined at higher than JFC level of authority.)

(b) Coordinating the local security of US bases and base clusters to include establishing priorities for security and ADC in accordance with JFC directives.

(c) Establishing a command and control network linking US bases and base clusters and ensuring adequate coordination is established with allied forces and HN activities within or bordering their AOR. The JRTOC should have a dedicated radio net.

(d) Ensuring US base and base cluster defense plans are adequate, coordinated, and complementary to applicable HN security plans.

(e) Serving as the US single point of contact for coordinating security issues within their AOR with the HN (if so designated by the JFC).

(f) Ensuring US bases that are other CINC or national assets but are located in their AOR are adequately defended.

(g) Ensuring response forces are identified, trained, and positioned in accordance with JFC directives and priorities.

(h) Performing other security responsibilities as directed by the JFC through the JRAC. In the absence of a viable HN with existing security agreements, component commands with area responsibilities will have both overall area responsibility for security and the responsibilities inherent in coordinating local security of US bases and base clusters in their AOR. Area command responsibilities for other JRA functions will vary in accordance with HN agreements and capabilities and with the level and capabilities of the area command.

(2) C2 Elements. Army and Marine Corps component area and subarea commands usually have rear area operations centers (RAOC) or rear tactical operations centers (RTOC) to assist their commanders in
accomplishing their joint rear area operations missions. Specific responsibilities for these C2 elements should be complementary to those of the JRTOC and are found in appropriate Service manuals. Area commands without these organizations should create equivalent organizations to accomplish the mission. RAOCs or RTOCs, upon approval from higher headquarters, will establish connectivity with the JRTOC to coordinate defense, exchange intelligence information, request support, and respond to information.

3. Base Defense Operations

a. General. The base and base cluster (designated when required) are the fundamental building blocks for planning, coordinating, and executing base defense operations. Each Service organizes, trains, and equips forces capable of contributing to the security and defense of the rear area in consonance with legislated Service functions. The base commander coordinates the forces of the various Service or functional components to best capitalize on their combined capabilities, synergies, and mutual supportiveness, while minimizing the vulnerabilities of each. At the base level, the component in command of a base has overall responsibility for defense of the base; hosted forces from other Service or functional components defend their own facilities and may be tasked to contribute to the overall base defense, commensurate with their capabilities and the circumstances. Medical personnel may only guard their own unit and wounded and sick without jeopardizing their protective status under the Geneva Convention. The basic principles governing these responsibilities are addressed in this section.

b. Responsibilities

(1) Base Cluster Commanders. Base cluster commanders (when designated) are responsible for coordinating the defense of bases within their base cluster and integrating base defense plans into a base cluster defense plan. Their specific responsibilities for base cluster defense include:

(a) Establishing a base cluster operations center (BCOC) from available base or cluster assets to serve as the base cluster's tactical operations center and focal point for planning,
directing, coordinating, integrating, and controlling base cluster defense activities. This tactical operations center usually serves as both the BDOC and the BCOC. An alternate BCOC and base cluster commander will be designated and will have the capability to assume BCOC and/or command functions should the primary facility and/or commander be neutralized. The BCOC will establish connectivity with the JRTOC through the RAOC or RTOC as required.

(b) Providing appropriate facilities and housing for necessary liaison personnel from bases within the cluster.

(2) Base Commanders. The base commanders are responsible for base defense. The forces of components other than their own, assigned to the base primarily for the purpose of local base defense, will be under their operational control. Forces of other Services or functional components assigned or attached to the base for primary purposes other than local base defense, will support local base defense during an imminent attack or threat of an attack. The base commanders' specific responsibilities for defense of the bases include:

(a) Establishing a base defense operations center (BDOC) from available base assets to serve as the base's tactical operations center and focal point for security and defense. The BDOC will assist with the planning, direction, coordination, integration, and control of base defense efforts. The BDOC will establish connectivity with the JRTOC through the RAOC or RTOC as required.

(b) Establishing an alternate BDOC from base resources or, if base assets cannot support this requirement, designating a headquarters element from units dedicated to the base for its local defense. The alternate BDOC may be located on or off base but must be able to provide the necessary C3 for base defense if the primary BDOC is neutralized.

(c) Planning for employment of transient forces by ensuring base defense plans include
provisions for augmenting the regularly assigned base
defense forces present at the base during an attack or when
the base is threatened with attack. In an emergency, the
base commander will be considered an area commander insofar
as establishing authority and command relationships for
base defense are concerned. All other principles governing
support provided by a transient force during an emergency
to a commander in whose AOR the transient force is located,
and the responsibilities of the commanders concerned, are
fully addressed in Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed
Forces (UNAAF)."

(3) Individual Component Commanders. Commanders of tenant
forces of each component at a base are responsible for the
following:

(a) Participating in the preparation of base defense
    plans.

(b) Providing, staffing, and operating base defense
    facilities in accordance with the base defense plans. The
    tasks assigned each commander will follow, in general, the
    Service functions identified in Joint Pub 0-2.

(c) Conducting individual and unit training of assigned
    forces, as necessary, to ensure their readiness to perform
    their assigned tasks in defense of the base.

(d) Providing appropriate facilities and essential
    personnel for a BDOC for the base commander and providing
    liaison and support, as necessary, for the base cluster
    commander at the BCOC.

(e) Providing liaison personnel to advise the base
    commander on matters peculiar to their Service and, if a
    joint staff is established, to be regular working members
    of the staff.

(f) Providing for the internal security of the command.

(g) Providing housing for the forces under their command.
(h) Providing C2 communications systems, to include common-user communications within the command.

(i) Providing health service support (HSS) for the forces under their command.

c. Determining Service Identity of the Base Commander. The Service commander of a base is determined by the classification of the base and by the functions assigned to the individual Services. The Service designated with base command responsibilities provides the C2 structure for base defense operations.

d. Classification of Bases. The CINC will determine (unless determined by higher authority) and announce the classification of bases in his area in accordance with policies established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A base may be:

(1) A single-Service base.

(2) A joint base. A joint base may be either:

(a) One in which one Service has primary interest.

(b) One in which two or more Services have coequal interest.

e. Base Clusters. Base clusters can perform a valuable C2 role in security operations and can enhance the support and security of numerous individual bases in an AO.

(1) Base clusters may be designated when:

(a) The large number of bases in an area or subarea exceeds the commander's normal span of control.

(b) Their designation would lead to improved support and security for bases in a localized area.

(c) Bases are located in such close geographic proximity as to require deconfliction of their respective defense plans.

(d) Directed by appropriate higher authority.
(2) Large, single-Service bases and joint bases that are geographically isolated may be independent of base clusters.

4. C2 in Combined Operations

a. General. The JRA will normally be sovereign territory presided over by viable and capable HN governments. These governments, represented by forces and their law enforcement agencies, will generally have overall responsibility for many of the functions identified with joint rear area operations. In these circumstances, the CINC will be responsible for coordinating US requirements for selected functions with HN commands (and receiving significant HN assistance) while assuming full responsibility for other functions. (NOTE: Even though all functions are generally coordinated with HN, selected functions, like sustainment, are usually US responsibilities.) In certain theaters, however, and in many contingency operations, the JFC may have no HNS or operate in a noncooperative HN and will have full responsibility for all functions conducted in the JRA. Therefore, the JFC must plan for, and be prepared to execute, all joint rear area functions with or without HNS. C2 responsibilities will vary by functional area, by theater, or by contingency operation and are determined, to a great extent, by HN agreements and by US force composition and capabilities.

b. Coordination Responsibilities. The JFC establishes coordination with HN commands in accordance with existing agreements at all appropriate levels within the joint force. In some instances or contingencies, the JFC will have access to the US Ambassador and his country team for help in the coordination process. Details of HNS are addressed in Chapter VIII.

5. Communications

a. General. The JRAC must have an interoperable, secure, reliable, flexible, and survivable communications network to accomplish the mission. Existing military or commercial communications systems will be used to the maximum extent possible. However, additional communication systems may be required to reconfigure or expand the network.
b. Responsibilities

(1) JRAC. The JRAC, in conjunction with the JFC J6, normally designates a joint rear area communications officer (JRACO) to provide overall management of organic communications systems (i.e., single channel radios and internal switching or terminal equipment supporting the JRA headquarters element only) and to coordinate with the appropriate system manager for nonorganic C3 systems supporting the JRA. The JRAC also designates units to establish HN connectivity in order to fulfill rear area responsibilities. (NOTE: The JRAC will establish necessary liaison with the J6/JRACO to ensure all communications requirements for the rear area intelligence activity are met.)

(2) JRACO

(a) Provides overall management of organic communications systems supporting the JRAC and coordination with the appropriate system manager for nonorganic C3 systems supporting the JRAC.

(b) Publishes C3 plans, annexes, directories, and operating instructions to support the assigned mission.

(c) Coordinates network connectivity with units operating in, and transiting, the rear area.

(d) Coordinates the use of communications security (COMSEC) materials.

(e) Coordinates with HN agencies for communications support.

(3) Individual Components. In accordance with joint procedures, each component is responsible for its own internal C3 systems. Each component command should be prepared to support establishing communications with the JRAC. Deficiencies in communications assets should be identified and requested through the JFC.

c. C3 Systems Employment. The JRACO must coordinate with the joint force communications officer, components, allies, and HN to support the rear area mission. Within an established theater, communications support is built
on an existing communications infrastructure, but a contingency theater may require a tailored theater communications system.

d. Reference. A further discussion of C3 systems support to joint operations can be found in Joint Pub 6-0, "Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations," and the 6-series publications.

