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U58d

DRAPER REPORT

"In our fascination with our own mistakes, and the constant use of foreign aid as a whipping boy, we may be gradually choking this vital feature of our national security to death."

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**RETURN TO
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ROOM 416 M**

**The President's Committee
To Study the United States Military Assistance Program**

INTERIM REPORT

ROOM 1003 RB

**708 Jackson Place, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.**

March 17, 1959

(Not printed at Government expense)

Draper report

355 U.S. President's Committee to Study the United
U58d States Military Assistance Program,
Washington, D.C.
Interim report. Mar. 1959.

1. Military assistance, American. I. Draper
report.

What the President Asked the Committee To Do:

“. . . I request that your committee undertake a completely independent, objective, and non-partisan analysis of the military assistance aspects of our Mutual Security Program . . . to evaluate the results to date . . . to recommend the most suitable means whereby the free world's defenses may be insured . . .

“What is needed . . . is a forthright evaluation . . .

“I am particularly interested in your committee's critical appraisal . . . of the relative emphasis which should be given to military and economic programs, particularly in the less developed areas . . .

“It would be advantageous if your committee could furnish me with some preliminary conclusions which can be taken into account in presenting the Mutual Security Program to the Congress at its next session . . . However, I desire that your study and final recommendations be the product of a thoroughgoing analysis which I realize might well take longer . . .”

EXCERPT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET MESSAGE FOR THIS YEAR:

“The accomplishments, future needs, techniques, and interrelationships of military and economic assistance need to be reassessed in the light of continuing change in military technology and strategy and in economic and political conditions, and with consideration of new Communist techniques in waging the cold war. Therefore, I recently appointed a committee . . .”

NOTE: This is printed to make available information concerning the basic concept underlying the Committee's report: the need for strengthening both the economic and military foundations of the free world. Copies may be obtained at the address given on cover.

HIGHLIGHT QUOTATIONS

THE DANGER

"The Communist military threat is greater than ever. The Communist economic and political threat and capabilities are expanding."

THE ISSUE

"The issue is whether we intend to seek survival in isolation—a state of siege—as the world continues to shrink . . . This is not a new issue. It is an old one, but the new feature is that time to settle it is running out."

THE ALTERNATIVE

"The only alternative we can see to the interdependent allied free world, strengthened by our aid where needed, would be the Fortress America concept—taking our first stand in the last ditch."

THE CRITICISMS

"The administration of this Program has been imperfect in some respects . . . A firm and persistent effort to improve the overall management of the program is called for . . . To abandon the program, for errors in execution or for any other reasons, would be to abandon the free world and to lose the cold war."

THE RIGHT COURSE

"We are all convinced that the Mutual Security Program both in its military and its economic aspects is a sound concept . . . The Mutual Security Program is now and will remain an essential tool of foreign policy."

THE RECOMMENDATION

"The United States should commit itself to go ahead with a constructive program in this whole field, both military and economic, or alternatively determine that we should no longer undertake the program . . . the Committee proposes that the Congress and Executive Branch take the necessary legislative and administrative steps to put the Mutual Security Program on a continuing basis."

The full text of the Committee's Interim Report, together with the letter of transmittal to the President, will be found on the following pages.

The President's Committee
To Study the United States Military Assistance Program
708 Jackson Place, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

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March 17, 1959

Dear Mr. President:

Your Committee has completed its preliminary analysis of military assistance and related economic aspects of the Mutual Security Program. We have advised you informally of our preliminary conclusions and we now present them in written form. You will note we unanimously recommend that an additional amount should be made available for military assistance in Fiscal Year 1960, mostly for the area of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In our judgment, the economic assistance requested for the same year is the minimum required, and increased funds for economic development will be needed in subsequent years.

In our final report we will deal with what we think needs to be done over the longer term in organizing a more effective mutual security effort and will outline the desirable scope and nature of that effort.

In transmitting our interim conclusions we invite your attention to our unanimous belief that a basic issue of foreign policy underlies the questions that you have submitted to us, and that there is an urgent need for its early resolution.

Simply put, the issue is whether we intend to seek survival in isolation—a state of siege—as the world continues to shrink. This would be the inevitable result if we fail to take vigorous action on mutual security. The positive course—much more in the nature of our people—would be to accept fully the great responsibilities which our generation has partly inherited and partly earned.

