DOCTRINE FOR JOINT INTERDICTON OPERATIONS

11 DECEMBER 1990
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Subject: Joint Test Pub 3-03, "Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations"

1. This test publication contains proposed joint doctrine to guide the activities and employment of the Armed Forces of the United States during joint interdiction operations.

2. Joint test publications are developed and issued in accordance with Joint Pub 1-01. This test publication has been staffed with the Services and combatant commands. It is now ready to undergo evaluation in the field. After a thorough evaluation and consideration of feedback, the publication will be implemented under the provisions of CJCS MOP 9.

3. The US Air Force is the lead agent, and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is J-7.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. This publication provides guidance for conducting actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. This publication promulgates fundamental principles to conceptualize, plan, and conduct successful interdiction operations. It provides a framework for preparation and employment of joint forces for interdiction.

2. Scope
   a. Doctrine for joint interdiction operations applies across the operational continuum and in all wartime environments—land, maritime, air, and space. Combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces are affected.

   b. US forces in combined operations are subject to command arrangements established by international agreements.

3. Concept. Joint interdiction doctrine aims to guide JFCs in orchestrating interdiction operations of joint forces to maximize their capabilities. US forces can conduct interdiction as individual operations designed to achieve tactical objectives or as a series of operations aimed at accomplishing operational or strategic objectives. The approach selected will depend upon the JFC’s objectives and the theater campaign plan.
CHAPTER II

FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERD ICTION OPERATIONS

1. Interdiction Characteristics. Interdiction can significantly affect the course of war. It contributes by interfering with the enemy's ability to mass, maneuver, withdraw, supply, command, and reinforce his combat power and by weakening him materially and psychologically. It can also create opportunities for friendly commanders to exploit. However, the use of interdiction is highly scenario dependent. Results against an enemy with minimal logistic requirements, a simple force structure, and primitive logistic systems will differ from interdiction conducted against a highly mechanized, modern force possessing intensive logistic requirements. Interdiction is most appropriate when the enemy must move major forces and equipment rapidly. Interdiction conducted against enemy forces and logistics without regard to the operational situation may be largely ineffective; thus, planning for interdiction must be closely integrated into the JFC's planning process.

a. The relative immediacy of the impact of interdiction may depend on (1) the distance between interdiction operations and the location of intended effect; (2) the means of enemy movement (e.g., ships, trains, aircraft, trucks, tanks, foot); (3) the objects of interdiction (e.g., forces, supplies, fuel, munitions, infrastructure); and (4) the level of enemy activity. Interdiction across the breadth and depth of the theater of war results in a number of effects. The JFC should not apply strict geographic boundaries to interdiction but should plan for its theater-wide application, coordinating across boundaries or between subelements, to take full advantage of the effect of interdiction at the operational level.

b. Interdiction can affect enemy capabilities at all levels of war--strategic, operational, or tactical.

(1) Interdiction operations can achieve strategic effects by cutting off the enemy from sources of personnel and materiel that affect the entire theater. However, the greatest time lag in these operations is usually between interdiction and discernible results at the location of intended effect.

(2) Operational level effects can result when interdiction efforts are sequenced and
coordinated to help achieve the JFC’s theater campaign objectives.

(3) Tactical level effects result from interdiction directed against tactical targets.

c. All operations, including interdiction, support the JFC’s campaign plan. To have the greatest impact, the planning and conduct of interdiction operations must compliment surface operations. Correspondingly, commanders of surface forces should consider how their capabilities and operations might complement interdiction in achieving the theater campaign objectives. Planning and conducting interdiction and surface operations within a coherent framework will enhance their synergistic effect.

2. Interdiction Objectives. Interdiction aims to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

a. Diversion. Interdiction operations can divert enemy naval, engineering, air defense, and manpower resources to the task of keeping LOCs open. These critical resources would not then be available for more harmful employment. Interdiction can also divert civilian assets from critical tasks to keeping the LOCs open or can result in using a more circuitous route.

b. Disruption. Disruption forces the enemy into ineffective tactical dispositions and degrades movement of the enemy’s materiel, forces, and supplies.

   (1) Interdiction can disrupt by attacking enemy LOCs, thus forcing less capable transport. Additionally, if enemy units slow down, sustain damage, are destroyed, or their C3 is disrupted, the result affects the enemy’s tempo. This degradation can be as effective as successful attacks directly on enemy C3 facilities.