6. Intelligence

a. General. Effective collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence and counterintelligence are essential for planning and conducting successful security operations in the JRA.

b. Responsibilities. The JRAC is responsible for ensuring the J2, through the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), provides intelligence and counterintelligence to JRA units and activities to allow them to fulfill their rear area security responsibilities. The theater J2 and JIC will use interoperable, secure communications and/or data processing systems with existing intelligence and counterintelligence liaison or coordination channels to transmit the information.

c. Intelligence Considerations

(1) Operational Intelligence. The JRAC requires timely and accurate operational intelligence in order to coordinate appropriate defensive actions. For the JRA, this operational intelligence will come from supporting counterintelligence elements operating in the JRA. This is particularly important because of the limited availability of combat forces in the JRA. Friendly forces operating in the JRA are also a lucrative source of information regarding potential unconventional, subversive, NBC, guerrilla, and terrorist threats. This information is usually reported through counterintelligence and operational channels simultaneously. The JRAC, in conjunction with the combatant command counterintelligence support officer (CISO) or the JTF counterintelligence coordination authority, coordinates with appropriate commanders and staff to ensure that reporting means and procedures are established and utilized for the timely reporting of suspicious activities or incidents to the JRTOC; adequate liaison is established with HN military commands and government
agencies in the JRA to collect valuable information from those sources; component command and tactical chains of command are fully utilized to convey essential information and intelligence to support all forces engaged in rear area operations; and separate or transient forces that may have been diverted from other tasks, and which may not otherwise have access to critical information, receive effective intelligence support.

(2) Counterintelligence. An effective counterintelligence process is one of the most important ways commanders can contribute to maintaining security in the JRA. The counterintelligence process includes the complementary functions of collection, operations, investigations, and analysis. The J2, through the CISO and in conjunction with the Service supporting counterintelligence organizations, should develop a counterintelligence plan for collection requirements, liaison operations with HN intelligence and security services, incident investigations, and analytical support. The counterintelligence plan should include an assessment of all foreign intelligence services that could affect the JRA. Counterintelligence is particularly effective in assisting commanders and staff in identifying the espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorist threats to the JRA. Counterintelligence can provide commands and staff with identification and analysis of threats from unconventional forces, partisans, and civilian groups sympathetic to the enemy. The CISO is responsible for providing the commander with current counterintelligence estimates that include analysis of enemy or other foreign intelligence capabilities and other threats as appropriate. The CISO must ensure that effective communication networks and liaison with HN, allies, joint forces, and law enforcement agencies are established and that this information is reported in a timely and consolidated manner to the impacted components in the JRA.

d. Reference. Aspects of intelligence support to joint operations and the integration of intelligence in support of joint operations can be found in Joint Pub 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations." Counterintelligence support to joint operations can be found in Joint Pub 2-02.2, "Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Joint Operations."
CHAPTER III
SECURITY

1. Introduction

a. General. The JFC is responsible for providing sufficient forces to ensure the security of the JRA. All US forces in the JRA have an inherent responsibility to contribute as many forces as possible for base defense and local security for themselves, their facilities, installations, and activities. This must be done without seriously degrading their capabilities to perform their primary mission. Major aspects of security are introduced in this chapter. The fundamental principles of base defense analysis and planning will be addressed in Joint Pub 3-10.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense." Headquarters will frequently be collocated with HN counterparts. The security of the area will be enhanced by close cooperation with HN authorities. Additionally, the integration of HN security personnel with US facility and personnel detachments is invaluable in evaluating and resolving issues and incidents with the local population and with HN authorities.

b. Objectives of Security Operations in JRA

(1) Prevent or Minimize Disruption of Support Operations. Commanders should take all reasonable measures, including camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, and movement to avoid becoming engaged with threat forces that could disrupt forward support of combat forces.

(2) Prevent or Minimize Enemy Interference with Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. US forces should establish effective C3I for day-to-day operations and for successful security operations. Security forces should protect key C3I facilities to prevent or minimize enemy interference.

(3) Protect Personnel and Facilities. Units should take active and passive measures that protect themselves and high value assets in the JRA.

(4) Protect JRA Lines of Communication. Protection of land, water, and air routes within the JRA that connect an operating military force with its theater base of operations is essential to sustaining
campaigns. Geographic features may be used, and friendly security forces and uncommitted combat units should be employed to maximize LOC security. Responsibility for overall protection of JRA LOCs is assigned to the JRAC with active participation and coordination by the respective component commanders.

(5) Find, Fix, Contain, and Defeat Enemy Incursions. US forces should use all means of intelligence, counterintelligence, reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, law enforcement agency support, surveillance, and detection to anticipate and locate enemy incursions. Surveillance and warning assets and fighting forces should be linked together as simply, robustly, and reliably as possible. Once located, enemy forces should be contained or defeated quickly.

(6) Plan and Execute Area Damage Control. Commanders at all levels must prepare plans, establish specific responsibilities, and ensure all available assets are prepared for operations to ensure continuous support and restoration of assets. Comprehensive intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement agency information regarding threats to the rear area are key to the prior planning in ADC that will prevent or minimize casualties or physical damage associated with enemy attacks against JRA facilities and personnel.

(7) Assess and Prioritize Bases. The JRAC ensures component commanders, in accordance with JFC priorities and the nature of the threat, assess and prioritize bases for protection and damage repair in order to ensure that operational and logistics planners are able to identify key bases, establish security and ADC requirements for those bases, and position other assets. This process should help to maximize defense force and ADC efforts.

2. Security-Related Operations

a. General. Security-related operations such as populace and resource control (PRC) operations, enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations, civilian control operations, and noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) operations are not the exclusive responsibility of US forces but do impact on the security of the JRA. US forces are frequently involved in these types of
operations and should be prepared to provide assistance as necessary.

b. Responsibilities

(1) JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs concerning security-related operations, ensuring that JFC-directed security measures and priorities are established, disseminated, executed, and coordinated with HN commanders.

(2) Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for ensuring that adequate security is maintained for security-related operations within their AOR and these operations are coordinated with appropriate HN authorities.

c. PRC Operations. PRC operations are designed and conducted to detect, isolate, and neutralize insurgent or guerrilla activities. These operations are normally carried out by HN police or military forces but US forces are frequently called on to conduct PRC operations until HN forces are available to relieve them. PRC operations are generally accomplished in concert with civil affairs (CA) efforts. Additional guidance may be found in Joint Pub 3-07, "Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict," and Joint Pub 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."

d. EPW Operations. Military police and/or security police are normally responsible for EPW operations in their respective Services; however, additional forces may be required to ensure control. The JRAC should establish procedures for all phases of EPW operations and coordinate with appropriate HN commands to ensure a smooth flow of EPWs through the JRA. Procedures for security of sick, injured, or wounded EPWs in medical treatment facilities will also be established. US military police have the lead in preparation for and receipt, processing, and transfer of EPWs. US-captured EPWs are the responsibility of the United States and must be processed through the EPW channels before transfer to HN or retained in the JRA by US Army military police at EPW facilities.

e. Civilian Internees, Detainees, and Refugees. Civilian control operations are the responsibility of HN authorities (excluding US NEO operations), but US forces may be tasked to collect, retain, and interrogate
civilian internees and detainees until they can be evacuated. US military forces do not assume control of refugee movements unless requested to do so by the HN or unless operating in an environment with a hostile government. US forces may have to assist, direct, or deny the movement of civilians whose location, direction of movement, or actions place them in jeopardy and/or hinder military operations.

f. NEO. US forces will be responsible for the safety and security of US citizens during NEO. Commanders must ensure joint operational planning for NEO addresses security and that security is maintained throughout the execution of NEO. Additional guidance may be found in DOD Directive 5100.51, "Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad," Joint Pub 3-00.1, "Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations," and in Joint Pub 3-07, "Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict."

3. Combatting Terrorism

a. General. Acts of terrorism span the globe and are an inescapable element in every general state along the operational continuum. Each JFC must institute continuous and aggressive programs to combat terrorism in their AOR. These include use of psychological operations (PSYOP) support to develop operations that encourage international acceptance of US actions.

b. Responsibilities

(1) JRAC. The JRAC's responsibilities for combatting terrorism in the JRA vary in accordance with his capabilities and JFC directives. The JRAC may serve as a coordinating authority for these actions or assist another office or agency in this responsibility. Additionally, the JRAC monitors terrorist acts and ensures component commanders are informed of their security implications.

(2) Component Commanders. Component commanders' responsibilities for combatting terrorism in their AOR, to include ensuring all US forces meet their required responsibilities, are in accordance with JFC directives.

c. Response to Terrorism. Responses to terrorism can occur at either of the two measures listed below.
(1) Antiterrorism (Defensive Measures). The basis of this program includes the collection, analysis, and dissemination of timely threat information, the conduct of threat awareness programs, and the implementation of sound defensive programs. The JRAC and component commanders ensure these measures are incorporated into security operations. Counterintelligence serves as the main source for collection, analysis, and dissemination of antiterrorism information for the JRAC. Details of this support are found in Joint Pub 2-02.2, "Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Joint Operations." The primary source for guidance on antiterrorism is Joint Pub 3-07.2, "JTTP for Antiterrorism."

(2) Counterterrorism (Offensive Measures). The responsive phase of combatting terrorism is based on extensive preparations and planning, as well as response measures that can include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. The type forces and command and control structure used depend on the location, type of incident, and degree of force required. The JRAC and area commanders support counterterrorism operations within force capabilities. Counterintelligence serves as the main source for collection, analysis, and dissemination of antiterrorism information for the JRAC. Details of this support are found in Joint Pub 2-02.2, "Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Joint Operations." Additional guidance on combatting terrorism can be found in Joint Pub 3-07, "Doctrine for Joint Operations In Low Intensity Conflict."