This is not a new issue. It is an old one, but the new feature is that time to settle it is running out.

What we do this year is an important step in one direction or the other. By forthright and affirmative action we can set the example expected of us. The penalty for failure to do so can well be the beginning of the end

of the free world coalition, and the gradual isolation of America. For there can be no doubt that the free world is gravely threatened by the aggressive onslaught of a powerful and determined opponent—the Sino-Soviet communist bloc. There is no precedent in history for the enormity of the threat.

Our strong military forces, supported as they are and must continue to be by a sound economy, constitute but a portion of the total resources which oppose the communist threat. The remaining elements are the capabilities of the other nations of the free world whose clear and obvious desire is to remain free. These nations have varying degrees of ability to support enough military strength to resist communist take-over. For a number of years our nation has aided many of them in their efforts to strengthen their military forces and to develop economies which could ultimately support their own forces. There is indeed no precedent in all history for what our country has done under the mutual security programs.

This course of action has involved the employment of substantial U. S. resources for military and economic uses in other countries. This now amounts to somewhat less than one per cent of our annual gross national product.

The increasing intensity of repeated and bitter attacks on the foreign assistance programs by their articulate critics raises the basic question as to whether these programs are more useful implements of national security policy than equivalent efforts and resources devoted to other uses. The only alternative we can see to the interdependent allied free world, strengthened by our aid where needed, would be the Fortress America concept—taking our first stand in the last ditch.

We are all convinced that the Mutual Security Program both in its military and in its economic aspects is a sound concept. What is needed is the determination to continue it and the ability to administer it well.

The administration of this Program has been imperfect in some respects. We in America are novices at many of the tasks which befall us in our unprecedented position in world affairs, for in history's perspective these tasks have occupied us for a relatively few years. We have not developed the well trained corps of personnel required to carry out such a far flung program with absolute efficiency. Some

projects have been imperfectly conceived, inadequately planned and poorly executed. On the other hand, most projects have been well conceived and successfully carried out. Additionally, we have developed many competent administrators, though it may be years before there are enough such people in the program to provide a level of efficiency comparable to that which we see in business affairs and in other American endeavors. Meantime, while each blunder seemed worth a headline, the successes have made little news.

Nevertheless, we have seen, with substantial contributions from the Marshall Plan and from our mutual security and other efforts, the rebuilding of Europe and Japan, the development of powerful allies in NATO and the strengthening of the nations around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. We have seen slow but heartening progress in some parts of the less developed third of the world. With better internal security and a greater ability to defend themselves, peoples in these areas have acquired a growing confidence in their future. This is indispensable to economic development. Thus, despite imperfections of the programs, we have seen greater strength come to free world nations with the help of our aid. We do not now stand alone.

The choice our country faces is very real and near at hand. In our fascination with our own mistakes, and the constant use of foreign aid as a whipping boy, we may be gradually choking this vital feature of our national security policy to death.


The United States should commit itself to go ahead with a constructive program in this whole field, both military and economic, or alternatively determine that we should no longer undertake the program.

We believe strongly that the doubts about the program and the policy it supports should be resolved affirmatively in the context of a longer term outlook, and not be left to year-by-year uncertainty as to what course our country will follow.


At the same time all of us must realize that ultimate success depends on something more than the dollars and military equipment of our aid programs. It also depends on our ability to maintain and strengthen, along with other nations, the political and economic bases of our free world relationships. We can truly succeed only if we have the full confidence and willing cooperation of our friends and allies.


We recommend, Mr. President, that every effort be made within the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government to bring clearly before the American people the relationship between the Mutual Security Program and the national interest, and the need for continuity of this program if it is to make its required contribution toward our world position of strength.

Respectfully yours,


William H. Draper, Jr.
Chairman



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

Joseph M. Dodge


Alfred M. Gruenther



Marx Leva


John J. McCloy


George McGhee


Joseph T. McNarney


Arthur W. Radford


James E. Webb

The President,
The White House,
Washington 25, D. C.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

of

The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program

**Submitted to the President With the Committee's Letter
of March 17, 1959**

The Committee appointed by you has made its preliminary analysis of the United States Military Assistance Program. Previous studies of the program made by the Congress, the Executive Branch and others have been taken into account. We have consulted governmental, business, academic and private agencies and individuals. Members of the Committee have visited all of the major areas of the world which participate in the Military Assistance Program. While our work is not complete, we submit our findings thus far in response to your wish that they be available in connection with recommendations you may wish to make to the Congress.