   (2) Interdiction attacks on enemy troops, C3 systems, transportation, and supplies can also produce a psychological impact that significantly degrades enemy capabilities and morale. Uncertainty as to whether or not troops, materiel, or supplies will arrive will directly affect enemy commanders and their staffs and forces.

c. Delay. Delay seldom translates directly into postponement of enemy operations.
(1) If interdiction delays the enemy, friendly forces gain time. What JFCs do to improve their situation in the time gained is critical in any assessment of interdiction’s contribution. This is the primary reason why interdiction must be synchronized with other operations. However, an interdiction plan that focuses on delay and is effectively executed does not guarantee success. The enemy must face urgent movement requirements in order for delay to have a major impact.

(2) It is advantageous for friendly forces to force their opponent to attempt time-urgent movement. It is even more of an advantage if JFCs hold the initiative on the ground, sea, air, and space; then they can force their opponent to make time-urgent movements, can control their time and place, and reap the benefits of interdiction.

(3) Delay is critical in achieving additional interdiction payoffs. For example, it lengthens the time during which enemy land or maritime forces are at risk to attack. When vehicles bunch up behind a damaged route segment or ships bottle up in a harbor because of mines, a more concentrated set of targets over a longer period of exposure results, thus facilitating destruction.

d. Destruction. The destruction of enemy forces, their support elements, and supplies in transit represents an end in itself and a means of achieving other interdiction aims. The destruction of transportation systems is usually not an end in itself but contributes to the delay, diversion, and disruption of enemy forces and materiel. The demonstrated or perceived ability to destroy may sometimes by itself achieve substantial delay and diversion of enemy resources, such as causing movement only at night, or the massing of air defense assets (useful elsewhere) around critical transportation nodes. Also, the enemy may have to divert engineer resources from other tasks to prepare alternate routes in anticipation of possible attacks, even when transportation systems remain largely undamaged. The effect of such collateral results is almost impossible to quantify.

3. Interdiction and the Environment

a. Geography must be of fundamental concern in conducting interdiction operations. Geography influences (1) enemy movement and capacity to attack that movement; (2) the enemy’s options by determining
how large a force can be moved, where it can move, the
means that must be used, and, perhaps most importantly,
the speed at which the movement takes place; (3) the
selection of weapons and weapon systems to perform
interdiction.

b. Adverse weather conditions affect movement as well as
the capability to interdict. Additionally, darkness and
other conditions that degrade visibility will limit
surveillance and reconnaissance efforts and degrade
weapon systems and forces.

c. The unique nature of the space environment allows for
space systems to support interdiction and other military
operations across the operational continuum and act as a
force multiplier. Space systems support military
operations by providing capabilities for C3; ocean,
battlefield, and space surveillance; intelligence
collection; tactical warning and attack assessment;
navigation; mapping, charting, and geodesy; and
environmental monitoring.

4. Results of Interdiction

a. Interdiction can:

(1) Divert enemy strength.

(2) Divert manpower, supplies, and assets to repair
and recover damaged equipment.

(3) Disrupt enemy C3.

(4) Disrupt the enemy's industrial base.

(5) Degrade enemy tactical disposition and routing.

(6) Disrupt enemy tempo.

(7) Restrict enemy freedom of maneuver.

(8) Delay enemy forces and supplies.

(9) Destroy enemy forces and supplies.

(10) Demoralize the enemy.

b. These results contribute to the theater campaign and
should be exploited in conjunction with other operations.

5. Interdiction Resources. Interdiction operations can be
conducted by any or all the Services. It is important to
recognize that lethal and nonlethal systems can be used to
conduct interdiction. This doctrine is designed for all weapon systems and forces capable of interdiction.

a. Predominant weapons, systems, and forces to conduct interdiction include:

(1) Fighter/attack aircraft and bombers.
(2) Ships and submarines.
(3) Conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground maneuver forces.
(4) Special operations forces.
(5) Surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and mines.
(6) Artillery and naval gunfire.
(7) Attack helicopters.
(8) Electronic warfare systems.
(9) Antisatellite weapons.
(10) Space-based satellite systems or sensors.

b. Operations complementary to interdiction include:

(1) Counterair.
(2) Suppression of enemy air defenses.
(3) Antisubmarine warfare.
(4) Antisurface warfare.
(5) Command, control, and communications countermeasures.
(6) Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
(7) Intelligence collection and reporting.
(8) Psychological operations.
(9) Special Operations.
CHAPTER III

CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

1. Basis of Interdiction Doctrine. Doctrine is fundamental in guiding military forces in support of national objectives. Doctrine derives from knowledge gained primarily from the study and analysis of what has or has not worked. Understanding and considering these experiences are essential in formulating interdiction operations.