4. NBC Defensive Operations

a. General. NBC defensive operations are of primary importance to joint rear area operations and must be incorporated into all appropriate plans and procedures. Enemy NBC operations pose a significant threat to rear area security. Many potential threat forces have the capability to employ NBC weapons that can reach critical facilities located in the JRA. All US forces in the JRA must be prepared to actively participate in planning and execution of NBC defensive operations.
b. Responsibilities

(1) JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with component commanders and other appropriate commanders and staffs, ensuring they incorporate appropriate NBC planning, exercises, equipment, personnel decontamination measures, and preventive measures into overall security planning and operations throughout the JRA. This responsibility includes due consideration for positioning of friendly NBC assets to support current mission requirements and anticipated follow-on actions.

(2) Component Commanders. Component commanders incorporate NBC planning, exercises, equipment, personnel decontamination measures, and preventive measures into area and base or base cluster defense plans within their AOR. They also position friendly NBC personnel and assets in their AO to support current mission requirements and facilitate future operations, in accordance with JFC directives and priorities. Additional guidance on chemical operations can be found in Joint Pub 3-11, "Joint Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense."

5. Deception Operations

a. General. The destructive power of modern weapons and possible numerical superiority of enemy personnel and weapons make it imperative that deception is integrated into operations at every possible level. In the JRA, effective deception can reduce the vulnerability of friendly facilities, installations, and activities.

b. Responsibilities

(1) JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs, ensuring the JFC’s deception planning and operations are incorporated into security plans and operations throughout the JRA. Additionally, the JRAC ensures all deception proposals, concepts, plans, and activities are coordinated to ensure their mutual consonance and to prevent unintended negation of effort in the JRA and the combat zone.

(2) Component Commanders. Component commanders plan and execute, or assist in the execution of, deception operations in their AOR in accordance with JFC directives and priorities.
c. Objective. The overall objective of deception in support of joint rear area operations is to mislead the enemy by providing manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

d. Planning. Deception planning and preparation should be considered for all major joint rear area operations and incorporated into those operations when it is determined that it will aid in the accomplishment of the mission. Planning deception efforts should be an integral part of the planning process, not an afterthought. Planning must be coordinated with all appropriate headquarters to ensure the accomplishment of those actions that will make the deception believable to the enemy. The enemy's HUMINT sources must not be allowed to refute deception indicators picked up by his SIGINT or IMINT systems. Commanders and staff use counterintelligence assessments for developing comprehensive estimates of the actual enemy or other foreign intelligence collection systems directed against the JRA. This information is essential in determining what the enemy can see or hear and the types of deception indicators that will be effective in deceiving the enemy. Counterintelligence (CI) personnel use information through the counterintelligence process to assist in developing indicators that will deceive enemy HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT so that all deception efforts are coordinated to ensure the enemy receives consistent information from all of his sources. For additional guidance on deception operations and counterintelligence procedures, see Joint Pub 3-58, "Doctrine for Joint Operational Deception," and Joint Pub 2-02.2, "Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Joint Operations."

e. Smoke Operations

(1) General. Smoke operations in the JRA may be employed to conceal reception, assembly, marshaling, staging, medical evacuation, logistics, and other vital areas; to conceal the movement of forces and materiel; and to deceive the enemy.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) JRAC. The JRAC monitors smoke operations and may participate in the planning of such operations, ensuring they comply with the
directives and priorities of the JFC.

(b) Component Commanders. Component commanders plan and execute smoke operations in their AOR in accordance with JFC directives and priorities.

6. Psychological Operations

a. General. PSYOP activities should be planned and conducted as an integral part of joint rear area operations. PSYOP includes the use of various communications techniques to reduce potential or actual enemy prestige and influence and increase friendly prestige or influence in hostile, neutral, or friendly areas.

b. Responsibilities. JRAC coordinates with component commanders to ensure they use a PSYOP program when appropriate to enhance the security of the JRA and that each PSYOP concept, activity, plan, and proposal is complementary to other JRA and combat zone efforts.

c. Considerations. PSYOP elements advise commanders and staffs on psychological effects and implications of proposed courses of action and assist in negating or minimizing effects of hostile disinformation. PSYOP elements develop and conduct activities to bring psychological pressure to bear on enemy forces and civilians under hostile control. Theater and tactical PSYOP planning for the JRA, as with the main battle area, should be done in coordination with military deception and operational security (OPSEC). Successful PSYOP can provide significant support to the JFC concept of operations by gaining the confidence of friendly populations, reducing the effectiveness of the enemy forces, and facilitating informational and goodwill programs. To preclude PSYOP activities working at cross purposes with HN security efforts and to prevent possible miscalculation on US intentions, PSYOP normally requires prior coordination with friendly HN authorities. See Joint Pub 3-53, "Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine," for additional guidance.

7. Civil Affairs Operations

a. General. Civil affairs operations assist JRACs in establishing and maintaining positive relationships between assigned forces and civil authorities and population in a JRA. They are integral to efforts to
assure civil authority and popular understanding of, as well as compliance with, military security and stability measures. They enhance support for US forces and alleviate conditions that may result in local interference with military operations.

b. Responsibilities

(1) JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with component commanders, ensuring they incorporate civil affairs procedures into all joint rear area operations throughout the JRA.

(2) Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for civil affairs procedures within their AOR in accordance with JFC directives.

c. Considerations. Civil affairs personnel and forces can assist in conducting security operations by providing assessments on local civilian capabilities and vulnerabilities in such areas as public facilities, transportation, and supplies. They can provide interface and coordination directly with designated civil agencies and authorities to facilitate or develop:

(1) Force protection measures.

(2) Essential population and resource control measures.

(3) Organization of civil security and defense forces.

(4) Civilian movement or evacuation plans.

(5) Relief efforts by governmental and international agencies.

(6) Civil information activities, in conjunction with PSYOP programs, to dispel rumor and disinformation generated by hostile elements. Additional information can be found in Joint Pub 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs."

8. Operations Security

a. General. Operations security (OPSEC) must be an integral part of joint rear area operations at all levels of command. Because of the relatively static nature and predictable, repetitive activities of most units in the
JRA, OPSEC takes on a special significance and must be aggressively pursued by the chain of command. All-source intelligence and counterintelligence threat information is essential to understanding the threat and implementation of effective countermeasures.

b. Responsibilities

(1) JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with component commanders, ensuring they incorporate OPSEC procedures into all joint rear area operations throughout the JRA.

(2) Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for OPSEC procedures within their AOR in accordance with JFC directives.

c. Considerations. Most communication in the JRA, especially at the lower command levels, will take place over unsecured telephone lines. Additionally, US personnel in the JRA are frequently working with HN personnel who may not be cleared for classified information. Care must be taken when developing essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) to ensure planning and operations information will not be compromised to enemy forces. Commanders should also use COMSEC to protect operational information throughout the JRA. See Joint Pub 3-54, "Joint Doctrine for Operations Security," for additional guidance.

9. Alert Notification System

a. General. Early threat warning is essential to the protection of US forces in the JRA. Alert notification systems are divided into two general categories.

(1) Air Warning. The air defense and missile warning system is a critical link in the JRA early warning system. Early warning and identification of enemy air threats, enemy surface-to-surface surface missiles and airborne and air assault operations are provided by several types of forward collection methods including forward deployed combat reconnaissance units, air defense systems and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Navy Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, and Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS). A CINC's tactical warning requirements are supported by national and theater intelligence systems.
(2) Surface and Land Warning. Information about potential surface and land threats is provided by various sea, land, air, and space intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition systems. The counterintelligence element at the JIC will provide fused intelligence early warning of surface or land threats to the JRA.

b. Responsibilities

(1) JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure that a reliable, responsive, and redundant early warning system is established from the joint force level to the base level in the JRA. The JRAC will ensure that a standardized alert system is implemented throughout the JRA to ensure warning and uniform response to threats.

(2) Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for ensuring adequate early warning systems are established in their AOR in accordance with JFC directives.

c. HN Support. HN intelligence and alert systems, if the HN is viable and supports US objectives, should be incorporated into US early warning systems.

10. Laws and Agreements

a. General. Treaties, agreements, and national interests determine relationships and support between allies and friendly nations. They provide a primary basis for the legal aspects of security operations and, in general, regulate the status and activities of US forces across the continuum. This section provides a summary of principal legal instruments that may impact on the JRA.

b. Responsibilities

(1) JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure that ROE procedures and other legal issues are addressed throughout the JRA in accordance with JFC directives.

(2) Component Commanders. Component commanders ensure that ROE, consistent with National Command Authorities (NCA) and JFC ROE, are published and disseminated to all members of the joint force.
operating in or passing through their AOR. They ensure laws, regulations, and procedures regarding treatment of belligerents, insurgents, and prisoners are published and disseminated to all appropriate US forces and that adequate liaison is established with HN authorities to coordinate these actions when required. If hostilities are likely, they also ensure legal representatives are available to assist US forces and to coordinate with friendly HN authorities on such matters as HN supply of US forces, acquisition of HN and enemy materiel, responsibility for handling of EPWs, division of police authority between HN and US forces, and responsibility of area damage control. The Army component commander normally has primary responsibility for EPWs.

(3) In certain theaters and in many contingency operations, the JFC may have no HNS or operate in a noncooperative HN and will have full responsibility for all functions conducted in the JRA. Therefore, the JFC must plan for, and be prepared to execute, all joint rear area functions with or without HNS. JFC responsibilities will vary by functional area, by theater, or by contingency operation and are determined, to a great extent, by US force composition and capabilities.

c. Law of War. In the event of armed conflict involving US forces, it is US law that the law of war (also called law of armed conflict) and the obligations of the US Government under that law are observed and enforced by the US forces. US commanders will ensure that the DOD Law of War Program is implemented in accordance with DOD and Service directives and that adequate procedures are in place for the prompt reporting and thorough investigation of any allegations of violations of the law of war by or against US or enemy personnel. Three general categories within the law of war relating most closely to security operations are briefly discussed below. Legal representatives should be consulted concerning implementation of these basic laws.