The World Situation

The Committee believes that the Military Assistance Program must be determined primarily in the light of three main considerations:

First, the mighty challenge to the free world posed by the great strength of the Soviet Union and Communist China and their continuing determination to dominate the world.

Second, the revolutionary changes taking place in many areas of the world still free of Communist control, generally classed as "less developed," many of which have only recently achieved their independence.

Third, the ability and willingness of the United States to sustain the expenditures involved in such a program together with its own defense requirements while preserving a sound domestic economy.

The Communist dominated countries contain about one-third of the world's population, and the less developed countries above referred to constitute more than another one-third. This fact indicates the scope of the problem.

We are convinced that there has been no lessening of the total Communist threat to the survival of the free world. In fact, Soviet-Chinese capability to apply military, political and economic pressures is expanding. This is evidenced by its arms assistance programs, by an aggressive propaganda and political drive directed particularly to the weaker economic areas of the world and by a vigorous economic offensive in those

areas. It is indisputable that Communist military strength is steadily increasing. Clear evidence has recently appeared of an intent to wield that strength in order to obtain political objectives. The attack on Quemoy, the threats of atomic destruction, and the talk of possible war over West Berlin, are the most dramatic recent instances of the continuance of the military threat.

Need for Long Term Program

The challenge is a powerful one. It is a long term challenge requiring long term methods to meet it. The United States, together with its allies and friends, certainly has the wisdom and the resources to win. But we must be resolute in taking the necessary action.

While every effort should be made to reduce the tensions which are implicit in this challenge, we fail to find in the present situation any promise of relaxation of those tensions. Unless progress is made in the way of general disarmament or in moderating the objectives of the Sino-Soviet bloc, we shall have to face a protracted period of international tension.

Now that the United States no longer has a monopoly of long range nuclear weapons, any weakening of our support to outlying allied positions makes the danger of local aggression even greater, and accordingly the Military Assistance Program becomes even more essential to our security.

The time has come to face the facts of both the long term nature of the struggle and what we must do to assure survival and ultimate victory. We believe strongly that the attainment of United States objectives in the Military Assistance Program has been impaired by the lack of continuity in the authorization and administration of the program. The present methods, we find, interfere with the meshing of the plans and the resources of the recipient countries with our military assistance programs, materially delay deliveries, increase costs, and sometimes even prevent the accomplishment of our objectives.

The Committee therefore believes it is essential to the achievement of the program's basic objectives, and to the flexibility necessary to meet new threats and new challenges, that the country recognize its long term nature. Legislative and administrative steps must be taken to put the program on a continuing basis. We are convinced that this would not only improve the effectiveness of the program, but its economy as well.

Such a long range program would have important imponderable advantages. We believe it would strengthen the deterrent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, it would improve the confidence of our allies and result in greater willingness to make longer range commitments and to devote a larger element of their resources to the common defense.

Free World Defense

The free world's far flung defense perimeter is manned jointly by allied and United States forces and extends through Middle Europe, the Middle East, and around the rim of Asia to the Northern Pacific. The weapons for the allied forces defending this perimeter have very largely been furnished by our Military Assistance Program. It is a very wide area important to our security. The nations of this area, without our help, cannot defend it. Together we do have the strength. Within this perimeter are the homelands of our friends and allies and the means by which we together can maintain mutual bases, room for maneuver, defense in depth, and unrestricted use of the seas. This forward area, manned largely by allied forces, defends a complex of dispersed air bases which materially strengthen the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent. If strong and well armed forces hold these perimeter positions, then, in the event of local aggression, our friends, our allies, and we ourselves gain time for reinforcement and, equally important, for political action. These forces in being give the free world advantages should war come; but more importantly, they represent a major deterrent to aggression and an opportunity through negotiation to avoid war itself. Also, the capacity of these forward allied forces to meet limited attack, as recently demonstrated at Quemoy, provides another and much more acceptable alternative than surrender or resort to atomic warfare.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Our most important alliance and the one in which we have our largest investment is NATO. NATO includes Canada and the United States and—extending across the Atlantic to the Mediterranean—encompasses most of Western Europe. Western Europe is an area of more than one million square miles, 250 million people and great resources. It contains an accumulation of some of the highest managerial and technical skills in the world, to say nothing of its being a great repository of the arts and culture of the world. It is emerging, for the first time in history, as an integrated unit. Combined, it has potentialities that approach the strength of the United States. Its unity today is being forged by increasing economic ties which may, in the not too remote future, involve closer political association—a post World War II development comparable in its significance to the rise of Soviet power and the development of China.