2. Elements of Effective Interdiction. Interdiction usually involves a combination of the following elements: accurate and timely intelligence, freedom of action, ability to detect and identify targets, sustained pressure, concentration, channelization, high rates of consumption, logistic constriction, time-urgent movement, and effective C3. To what degree each will contribute depends on the nature of the conflict, geographic location, and characteristics of the enemy.

   a. Accurate and Timely Intelligence. Information about the enemy’s LOCs and tactical dispositions is imperative. Accurate intelligence enables commanders to select appropriate weapons and delivery systems and keeps commanders abreast of the enemy’s response. Accurate intelligence provides information on the enemy’s probable intentions and identifies critical nodes. It allows the commander to act in a timely fashion to affect enemy actions or counter actions. Interdiction is dynamic and demands that friendly forces adapt their methods to cope with enemy responses.

   b. Freedom of Action. To ensure interdiction success, the JFC must promote efforts that provide conditions conducive to effective operations in enemy areas. For example, localized air or maritime superiority permits successful operations in enemy rear areas. Without that freedom, sustained interdiction operations could result in excessive losses.

   c. Target Selection. The targets selected for interdiction must reflect the JFC’s campaign objectives. Targets must not be identified or selected in a random fashion. The target’s importance in contributing to interdiction effects is essential in determining its priority.

   d. Ability to Detect and Identify Targets. Targets must be detectable and identifiable to make interdiction
feasible. The ability to detect and identify targets is a function of the following attributes:

(1) Target Nature. The nature of a target set may determine its suitability as a target for interdiction. For example, a pipeline laid in the jungle might best be attacked by SOF ground elements.

(2) Target Area Environmental Conditions. Darkness, adverse weather, and passive defense measures such as smoke reduce visibility, may conceal targets, and degrade weapon systems and force capabilities.

(3) Technology. Technology can enhance detection and identification of obscured targets. For example, night vision devices, laser target designators, and electronic sensors can eliminate the concealment provided in limited visibility conditions. Commanders must use caution, however, in relying too heavily on technology to solve problems of detectible and identifiability.

e. Sustained Pressure. Generally, interdiction demands sustained attacks. Most often, interdiction occurs against either replaceable systems (vehicles) or repairable systems (engineering features). Therefore, pressure must be sufficient to impede efforts to replace or repair affected assets and cause stress on the entire enemy operation. This requirement applies particularly to operations of long duration because time allows the enemy to restore losses.

f. Concentration. The fewer conveyances and depots in an enemy transportation system, the more that system is vulnerable to interdiction. Conversely, an enemy possessing a varied, dispersed transportation system is less affected by interdiction.

g. Channelization. Channelization generally results from geography or the lack of transportation routes. The fewer the routes to handle enemy supplies and reinforcements, the greater the loss or delay caused by their severance. Geography may also restrict or channelize surface movement, thus creating chokepoints and concentrated targets.

h. High Consumption. When the enemy consumes large quantities of supplies because of heavy combat or extensive movement, interdiction operations have considerably greater impact. This is true for two reasons. First, when opponents are under heavy pressure,
they will be less able to stockpile and more likely to suffer critical shortages if interdiction constricts their LOCs. Inability to stockpile supplies will make it more difficult for the enemy to initiate large-scale offensive operations. Second, high consumption drives an enemy to use direct routes, making the enemy more vulnerable to interdiction attacks.

i. Logistic Constriction. The less surplus capacity the enemy’s logistic system has, the less it can compensate for damage. The problems of logistic constriction differ from those of high rates of consumption: high consumption refers to the demand side of the logistic equation, constriction refers to the supply side.

j. Time-Urgent Movement

(1) Time-urgent movement results when the enemy (a) aims for surprise, (b) needs to defeat forces before reinforcements or resupply arrive, (c) requires rapid reinforcement of threatened defensive positions, (d) wishes to exploit offensive operations, or (e) is driven to urgent movements because of delays imposed by interdiction effects. Under these conditions, the enemy has a strong incentive to reach specific objectives within time constraints. Rapid movement of enemy forces and supplies makes them more vulnerable to interdiction.