(1) Treatment of Combatants. During armed conflict, treatment of combatants is governed by the law of war and relevant HN and domestic laws. Enemy personnel acting in accordance with the law of war will be accorded enemy prisoner of war status. All enemy combatants will be accorded the protection of law of war and will be treated in a manner consistent with
EPW status until an Article 5 tribunal makes a determination of the merits of the claim to EPW status.

(2) Treatment of Insurgents. US policy requires and directs humane care and treatment for insurgents held in US military custody during counterinsurgency operations from the moment of capture until release or repatriation. Inhumane treatment, even under stress of combat and with deep provocation, is a serious and punishable violation under international law and the US Uniform Code of Military Justice.

(3) Treatment of Prisoners. The treatment of EPWs is outlined in the 1949 Geneva Convention, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, which prescribes specific protective measures for EPWs captured during armed conflict.

(4) Rules of Engagement. The CINC establishes ROE for his theater in accordance with ROE established by NCA and in coordination with Department of State representatives through authorized military command channels. ROE must conform to the law of war but the formulation process also takes into account operational, political, and diplomatic factors, such as HN laws concerning defense of others, self defense, and protection of military facilities. (NOTE: ROE may change at national boundaries.)

d. US Law. US forces, regardless of location, follow US law, executive orders, DOD directives, Service regulations, and CINC regulations promulgated under the law as well as international agreements concluded pursuant to US law.

e. International Agreements. International agreements are the primary source of rules of international law applicable to US, allied, and HN forces. The most comprehensive are status of forces agreements (SOFAs), which may, however, be modified or become inapplicable in time of armed conflict. Other important types of international agreements concern security assistance and HN support agreements.

f. HN Laws. HN laws apply to official activities of the US forces in the HN to the extent provided by international agreement. HN laws apply to individual members of the US forces in the HN, engaged in other than official activities, unless specifically modified or made
not applicable to US forces by the terms of an international agreement. HN laws have broad as well as finite implications on the conduct of all functions involved in joint rear area operations.

11. Area Damage Control

a. General. The improved destructive capabilities of modern weapons systems significantly increase the need for effective damage control. Effective planning, establishment of specific responsibilities, and use of all available assets are necessary to conduct ADC and to ensure prevention, containment, and rapid restoration of operations.

b. Responsibilities

(1) JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure ADC operations in the JRA are conducted in accordance with the JFC's directives and priorities.

(2) Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for ensuring ADC plans in their AOR are developed, prioritized, coordinated, and executed in accordance with the JFC's priorities and concept of operations.

(3) Host Nation

   (a) Authority. The HN, depending on applicable agreements, may have overall responsibility for ADC within their territorial boundaries. In these circumstances, US forces will retain responsibility for ADC within US base perimeters and be prepared to assist the HN within their unit capabilities with ADC operations outside US base perimeters. Assistance should be provided with the concurrence of the appropriate US command authority and should support the JFC's ADC priorities and concept of operations.

   (b) Assistance. HN agreements frequently address HN assistance for ADC operations. Component commanders usually serve as single points of contact for coordinating ADC operations within their respective AOR and, in that capacity, should ensure HNS for ADC is planned, coordinated, prioritized, and executed.
c. ADC Planning Requirements

(1) General. Effective ADC planning is decentralized and executed at the lowest level. Base and base cluster defense plans should have ADC annexes identifying responsibilities, priorities, requirements, and procedures for conducting ADC operations. These plans will be coordinated and integrated at the component and subordinate command levels to ensure rapid response and efficient utilization of limited ADC assets. Vulnerability analysis is necessary to ensure that units and facilities are not positioned in such a manner that could place units at unnecessary risk; e.g., a hospital unit should not be within the danger zone of an HN ammunition storage site or fuel facility.

(2) Specific Planning Responsibilities. Base and base cluster ADC annexes should identify responsibilities and procedures required before, during, and after an incident. Plans should also include responsibilities for all units occupying the base or located in the base cluster that can make contributions to ADC. Examples include, but are not limited to, military and security police, engineers, ordnance, NBC decontamination or reconnaissance, smoke, civil affairs, maintenance, health service support, C3 systems, supply, and transportation.
CHAPTER IV

COMBAT OPERATIONS

1. General

   a. Introduction. The JFC must consider and plan for combat operations in the JRA. The JFC must develop and organize plans for a TCF that is trained, led, and equipped to concentrate the necessary combat power at the decisive time and place in the JRA in order to maintain the integrity of the JRA and continue sustainment operations. The JFC must also ensure that appropriate active and passive measures are taken in the JRA to protect US forces and equipment. These general guidelines for planning and conducting combat operations in the JRA should be supplemented by the joint pubs referenced in this section.

   b. Responsibilities

      (1) JFC. The JFC:

          (a) Determines the need for a TCF based on the threat, friendly forces available, and amount of risk he is willing to accept. If required, designates a TCF and a TCF commander.

          (b) Establishes C2 relationships of the TCF with JRAC, component commanders, allies, HN commands, and other subordinate commanders.

          (c) Determines when and under what conditions the TCF may be used.

          (d) Establishes ROE for the TCF.

      (2) JRAC. The JRAC:

          (a) In coordination with the component commanders, advises the JFC, who designates the AO for the TCF and provides mission guidance.

          (b) Effects coordination to ensure the TCF has the required fire support, intelligence, counterintelligence, logistics, liaison, and other support to accomplish the mission.

          (c) In coordination with component commanders, recommends combat forces (air, ground, naval)
that may be designated as a TCF or directed to support a TCF.

(d) Establishes liaison and communications with TCF, normally through the JRTOC.

(e) Coordinates with appropriate commanders and staffs to ensure JFC priorities for security and ADC are disseminated and executed in the JRA.

(3) TCF. The TCF commander:

(a) May receive OPCON or TACON of security response forces designated by JFC in the designated AO.

(b) May receive OPCON of transient forces, in an emergency, as directed by appropriate higher headquarters and in accordance with conditions established in Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces."

(c) May receive augmented fire support and air defense as directed by appropriate higher command.

(d) Receives necessary liaison from component or other joint force commands (normally, liaison from component commands with area responsibilities comes from RAOCs or RTOCs).

(4) Component Commands. Component command support to the TCF includes:

(a) Fire support, intelligence, counterintelligence, logistic, liaison, and other support as directed by higher command.

(b) Coordination with appropriate bases and base clusters to ensure local defense efforts are complementary with TCF objectives.

(c) Supply combat forces for the TCF as directed by the JFC.

c. Designation of TCF. Actual and potential level III threats to the JRA mandate the requirement to designate a TCF that can respond to the threat and protect the forces in the JRA. The theater combatant commander normally
determines the subordinate JFC's options and parameters for selection and commitment of a TCF. The theater combatant commander may allocate combat forces to the subordinate JFC for use as a TCF, give a TCF mission to an element of the theater combatant commander's strategic reserve, direct the subordinate JFC to use his own forces for a TCF mission, or select another option as appropriate. Based on the theater combatant commander's direction and guidelines, the subordinate JFC options for a TCF include:

(1) A theater strategic reserve force.

(2) Tactical units passing through the JRA to the forward-deployed combat forces.

(3) Units assigned to security missions in the JRA or units being reconstituted in the JRA.

(4) Allied tactical units under OPCON or TACON of the JFC.

(5) Tactical units from forward-deployed combat elements.

(6) A task-organized force from assets disembarking in the theater.

(7) Combat elements assigned to the JFC.

(8) Other combat forces as directed by the JFC.

d. Planning Considerations. The JFC plans for combat and recovery operations must be designed to optimize the use of all available combat, combat support, combat service support, and HN forces. Ground, air, and naval operations should be mutually supporting, able to support a TCF if required, and fulfill the requirements of the overall concept of operations. HN and other friendly forces should be integrated as appropriate. Specific planning considerations include:

(1) Key Asset Defense Plans. Plans must be developed for defense and reinforcement of key assets or sensitive areas in the JRA that have major implications for the success of joint force operations. Key asset defense must also consider attack from tactical missiles, aircraft, artillery, and naval forces.
(2) Positioning Considerations. The placement of reserves, air defense artillery (ADA) units, military police, engineers, response forces, field artillery, aviation assets, naval assets, and command posts all require special consideration of the threat to the JRA, the vulnerability of the JRA, and the JFC's concept of operations.

(3) Unit Movement Plans. All rear area unit defense plans should include plans to displace, if necessary, rather than be overwhelmed.

(4) Area Damage Control. ADC is particularly important before and after combat operations and must be executed by all units in the JRA. ADC operations reduce the spread of damage and restore essential assets by assessing damage, neutralizing or eliminating unexploded ordnance, providing HSS, making essential repairs, and removing hazards. Preventive ADC actions before to combat operations can also minimize expected damage.

e. Tenets. The tenets for successful combat operations in the JRA are knowledge of the enemy, unity of command, economy of force, and responsiveness. These tenets are also valid within the more constrained context of security operations.

(1) Knowledge of the Enemy. Knowledge of the enemy's capabilities, vulnerabilities, and likely intentions is essential to prepare for combat operations, prevent surprise, and protect the JRA.

(2) Unity of Command. Unity of command is the cornerstone for uninterrupted support of the main effort and the protection of the rear area. It may be achieved by the JFC through the JRAC, component commanders, base cluster commanders, and base commanders. A TCF, if required, may be employed directly by the JFC, a component commander, or another commander as directed by higher authority. The TCF will normally operate in a specified AO within the JRA.