The first and the basic expressions of European unity were in terms of United States-European cooperation in the Marshall Plan and the common defense effort of NATO. The present NATO structure, appreciably strengthened by military assistance, is potentially a great defensive force against Communist pressures. Our NATO allies will continue to require our aid to achieve the necessary strong and well integrated defense.

The impact of technology on the development of new weapons has recently made it necessary from the overall NATO as well as the United States standpoint to make large new investments in modern types of planes and other weapons, including strategic and tactical missiles in Europe. These modern weapons represent an invaluable addition to the already existing deterrent capabilities. At the same time, an incident like the current Berlin crisis demonstrates the need to support resolute statements with actions. It underlines the extremely sensitive nature of the European situation and the fact that forces with a flexible capability are essential. Any further advance by the Soviets in Europe would be a disaster for the entire free world.

The developing political, economic and technological situation makes the unity, strength and defensive versatility of NATO increasingly important. While our allies are moving to share in production of some of the more modern and expensive weapons, most of these are currently being produced only in the United States. The Committee is convinced that the present situation requires adequate provision of modern weapons to other countries of NATO, and also greater mutual effort during the next fiscal year to maintain a strong position in other weapons and to meet the existing obsolescence and replacement problem.

Other Areas

We recognize that our mutual defense effort in less developed countries in direct contact with Communist forces is particularly difficult, though vital to them and to ourselves. Unless these countries have adequate holding forces, they cannot hope for timely help short of the most drastic military action by their allies. Situated on the front line and with examples of recent Communist aggression in mind, their leadership, with which we live on a cooperative basis, wants to have the forces they judge adequate to their particular circumstances.

Without the weapons and support we have furnished to the SEATO and Baghdad Pact nations, and to other Asian nations adjacent to the Communist bloc, their own direct defenses and our own position beyond our shores would have little substance short of a major nuclear effort. Large forces far beyond the capacity of these countries to maintain need to be supported in Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, since they are not even formally at peace with the Communist power they face. In our judgment, some increased air strength, replacement of obsolete equipment and a degree of weapons modernization are needed in the Far East area.

We believe that changes and modifications in certain of the military assistance programs can be justified in terms of more selectivity in allocating military assistance to fulfill essential objectives. In programming our mutual defense efforts, we and our allies have to give full consideration

to geographic location, to national characteristics, and to many other local, regional, and historical problems.

However, in making any changes, we are faced with the fact that existing treaties, commitments, and programs cannot be easily or quickly modified. Any abrupt or substantial changes by the United States could easily be misunderstood and could produce a whole new series of complicated negotiations and readjustments in our relations with friendly countries and allies.

The Pipeline—Unexpended Balances

In view of the time required to produce and deliver military hardware, the amount of funds appropriated for Fiscal Year (FY) 1960 will not greatly influence the amount of expenditures or deliveries until 1961 and later. We and our allies have the problem of proceeding with a progressive re-equipping of forces abroad that were equipped years ago with weapons that are now wearing out or are becoming obsolete. There is every indication that the initial and maintenance cost of modern weapons will be substantially higher in the future. A partial offset is the fact that several of our NATO partners are now able to pay most or all of the costs of their forces and weapons. Consequently, it should not be necessary to return to the delivery levels required for the first round of initial equipment of several years ago which reached a peak of \$4 billion in 1953. It seems clear to us, however, that expenditure levels estimated at \$1.85 billion for FY 1960, and the even lower levels in FY 1961 and FY 1962 which would result from the proposed appropriation of \$1.6 billion for FY 1960, are inadequate. They would not permit the United States to make the contribution necessary for the modernization of NATO forces now under way, and to help maintain effective forces in other parts of the world.