(2) Time-urgent movements are temporary. For interdiction to capitalize on such opportunities, it must deny the enemy mobility when most needed. Interdiction also demands close coordination among all forces to take full advantage of the situation in the time provided, otherwise, the enemy can shift or expand the use of time and possibly negate the effects of interdiction.

k. Command, Control, and Communications. C3 complements planning, conducting, and sustaining successful interdiction operations. Intelligence, operations, and logistic functions usually involve effective C3.
CHAPTER IV
ORGANIZING FOR JOINT INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

1. Joint Organizational Authority. The commander of a combatant command or subordinate unified command or joint task force is designated the JFC and is assigned the mission of the joint force and the objectives to be accomplished. The JFC has full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as necessary to accomplish assigned missions. The JFC has OPCON of all assigned forces, and has the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.

2. Interdiction Operations. JFCs translate the strategic goals and guidance given into objectives and operational concepts. To accomplish these objectives, JFCs design and execute campaigns and major operations. Through these they orchestrate a series of actions by land, maritime, air, and space forces to achieve objectives.

   a. JFCs can employ their forces for a variety of purposes; the principal challenge is to combine force capabilities and operations into a concentrated effort. The planning, coordination, and integration of interdiction with other operations, such as maneuver, can yield unique advantages. A theater campaign perspective can facilitate such synchronization. The planning and conduct of interdiction operations aid in an effective use of force; enhance the exploitation of tactical events; avoid fragmented, duplicated, and conflicting efforts; and ensure that interdiction operations are part of a larger design aimed at achieving the JFC’s objectives.

   b. Joint interdiction of follow-on forces, a subset of joint interdiction operations specifically directed against enemy land forces, is interdiction of uncommitted enemy echelons that can be brought to bear on friendly forces. Such interdiction provides an operational level focus against a specific force objective to achieve a specific result over a specific time period. FOFA operations will be conducted in accordance with this doctrine and Joint Pub 3-03.1, "Doctrine for Joint Interdiction of Follow-on Forces (Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA))."
3. Organizing Interdiction. Planning, coordination, and execution of interdiction operations occur at all levels of command within a joint force.

   a. Campaign Planning. At the highest level, the JFC establishes broad planning objectives and guidance for interdiction of enemy forces as an integral part of the theater campaign. With the advice of subordinate commanders, the JFC sets interdiction priorities, provides targeting guidance, and determines the weight of effort to be devoted to joint interdiction operations. Subordinate commanders recommend to the JFC how to use their combat power more effectively to this end. The weight of effort devoted to joint interdiction may be expressed:

   (1) In terms of percentages of total available resources.

   (2) By assigning priorities for resources used for joint interdiction with respect to other aspects of the theater campaign or operation.

   (3) As otherwise determined by the JFC.

The JFC assigns interdiction missions to forces based on the overall mission of the joint force; tasks assigned to subordinate commanders; resources available; capabilities; friendly force security; and the land, sea, air, and space situations. JFCs may task an organization within their staffs to accomplish these broad planning functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. In any case, this broad planning is a joint process reflecting JFC guidance and objectives and involving all applicable subordinate commands.

   b. Execution Planning. JFCs will normally delegate the authority or may use their staffs to conduct execution planning, coordination, and deconfliction of interdiction operations and will ensure that this process is also a joint effort involving applicable subordinate commands.

   (1) Whoever is designated this responsibility must possess a sufficient command and control infrastructure, adequate facilities, and ready availability of joint planning expertise. The organization of a joint targeting cell or board has proven to be an efficient mechanism to facilitate this process (see Joint Pub 5-00.2, "Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures").
(2) Commanders of air forces will most often possess the superior capability to execute interdiction. Such a commander will normally be designated the JFACC by the JFC and assigned the responsibility to conduct detailed execution planning and coordination of the overall interdiction effort. Other choices exist for the JFC; for instance, other component commanders possessing the preponderance of interdiction capability may be assigned this responsibility. The JFC will ultimately approve the integration of interdiction operations with execution of other joint force operations.