(3) Economy of Force. Protection of the JRA should not detract from the overall combat tasks of the joint force. Consequently, only the minimum means necessary to accomplish the mission should be employed in the JRA.
(4) Responsiveness. Responsiveness requires immediate reaction and rapid deployment of sufficient combat power to destroy the enemy and area damage control resources to minimize damage. Responsiveness is enhanced by timely intelligence and reliable communications.

f. Fire Support

(1) Considerations. The JFC may provide the TCF commander additional fire support assets. The TCF commander coordinates actions and fire support with the JRAC, through the JRTOC, and with appropriate component and HN commanders. The TCF commander must be cognizant of status of forces agreements and other treaties which establish ROE that may severely restrict activities in the JRA. Fire support planning must be detailed and take into account air and naval assets (close air support and naval surface fire support) and the nonlinear and dispersed nature of friendly forces in the JRA.

(2) Fire Support Coordination Measures. The TCF must use effective fire support coordination measures to assist in expediting fires and safeguarding friendly installations and personnel. Joint Pub 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support," provides doctrine for fire support in joint operations.

g. Theater Counterair Operations

(1) Responsibilities. The JFC may designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC), an airspace control authority (ACA), and an area air defense commander (AADC). Because of the integrated nature of airspace control and air defense, ACA and AADC duties should normally be performed by the same person, who may also be the JFACC. The AADC is responsible for air defense requirements above the JRA and will ensure these requirements are integrated into joint force air defense plans. The JFACC normally assigns the JFACC responsibility for planning, coordinating, allocation and tasking for theater counterair operations based upon JFC apportionment decisions. The JRAC ensures air defense requirements for the JRA are integrated into US, allied, and/or HN air defense plans in accordance with JFC priorities and concept of operations. He ensures this integration is accomplished by establishing
coordination with the JFACC or a designated representative.

(2) Procedures. The JFACC may also perform duties as the
Airspace Control Authority (ACA) and Area Air Defense Commander
(AADC) because of the integrated relationship between airspace
control management and conduct of air defense operations.
Although the organizational form of airspace control system may
vary, the basic doctrine, principles, and concepts relating to
joint airspace control is intended to be universal.

(3) Coordination. The JRAC should maintain close coordination
with the JFACC to maximize the contributions of all the
capabilities available, including national and strategic assets,
to protect JFC's force. In accordance with the JFC priorities,
protection of priority assets in the JRA should be coordinated
by the JRAC and integrated into the JFC's airspace control plans
and orders.

(4) Defensive Counterair Operations. The common aim of all
counterair operations, to include active and passive air defense
operations and measures, is to gain control of the air
environment and protect friendly forces. Combat zone airspace
control procedures must prevent mutual interference from all
users of the airspace, facilitate air defense identification,
and safely accommodate and expedite the flow of all air traffic
in the theater of operations. Defensive counterair (DCA)
operations are both active and passive. Active DCA operations
are normally conducted near or over friendly forces, such as the
JRA, and are generally reactive to enemy offensive air (tactical
missile and aircraft) operations. Passive DCA measures are
required by all elements of the joint force to include units in
the JRA. These measures are implemented before, during, and
after attack and include:

(a) Camouflage, concealment, and deception to frustrate
effective enemy targeting.

(b) Dispersal to decentralize critical assets.

(c) NBC defense to counter NBC effects.

(d) Enhanced facility construction or expedient hardening
to reduce attack damage.
2. Contingency Operations

a. General. Contingency operations are normally conducted in crisis situations that present a definite threat to US interests. A JFC, normally a Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF), is designated by the Secretary of Defense, by a CINC, or by the commander of a subordinate unified command, or an existing JTF. For the purpose of this discussion, it is assumed that a CJTF has been designated. Joint C2 is frequently complex, especially during the early phase of operations. Commanders must be prepared to adjust quickly to new task organizations and be prepared to serve multiple roles to support the contingency operation.

b. Responsibilities

(1) Commander, JTF. The CJTF may task a combat force commander assigned to the contingency force or a member of the JTF staff the mission for the overall security of the contingency AO. This officer's specific responsibilities are tailored to fit the contingency operation but parallel those of the JRAC as identified in this manual. A JRTOC or equivalent organization may be designated to assist in accomplishing this mission.

(2) Subordinate Commanders. All subordinate commanders have area and/or local security responsibilities commensurate with the responsibilities they would have during normal operations or as directed by the CJTF or his designated representative.

c. Security Considerations. Security requirements will vary greatly and are highly dependent on the area where the contingency operation is being conducted. General considerations include:

(1) HNS. If the contingency operation is in support of an allied nation and valid agreements for support and security exist, the HN may provide overall security for the AO or segments of the AO. US forces
will retain responsibility for their local security and will coordinate their local security measures with HN commands as appropriate.

(2) Lack of HNS. If the HNS is not viable, the CJTF is in a hostile country, or HN agreements do not exist, the CJTF must ensure that US forces take adequate measures for local security and that forces are identified to ensure security for contingency operations as required. If the risk is too great, the JTF commander may position bases outside the contingency area until security of JTF forces is ensured.

(3) Planning Factors. Security requirements in a contingency operation depend on several key factors and will only be specifically decided as the mission is planned. Key planning factors that affect the C2 and force structure required for security operations include:

(a) Contingency force mission and support requirements.
(b) Threat capabilities.
(c) Terrain and weather.
(d) Friendly force capabilities.
(e) Time available.
(f) Intelligence and counterintelligence assessment (tactical and strategic).
(g) Posture of HN government and military.
(h) Degree of acceptable risk.

d. Planning and Employment Considerations. Contingency operations are often of limited duration and scope, but commanders must prepare for a wide range of mission requirements and employment considerations. Commanders must be prepared for the possibility that contingency operations may lead to extended combat operations. See Joint Pub 3-07, "Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict," for discussion of contingency operations in a low-intensity conflict environment and Joint Pub 3-00.1, "Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations," for discussion of contingency operations in
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CHAPTER V
LOGISTICS

1. General. Joint rear area logistics integrates strategic, operational, and tactical level logistic operations. Planners abide by requirements necessary for effective combat support (CS)/combat service support (CSS), while seeking to prevent or minimize the disruption of support operations because of rear area security requirements.

2. Rear Area Logistic Principles

a. To support the CINC's strategy, joint rear area logistics must balance the necessity for security with the logistic principles (cited in Joint Pub 4-0) of responsiveness, simplicity, sustainability, survivability, flexibility, economy, and attainability. Identifying logistic principles necessary for the successful execution of an operational plan is critical to the joint rear area logistic system. Operationally, theater logistic constraints may dictate the rate of buildup or theater movement, overall size of the combat force, the depth of any attack, or the speed of advance. Often, the logistician will be faced with conflict between various principles, operational requirements, and rear area security.

b. Responsiveness ensures that any concept of operations of the supported commander is supported. Simplicity keeps the plan simple and fosters efficiency in both the planning and execution of any operation. Sustainability requires control measures that can adjust the flow of supplies and services in the pipeline or in the theater to meet changing situations and requirements. Survivability requires some degree of dispersion and duplication during transit to and within the theater area of operations. Active measures must include a plan for ground defense of logistic installations with provisions for reinforcement and fire support. Passive measures include dispersion and limiting the size and capabilities of an installation to what is essential for the mission. Survivability may dictate dispersion and decentralization at the expense of economy. The allocation of reserves, development of alternatives, and phasing of logistic support contribute to survivability. Flexibility is the ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operation. Logistic plans and operations must be flexible to achieve both responsiveness and economy. The
principle of flexibility also includes the concepts of alternative planning, anticipation, reserve assets, redundancy, forward support of phased logistics, and centralized control with decentralized operations. Economy is the provision of support at the least cost in terms of the resources available and necessary to accomplish the mission. Unwise use of logistic resources may deprive combat forces of either manpower, equipment, supplies, or opportunities to pursue other options. Attainability (or adequacy) is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations. The inability to attain the necessary level of support in any functional area can jeopardize success.

3. Responsibilities

a. CINC

(1) The combatant commander is authorized to exercise directive authority over logistic operations within his area of responsibility (AOR). The CINC's directive authority over logistic operations does not release the Services from their responsibility to staff, equip, train, and sustain their respective components.

(2) Under wartime conditions, or when critical situations mandate diversion from the normal logistic process, this authority is expanded to authorize combatant commanders to use all necessary facilities and logistic resources for the accomplishment of their missions.

b. JRAC

(1) Sustaining the force is the responsibility of the forces in the rear area; their technical duties are explained in Service doctrine and field manuals. These rear area forces operate under appropriate C2 structures using the JRAC as the means of coordinating cross-Service, joint, or coalition requirements.

(2) The JRAC coordinates the overall security in the rear area and seeks efficient joint support of the theater campaign's logistic concepts, scheme of maneuver, and operations timing. The JRAC should coordinate with the Joint Movements Center (JMC) on employment of all theater transportation. (Additional
responsibilities are discussed in Chapter VII.)

4. Considerations. Rear area sustainment units are generally wholesale outfits that move support to retail units farther forward. There are some retail (direct support) units in the rear area, but they are generally geared toward supporting other rear area units. They may not be organized, equipped, or trained to defend against or engage high level or emergency threat forces unassisted. Understanding the limitations of the Services components' rear area units is essential to avoid assigning missions or requirements that they will be unsuited or unable to provide.

   a. Medical Evacuation Operations. Enemy operations in the JRA may interdict LOCs and disrupt sustainment activities. This could seriously impact on the ability of HSS personnel to retrieve and evacuate wounded, sick, and injured personnel and provide timely medical care. Although forbidden by the Geneva Convention, attacks on medical organizations, personnel, or medical materiel may occur and result in serious degradation of HSS and morale of US forces.

   b. Reception and Preparation of Reinforcements in JRA. There will be requirements in all theaters or areas of operation to receive and prepare reinforcing units for further deployment and employment. These units may not be fully organized for combat during these operations and thus may be particularly vulnerable to a hostile threat.

   c. Reconstitution. Reconstitution actions taken by a commander to restore a unit to a desired level of combat effectiveness include reestablishment of command and control; cross-leveling or replacement of personnel, supplies, and equipment; and conduct of essential training. Reconstitution sites in the JRA may require security augmentation and should be considered in JRAC and component command security plans.
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CHAPTER VI
AREA MANAGEMENT

1. Introduction

a. General. Effective area management is critical to the success of joint rear area operations because of the security implications of positioning assets that may provide protection for the JRA or determining locations for vital support facilities that require security assistance.

b. Responsibilities

(1) JFC. The JFC has overall responsibility for area management in the JRA and assigns specific JRA area management responsibilities to subordinate commanders as appropriate.