We believe not only that deliveries must be maintained at higher future levels than would be supported by the \$1.6 billion proposed appropriation, but that certain factors now operative may result in longer lead times and a consequent need for increased funding. A larger part of future deliveries for military assistance will come from new production and less from the existing inventories of our own forces. Also, a greater proportion will consist of advanced weapons requiring longer time to produce. In addition to these factors, the long decline in obligated but unexpended balances from over \$8 billion a few years ago to about \$2.5 billion at the end of this fiscal year, has brought these balances to about the minimum level for funding the needed procurement. We cannot any longer rely on large drawdowns from this pipeline to supplement current appropriations. In summary, deliveries in future years, on the average, will approximately equal the current flow of appropriations. We view with concern the projected sharp decline in the rate of deliveries below the \$2.4 billion average level of recent years.

Military Assistance Program for Fiscal Year 1960

Your letter calls for our general conclusions respecting the FY 1960 program. A review of the strategy and objectives of NATO and the requirements which have been outlined to us by the various commands in other areas of the world convinces us that it would be less than prudent if we did not maintain something more than the level of the FY 1959 and the FY 1960 programs. Our conclusion is reached on the basis of our trips, our studies, and the presentations which have been given us, as well as upon some consideration of what additional modern weapons should be funded in FY 1960.

We conclude from our area studies and from the pipeline analysis presented above, as well as from our many discussions in Washington, that an additional amount in the order of \$400 million, primarily for NATO, should be available for commitment in FY 1960 in addition to the program already proposed. Representatives of the Executive Branch have assured us that suitable weapons can be contracted for in that fiscal year to cover some of the shortfalls in force modernization which would otherwise occur. Even this increased level would not maintain the rate of deliveries in future years which we believe will be necessary.

The Committee must of course leave to the Executive Branch the determination of additional specific weapons and other assistance to be programmed. In view of the long lead time required for the type of weapons which would be so provided, the action we propose should not change significantly the estimated expenditures in FY 1960.

Economic Aid Program for Fiscal Year 1960

In accordance with your instructions, the Committee has considered the impact of our Military Assistance Program, where it appeared to be a significant factor, on the economic betterment and growth of the free world. It has also endeavored to assess the relative emphasis which should be given to military and economic programs, particularly in the less developed areas.

Economic assistance serves two main purposes: First, our own military defense requires effective forces in the hands of our friends and allies, which, in turn, depend in large measure on the stability of the underlying economic base of the individual countries. Secondly, our security requires that both our allies and the uncommitted countries have an opportunity to solve their pressing economic problems within the framework of the free world. Without such an opportunity, some of them would offer an easy target for Communism. They are not only being attracted by well contrived offers of assistance from the Communist bloc, but they are also impressed by the economic achievements of Russia and

Communist China, without always fully understanding the real cost in human misery.

We recognize that some of our military allies among the less developed countries are unable to support their part of the common military effort without economic defense support assistance. Members of the Committee have visited the major countries receiving such aid. We have been able to review the program in some detail and believe it to be programmed to an austere level which it would be dangerous to reduce. The same reasons which lead this Committee to recommend placing military assistance on a continuing basis apply with equal force to the closely related defense support.

Defense support serves effectively to "cushion" the economic burden of military forces supported by the United States, with the result that the normal economy of the country, and prospects for economic development are not adversely affected. As long as this balance is achieved, military assistance and additional funds for development assistance are, in effect, independent variables and should be considered on their respective merits, and not as competitors. Money should be appropriated for each to the extent that it is considered in the United States' interest in achieving free world security.

In some countries the Committee believes that under certain conditions there is a reasonable possibility that military expenditures by the United States or the country concerned could be reduced. Problems, of course, arise in obtaining acceptance by sovereign nations of our view. No important needs for increases in defense spending now exist among most of the less developed countries, although this could change with circumstances.

The fostering of economic growth throughout the free world presents a real challenge to the American people. Here is a positive goal which is consistent with our long term economic interests and at the same time provides an opportunity to further the free political development of other nations. This opportunity calls for a cooperative effort by the United States and other nations which can generate export capital. There is need for both public and private financing, and for multilateral and unilateral programs, with increasing emphasis on loans rather than grant aid.