(3) Detailed joint interdiction execution planning is based on the JFC’s theater campaign planning objectives and is accomplished in close cooperation with elements of the appropriate components. Joint interdiction execution planning determines the following:

(a) Target selection.

(b) Means of attack (e.g. aircraft, artillery, SOF, surface-to-surface missile, naval gunfire support).

(c) Desired effects.

(d) Time of attack.

(e) Place of attack.

c. Execution. Whoever is responsible for joint execution planning is also responsible for ensuring unity of effort for interdiction execution. This includes deconfliction, coordination, control measures, and adjustments to the interdiction plan. The JFC provides unity of command for overall battlefield operations.

d. Coordination with Close Support. Planning and execution of joint interdiction and close support must be integrated to ensure unity of effort (see Joint Pub 3-09, "Doctrine for Joint Fire Support").

e. Tasking. The authority to designate and task forces for interdiction rests with the JFC. Units tasked should receive as much latitude as possible in the detailed mission preparation (tactics and ordnance determination, etc.) and execution of their tasks. Joint tactical and strategic forces conducting interdiction will generally remain under the command of their respective components,
although some forces may be TACON on a mission-by-mission basis to other than their normal command. For example, tasking of aircraft sorties and artillery missions for interdiction will be in accordance with the appropriate joint publications, in particular Joint Pubs 3-56.20 through 3-56.24 ("Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations"). Guidance on the exercise of OPCON of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander's organic aviation assets during sustained operations ashore is found in Joint Pubs 3-01.2, 3-56.23, and 3-56.24.

4. Joint Coordination Responsibilities

a. Subordinate Commanders. All subordinate commanders possess resources that can contribute to interdiction. The capabilities of all joint forces, as well as the magnitude of their potential contribution, must be considered in planning and conducting interdiction. The JFC is responsible for ensuring that diverse component capabilities, operations, and forces complement each other to achieve the desired results. Piecemeal employment will result in a less-than-optimum effect.

b. Methods of Coordination. Proper coordination helps ensure a coherent interdiction effort involving diverse forces, under the tactical control of different commanders, using different employment procedures. Interdiction coordination procedures must not inhibit timely application of firepower in the conduct of other operations. Procedures must be simple and effective; based on the needs of the JFC, and give due consideration to individual Service capabilities for speed, range, maneuver, weapon system characteristics, EW ability, and intelligence-gathering. Subordinate commanders must inform the JFC of operations that affect interdiction objectives.

1. Normally, subordinate commanders will establish planning cycles for operations based on JFC guidance that permit the coordination of applicable operations with the JFC early enough and in sufficient detail to allow integration of those operations into the interdiction plan.

2. Certain time-sensitive targets may preclude use of normal coordination procedures. In such cases, pre-coordinated rules of engagement should allow rapid attack of targets of opportunity that arise
CHAPTER V
CONDUCTING JOINT INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

1. Planning

a. Objectives. The JFC, with advice from subordinate commanders, establishes interdiction objectives.

(1) Interdiction focuses on operational level (theater or campaign) objectives as delineated in the JFC’s theater campaign plan. In special circumstances, interdiction may aim at strategic objectives by working in concert with other efforts to neutralize the enemy’s center(s) of gravity. Interdiction can also support tactical objectives that directly complement maneuver forces. The conditions for successful interdiction, the close integration of interdiction with other operations, available resources, and expected results, must be considered in establishing interdiction objectives to help ensure a proper focus of effort.

(2) Strategic and operational level objectives are best described in terms of desired outcomes rather than specific targets. Once objectives and outcomes are known, commanders can make appropriate targeting decisions.

b. The Interdiction Plan. Effective planning is driven by a thorough understanding of the JFC’s campaign plan. Once the JFC establishes interdiction objectives, the designated commander or organization plans the employment of forces with the advice of the subordinate commanders. To ensure a coherent and coordinated effort, they must develop a joint interdiction plan that addresses two principal areas: a general concept of operations and a description of the planning and coordination cycle required for the phasing of interdiction operations.

(1) The concept of operations for the interdiction plan should include:

(a) Identification of objectives, broad concept of operations, and resource requirements necessary to sustain activities.