(2) JRAC. The JRAC coordinates area management in the JRA within JRAC capabilities and in accordance with directives and guidelines established by the JFC. The JRAC's primary area management responsibility is ensuring that positioning and stationing of units and facilities in the JRA are made with due consideration for security.

(3) Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for area management in accordance with directives and guidelines established by the JFC. They ensure that positioning and stationing of units and facilities are made with due consideration for security.

c. Positioning Considerations

(1) Unit Positioning. Factors affecting unit positioning include the implications of the current JRA threat assessment; the suitability and survivability of available facilities; and the subordinate unit's mission requirements. Component commanders and their staffs should use these factors, and their own risk assessments, to determine whether units should be dispersed to enhance their survivability or grouped together for mutual support.

(2) Facility and Supply Positioning. Factors affecting facility or supplies positioning include the current JRA threat assessment, the security
implications, the requirements of the units operating or using the facility and/or supplies, the impact of the facility or supplies on the joint force mission and/or concept of operation, lines of communication, and accessibility.

(3) Competing Risks. Commanders at all levels must balance mission and security requirements when they position assets. Considerations include:

   (a) Clustering. Clustering of support activities reduces vulnerability to ground attack but can increase vulnerability to air, missile, and/or nuclear or chemical attack.

   (b) Location. Locating key facilities away from high-speed routes minimizes vulnerability to enemy ground penetrations but may also reduce accessibility to units requiring support.

   (c) Dispersal. Dispersal of critical supplies such as fuel, ammunition, and spare parts reduces the risk of loss but also reduces the ease and speed of distribution.

2. Infrastructure Development

   a. General. Infrastructure is a term generally applicable to all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications, or facilities that can be used for the support and control of military forces. Joint forces deployed to developed areas should be able to capitalize on established infrastructure and the use of existing facilities. Infrastructure development should focus on facility security modification and battle damage repair. HNS in manpower, HSS, equipment, and materiel should be maximized. Joint forces deployed to less developed areas must rely more on construction of new but austere, initial or temporary, facilities in accordance with established base development criteria. HNS should be sought but will normally be less available than in developed areas.

   b. Responsibilities

      (1) JFC. The JFC, in conjunction with allies and involved HN, is responsible for identifying the wartime facility and construction requirements for US forces before to hostilities. During hostilities, the theater combatant commander specifies theater
construction policy through the civil engineering support plan (CESP) for each OPLAN.

(2) JRAC. The JRAC coordinates with component commanders to ensure the JFC's construction policy in the JRA is implemented with due consideration to security concerns and requirements.

(3) Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for implementing construction policy in accordance with JFC directives and guidelines. They plan and implement construction projects with due consideration to security concerns and requirements.

c. US Assistance to HN Governments. Assistance for HN governments to rebuild HN infrastructure will be based on US law. Civil Affairs (CA) assets can provide assistance in negotiating agreements concerning this matter, including providing advice on tailoring proposed support agreements to HN experience, institutions, and expectations. For additional discussion of infrastructure development, see Joint Pub 4-04, "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support."
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CHAPTER VII

MOVEMENTS

1. General. Movements within a JRA involve the receipt of combat forces and their movement to forward areas; movement of materiel, replacement personnel, and support forces; evacuation of patients and other casualties; evacuation of US nationals; evacuation of EPWs, civilian internees, detainees, and refugees; and retrograde of materiel. Maintaining movement control, keeping LOCs open, protecting key reception and transhipment points, and obtaining HNS are critical requirements in preserving freedom of movement throughout the JRA.

2. Responsibilities

a. JRAC. The JRAC is responsible for coordinating the overall security of the JRA so that all movements can take place. He may become involved in critical movement operations (movements of special weapons, critical cargo, reception and onward movement operations, noncombatant evacuation services, etc.) to ensure that security and ADC assets are adequate and prioritized, if necessary, to support the operation.

b. Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for movements in accordance with JFC directives and guidelines. Their responsibilities include planning and coordination for, and providing adequate security for, movement operations.

3. JRA Movement Considerations. In wartime or during crisis action deployments, the JFC should consider having, as a minimum, an agency, center, or cell to execute the movement control function. In peacetime the JFC should also establish a similar organization to perform the planning and resolution of conflict function and to coordinate transportation issues with HN activities as required. The JFC normally designates a JMC to manage these activities. The JRAC should establish liaison with the JMC through the JRTOC to monitor movements in the JRA. Joint Pub 4-01.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control," addresses joint movements and movement control organizations in detail.
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CHAPTER VIII
HOST NATION SUPPORT

1. General. The effective use of HNS enhances the capability of US forces to maintain successful combat operations on any battlefield. Many HNs can provide valuable support for conducting security operations. The JRAC and appropriate subordinate commanders must consider their HN capabilities when planning and conducting security operations in the JRA. HN personnel and organizations can frequently perform many functions as well as, or better than, US personnel or units because of their familiarity with language, local customs, terrain, transportation and communication networks, facilities, and equipment. The scope of HNS is limited only by the availability of resources and the ability of the United States and the HN to reach agreements concerning their use.

2. Responsibilities

a. National Command Authorities. The NCA, working through the Department of State, its embassies, and embassy country teams, are responsible for establishing treaties and agreements for HNS.

b. JFC. The JFC is responsible for ensuring that available HNS is consolidated and prioritized to support the requirements of the joint force and that legal agreements are in place to allow full execution of operations. The JFC should establish a single office to serve as the executive agent to manage and coordinate HNS. This office would serve as the single point of contact with the HN and resolve conflicts between components seeking the same HN assets.

c. JRAC. The JRAC, coordinating with appropriate commanders and staff, ensures that HN security assets in the JRA are used to enhance the overall security of the JRA and support the JFC's current and future concept of operations.

d. Component Commanders. Component commanders are responsible for the use and employment of HNS in accordance with JFC directions and guidelines. When HNS security assets are available, component commanders' responsibilities include ensuring that:

   (1) HN security assets dedicated to US forces are used and positioned to help defend critical
operations or facilities in the JRA and can support the JFC's current and future concept of operations.

(2) US base and base cluster defense plans are coordinated with and complement HN overall security plans.

(3) Appropriate HN commands are advised of US forces' general priorities for security.

3. Considerations. HNS is normally based on agreements that commit the HN to provide specific support in prescribed conditions. Agreements are made at various levels including national, joint force command, Service component command, and unit. In general, HNS is highly situational and heavily dependent on both the operational capabilities of the HN and its support for US policies.

a. Planning Factors. The JFC must determine functional types and levels of HNS that can be accepted with a high assurance that the HN will be able to deliver on the commitments. Factors to be considered in determining whether to use HNS for specific missions and functions include:

(1) Capability, dependability, and willingness of the HN to provide and sustain resources.

(2) Shortfalls in US forces supplemented by HNS and reductions in US forces made possible by using HNS.

(3) Effects of HNS on morale.

(4) Effects of HNS on the political structure within the HN.

(5) Effects on security to include OPSEC.

(6) HN international agreements and treaties that specify US involvement in the area of operations.

(7) Capability of US forces to accept and manage HNS.

(8) Availability of HNS in the type and quantity agreed across the operational continuum.

(9) Capability of US forces to supplement and assist HN forces executing rear operations.
b. Command and Control. US and HN personnel command their respective units and normally work in cooperation with, or TACON of, but not usually under OPCON of each other. The degree of coordination between US forces and HNS activities depends on the type of HNS involved, the location, tactical situation, the political environment, and existing agreements. The United States coordinates its control of HN resources through local officials or HN territorial commands and defines control with treaties or HNS agreements. When an established US armed forces structure is absent, the US security assistance organization (SAO) assigned to the country team will normally be the point of contact for US forces' coordination of HNS requirements.

c. HNS During Transition Periods. HNS is particularly valuable during periods of transition, such as going from peacetime military operations to war. Three examples of operations that normally begin during transition periods and may extend into conflict and/or war include:

(1) Civilian Movements. HNS is invaluable in controlling and assisting in the evacuation of all civilians located in or moving through the JRA, including US NEO activities, movement of third country nationals, and planned or unplanned movement of HN civilians. Details for these civilian movements are found in appropriate Service publications.

(2) Reception and Onward Movement. Unit reception and movement will occur simultaneously with civilian movement and materiel arriving and moving in the theater. All of these movements will require considerable HNS, especially in the areas of port and airport operations, highway regulation, traffic control, and security.

(3) Medical Care--Health Service Support. Before and after initial onset of hostilities, HN medical HSS may be critically needed until US medical HSS capability is established in the joint rear area. After US medical care HSS capability is established, significant HNS may be necessary, particularly in areas of base operating and infrastructure support.

d. HN Security Support. Many HNs provide extensive support for security-related activities. Specific types of HN security support include:
(1) Civilian Guard and Labor Service Units. These units are usually in place during peacetime or developed after the commencement of hostilities. During peacetime, civilian guards are frequently employed with varying retainability after hostilities commence.