The precarious situation throughout the less developed countries leads us to conclude that the total FY 1960 budget for economic assistance is the minimum required.

In its final report, the Committee expects to examine this question more fully; however, as an order of magnitude, we believe that loans for economic development under the Mutual Security Program will probably be needed at a rate of at least \$1 billion a year by FY 1961.

The Cost of the Mutual Security Program

We have considered the burden of financing these programs upon the economy of the United States. Its military and economic strength is a bulwark of the free world alliance. Our economy is carrying a heavy burden and the amounts involved in the Mutual Security Program are a part of that burden. These amounts are substantial but they represent a relatively small proportion of our resources. The total, including both military and economic aid in the Mutual Security Program, has accounted for less than five per cent of our total Federal Budget in recent years, and has represented less than one per cent of our annual gross national product. It would cost us far more to attempt to build an equivalent amount of defensive strength in the world with our own forces than it does through this program. Even apart from other considerations, loss of any important part of the free world to international Communism would have repercussions on our own economy and defense expenditures greater than the cost of the Mutual Security Program. We believe the program essential to our own security and that of the free world and are convinced that we can afford what is necessary. What we cannot afford are the costs and risks involved in abandoning or emasculating the Mutual Security Program.

Criticisms

During its field trips and deliberations the Committee took note of the many criticisms by the public, the Congress and within the Executive Branch. These were of varying degrees of validity and credibility. We found evidence of long delays from the initiation of proposals to the development of a firm program, and of an excessive number of reviews and over-coordination during the programming process. Further, there has been evidence presented of faulty or uneconomic programming, and of various other shortcomings. In Washington, policy coordination has not always been promptly or effectively accomplished. A firm and persistent effort to improve the overall management of the program is called for. The Committee believes that its recommendation to place the program on a continuing basis, if accepted, will provide the opportunity to overcome many of these problems and to alleviate some of these criticisms. It expects to consider and deal with them further in its final report.

The Committee states, however, that while mistakes have been made in the conduct of the program, a fair review must take into account the many difficulties inherent in such a complex and widely spread operation. It must also recognize that the errors have been largely in matters of detail. Most projects in the program have been well planned and successfully executed. The Committee concludes that the Mutual Security Program is and will continue to be an effective and essential tool in carrying out our national security interests and in promoting free world

defense. To abandon the program, for errors in execution or for any other reasons, would be to abandon the free world and to lose the cold war.

Summary

1. The Communist military threat is greater than ever.
2. The Communist economic and political threat and capabilities are expanding.
3. The average level of expenditure needed for military assistance over the next few years is, in the judgment of the Committee, not likely to be less, as an order of magnitude, than that required in the recent past. To reduce the program by approximately one-third from the present rate of deliveries, which would, in a year or two, be the result of continuing the current fiscal year's \$1.5 billion military assistance appropriation or the \$1.6 billion present request for Fiscal Year 1960, would amount to a fundamental change in United States national policy. It would imply a strategic retreat.
4. The amount of military assistance required for Fiscal Year 1960 has been considered in some detail by the Committee. Its sub-groups visited many countries, including most of those receiving major amounts of military assistance. The Committee recommends that approximately \$400 million be made available for new commitments, primarily for the NATO area, in addition to the \$1.6 billion present request. This should not change significantly the estimated expenditures in Fiscal Year 1960.
5. The proposed economic assistance program for Fiscal Year 1960 is the minimum needed. Material reductions in the total might well restrict the United States to a disproportionately military approach, and thus make the Communist economic offensive more effective. In fact, a level of lending for economic development under the Mutual Security Program at a rate of at least \$1 billion a year will probably be needed by Fiscal Year 1961.
6. Certain features of the applicable legislation and procedures have tended to impede efficient administration of the mutual security and related programs. These should be reconsidered and improved in the interest of bringing these programs to maximum effectiveness.
7. The Mutual Security Program is now and will remain an essential tool of foreign policy. Accordingly, the Committee proposes that the Congress and the Executive Branch take the necessary legislative and

administrative steps to put the Mutual Security Program on a continuing basis. Specific recommendations will be made in our final report.

Respectfully submitted,

DILLON ANDERSON

JOSEPH M. DODGE

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

MARK LEVA

JOHN J. McCLOY

GEORGE MCGHEE

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY

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