(b) An orderly schedule of anticipated decisions needed to shape and direct the conduct of interdiction.
(c) Phases for related interdiction operations.

(d) Arrangements for orchestrating the operations of air, land, space, and maritime forces to ensure a synchronized effort.

(e) Scheme of support operations needed to assist and protect forces engaged in interdiction operations.

(f) Provisions for feedback or analysis concerning the effectiveness of interdiction operations.

(2) The planning and coordination cycle for interdiction should:

(a) Emphasize simplicity.

(b) Emphasize mission type orders where appropriate.

(c) Ensure availability of appropriate forces and capabilities for employment against the right targets in a timely manner.

(d) Ensure that component efforts support and reinforce each other to minimize duplication and conflicting actions.

(e) Arrange tasking and coordination of support operations to assist and protect forces engaged in interdiction.

(f) Preclude adverse effects on other friendly forces and operations.

(g) Ensure the continuance of effective operations during periods of degraded communications.

(h) Provide flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and priorities.

(3) Once mission objectives, desired results, attack means, and time sequencing have been jointly planned and integrated with the campaign plan, details such as tactics, ordnance, deconfliction, and fire control measures can be worked out by those responsible for execution. This detailed planning may require coordination with tactical level units.
c. Intelligence. Accurate, relevant, timely, and all-source intelligence is basic to successful interdiction. Planning interdiction operations should be a continuous process during peacetime as well as during war.

(1) Intelligence must create and maintain accurate data bases, analyses, and estimates essential to planning objectives, targets, weapon systems, routing, and methods of attack. These activities are essential to peacetime preparations, accelerate during conflict, and reach maximum capability in wartime.

(2) Intelligence should provide crucial inputs on enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions, operations, vulnerabilities, and defenses. It should optimize employment of friendly capabilities and match weapon systems and munitions with specific targets. It should provide real-time updates on unfolding enemy and friendly operations, especially in a mobile environment. Intelligence should indicate how the enemy is adapting to interdiction operations and recommend how friendly operations should compensate for enemy adjustments. Finally, intelligence should analyze interdiction effectiveness and identify areas that require additional effort, de-emphasis, or other modifications. IPB contributes toward accomplishing these requirements and provides a systematic approach.

2. Employment

a. Command, Control, and Communications. Synchronization of diverse interdiction operations, forces, and weapon systems demands unambiguous assignment of authority.

(1) Command and Control. Joint interdiction operations call for centralized direction and decentralized execution. Centralized direction of interdiction ensures coherence and focus on essential JFC objectives. Decentralized execution ensures effective employment of limited assets, allows tactical adaptation, and accommodates the Services’ different employment concepts and procedures. Interdiction operations normally use established joint and Service-specific procedures. These procedures detail implementation of doctrine established in this document.
(2) C3 Functions. C3 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures. Effective C3 operations demand the capability to process, display, and communicate appropriate information to the correct command level, at the correct time, and in the correct format. Essential information must be exchanged among the JFC and subordinate commanders possessing interdiction capabilities in near-real-time.

(a) C3 systems exist to support war; they must be survivable, secure, sustainable, flexible, and reliable. C3 systems will be stressed in war. C3 systems, including space-based resources, will be subject to intense electronic warfare and conventional attack. Systems must provide secure, survivable, jam-resistant, near-real-time exchange of essential information. Commanders must develop alternate systems and procedures to maintain continuity if primary systems fail.

(b) Interoperability among friendly C3 systems is necessary. Realistically, full compatibility is unlikely. Differences in C3 equipment among the Services increase the need for coordination. Commanders must develop modifications, procedures, and methods to achieve maximum interoperability among systems.

(c) Planning and execution of an interdiction operation using mission type orders requires C3 systems capable of providing a common picture of the battlefield at the different levels of command and in different Service components. Resource and target data bases with near-real-time update are needed for whoever is directing interdiction operations.