(2) Special Military Units. These units are designed during peacetime to perform specific wartime missions such as guarding enemy prisoners of war and securing valuable facilities, materiel, or ammunition. Included in this group are HN military police units, which provide support but are not necessarily assigned or totally dedicated to US forces.

(3) Individual Military Personnel Units. These personnel may be used as fillers for selected HN units, which provide individual HN personnel to support US forces such as the Korean augmentation to US Army in Korea.

(4) Paramilitary Units. Some nations' police are paramilitary in nature such as Belgium's Gendarmerie and function in both civilian and military roles. They have significantly more utility for HNS in a hostile environment than normal civilian police.

(5) Light Infantry and Security Units. Most HN countries use these type units as their primary security forces. They are frequently given both area and point security missions.

(6) Civilian Police. These organizations frequently assist US military police and security police forces during peacetime but have significantly less capability during wartime. Under the Geneva conventions, civilian police are classified as noncombatants and as such are not required to provide any support to friendly military units.

(7) Intelligence Units and Agencies. Intelligence organizations located in the rear area must be employed to satisfy the JFC's requirement for rear area essential elements of information. HN organizations can provide tactical intelligence on enemy ground, naval, and air forces; counterintelligence on foreign intelligence and security service threat (through the CISO); terrorist intentions and collection capabilities; and
interrogation and debriefing reports from EPWs, refugees, returnees, and threat sympathizers.

d. HNS in NBC Environment. In the event of an NBC attack or NBC environment, many types of HNS support may be needed. The need of HNS may be due to limited NBC supplies and/or units. Some of the types of HNS that can be requested are decontaminates, water, water transportation assets, NBC detection devices, engineer digging equipment or units, and decontamination equipment or units.

4. Role of Civil Affairs Personnel in HNS. Commanders at all levels can be expected to be involved in civil affairs activities and should use CA personnel to monitor those activities and assist in the communicating of information concerning all aspects of joint rear area operations to the HN. CA personnel efforts are critical to the success of US-HN interface efforts in the JRA. They can also provide assistance in negotiating HNS agreements and treaties. See Joint Pub 3-57, "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs," for additional guidance.

5. Public Affairs. Public Affairs (PA) role in the HN is to gain support and understanding from all publics. The JFCs, through their subordinate commanders and staffs, should coordinate PA activities to ensure all actions are complementary. PA offices plan flexible internal media and community relations programs to support the mission in a dynamic threat environment. They also coordinate with PSYOP units to gain their assistance in developing programs to inform US forces of necessary security measures and to help alleviate unrest and disinformation in the JRA. Joint Information Bureaus (JIBs) are frequently established to improve dissemination to internal audience and other publics. The JIB also provides a central location for news and media access and support.

6. Role of PSYOP in HNS. Commanders at all levels can expect to be involved in PSYOP activities and should use PSYOP personnel to support and exploit efforts to obtain maximum cooperation from the populace in the JRA. Additionally, PSYOP personnel can assist in search or identification of indigenous hostile equipment, supplies, personnel, and communications media. See Joint Pub 3-53, "Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine," for additional guidance.
APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1. General. The practice of using regular or irregular forces against an enemy's soft and relatively vulnerable rear area has been demonstrated repeatedly and successfully throughout the history of warfare. The following vignettes substantiate the disruptive or even decisive effect such operations may have on the outcome of an armed conflict.

2. World War II. A graphic example of disruptive operations in an opposing force's rear area was the Soviet partisan movement against invading German forces in WW II. At its height, it grew to a well-organized force of a quarter million members and forced the Germans to commit up to 25 divisions to maintain their supply lines against this sustained rear area threat. Typical missions for partisan forces were to blow up bridges and railroads; damage telephone and telegraph lines; set fire to forests, stores, and transports; support partisan welfare; and, later in the war as their strength and capabilities grew, attack German combat support forces. In general, they made the occupied areas unbearable for the Germans and, in effect, created a front behind the front. The net result of their efforts was to disrupt communications and transport, deny raw materials and local supplies, remove potential local labor sources, and divert front-line German combat forces for rear area security missions. German operations in the allied rear areas were nowhere near as extensive as those of the Soviet partisans but were, nonetheless, credited with delaying allied advances. The Ardennes campaign was slowed by successful infiltration of German sabotage detachments who disrupted logistic and communications support behind US lines. These German operations resulted in allied follow-on and support units being routinely tasked to eliminate pockets of resistance in mop-up actions behind the allied front lines.

3. Korea. The allied assault at Inchon and subsequent penetration of North Korean rear area LOCs provide one of history's best examples of the implications of a successful thrust of a major combat force into an enemy's vulnerable rear area. It demonstrated the impact of disrupting or destroying an enemy's logistic tail, severing LOCs, isolating C2 elements, and shutting off reinforcements.

4. Vietnam. Even though a "rear area" in Vietnam could not be defined by established linear boundaries, there were isolated pockets (de facto rear areas) that were considered to be relatively secure and yet found to be vulnerable to a
determined enemy attack. The city of Saigon before the 1968 TET Offensive is an example. Saigon was an insulated city. Aside from occasional incidents of small-scale terrorism during more than 20 years of civil strife, the Communists had done little to disturb the sense of security enjoyed by most Saigonese. Defended by 10 ARVN battalions and a division-sized national police force, and encircled by a series of major US command centers and bases, the capital seemed invulnerable to serious attack. TET would change that. Despite initial success, North Vietnamese attacks into the "rear area" eventually failed, but not before changing the course of the war.
APPENDIX B

NAVAL COASTAL WARFARE

1. Mission. NCW forces plan and conduct operations to ensure strategic mobility and provide a safe haven for US and allied forces in NCW areas, during time of war or other contingency situations, in support of the JFC's concept of operations.

2. Concept

a. NCW is the responsibility of the JFC. This responsibility is exercised through the naval component commander (NCC), who will normally assign an NCWC for an appropriate NCW area. The NCWC plans and conducts NCW operations within a defined geographic area, normally designated as the NCW area. NCW encompasses coastal sea control, harbor defense, and port security. NCW operations include but are not limited to:

   (1) Intelligence gathering.
   (2) Reconnaissance and surveillance.
   (3) Interdiction.
   (4) Security and safety.
   (5) Supporting operations.

These operations may be done independently or in support of other operations.

b. The NCWC may assign subarea operational commanders, as needed, for coastal sea control and harbor defense to conduct these operations. Supporting functions such as mine countermeasures or search and rescue may be assigned to the NCWC. The conceptual organization is illustrated in Figure B-1.

Figure B-1. Conceptual NCW Organization
3. Command Relationships

a. Unified commanders and joint force commanders have the responsibility for NCW within their respective areas of responsibility. This responsibility is exercised through the NCC. The NCC tasks the NCWC to conduct NCW operations. The NCC will assign supporting forces to the NCWC as required and available. The NCWC may request Coast Guard support before the transfer of the Coast Guard as a service to the Navy. A notional NCW organization outside the United States is illustrated in Figure B-2.

![Figure B-2. Notional NCW Organization Outside the US](image-url)
b. Naval Coastal Warfare Commander. The NCWC conducts NCW operations within a designated NCW area. The NCWC may identify one or more coastal sea control commanders (CSCCs), harbor defense commanders (HDCs), and supporting function commanders, as appropriate.

c. Liaison With Other Commands and Authorities

(1) Forces Ashore. The NCWC conducts liaison with Service component forces ashore via the JRAC or the JRA commander, if designated, during joint operations. Close coordination is essential. CSCCs and HDCs establish corresponding relationships with Service component forces ashore to coordinate security operations.

(2) Host Nation. The NCWC is subject to all agreements between the US and HN governments. Close liaison between the NCWC and appropriate HN agencies is necessary to operate within that country's territorial waters and to coordinate support from local civil and military authorities.

(3) Reference. Details of the organization, functions, and liaison requirements of the NCWC and subordinates are discussed in detail in NWP-39, "Naval Coastal Warfare Doctrine."
APPENDIX C
REFERENCES


2. Joint Pubs
   a. Joint Pub 0-2, 1 December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."
   d. Joint Pub 2-0 (Test), 30 June 1991, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."
   e. Joint Pub 2-02.2 (in development), "Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Joint Operations."
   f. Joint Pub 3-0 (Test), 1 January 1990, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."
   g. Joint Pub 3-00.1 (in development), "Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations."
   h. Joint Pub 3-01.2, 1 April 1986, "Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations."
   k. Joint Pub 3-07.2 (in development), "JTTP for Antiterrorism."
   l. Joint Pub 3-09 (in development), "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support."
m. Joint Pub 3-10.1 (in development), "JTTP for Base Defense."

n. Joint Pub 3-11 (in development), "Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense."


t. Joint Pub 3-58 (in development), "Joint Doctrine for Operational Deception."


v. Joint Pub 4-01.3 (in development), "JTTP for Joint Movement Control."

w. Joint Pub 4-02 (Test), 20 August 1991, "Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations."

x. Joint Pub 4-04 (in development), "Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support."


3. Multi-Service Pubs


d. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-47/TAC, USAFE, PACAF, "Joint Concept and Procedures for Close Air Support in the Rear Battle."

4. Army Pubs

a. FM 1-111 (Draft), "Aviation Brigades."

b. FM 5-116, "Engineer Operations: Echelons Above Corps."

c. FM 9-6, "Munitions Support in Theater of Operations."

d. FM 11-23, "Theater Communications Command."

e. FM 19-1, "Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle."

f. FM 33-1, "Psychological Operations."

g. FM 34-1, "Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations."

h. FM 34-37, "Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations."

i. FM 34-60, "Counterintelligence."

j. FM 41-10, "Civil Affairs Operations."

k. FM 55-10, "Movement Control in a Theater of Operations."

l. FM 63-3, "Combat Service Support Operations - Corps."

m. FM 63-4, "Combat Service Support Operations: Theater Army Area Command."

n. FM 90-14, "Rear Battle."

o. FM 100-5, "Operations."


q. FM 101-5, "Staff Organization and Operations."

r. TRADOC Pam 11-9, "Army Programs: Blueprint of the Battlefield."
5. Air Force Pubs
   d. Air Force Regulation 360-1, "Air Base Operability -- Planning and Operations."