(d) Requirements for near-real-time, responsive C3 systems is essential for FOFA or other interdiction missions against moving targets.

b. Mission Type Orders. Interdiction operations should normally rely on mission type orders, which assign subordinate commanders clear military objectives and allow them to develop the details. Mission type orders task subordinate commanders to achieve an effect—to slow, channel, weaken, or destroy enemy forces. Mission type orders have three principal advantages. First, they
place a premium on initiative at the lowest level. Second, they allow the units and personnel who actually execute operations to select appropriate tactics and techniques. The result is the application of expertise at the proper level, which is particularly important in joint operations. Forces are allocated for mission accomplishment at the component commander level. The correct level for determining specific execution is at the unit level. Finally, mission type orders help subordinate commanders understand their objectives and continue operations in the face of communications breakdowns.

c. Mission Type Order Development and Prioritization. Commanders must ensure careful development and coordination of mission type orders so those orders not only serve the JFC’s objectives but also encompass subordinate commanders’ objectives and capabilities.

(1) Subordinate commanders identify mission effects desired and/or the enemy systems for interdiction. At this level, analysis should focus on the determination of critical vulnerabilities, time windows in which vulnerabilities are likely to occur, threats to friendly forces, and the relative value of potential mission objectives or enemy systems. These assessments should focus not only on enemy threats and vulnerabilities but also on interdiction opportunities. To the maximum extent, subordinate commanders should think in terms of achieving effects rather than simply striking targets.

(2) Subordinate commanders prioritize interdiction recommendations in accordance with whatever arrangements the JFC has made for directing the interdiction effort. Forwarding missions rather than target nominations give those responsible for conducting interdiction maximum flexibility to exploit their capabilities.

(3) JFCs or their designated representative for interdiction operations will prioritize the mission and/or target system nominations in accordance with the JFC’s objectives and will coordinate with subordinate commanders to ensure synchronized action.

d. Interdiction Targeting. Targeting translates desired effects into specific missions and attacks. It selects targets and matches appropriate resources to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. Interdiction targeting aims to execute a connected series
of missions and attacks to produce effects based on the JFC’s interdiction objectives. As an example, the JFC may decide that an enemy armored force (an operational maneuver group, a division, etc.) cannot be allowed to interfere with his operations. The interdiction objective is to prevent that interference. Interdiction can achieve that objective by (1) killing tanks individually (difficult and time consuming), (2) killing personnel (potentially much easier), (3) destroying support systems such as fuel and ammunition (easier to destroy and has a multiplier effect), or (4) disrupting transportation, etc. Differing conditions and considerations will determine the operations conducted. Interdiction should aim at affecting those systems that if disrupted, result in the greatest payoff.

e. Combat Assessment. Interdiction requires frequent and regular assessment to determine what modifications, if any, to make in the interdiction plan to ensure that operations continue to have the desired effect on the enemy. Assessments of interdiction operations must rest on reporting from all sources. Feedback on the effectiveness of interdiction operations, and/or enemy responses, must be quickly relayed to the appropriate command levels.

3. Training The modern battlefield—intense, chaotic, and highly destructive—will not allow time to polish skills or to develop new procedures and techniques or new organizations. Therefore, successful application of joint interdiction depends on realistic exercises and training within a coherent doctrinal framework. Commanders must develop and implement training programs and exercises that build required combat skills and that simulate, as closely as possible, the environment in which the United States expects to fight.
GLOSSARY

PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASAT antisatellite
ASW antisubmarine warfare
ASUW antisurface warfare
C2 command and control
C3 command, control, and communications
C3CM command, control, and communications countermeasures
CA counterair
EW electronic warfare
FOFA follow-on forces attack
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
LOC line of communication
NCA National Command Authorities
OPCON operational control
SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses
SOF special operations forces
TACON tactical control
GLOSSARY

PART II--DEFINITIONS*

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 3-0)

center of gravity. That characteristic, capability, or locality from which a force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. It exists at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. (Joint Pub 3-0)

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise Combatant Command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 3-0)

* Unless identified as extracted from Joint Pub 1-02, terminology herein is not standardized within the Department of Defense and is applicable only in the context of this document.

** Upon final approval of this publication, this term will be included in Joint Pub 1-02.
Joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander derives his authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinate commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander’s responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based on the joint force commander’s apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with other service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mission type order. 1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (Joint Pub 1-02)
operational control. Transferable command authority which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in Combatant Command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives. Activities at this level establish national and alliance military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide armed forces and other capabilities in accordance with the strategic plan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**synchronization. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.
tactical control. The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Also called TACON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)