6. Marine Corps Pubs
   a. FMFM 2-6, "MAGTF Rear Area Security."
   b. OH 6-1, "Ground Combat Operations."
   c. FMFM 3-5, "Employment of Military Police in Combat."

7. Navy Pubs
   a. NWP 39, "Naval Coastal Warfare Doctrine."
   b. NWP 40, "Inshore Undersea Warfare."
APPENDIX D

USERS EVALUATION REPORT
ON JOINT PUB 3-10

1. Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this pub. Please fill out the following: Users' POC, unit address, and phone (DSN) number.

2. Content
   a. Does the pub provide a conceptual framework for the topic? ______________________________________________________
      ______________________________________________________
   b. Is the information provided accurate? What needs to be updated? ______________________________________________________
      ______________________________________________________
   c. Is the information provided useful? If not, how can it be improved? ______________________________________________________
      ______________________________________________________
   d. Is this pub consistent with other joint pubs? ______________________________________________________
      ______________________________________________________
   e. Can this pub be better organized for the best understanding of the doctrine and/or JTTP? How? ______________________________________________________
      ______________________________________________________

3. Writing and Appearance
   a. Where does the pub need some revision to make the writing clear and concise? What words would you use? ______________________________________________________
      ______________________________________________________
   b. Are the charts and figures clear and understandable? How would you revise them? ______________________________________________________
      ______________________________________________________

4. Recommended urgent change(s) (if any). ______________________________________________________
      ______________________________________________________

5. Other ______________________________________________________
      ______________________________________________________

6. Please fold and mail comments to the Joint Doctrine Center (additional pages may be attached if desired) or FAX to DSN 564-3990 or COMM (804) 444-3990.
## GLOSSARY

### PART I--ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AADC</td>
<td>area air defense commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>airspace control authority</td>
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<td>ACE</td>
<td>aviation combat element</td>
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<td>air defense artillery</td>
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<td>Air Force forces</td>
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<td>naval advanced logistic support site</td>
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<td>airborne warning and control system</td>
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<td>base cluster operations center</td>
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<td>base defense operations center</td>
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<td>command, control, and communications</td>
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<td>command, control, communications, and intelligence</td>
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<td>defensive counterair</td>
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<td>essential elements of friendly information</td>
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GL-1
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>IMINT</td>
<td>imagery intelligence</td>
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<td>MACCS</td>
<td>Marine air command and control system</td>
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<td>Marine Air-Ground Task Force</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
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<td>security assistance organization</td>
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<td>status of forces agreement</td>
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<td>TAACOM</td>
<td>Theater Army area command</td>
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antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism. Also called AT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area command. A command which is composed of those organized elements of one or more of the armed services, designated to operate in a specific geographical area, which are placed under a single commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area damage control. Measures taken before, during or after hostile action or natural or man-made disasters, to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operations. That portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. A defined area of land in which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area for the development and maintenance of installations, control of movement, and the conduct of tactical operations involving troops under his control along with parallel authority to exercise these functions. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

base. 1. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. 2. An area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support. (Joint Pub 1-02)

base cluster.** In base defense operations, a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

base cluster commander.** In base defense operations, the senior officer in the base cluster (excluding medical
officers, chaplains, and commanders of transient units), with responsibility for coordinating the defense of bases within the base cluster and for integrating base defense plans of bases into a base cluster defense plan. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

base commander.** In base defense operations, the officer assigned to command a base. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

base defense. The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, so as to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to US forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

civil affairs operations. Actions carried out as an integral part of a military mission that assure local authority and popular understanding of, and compliance with, measures supporting military operations and consolidation activities to attain US objectives. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-57.)

civil-military operations. Activities in support of military operations that embrace the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population, and the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 3-07.)

coastal sea control.** The employment of forces to ensure the unimpeded use of an offshore coastal area by friendly forces and, as appropriate, to deny the use of the area to enemy forces. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander-in-chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat service support. The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all
levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. (Joint Pub 1-02.)

combat support elements. Those elements whose primary missions are to provide combat support to the combat forces and which are a part, or prepared to become a part, of a theater, command, or task force formed for combat operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., Combined Navies.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

communications zone. Rear part of theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

concept of logistic support. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of how a commander intends to support and integrate with a concept of operations in an operation or campaign. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities. (This definition is provided for information and is proposed for inclusion in Joint Pub 1-02 by Joint Pub 2-03.)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

decontamination. The process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing, chemical or biological agents, or by
removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. (Joint Pub 1-02)

essential elements of information. The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. (Joint Pub 1-02)

evacuation. 1. The process of moving any person who is wounded, injured, or ill to and/or between medical treatment facilities. 2. The clearance of personnel, animals, or materiel from a given locality. 3. The controlled process of collecting, classifying, and shipping unserviceable or abandoned materiel, United States and foreign, to appropriate reclamation, maintenance, technical intelligence, or disposal facilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

high-water mark.** Properly, a mark left on a beach by wave wash at the preceding high water. It does not necessarily correspond to the high-water line. Because it can be determined by simple observation, it is frequently used in place of the high-water line, which can be determined only by a survey. When so used, it is called the high-water line. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, or to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, times of crisis/emergencies, or war based upon agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint base. For purposes of base defense operations, a joint base is a locality from which operations of two or more of the Armed Forces of the Department of Defense are projected or supported and which is manned by significant elements of two or more Services or in which significant elements of two or more Services are located. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise Combatant Command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint logistics. The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force commander and staff, logistic
operations to support the protection, movement, maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more Services of the same nation.  (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear area.** A specific land area within a joint force commander's area of operations designated to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force.  (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear area coordinator.** The officer with responsibility for coordinating the overall security of the joint rear area in accordance with joint force commander directives and priorities in order to assist in providing a secure environment to facilitate sustainment, host nation support, infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force. The joint rear area coordinator also coordinates intelligence support and ensures that area management is practiced with due consideration for security requirements. Also called JRAC.  (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear area operations.** Those operations in the unified and joint rear area that facilitate protection or support of the joint force.  (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear tactical operations center.** A joint operations cell tailored to assist the joint rear area coordinator in meeting mission responsibilities. Also called JRTOC.  (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

lines of communications. All the routes, land, water, and air, which connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move.  (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel;

b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel;

c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities;

d. acquisition or furnishing of services.  (Joint Pub 1-02)

movement control. The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel, and cargo movements over lines of
communications; also an organization responsible for these functions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

naval advanced logistic support site. An overseas location used as the primary transshipment point in the theater of operations for logistic support. A naval advanced logistic support sites (ALSSs) possesses full capabilities for storage, consolidation, and transfer of supplies and for support of forward-deployed units (including replacement units) during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval ALSSs, with seaport and air facilities in close proximity, are located within the theater of operations but not near the main battle areas, and must possess the throughput capacity required to accommodate incoming and outgoing intertheater airlift and sealift. When fully activated, the naval ALSS should consist of facilities and services provided by the host nation, augmented by support personnel located in the theater of operations, or both. Also called naval ALSS. See also naval forward logistic site. (Joint Pub 1-02)

naval coastal warfare.** Coastal sea control, harbor defense, and port security, executed both in coastal areas outside the United States in support of national policy and in the United States as part of this Nation's defense. Also called NCW. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

naval coastal warfare area.** An assigned geographic area of responsibility which includes offshore waters, harbor approaches, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and those internal waters and rivers which provide access to port facilities. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

naval coastal warfare commander.** An officer designated to conduct naval coastal warfare missions within a designated naval coastal geographic area. Also called NCWC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

naval forward logistic site. An overseas location, with port and airfield facilities nearby, which provides logistics support to naval forces within the theater of operations during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval forward logistic sites may be located in close proximity to main battle areas to permit forward staging of services, throughput of high priority cargo, advanced maintenance, and battle damage repair. Naval forward logistic sites are linked to in-theater Naval Advanced Logistics Support Sites (ALSSs) by intratheater airlift and sealift, but may also serve as transshipment points for intertheater movement of high-priority cargo into areas of direct combat. In providing fleet logistic support, naval forward logistic site capabilities may range from very austere to near those of a
naval advanced logistic support site. Also called FLS. See also naval advanced logistic support site. (Joint Pub 1-02)

port. A place at which ships may discharge or receive their cargoes. It includes any port accessible to ships on the seacoast, navigable rivers or inland waterways. The term "ports" should not be used in conjunction with air facilities which are designated as aerial ports, airports, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

port security. The safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities and cargo from internal threats such as: destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts; accidents; thefts; or other causes of similar nature. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rear area. For any particular command, the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area of responsibility of the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of combat service support functions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

reception. 1. All ground arrangements connected with the delivery and disposition of air or sea drops. Includes selection and preparation of site, signals for warning and approach, facilitation of secure departure of agents, speedy collection of delivered articles, and their prompt removal to storage places having maximum security. When a group is involved, it may be called a reception committee. 2. Arrangements to welcome and provide secure quarters or transportation for defectors, escapees, evaders, or incoming agents. (Joint Pub 1-02)

reconstitution site. A location selected by surviving command authority as the site at which a damaged or destroyed headquarters can be reformed from survivors of the attack and/or personnel from other sources, predesignated as replacements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security. 1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from
hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, it is the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

subordinate command. A command consisting of the commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sustainability. The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Upon approval of this publication, this term and definition will be included in Joint Pub 1-02.